

VOL. I

JULY, 1927

PART IV

ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

A Quarterly Devoted to the
Theory and Treatment of the Neuroses and Psychoses

DIRECTED BY
L. PIERCE CLARK

WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF
T. E. UNIKER EUNICE B. ARMSTRONG
AGNES G. BRILL JEAN FROIS-WITTMAN ETHEL L. ROURKE
K. CUSHING



PUBLISHED BY
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE
STAMFORD, CONN.

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THE SISTINE MADONNA (*Raphael*)

In this sublime painting, showing the complete undisturbed identification of Mother and Child, Raphael has produced a work which has been universally regarded as the most beautiful and satisfying treatment of the subject to be found in Christian art.

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THE ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS is issued quarterly. Its purpose is to make intensive and detailed studies of analyzed cases, primarily of the narcissistic neuroses and psychoses, such as epilepsy, melancholia, and schizophrenic reactions. Most of the journals devoted to the field of psychoanalysis have found it impossible to present the complete clinical data of single cases due to the complex nature of the subject matter and its necessarily lengthy detailment. In consequence there exists no publication to which one may turn for clinical guidance in research and therapeutic work.

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THE ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

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ANNOUNCEMENT

The Editor desires to announce that the ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS will be discontinued from date of its present issue, which completes one year of its existence as a special journal devoted purely to the field of psychoanalysis.

It has been found that too much time and effort have been entailed upon the staff of collaborators at the Psychoanalytic Institute to warrant the undertaking of a second volume under the present regime.

Case studies similar to those published herein will be put out in monographic form from time to time by the Institute.

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ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

VOLUME I

JULY, 1927

PART IV

STUDIES OF SOME ASPECTS OF THE ART OF THE RENAISSANCE

BY

L. PIERCE CLARK

I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MADONNA-CHILD RELATIONSHIP REPRESENTED IN CLASSIC ART

Introduction

In that early Atlantis of life, the subjective phase of infancy, we have found through analytical investigation that it is possible to gain access to the earliest years of existence. Beginning, as we have every reason to believe, in uterine life, and undoubtedly soon after birth, the early memories of experiences and feelings have been shrouded in mystery and uncertainty, for few people can force into a vague memory-picture more than a meager portion of this early drama of childhood. At best, doubtful data for the latter phase of this period may be gained by inference. Now that the maximum effort of psychoanalysis is placed on the relief of the so-called infantile neurosis, these first years of life become of paramount importance. Indeed, the absence of early fixations and vagaries in emotional development makes for sound mental health in adult life. Here, however, as elsewhere, one finds no specific criterion or norm by which one may gauge just how much tarrying may be healthfully permissible and not spell shipwreck in later phases of development. Nor is there any probability that one will ever be able to evaluate with any degree of accuracy these balancing emotions of infancy. Their proper determination must be left to the delicacy of the life-scale that balances the various impulses of the unconscious at the behest of the growing perceptive-ego and its super-egoistic checks.

Child analysis by such workers as Melanie Klein, Anna Freud and Bernfeld are steadily pouring light upon infantile neuroses and their bearing upon adjacent and less evanescent aspects of childhood.

Data from adult and child analysis and a reconstruction of phantasied material singularly supplement each other and bid fair to enable us to formulate more fully,—tentatively at least,—the main outline of this emotional existence which holds such great portent for the future health of all individuals. It is not too venturesome to state that just as we have infantile neuroses in children and adults, so we have patterns of so-called normalcy of conduct and behavior that may be susceptible to more exact understanding as the turbulent and tempestuous sea of neurotic life leads into the calmer harbors of so-called normal existence. Gradually freed from undue stress and accent of life's emotional distortions we shall be able to map out some of the landmarks of the upland country of genius and still more remotely view the main boundaries of the gentle plains of our daily lives.

It has been hazarded that the genius possesses only a little less distorted pattern of behavior than the neurotic, and although he is still attached to the adaptive principles of reality, one sees outcroppings of neurotic symptoms which indeed at times threaten destruction to the very light of his creative work. In fact any signal blocking in sublimation in these individuals has given rise to a "superman neurosis," examples of which we encounter daily. The biographies of genius are replete with instances of these colossal vagaries.

It is not our purpose to detail the blemishes of neurotic disturbances in the genius but rather to see if we may not find some fundamental trend in the early formation of emotional relationships which will throw some light upon the masterpieces of these men. It is a singular fact, although not often commented upon, that all the creative art which lives for all time has been produced by men. No more exquisite instance could be cited of the feminine protest in men than this as a counterpart to the masculine protest in women. In everyday walks of life we have a similar division of sublimation in the woman's satisfactions derived from homemaking and child bearing, and the man's creative upbuilding of business and trade.

In order to sketch a proper background for the occurrence of the genius type and the particular products of their activities in the subject of our thesis, we shall undertake first to give a tentative outline of the developmental data of the infant. Even when we have done this and posited the particular defects with which our geniuses seem to have been afflicted, we shall not be able to know how their beautiful creations actually came into being. Indeed, a comprehensive explanation of this intricately fashioned form of beauty still lies deeply hidden in the very foundations of the unconscious, and how they are embedded in the preformed and inherited patterns of

the so-called "collective unconscious" one may not even profitably speculate at this time. We may, however, know more and more *how* it comes about and perhaps in time we may know *why*. Our present knowledge of the early origin of some aspects of the mind may be summarized from Ferenczi's excellent thesis upon the development of the sense of reality. We may call this schema the background or framework upon which tarryings here and there, or even a too rapid disposal of the various phases of infantile existence, furnish points for the more expanded thesis of our present study.

Before birth the child lives a parasitic life. A sense of an "outer world" is but vaguely felt by the infant as it can have only an unconscious awareness of its position and surroundings. If one defines omnipotence in a negative sense, at least that one has all one wants, then the child in utero may be said to be omnipotent. It may be doubted, however, whether this wish-free state is actually as free from desire as we would picture it. In fact there is just as good evidence that in its own limited and shadowy way the child within the mother has as definite a reactive life as at the moment of birth. It is axiomatic that all life possesses this inherent power, though as yet we do not possess sufficiently sensitive instruments to delicately gauge this living process and the beginnings of mind. This already experienced viability of the child within the mother takes on a directive control and shaping influence of the psychic life at and after birth. All activities of the child bespeak of this continuity of the life process.

The behavior of the infant at birth shows that the environment does not conform in all respects to its needs. We infer by its actions that it is most tranquilly content with situations that as nearly as possible reproduce the life before birth. The infant is placed close to the body of the mother and wrapped in soft warm coverings with an idea of imparting to it the illusion of the mother's protection comparable to the life within the mother's body. All the attention and care given the infant further this illusory sense, such as rocking, crooning and monotonous rhythmic stimuli comparable to those it experienced before birth.

If we now attempt a subjective identification with the infant at this period, we find that it makes very amateurish and poorly adapted motions to satisfy the riddance of the flood of disturbing stimuli experienced at birth. It is, as it were, the use of types of movements once sufficient in a limited sphere of existence, but now no longer adequate. Possibly, as has been postulated, the unrequited wish is father to the thought, and the infant imagines (hallucinates)

that he has recaptured the state before birth. This imaginary repossession of the foetal situation is what Ferenczi has called the period of *magical hallucinatory omnipotence*. That the intuitive response of all mothers is in the right direction is shown in that the child falls into peaceful sleep so soon as the necessary nursing measures are carried out.

We have a right to suppose that the first sleep is nothing more than psychic reproduction of the life within the womb which as far as possible protects the foetus from external stimuli. It seems plausible that sleep throughout life is a reduplication of this regressive tendency.

Learning through experience that it is not sufficient to get what it desires by simple hallucinosis, the infant makes inadequate motor exertions or signals so that the situation may be changed. It thus forges new links in the use of ideational identity to that of perceptual identity (Freud). That which seemed largely meaningless crying and struggling on the occasion of disagreeable affects, is now made use of by the infant as signals for its wants to be satisfied. Just as the infant's wants grow in complexity, so the magic signals keep pace in differentiation as gesture language; and by means of magic gestures it may still feel in a measure that it is omnipotent. Soon, however, certain perfidious things in the outer world are found not to obey these magic signals as well as the ego or inner world of feelings and the objectivated sensations. The infant learns in time to be content with having only a part of the world, the ego, at its disposal. The outer world often opposes its wishes and yet it continually strives to conquer this outer world with ego qualities and seeks to find itself and all its animistic attributes in this outer world. At first the child is largely if not solely concerned with his own body and later chiefly with the satisfaction of his instincts. Thus arise those intimate connections which remain throughout life between the body and the objective world which we call symbolic. On the one hand, in this stage the infant tries to fashion the external world into things already experienced in his own body; on the other, he learns to represent by means of his body the multifariousness of the outer world. This capacity for symbolic representation is an important completion of the gesture-language; it enables the child not only to signalize such wishes as immediately concern his body, but also to express desires that relate to the changing of the outer world, now recognized as such. If the child is surrounded by loving care, he need not even in this stage of his existence give up the illusion of his omnipotence. He

still needs simply to represent an object symbolically and the thing, believed to be alive, often really "comes" to him; for the animistically thinking child must have this impression when he finds his wishes gratified.

One of the physical means that the child makes use of for representing his wishes attains special significance, and ranges beyond all other means of representation, namely, speech. Speech is originally imitation, that is to say, vocal representation of sounds and noises that are produced by things or which can be produced by their help; the capacity to use the speech organs allows the reproduction of a much greater multiplicity of objects and processes of the outer world than was possible with the help of gesture-language, and in a much more simple manner. Speech symbolism thus becomes the substitute for gesture symbolism. There is no longer a necessity for the cumbersome figurative imagination and the still more cumbersome dramatic representation; the imagination and representation of the series of sounds that we call words allow a far more specialized and economic conception and expression of the wishes. At the same time conscious thinking makes speech symbolism possible by becoming associated to thought processes that are in themselves unconscious, and lend them perceptual qualities.

Now conscious thought by means of speech signs is the highest accomplishment of the psychic apparatus, and alone makes adjustment to reality possible by retarding the reflex motor discharge and the release from unpleasant situations. In spite of this the child knows how to preserve his feeling of omnipotence even in this stage of his development, for his wishes that can be set forth in thoughts are still so few and comparatively uncomplicated that the attentive entourage concerned with the child's welfare easily manages to guess most of these thoughts. The mimic expressions that continually accompany thinking (peculiarly so with children) make this kind of thought-reading especially easy for the adults, and when the child actually formulates his wishes in words the environment, ever ready to help, hastens to fulfil them. The child then believes that he himself possesses magic capacities, and is thus in the *period of magic thoughts and magic words*.

In general the development of the reality-sense is represented by a succession of repressions, to which mankind was compelled, not through spontaneous "striving towards development" but through necessity, to adjust to a demanded renunciation. The first great repression is made necessary by the process of birth, which occurs without active coöperation and without "intention" on the part

of the child. The foetus would much rather remain undisturbed, but it is forced out into the world, and it has to forget (repress) the kinds of satisfactions to which it had become accustomed and adjust itself to new situations. The same cruel game is repeated with every new stage of development.*

The foregoing, in brief, is the gradual unfoldment of the sense of reality. What may we say of the development of the ego, that portion of the child's mind which lies so deeply buried and is so helpless at birth that it strives to recapture peace, security and attachment to the mother? At first it makes no differentiation between itself and the mother, for the organic mother (the breast) seems to be a part of itself. Some unseen (perfidious) force takes the breast away from the child while it still wishes to be nursed; gradually the weaning process takes place and the feeling of separateness from the mother comes about. This state of identification in some of its varied symbolic aspects often exists throughout life. In the case of the male child, with whom we are mainly concerned in our thesis, this identification or dependence is slowly repressed by aid of identifications with the father or masculine attributes; thus the boy becomes manly and takes on attitudes that not only repress the identification of feminine ways of feeling but enable him to return to the mother as her protector, guardian or little lover (Oedipus situation). The latter once thoroughly developed, in its displacement or repression of the mother identification, makes it possible for the boy to take on adult love which always possesses some attribute (obvious or repressed) of the mother imago. An emotional arrest or fixation upon this developmental process fashions all sorts of so-called normal and abnormal patterns of personality and character.

In a psychophysiologic sense we know that the boy's penis becomes the remnant or symbolic representation of the mother's nipple. Nor is the penis the only symbol. All protuberances of the body possess some attributes of feeling, the maximum of which is finally deposited in and about the genitals. The wise nurse knows that so soon as finger and toe sucking is abolished in the weaned child that he must be taught also not to touch the penis. If the boy has been too closely identified with the mother his whole genital organization becomes fixated on the mother as the love object; his later sexual life then becomes autoerotic and narcissistic, and his love object will be his own person. Later in life he may accept an ego-ideal

* S. Ferenczi, "Sex in Psychoanalysis," Badger, 1916.

substitute for this repressed love object or he may himself pass from a repressed to a frank homosexual either with repressed sexual gratification or overt practices as occasion may arise. If his nervous constitution is not strong he is burdened with a sense of guilt and a neurosis; and if the sexual life is repressed and a neurotic weakness of temperament obtains, he has a neurosis of a compulsive or substitutive character if he is not actually overt in his sexual experiences. Thus a neurosis is more or less inevitable although its force may be very much mitigated in character and purpose as the substitutive outlets in sublimated activities are permitted. In the case of genius, one will note how these men even though they were highly productive, had so much of their peculiarly repressed constitution not expended in their work that they manifested various neurotic disorders as a surplus of sexual libido not transmuted in their art.

Freud states that art brings about a reconciliation between the pleasure-principle and the reality-principle in a peculiar way: The artist is originally a man who turns from reality because he cannot come to terms with the demand for the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction as it is first made, and who then in phantasy-life allows full play to his erotic and ambitious wishes. But he finds a way of return from this world of phantasy back to reality; with his special gifts he moulds his phantasies into a new kind of reality, and men concede them a justification as valuable reflections of actual life. Thus by a certain path he actually becomes the hero, king, creator, favorite he desired to be, without pursuing the circuitous path of creating real alterations in the outer world. But this he can only attain because other men feel the same dissatisfaction as he with the renunciation demanded by reality, and because this dissatisfaction, resulting from the displacement of the pleasure-principle by the reality-principle, is itself a part of reality.

If the individual child is to have a high degree of creativeness not only must he possess a due amount sensitivity or demand for identification and a power and desire to absorb the identified attributes, but he must still further be able to fashion his own projected imagination and even more endlessly reidentify himself with these projected self attributes and thus enlarge and amplify the creative art which he originally imagined (hallucinated). Unfortunately, most individuals are able to make but one vivid identification, hence their creativeness is confined to their one single identification with the mother. As a natural corollary one may expect that the creative artist or multiform genius may possess a loosely knit or

poorly organized character in the commonly accepted sense, for he early disestablishes his various identifications (real and self projected) and fashions them into artistic creations. The creative genius is thus one who maintains a proper integrative balance in absorbing these identifications clothed or invested by a transition through his very own ego, and yet such reprojected identifications shall not bear too heavy an imprint of either the primary identification or that of his own personality. Success in these two directions may allow such an artist a certain universality of appeal. The first fault may mar the really great creativeness in the art itself and the second will cause the production to lose its universality through undue accent on the artist's own intensive personality, as in the case of Michelangelo. We shall see later why it was said that too slavishly following Michelangelo's art as a model would be harmful to the student of art.

Before we outline more precisely the psychoanalytic *raison d'être* of the master artists' work and the manner of how it comes about we wish to reiterate that the complete fixation of the maternal identification, its repression or satisfactory sublimation is never all one or the other and the very variation of these different states in completeness gives us a varying picture in our clinical types of artists. It ranges all the way from artistic representations of pure subjective identifications, as in Leonardo, Michelangelo and Raphael, to that of objective separation as in Titian, Correggio and del Sarto, or to that of a bisexual representation that embraces both the subjective identification and mutual adoration, as in Donatello and Botticelli. In other words, certain portions of the fixations and libidinal correlates to the ego cathexis tendency range all the way from the homosexual (subjective identification) to the mutual adoration or objective libidinal cathexis.

We may now essay to more precisely discuss the hypotheses that underlie our present understanding. The libidinal pathway in the formation of these master artists is by way of the maternal identification and symbol formation drawn from the affective feelings of different substitutes of the mother's breast as well as the direct symbol remnant in the phallus and also fixation upon this organ. In the primary maternal identification the fixation does not remain upon the mother's breast but is displaced by the ego tendencies upon far reaching identification objects of the world about the artist. Not alone is there an ego libidinal cathexis upon these outer world objects but it may carry also, as Sperber has suggested, much of the love impulses. He has pointed to an important part which love



THE VIRGIN IN THE LAP OF ST. ANNE (*Louvre*)
(*Leonardo da Vinci*)

Here we have the subjective phase of the Madonna and Child subject, in which St. Anne is sharing the same emotional rapport.

motives play in the evolution of speech; that first spoken sounds were the alluring calls of mate to mate and also that it was not far to displace these calls to the accompaniment of different forms of occupations and work. The latter then become the source of sexual pleasure and also it may be, as Jones has said, that sublimatory work is this ontogenetic repetition of the whole process of its past building up.

As we have said, the child through the maternal identification seeks to rediscover its bodily organs in every activity (animism) and indeed in every object which it encounters. It probably sees in the upper part of its body an equivalent for each affectively important detail of the lower part. Freud has shown that the early orientation to the subject's own body is accompanied also by the discovery of fresh sources of pleasure. This comparison must subsequently be followed by the identifications with other objects that though quite different have a similar pleasurable tone or interest. Possibly this capacity for identification and displacement of libido upon objects outside oneself is bridged from the narcissistic bodily self concern (primary narcissism) through the mother's nipple to all sorts of external objects and their activities in the outer world. Another factor is the master artist's ability to hold greater quantities of libido in a state of suspension than many others. There is also an ease with which the libido tension flows into an ego activity or tendency. Both of these attributes must be constitutional if not hereditary. The extent to which the ego tendency can transform the identification upon outer world objects the greater will be the individual's capacity to maintain a variety and intensity of interests. For instance, Leonardo not only possessed an identification established between nipple-penis and vulture's tail* but in the case of

* We refer here to an early recollection of Leonardo da Vinci cited by Freud as follows: "It comes to my mind as a very early memory, when I was still in the cradle, a vulture came down to me; he opened my mouth with his tail and struck me a few times with his tail against my lips." That a person could retain a memory of the nursing period is not impossible, but Freud believes this to be in reality a phantasy which he formed later and transferred into his childhood. Freud's theory is that Leonardo became homosexual through a very intense infantile fixation on the mother, and this in turn was brought about by the passionate and sensuous devotion that a woman, deserted by her lover, would naturally lavish upon a son. In my study of Leonardo I have suggested further that the famous Leonardesque smile which this artist has depicted in a number of his paintings, is a subconscious reproduction of the look of complete autoerotic satisfaction which a woman experiences when nursing her child. It is fairly well known that the main factor in the fixation of the child upon a homosexual trend in development is during the nursing period; being too specific a fixation upon the mother's breast in

the latter he was able easily to resolve this fixation by an interest in the motions of this object, in the bird itself and its flight and the space in which it flew. While the pleasurable situation actually experienced or phantasied remained indeed unconscious and fixated, its libido ego tendency could be discharged in these several types of interest. When such pleasurable situations buried or bound in the unconscious can have this libidinal cathexis the original fixations lose their sexual character and continually serve as the driving force for talent or genius activity; they allow phantasy to unfold itself without check. If these individuals should be fixated on the pleasure situation and the phantasy be bound to itself tenaciously sublimation or even transference of the libido to ego tendencies would not be possible, hence no cathexis would occur, but the phantasy born of identification would then have to be repressed and remain bound in the unconscious. Various hysterical symptoms then might be possible if other etiologic factors were brought forward. It is also noteworthy in passing to say that in the case of Leonardo the scientific interest in the flight of birds showed that even in sublimation the fixation to the fancy continued to operate. Freud has shown that hysteria is nothing but a pantomimic representation of phantasies translated into terms of motion and projected on to motility and an analogous assertion may be made of these phantasies and fixations which as in the master artist are represented by motor imitations whether in relation to the subject's own body or some other medium. The hysterical attack uses for its material a peculiar condensation or archaic distortion of phantasies so the development either of an interest in art or a creative talent would in part depend upon the wealth and intensity of fixation and phantasies represented in the sublimation. Although we know little in regard to how the genius holds libido suspended in such great amounts or how he so easily and accurately employs by way of the ego cathexis the libidinal urge from the id to art creativeness or, again, how and when the

the act of nursing. It is also of common knowledge that many mothers during the process of nursing gain a sensuous satisfaction, comparable to sexual experiences or perhaps better, to a more secretive act in autoeroticism. The child, glancing up into the mother's face, is able to gain an impression of the mother's emotional state from her facial expression. It is therefore supposed that in many instances, in addition to the fixation upon the mother's breast as a means for the pleasure component of the sex constitution, that the mother enjoys a sensuous and secretive pleasure, which is portrayed in her face, and which the infant unconsciously identifies with the mother imago, and fashions his conception of the mother from this experience. It is therefore contended that this concept held in Leonardo's case, which, in conjunction with the pleasure component which he experienced while nursing, made enduring an image of secretive erotic satisfaction.



MADONNA AND CHILD (*Della Robbia*)

This is an excellent example of the physical and spiritual oneness of Mother and Child.

necessary factors concerned are present in such abundance as to give rise to unique groupings of similarities of libidinal fixation units, we do know that these units of fixation should not be too early repressed nor should they endure to such an extent that the art sublimations should engross all the libidinal love (objective as well as narcissistic love). It may be that art creativeness is really the outcome of an incomplete or unsuccessful sublimation. Thus the fixation which might lead to symptom formation (neurosis) is on the way to full sublimation but cut off or repressed too suddenly or completely leads to art creativeness. The earlier this process takes place the more will the art creativeness retain the actual sexual character or significance and the more will it sexualize the tendency on which the libidinal cathexis is bestowed instead of becoming merged in that tendency. Then, too, the whole artistic capacity will be unstable as we know it really is in all great artists and that it is always in danger of breaking into a neurosis by being remerged or repressed into the sexual object of the phantasy formation, or become too successfully sublimated, art being the loser but the artist being more objective and saner as is commonly held. The tendency in either direction is the real fear of the artist. It is not difficult to see the peril and that such an artist as Leonardo maintained his balance of completing his creativeness so poorly and that at the end he lost the power of subjective identifications with the completion process entirely.

We may summarize the peculiar variations in the sexual life of a few artists whose psychosexual lives will be sketched to illustrate our thesis. We shall then proceed to take up in detail some of these artists and study the bearing which such departures in the sexual life had upon the style of art which they produced in the special field of the Madonna and Child.

The subject of the Madonna and Child, through its combined human and religious appeal, has had a greater vogue than any other in occidental art, especially in that of the Italian Renaissance. The specific nature of the subject, the physical and spiritual relation between the mother and the young child, and the extraordinary frequency with which it has been treated, offer a particularly fertile field for psychoanalytic investigation. It is necessarily removed from being a literal study of some particular mother and child by its religious nature and so leaves the artist singularly free to express his own unconscious attitude towards it. Probably no sculptor or painter has consciously examined his own earliest relation with his mother before determining his particular treatment of the theme,

but he has, nevertheless, without realizing it, followed instincts and experiences more profound than he was aware of in determining the type of relation between the "Mother and Child" of his own creation.

A study of a very large number of examples of the Madonna and Child subject seems to throw interesting and important light not only on the individual psychology of the various artists concerned but also on the extremely important matter of the formation of the character of the child as determined by the physical and spiritual relation between him and his mother during his very early life. The material to be used in this study has been drawn from the works of masters of sculpture and painting of the Italian Renaissance, for not only has this subject been employed more constantly in this period of art than any other but it has also been treated with the greatest skill. Many examples from other schools and phases of art could likewise be included, together with not a few representations in modern art of the purely human mother and child, either somewhat idealized or in simple portrait form.

From the point of view of the psychology involved, these works of art as a whole tend to divide into three fairly distinguishable classes: the subjective-identification, the objective separation, and the mutual adoration. There are various minor subdivisions and modifications, but for our thesis it will be advisable to make these different types quite clear at the outset and present a simple and unmistakable example of each.

An admirable instance of the subjective-identification may be found in a Madonna and Child by Luca Della Robbia in the Metropolitan Museum of Art. It is of the familiar, white glazed, della Robbia terra cotta and shows the half length figure of Mary holding the Christ Child in her left arm while with her right hand she lightly clasps his lower limbs. She seems not to be specifically aware of the child, does not address him or caress him; he in turn does not appear to be conscious of her as a person apart from himself. Both turn slightly to the right and the glance of both follows the same direction. Both faces show the same quiet, serious but gentle expression as if a single mood, a common attitude towards the worshipper, animated both. It seems not to occur to either to regard the other as a separate being, for Luca has here very clearly and beautifully shown that interesting period in the child's life before he has learned his own separateness from the mother or has begun to think of her in objective terms. Their identity is still so close that he does not regard her as someone to whom he might turn for a response to his own feelings or whom he might love as an object distinguishable



MADONNA OF THE HARPIES (*Del Sarto*)

The Virgin is shown proudly aloof; the infant shares neither his mother's physical qualities nor her emotional mood.

from his own body. Though Mary, as a mature person, must recognize her physical separateness, she still thinks of her infant son as a part of herself; the perfect harmony of her spiritual identification with him has not yet been broken and their two bodies still act and react in accordance with their spiritual oneness.

A fair example of the second or objective-separation type is seen in Andrea del Sarto's *Madonna of the Harpies* in the Pitti Gallery in Florence, which is one of the artist's most beautiful and most beautiful and most admired works. The Virgin, an idealized portrait of Andrea's own wife, stands on a pedestal flanked by the Saints John and Francis, holding the Child with one hand and supporting a book against her thigh with the other. She carries herself with an air of rather proud aloofness or indifference, looking neither at the child nor at the spectator. The infant Christ shares neither his mother's physical qualities nor her emotional mood. With shyly smiling face he peeps at the worshipper over his shoulder, clinging to his mother more for support than in affection. The whole conception is simple, natural and normal, though it might be more agreeable if the mother were less indifferent towards her lovely blond child, less triumphant in her own beauty.

The third type, the mutual adoration, is perhaps only an important subdivision of the second. It is exquisitely illustrated by Botticelli's *Madonna and Child with the young Saint John*, in the Dresden Gallery. So completely are mother and child lost in the intensity of mutual love that the third figure seems an unwarranted intrusion. The Christ Child stands on his mother's lap and she holds him tenderly and reverently with both hands. He turns his face yearningly towards hers and embraces her. Mary bends her head until her cheek touches his. She closes her eyes to shut out all other impressions, her soul suffused with intense love for her child and with ineffable joy in his reciprocation. Each unmistakably recognizes the other as the beloved object, quite separate and distinguishable.

These three examples are clear and well contrasted, but besides these there are numberless others ranging through every variation, complete identification to absolute separation, and including combinations of both. Returning to the first type, among striking instances might be cited Agostino di Duccio's bas relief of the *Madonna and Child with Angels*, in the Louvre, or Mino da Fiesole's marble tondo of the same subject in the Bargello in Florence, in both of which complete identification is expressed with distinct charm. Another beautiful example is Basaiti's painting of the *Madona and Child* with two small angels singing and playing. Here the mother and her

babe are wrapped in the same lyrical and subjective mood listening to the angelic music and give us a sense of physical identity and spiritual unity. A sympathetic instance in modern art is seen in a *Virgin and Child* by Gabriel Max. George deForest Brush, in a celebrated portrait of his wife and child in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, has given us the same feeling in a cognate realm of subject matter, treating actual persons with religious reverence.

The Subjective Identification

Among the great Italian masters, let us consider first those who have shown a marked preference for the subjective-identification type. This is especially true of Michelangelo. This artist, whose homosexual temperament is well attested, shows a strong tendency towards identification in all of his not very numerous treatments of the Madonna theme. In a marble relief in the Bargello and in another in the Royal Academy, both Mary and the Child act in harmony and share the same mood. In the *Madonna della Scala* in the Casa Buonarroti the mother is quietly nursing her child but is neither looking at him nor fondling him. A vague sense of ominous foreboding seems to hang over both and renders each restless and uneasy. The same nameless, subjective feeling of impending sorrow is the main motive of the large group of the *Virgin and Child* in the New Sacristy of San Lorenzo, and here again mother and infant share it alike. In the *Madonna of Bruges*, though here the Christ child is a boy of some three or four years, he gives the sense of being one with his mother. Michelangelo has carefully placed him standing well back between his mother's knees and her drapery is arranged so as to encompass him, and both reflect a serious, contemplative mood, highly characteristic of the somber sculptor.

With the single remarkable exception of Vittoria Colonna, no woman seems to have influenced the emotional life of Michelangelo. All through his very long career he gives no indication that he ever felt the seductive appeal of the feminine form or character. Though he was perfect master of both masculine and feminine anatomy, his female types are huge brawny women, rugged of build and fit to be the mothers of giants. They have the essential female physical attributes but otherwise they seem masculine. His male types on the other hand, never show any feminine qualities but are overwhelmingly powerful and masculine. In regard to his beautiful friendship with Vittoria Colonna, it is too often forgotten by those who would make his attachment to her a romance of the ordinary sort, that the noble Roman lady was past fifty before Michelangelo



MADONNA WITH CHILD AND ST. JOHN (*Botticelli*)
The Mother and Child are lost in the intensity of mutual love.

met her and the artist himself was entering on old age. He found in her fine and deeply religious temperament a personality capable of understanding and sympathizing with his own. If ever there has been a true instance of Platonic friendship between man and woman, it is here to be found. The sonnets addressed to young men are not only among his best literary products, but reveal very clearly that high, intense and spiritualized form of passionate friendship of which Michelangelo's homosexual temperament was so singularly capable.*

The Madonna subject has been so frequently and favorably associated with Raphael that he seems almost to have made it his own. From his earliest youth to his latest period in Rome, this gentle, sensitive, almost effeminate painter constantly treated the theme of the infant Christ and his pure Mother. His heart seems always to have been touched by it, for he was able to give this already well-worn subject an endless variety of new and beautiful forms. With all the change of physical type, of composition, color scheme and setting that his Madonna pictures undergo as his art evolved, his psychological attitude towards the relation of mother and child remains essentially the same. It is practically always the subjective-identification type that is to be found in these works, though he occasionally leans towards the mutual adoration, as in the *Madonna della Casa Tempi*. The *Madonna del Gran Duca* and the *Madonna della Seggiola*, two of his finest and best loved pictures, show distinct physical and emotional identity, and, although in the *Madonna del Pesce* the motive of Tobit's presentation of the fish makes it less apparent, the type is really the same and both mother and child act in concert. In the *Madonna di Foligno* there is a wonderful sense of unbroken unity.

In the *Madonna di San Sisto*, Raphael reached the last and highest point in the long series of his Madonna pictures and produced a work that has ever since been regarded by the world at large as the most beautiful and satisfying treatment of the subject to be found in Christian art. In this sublime painting Raphael has not only given us the harmonious blending of classic beauty of form with Christian purity of character that the art of the Renaissance can show, but has surpassed all his previous success in the portrayal of the complete, undisturbed identification of mother and child. Although four other figures enter into the composition the two principal ones give no indication of heeding their presence, but are

* A study of Michelangelo's psychosexual life is given in detail in the last section.

shown as in a vision, detached from time, locality and action, as an eternal and universal idea manifested through perfect human form. Mary stands sweet and serene, holding but not fondling her Child who rests quietly against her breast and shoulder. Raphael has employed the full technical resources of his maturest art to make us feel the absolute oneness of these two figures. Every line, every mass of light and shade contribute to the unity. The purely physical resemblance between them is striking, but most wonderful of all is the feeling of their complete spiritual identification. The most exquisite mood of heavenly sweetness and light suffuses both. Neither seems aware of the other as a thing apart or objectively realized. Raphael has refused to allow the entrance even of any hint of that cruel separation which was destined to come into the lives of these twain and finally place the Son upon the cross before the eyes of the agonized Mother. May it not be that the extraordinary hold which this sublime picture has upon the heart of the world is in no small measure due to the effectiveness with which the artist has embodied in it the idea of unimpaired, uninterrupted union both of body and soul between mother and child?

Although emotional interest in women was by no means lacking in the life of Raphael, it seems always to have been of a refined, delicate and spiritual sort, as in the case of *La Fornarina* whose sweet and pure features look down on us from many of the most spiritual altar pieces of Raphael. The *Sistine Madonna* is clearly an idealized portrait of her. Raphael's temperament, in spite of his heterosexual love interests, was distinctly homosexual in many important respects. It is well known that when a cast of his skull, made some years ago when his tomb in the Pantheon was opened, was shown to a noted anthropologist, he mistook it for the skull of a woman. Something predominantly sweet, gentle, sensitive, assimilative, runs all through his character and gives it a markedly feminine tinge. His very person was delicate, fine and beautiful and in the manner in which he managed to avoid clash and rivalry, in a most tumultuous and competitive age and to harmonize a large body of artists of varied temperaments and training into a harmonious and coöperative school, he revealed a very feminine quality of charm and power to elicit sympathy. His extraordinary sensitiveness to all that was finest and most characteristic in the work of his fellow artists and the constant assimilative tendency which he showed are further proofs of receptive and responsive qualities more feminine than masculine. The fact that he was espoused at the time of his death to the niece of Cardinal Bibbiena is but proof of his desire to please a powerful



THE MADONNA OF BRUGES (*Michelangelo*)

A very beautiful subjective touch is given in this group. The Christ Child is not in his traditional place on his mother's lap, but is a partly grown boy standing between her knees.

patron. He found sufficient pretexts for postponing marriage until it was too late. It is worthy of remark, in this regard, that all three of the greatest artists of the Renaissance outside the Venetians, Raphael, Leonardo and Michelangelo, died unwed.

We have already cited an instance of the *Madonna and Child* of Luca della Robbia. His family name is one of the most familiar in Italian art, having been borne by a succession of artists of the same family through a period of nearly two centuries. Luca della Robbia was not only the first of the long line but also the greatest. Though he lacked the vivid temperament and astonishing skill of his chief contemporaries in Florentine sculpture, Ghiberti and Donatello, yet he ranks as a third with these two as a characteristic and dominant figure.

Luca was born in Florence in 1400 and early trained as a goldsmith. He showed unusual qualities of earnestness and industry, and under the inspiration of Ghiberti's work presently developed as a sculptor. He worked first in marble, then in bronze but finally turned to glazed and colored terra cotta, a facile and charming medium which he found exactly suited to his style and temperament and which he brought to a pitch of great technical excellence. The secret processes by which he produced such beautiful and lasting effects in this medium he imparted to his nephew Andrea who in turn taught them to his successors in the della Robbia family and they are supposed to have been lost with the final extinction of the line in the sixteenth century.

Luca's career was comparatively placid and little of a personal and intimate nature has been recorded of him. He went serenely on from one commission to another all through his fruitful life of eighty-two years. He was never married, his interest and energy being apparently wholly absorbed by his art. His sweet and gentle disposition is reflected in his works which deal by preference with genial and lovely themes and types. Although he shows less of direct influence from antique art in his style than most of his contemporaries, yet in the way in which he conveys a sense of a wholesome and reasonable balance and mingling of spiritual and physical health he comes nearer to expressing the true Greek spirit than any of the rest. His favorite subject of the Madonna and Child, though quite un-Greek in itself, yet is treated with a wholesome and serene air that is entirely Hellenic. Luca's marked preference for the subjective-identification type in dealing with this theme is quite what would be expected from an artist whose sexual life seems to have been successfully sublimated in his art.

The primary or subjective identification is exquisitely shown in Leonardo da Vinci's portrayal of the Madonna and Child. In fact, in his *Virgin in the Lap of St. Anne* the latter is also included in the primary phase.

Leonardo da Vinci, in his infinitely complicated and perhaps unfathomable temperament, presents both the most interesting and the most difficult psychological problem in all history. It may be remarked at once that in spite of the incomparable graces of his mind he never once, so far as the many records of his life reveal, had any sexual relations with women. They interested him endlessly and he studied their anatomy, their external beauty and their emotional and spiritual variety and charm all through his career but he seems never to have loved them. His favorite pupils, on the other hand, were all men remarkable for their youth and personal beauty and Leonardo made one of them his heir. In his innumerable studies of lovely, subtly smiling faces, Leonardo seems scarcely to differentiate between young women and youths just on the verge of manhood.

The Objective-Separation

There are innumerable examples in Italian art of the objective-separation type. A very obvious one is Fra Lippo Lippi's tondo of the *Madonna and Child* in the Pitti Gallery. Here the infant Christ has picked out a seed from a pomegranate in his hand and is holding it up for his mother to see. She is looking out of the picture and he has not yet caught her attention. It is a pleasant, natural, almost genre representation of a situation in which the child has already recognized his mother as another person than himself, one to whom he wants to exhibit an object that has interested him. It is quite such an interpretation of the mother-child relationship as one would expect from a man of such lively heterosexual temperament as the scapegrace monk who painted it.

According to most of his biographers, Fra Filippo Lippi was born in 1406. His father, Tommaso, a butcher, married Antonia di Bindo Sernigi. His mother died shortly after giving birth to Filippo and his father died when he was two years old. Both Filippo and his sister, Piera, were left practically unprovided for.

In 1414, at the age of eight, Filippo was placed in the Carmelite Friary by his aunt. It seems to be the general opinion of critics that Filippo entered the Friary merely because he had no other home. That he was forced to become a monk by his poverty and helpless position, and that the step, however unavoidable, was repugnant to him, is certain. Documentary evidence seems to prove that Filippo



MADONNA AND CHILD (*Fra Lippi*)

This is a pleasing and natural representation of a situation in which the child has already recognized the mother as a separate person.

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was duly entered on the books of the community as one of its recognized members, and was not merely a boarder at the Friary. Very probably, historians carrying on investigations in a religious frame of mind would prefer to say that Filippo was a boarder since his rather free life might cast a shadow over an otherwise spotless monastery. He made very few of the contacts that are normal in the life of an ordinary child. He lived within the cloistered walls of the Friary and studied the art of Masaccio. It has been stated that the fact that Filippo had more than his share of vices and a deficiency of virtues was perhaps due to the unfortunate circumstances of his abandoned childhood rather than to any natural perversity. His cloistered life did not altogether prevent him from coming into contact with the artistic movement of his age. As he grew older, he fell in with a group of painters and sculptors and enjoyed the gaiety and the freedom of the new pagan age. Filippo seems to have been of too fiery and buoyant a nature to have endured the monotony of his monastic life. We find him leaving the Friary when he was about seventeen years old. Vasari describes Filippo as one utterly devoid of a sense of responsibility, whose only motive in life was the gratification of his many and violent desires; and hearing himself so highly commended by all, he formed his resolution to become an artist at the age of seventeen and boldly threw off the clerical habit. But in a letter which Filippo wrote to Pietro de' Medici in 1436 we learn that Filippo had other reasons for wanting to leave the Carmine: "It is clear that I am the poorest friar in all Florence. God has left me with six unmarried nieces, infirm and helpless, and the little they have on earth comes to them from me."

As early as 1433 he was a protégé of Cosimo de' Medici. Vasari tells us that Filippo did no work when once under the influence of the brilliant court of Cosimo and relates a story of how the latter, wishing him to do a certain piece of work for him, locked Filippo in a room. But Filippo refused to remain in the room and slid out of the window on some torn sheets.

Filippo seems to have been unable to avoid petty arguments and quarrels with his neighbors. At one time, finding himself overburdened with work that he had allowed to accumulate, he hired an assistant. When the work was finished he refused to pay, stating that he had no money. Giovanni filed suit. Filippo forged Giovanni's receipt underneath the contract and then, exhibiting this document swore that he had already paid his assistant. Investigations confirmed the magistrate's opinion of Filippo's irresponsible character and put him to torture. The stomach lesions that resulted from the

torture in all probability caused his death. He does not appear to have been overcome with remorse or shame and after his sentence in jail, went on gallantly, getting into one uncomfortable situation after another. Before many months had elapsed, we find him obtaining an appointment as chaplain with the nuns of Sta. Margherita at Prato. The situation seems a bit ridiculous and most critics believe that it was due to the deficient moral sense of the age and to the powerful protection of the Medici.

Filippo bought a small house in Prato opposite the nunnery, and while at Prato two young girls, the daughters of Francesco Buti, a Florentine silk merchant, entered the nunnery. Francesco, having married a second time, his daughters were forced to enter the nunnery at the ages of seventeen and eighteen, and no one knows whether they really wanted to renounce the world or whether they entered the nunnery as boarders and then took the veil. Filippo's bad reputation did not precede him to Prato and he enjoyed the favor of the ecclesiastics. Lucrezia Buti was a very pretty, graceful girl, and although Filippo's appearance was not particularly romantic or sensitive, as he was fat and coarse featured, his energetic, passionate nature almost bordering upon violence made up for those sentimental gifts in which he was completely lacking, and he probably exercised a more powerful fascination upon the timid, inexperienced young nun than all the wooing of a more graceful but less manly suitor could have done. Filippo obtained permission from the abbess to have Lucrezia serve as model for the Virgin. After several weeks at work, he abducted her and urged her sister to follow and come to live in his house. Later three other nuns left and the nunnery closed in disgrace.

A son, Filippino, was born to Filippo and Lucrezia. Filippo had very little money and was constantly besieged by his creditors. Filippo loved Lucrezia and seems to have made some effort to make her life more comfortable. He appealed to the Medici for help. The case was submitted to the Holy See, asking the Pontiff to grant a special Brief dispensing both the friar and Lucrezia from their monastic vows and allowing them to marry. Fortunately Pius II was a good man and extremely tolerant of human weaknesses. There are no documents to show that Filippo married Lucrezia. Vasari takes up this point, and says that Filippo, desiring to retain the power of living after his own fashion and of indulging his love of pleasure as might seem good to him, never married at all. After the birth of Filippino, it is believed that Lucrezia returned to the nunnery, perhaps because she desired that life once again, or perhaps to atone



MADONNA WITH THE CHERRIES (*Titian*)

The idea of separation is accentuated here and an objective turn is given to the theme.

for her sin. Filippo seems to have been devoted and kind and when he died at Spoleto he asked his friend to take care of his son. After Filippo's renunciation of the religious life, he did not, as is so often supposed, renounce all belief. He continued to believe in God but it did not submerge his real self. As to his death one story is that Filippo was poisoned by Lucrezia's avenging relative. But it does not seem plausible that the relative would have waited for such a long period before doing the deed. If we believe that the poison story is true, it would be safer to attribute it to some other amatory escapade in which Filippo became entangled while working in Spoleto.

In Titian's grand *Pesaro Madonna* we have a characteristic portrayal by that painter whose full, rich, normal sex interest is expressed in almost every painting he did. Mary, enthroned aloft, turns to Saint Peter and a group of the Pesaro family on the left, while the Child turns to Saint Francis and another group of the family on the right, each thus taking a separate and independent part in the action. In many others of the same master's portrayals of the same subject, for instance in the *Madonna with the Cherries*, the idea of separation is accentuated and an active, objective turn is given to the theme.

Titian was born at Pieve among the mountains of Cadore. There was no register of births, marriages or deaths at Pieve and the exact date of his birth is not known. Most biographers agree that it was the year 1482. There has been some dispute about whether Titian lived to be ninety-nine or ninety-seven years old. At any rate, we do know that he had a long life and that he died in the plague that ravaged that part of the country. He was the son of Gregorio Vecelli, a distinguished soldier and councillor of Cadore, and his wife Lucia. We hear nothing regarding his mother. His father encouraged the artistic abilities of his son and sent him to Venice to study. From Titian's letters, we picture him as a rather shrewd man, intensely devoted to his art, extremely industrious and making the best possible use of his very valuable social connections. Vasari gives us a graphic description of the old man Titian and the treasures of his house in the year 1566: "Titian has enjoyed health and happiness unequalled. His house has been visited by all the princes, men of letters, and gentlemen who ever came to Venice. Besides being excellent in art, he is pleasant company, of fine deportment and agreeable manners." By his wife, to whom he was not married until two sons had been born, Titian had four children of whom two grew up (Bensusan). But we have no further information about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of his children. He was a good father

and grieved at the death of his wife, who died in giving birth to their daughter, Lavinia. Titian delighted in the beauty of his daughter and did many paintings of her. Titian appears to have thrived in the luxurious surroundings that accompanied the revival of the Pagan spirit. He lacked neither fame, friends nor fortune and lived to enjoy them to a very old age.

Most of the pictures by Correggio in which the Virgin and Child appear, also show the idea of complete separation. An instance of this is in the *Madonna with Saint George* and the *Madonna della Scodella*.

In such pictures as Fra Lippo Lippi's *Madonna Adoring the Child*, in the Uffizi, or the same subjects in the same gallery by Correggio, there is well represented a popular variant of the separation type. In such scenes the Christ Child is usually a passive participant, but the Mother, of course, regards him as quite separate and different from herself, and worships him as God incarnate.

Not much interest was taken by historians in the life of Antonio Allegri Correggio. Vasari began his life of Correggio shortly after the latter's death and even at that time was unable to gather much data on his intimate life. There is very little information about his personal affairs and there is much dispute about the little that is to be found. Vasari's account of his miserly character is open to much doubt. Other biographers believe that Correggio did not live in a "beggar's hut" at any period of his life, although he was never surrounded by luxury. His father belonged to middle class society and was in business as a victualler. We know very little of his mother, Bernadina Piazzoli, except that when she married she brought with her a dowry of 100 lire.

In 1520 Antonio married Gerolama Merlini, the seventeen year old daughter of Bartolomeo Merlini de Braghetio, arm bearer of Marquis of Mantua. Their first child was born in 1521. Correggio died in 1534, when he was 40 years old. He lived in the most brilliant period of the Renaissance but his biographers have always represented him as an isolated person, of a melancholy disposition and a misanthrope by nature. According to Vasari, he was of a very timid disposition and exerted himself to excess in the practice of his art for the sake of his family, who were a great care to him. Oppressed by family cares, he was so bent on saving that he became miserly to a degree. Ricci disagrees with Vasari on this point. He does not believe that he was miserly but admits that he was careful and thrifty, always desiring to provide for his family. Ricci believes that this foresight might have been due to Correggio's presentiment



MADONNA WITH ST. GEORGE (*Correggio*)

This artist has depicted here the idea of complete separation.

of an early death, and his thriftiness might have been the result of early training by his parents who were hard working people and frugal. If we believe that he was of a melancholy disposition, it is not in the least reflected in his art, which is of a particularly joyous and cheerful tone. He was an unusually reticent, modest person, never caring to measure himself up to the artists of his day; although he did admire their art and it is natural to suppose that he compared his work with that of other artists. By his personal habits or peculiarities, he does not seem to have made himself conspicuous at any time during his life. We conclude that he was industrious at his work, reticent and modest and personally not very effective.

In his numerous pictures of the Madonna and Child, Andrea del Sarto has perpetuated the beauty of his wife. Tall, proud, dark-eyed she seems more to insist on her own person than on the divine child she holds in her arms. Lovely as the child is in itself, there is wanting that perfect sense of harmonious relationship, of spiritual oneness with the mother, that makes the child in Raphael's pictures so effective and moving. Andrea seems to be relieved of an embarrassment when he can show Lucrezia as some other person than the mother.

Del Sarto, called by his contemporaries "*Il pittore senza errori*" (the faultless painter), was the consummation of the long and persistent struggle for technical perfection in painting which had been carried on in Florence from the days of Cimabue and Giotto to the sixteenth century. Andrea shows himself the heir of all his skillful predecessors, and gathers up and blends in complete harmony their varied contributions towards complete mastery of composition, drawing, chiaroscuro, color and tonal harmony. If technique alone were the gauge of an artist he should be ranked with the greatest, yet that is not the case, for he demonstrates remarkably well the fact that skill, however great, must be accompanied by grandeur of personality and intensity of feeling in order to produce an artist of the first rank. Andrea was denied this spiritual and emotional power, so that with all his technique he remains a secondary figure.

He was born in Florence in 1486. As a youth he was trained by Piero di Cosimo and profited greatly by the study of the works of Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo. He soon became one of the most promising of the younger artists of Florence and being recommended to Francis I of France, went into that monarch's service at Fontainebleau. Obtaining leave to return to Florence for his wife, Andrea not only abandoned the French king and the brilliant success he had begun at his court but appropriated a large sum of

money Francis had entrusted to him for the purchase of works of art and with it built a house for himself and his beautiful but worthless wife and so gravely compromised his whole subsequent career. He was completely under the domination of his wife, Lucrezia del Fede, whose face and form appear in almost every picture Andrea painted. She was incapable of understanding or sympathizing with his art and looked upon him merely as a source of revenue to spend on herself or her lovers, for she was not even decently faithful to him. When in his forty-sixth year Andrea fell ill of the plague, Lucrezia fled from his house and left him to die alone. Browning in his wonderful poem, "Andrea del Sarto," gives us a marvellous insight into the true character and spirit of the painter and shows how completely his wife failed to supply to him the inspiration, the power of thought and the depth of feeling which he himself lacked, so that with all his flawless art he can never rank with Leonardo, Raphael or Michelangelo.

Mutual Adoration

Though perhaps only a variant of the objective-separation type, the mutual adoration is interesting for the care and emphasis which certain artists have put upon its delineation. It is a common experience for mothers to caress and fondle their young babies and to watch with keenness for the first signs of a reciprocation. When the child has at length come to respond and assumes the rôle of the little lover, the scene is complete and such themes become the special favorite of some artists. Donatello and Botticelli are conspicuous in this regard and it is noteworthy that in the case of both these artists their sex life was either undeveloped or repressed. Donatello's *Pazzi Madonna* in the Berlin Museum and both of the stucco reliefs of the Virgin and Child by him in the Metropolitan Museum show the same tender, mutually expressed affection. Although Botticelli often shows the identification type and does so with great effectiveness, as in the *Madonna of the Pomegranate*, in the Uffizi, his most intense and generally preferred presentations of the Virgin and her Son are of the mutual adoration sort, as in the *Madonna del Magnificat*, the *Madonna and Child with Saint John* in the Louvre and the even more fervent version of the same theme in the Dresden Gallery which has already been described. A delightful but lighter variety of the same general idea may be seen in Madame LeBrun's portrait of herself and her daughter in the Louvre.

Donato di Niccolo di Betto Bardi, better known by his affectionate nickname of Donatello, was one of the most skillful, productive and



THE PAZZI MADONNA (*Donatello*)

Although this artist often painted the identification phase with great effectiveness, his most generally preferred presentations of the Virgin and Child are of the mutual adoration type.

influential sculptors of the fifteenth century in Italy. He not only enjoyed great fame and appreciation in his own period of the early Renaissance but is still regarded as one of the great sculptors of all time. The extraordinary esteem in which he is held is due not only to his superb skill as an artist but to his lovable personal qualities as well. Rarely have honesty, straightforwardness and disinterestedness been more strikingly exhibited than in his character.

In spite of his great renown, comparatively little is known of his career apart from his work but enough facts have been discovered to confirm the conclusions as to his temperament which are indicated in his sculpture. He was born probably in 1386, in the city of Florence. His father was sent into political exile and died while Donatello was still young. He lived with his widowed mother, Orsa, and later his widowed sister, Tita, and her son joined the household and he was the support of the whole family. His mother died at an advanced age when the sculptor was forty-seven. He himself lived to the ripe age of eighty. In all his long career there is no hint of his ever having had any sexual interest in women. The great romance of his life was his art which he followed with an intensity amounting to a passion. The only strong personal relation of which we know was his friendship with the greatest architect of his time, Filippo Brunelleschi, who was nine years older than Donatello. The two were constant and lifelong friends. When Donatello was sixteen he set out with Brunelleschi for Rome where they remained several years, living together and studying, one the sculpture, the other the architecture, of the imperial city.

There is abundant evidence of Donatello's singularly frank, honest, ingenuous temperament. His simplicity, kindness and generosity shine by contrast with the selfishness and jealousy of many of his fellow artists, yet with all his naiveté, he was a keen observer and a shrewd judge of character, as his highly individualized works of sculpture attest. He enjoyed the friendship and patronage of Cosimo de'Medici, one of the strongest and ablest minds of his day. Cosimo, dying somewhat before Donatello, charged his son, Piero, with the care of the aged sculptor and directed that at his decease he should be buried near him. This was later done and to this day the remains of these two, one the great man of affairs, the other the great artist, lie side by side at the foot of the high altar of the church of San Lorenzo in Florence.

In all the long array of his work, there is a marked predominance of the masculine figure. His male subjects range from small boys, through youths and mature men to aged patriarchs. He was especially happy in his treatment of young children and adolescents. He

rarely uses the female figure and when he does, it is usually that of the Virgin or some feminine saint. It is a remarkable fact that though his technical skill was entirely adequate for the task, he was past his fortieth year before he produced a statue of a woman. After this time he did a certain number of works in the round or in relief dealing with feminine subjects or containing female figures but they are all of a severe and lofty character with nothing of seductive womanly charm. This loftiness and severity of type is carried so far in the case of his famous group of Judith and Holofernes as quite to invalidate the story. It is hard to believe that so austere an heroine could ever have intrigued the general to his death. The figure of the Virgin in his *Annunciation* in Santa Croce is indeed beautiful in a grand and impersonal way, though her large and capable hands have a masculine look. One of Donatello's most successful female figures is that of the penitent Magdalen in the Baptistery of Florence. It shows the saint in all the rags, dirt and squalor of ascetic sanctity, her gaunt and bony frame proclaiming the severity with which she has subdued the flesh. Her cheeks are sunken, her teeth are gone and even her hair, the sole remnant of her former loveliness, is tangled and matted. One can scarcely imagine a figure more completely devoid of feminine charm. It gives one the impression that the sculptor enjoyed representing this perfect antithesis of voluptuous beauty. His several treatments of the subject of the Virgin and Child are nearly all of the identification or the mutual adoration type and the character of Mary is always shown strong and noble rather than sweet and delicate as in the same subjects by such followers of Donatello as Desiderio da Settignano or Rossellino.

It is rare indeed that any important character in history escapes adverse criticism whether or not it be deserved. In the case of Donatello, however, it is true that neither of his art nor of his personal character is there recorded any contemporary attack.

Alessandro Filipepi, or Botticelli as he is generally called, was one of the most idiosyncratic painters of the Italian Renaissance. His style is peculiarly his own and resulted from his highly individual temperament. The extraordinary combination of sensuous beauty and melancholy asceticism to be found in his works but reflects the conflicting qualities of his own character. Born in Florence in 1447, he was trained in his profession by the lively Fra Lippo Lippi whose son in turn later became a pupil of Botticelli. According to his father, he was "slow in his books" (Horne). Fra Lippi conceived a great love for him and instructed him so effectually in the art of painting

that he rapidly attained to such a degree in art as none would have predicted for him. He was of a careless, impulsive disposition, full of pranks and fond of good company. His services were much sought for and he received many lucrative commissions but he promptly spent what he earned so that in his old age when he had become so devout and mystic that he gave up painting entirely, he came to acute want and was saved from starving by the generosity of friends. He was particularly moved by the teachings of Savonarola and as a result joined the party of the "Piagnoni" whose severe and repressive tenets were so contrary to the pagan joy of the Renaissance. There is no mention of any sexual attachments in Botticelli's life. He died a bachelor, having concentrated his fervour and passion first in his painting, later in his mystical religious experiences.

Botticelli appears to have been haunted in some indescribable way by death, and was sad and gloomy under its shadow. It was merely an inarticulate presentiment, and young and lively, he gave himself up to the gay poetry of life. He was the youngest in a family of six, and the depth of feeling, the conscientiousness and piety which are eloquent in all his works are undoubtedly the product of his narrow but affectionate home life. He was small, of weakly stature, clear cut profile, powerful hook nose, pleasing expression and had rather a sad face but humorous smile. Was it because of his poor health that a foreboding of death permeated all his life? He could not bear to see the vigour of life in harsh contrast with cruel certainty of death. Botticelli saw life and death in harmony and was sad (Yashuri). We are told by the Anonimo, Botticelli's eldest biographer, that when he was once advised by a friend to take a wife, he is said to have replied that he had once dreamed that he was married and such terror had taken hold of him that he woke up and wandered desperately up and down the town all that morning. But from his paintings we see none of his shyness; he approaches feminine beauty with a frankness and keen appreciation and is particularly interested in young mothers and babies. His representations of the Madonna and Child are not only very numerous but are characterized by an ecstatic tenderness most beautiful and moving. He uses almost invariably either the subjective-identification or the mutual adoration type of interpretation.

As a recapitulation of our thesis, it may be stated that della Robbia, Michelangelo, Raphael and Leonardo da Vinci, who were engrossed in the subject of the subjective-identification type of Madonna and Child, were all homosexual. Donatello and Botticelli, who painted both the subjective-identification and the mutual adoration types,

were undeveloped and repressed in their sexual life. Fra Lippo Lippi, Titian, Correggio and del Sarto painted the objective-separation type, and all were heterosexual.

Conclusion. Such, then, is the visible material for our study. We have shown that perhaps all Madonna-Child art is one of two extremes, or a transitional phase between. All these artists were, as are all artists to-day, painting their particular idealisms. The motive emanates from the artist's own unconscious fixation or permanent attachment to the period of which he paints. The emotional lives of the artists prove this point. For each to have painted otherwise would have violated his sense of creative idealism and thus his work would lack any great beauty or harmony. There are many variations in the pose and character makeup of the duality presented, but the bond of union, the vital relationship, remains constant just as we know it does in society to-day. If these mother-child relationships remain in an unchanged mood from those shown in these paintings, social disasters in the love life follows, as has been the case in so many historic instances. What these varied types of social maladjustments are would take us beyond the present study, but it is sufficient for our purpose to say that all the normal and abnormal phases of love life pass through either one or both of these developmental periods and take their vitality and coloring from either the healthful or unhealthful aspects of one or both phases. All of us unconsciously appreciate the phase of the artist's mood which touches us most deeply. We thus unite our own particular mood (appreciation) with that of the artist's. By and large we should say that the majority of individuals select the earliest or identification, representation as the most appealing phase of the subject. Is it because the artist has painted this phase better, or do we naturally associate our own unconscious attitudes to it on the basis that the unity of the composition is better given? Only an individual analysis of one's own unconscious may finally determine the validity of such a decision.

II

A PSYCHOHISTORICAL STUDY OF MICHELANGELO

Introduction

Rather than give an extended psychobiologic treatment of all the artists of the preceding sections, we shall attempt as full an exposition as space will permit of one outstanding master of the Renaissance.*

Painters and sculptors of all periods have depicted life either objectively or subjectively. The subjective artists have been designated painters of the spiritual or inner beauty of their subjects. Michelangelo was preëminently a subjective artist. He was concerned mainly with representing in visible form a reflection of his own thoughts and the strivings of his own soul; the world, transilluminated by his personality, was transformed and reprojected in his art as a part of himself, and we gain a fairly representative view of the man in his works.

There are many works which discuss in detail Michelangelo's artistic achievements, and our purpose here is merely to sketch the main points in his artistic career for the benefit of those who are not familiar with Michelangelo's genius in the three fields of sculpture, painting and architecture, and after these preliminaries we shall give a résumé of the psychology of Michelangelo to show that he suffered from a compulsive neurosis based on the classic homosexual constitution, together with anal character.

We may speak of a compulsive neurosis in homosexuals as in heterosexuals. When the denial of an instinctual outlet is long maintained, the repressed instinct is likely to return in the form of a substitution activity in place of the repressed emotion; thus we have the compulsive life of Michelangelo as seen in his art and relationships to his family and others. The homosexual traits in his character are marked; personally his tendencies did not result in overt acts, and this fact the better explains the depressed melancholic temperament as well as the ceaseless working fury with which he expended so much vitality in the whirling torsos and planes of his masculine figures; even when he portrayed feminine forms they were essentially masculine in type cast in the anatomic structure of woman.

To understand the essential character makeup of the sculptor

* I acknowledge my indebtedness to Herbert R. Cross, professor of the history of art at New York University, who has kindly assisted in the text pertaining to the art of the Renaissance. Valuable material has also been gathered from the Encyclopedia Britannica.

genius such as Michelangelo so excellently illustrates, it will be necessary for us to hastily review the psychoanalytic work done upon the so-called anal character.

In 1908 Freud published a very short account of this subject in which he affirmed that certain neurotics present three character traits which make up the fundamentals of the anal character. These are, respectively, an orderliness which often degenerates into pedantry, a thrift which may go over into penuriousness, and an obstinacy which may be emphasized to violent refractoriness. In these individuals there is a primary pleasure in evacuation of the bowels and their dejections. This coprophilia after successful repression is sublimated in desire for painting, modelling, etc., or there may be an urge to cleanliness. In the unconscious, feces is equivalent to money or valuables. Sadger adds that persons with marked anal character believe they can do anything better than anyone else. Opposite traits may be seen side by side as perseverance or constancy with tendency to postpone to the last.

The child is born with a tendency to coprophilia which must be corrected by education. He loves to daub himself with feces and his immediate education in this direction comprises two elements, one of cleanliness and the other of regulation of the excretory functions. In giving up these infantile instincts of soiling himself the psyche must be more or less influenced.

The entire surface of the trunk and extremities comes in contact with urine and feces and while to the adult this kind of contact is unpleasant and even disgusting, the contrary is the case with the infant, who feels pleasure in the warmth of the feces and urine and in handling masses of feces and only when these discharges become cold does he express displeasure. According to Ferenczi, it is not only the feel of the feces but the sight and smell of them which give rise to pleasure. This pleasure in the products of defecation must not be confounded with the pleasure in the act of excretion, which comprises not only physical but a form of psychic pleasure. These sensations are narcissistic and in the education of the child in cleanliness his narcissism is exposed to a severe test. In the case which turns out favorably—and the majority of children become adapted sooner or later—the child makes a virtue of necessity, identifies himself with the educator and becomes proud of his success, which compensates for the primary injury to his narcissism. He has surrendered his independence but is gratified at the praise of his parents.

But not all children make this grade successfully. There may be an overcompensation, the child being unconsciously stubborn in holding to his right of self-determination with the likelihood of



MICHELANGELO (Etching by *Alphonse Francois*)

This is a contemporary portrait of Michelangelo. It gives a very interesting suggestion of his character, especially of the homeliness of his person. He was rather small and slight, somewhat frail, although he had an astounding amount of vitality. There is a seriousness in his character, and a restlessness, due perhaps to irritability, which is suggested in this authentic portrait.

occasional violent outbreaks. There are children, and adults as well, who are correct, obedient and good in demeanor but in the depths lie rebellious repressed impulses.

The valuation of the excreta as expressions of an enormous sense of power is foreign to the consciousness of the normal adult but in his unconscious this feeling persists. In the pride of the child in his evacuation we may recognize a primitive sense of power, and in the constipated neurotic we often encounter a peculiar feeling of weakness. Here the libido has been shifted from the genital to the anal zone and the inhibition of the intestinal functions gives rise to the same depression as sexual impotence. The discovery by Sadger that some of these anal erotics have the conviction of their superiority over others may be amplified to include others who believe themselves unique.

Jones has pointed out that while the anal subject will not make use of another's system he tries to force his own system on others as soon as he has evolved one. In this we see a combination of compulsion toward order and sadistic pleasure in domineering, and, in general, anal and sadistic currents often coincide. The system monger goes in for statistics, tabulations, records and rubrics of all kinds. These neurotics resist stubbornly all requisitions from without, whether put in the form of command or entreaty.

The excreta represent the first form of giving away something of one's own, parting with something, analogous to making gifts or presents, but the anal character, despite his refusal to command or entreaty will sometimes give voluntarily. There is a tendency to divide everything into portions—money, food, etc.—rationing and budgeting everything, dealing out little by little, which again introduces the sadistic element. The habit of paying small bills by cheque belongs here and cheques seem to represent "personal money" and something different from currency which is handled by everyone. The anal neurotic is extremely critical of the methods of others as is natural to one who would substitute his own system and this habit may degenerate into nagging. This criticism they apply to society and indeed form the chief contingent of the disgruntled. Anal obstinacy may take two different directions, one unsocial and unproductive in result and consisting of inaccessibility and headstrong quality, the other with social values and comprising persistency and thoroughness. In the latter, analerotic are mixed with other qualities.

We are studying character here and not symptoms and in this connection may touch upon the compulsive character. If in the psychic development the genital stage is not fully arrived at or if there has been regression to the anal (sadistic-anal) stage there is

always a diminution of masculine activity. Productivity suffers and not alone in the genital sense and this includes lack of initiative. The sadistic element is normally sublimated but in the anal character is seen in special strength. In these individuals there is ambivalence in the instinctive life.

The tendency to use the anal function as a productive activity is strongly associated with money and the love of giving for philanthropic or social purposes, this forming the relation to society. The anal character injures productivity in certain ways as when it leads to postponement and breaking off tasks once begun; and at times we may predict from the character of a man that his efforts will sooner or later be broken off. Opposed to this type is the man who once having begun a task is unable to stop until he completes it, although it may have been difficult to start it. We see a parallel here to habits at stool, as when one holds back urination and defecation to the last possible moment, when there is inability to check the evacuation. Here it should be noted that there is a pleasure in holding in as well as in evacuating.

In general one may say that in the neurotic the more masculine activity and productivity are restricted the more striking is the interest in possession. In pronounced cases of anal character formation, nearly all life relationships have to do with possession, either in holding fast or gaining. Envy is a pronounced character trait, the coveting something which is in possession of another, while at the same time there are feelings of hatred toward him.

One of the classic traits of the anal character is that relationship to money which is expressed by thrift and avarice. In certain cases we see a connection between thrift and intentional holding back of feces.

Another expression of the anal character is the carrying out of two tasks at the same time. The pleasure in possession is seen in hoarders and collectors, and the pleasure in acquisition is repeated as the collections are gloated over. An analogy may be seen in the compulsive inspection of all feces passed. Even when collections of objects have no practical value the same conditions obtain.

Much less common than thrift is a tendency to squander and this contrast suggests the physical one of constipation and diarrhoea. But those who are petty in money matters often spend freely the sums hoarded, here suggesting the individual who postpones evacuation until it becomes urgent.

In conclusion, one may say the anal character is often the odd, crochety individual, who betrays his nature in facial expression and bearing.

We may now give a short sketch of Michelangelo's greatest achievements in the field of art.

Artistic and Political Aspects

Michelangelo Buonarroti (March 6, 1475–February 18, 1564) was born at Caprese in the latter part of the early Renaissance. He lived for half a century in this period. He was born of Italian parentage, good but somewhat impoverished. His celestial name was given him because his parents thought they perceived something divine in him. In his infancy he was placed in the care of a wet nurse who was the wife of a stone mason, and Michelangelo said that he imbibed a love for marble with his first nourishment. His mother died when he was very young and all through the rest of his life he maintained a most devoted and constant love for his father.

At an early age, Michelangelo was sent by his father to study under Ghirlandaio, and spent some time with him as a student, and although he did not form his style there, he gained a sound knowledge of the technic of painting, especially fresco painting. It is said that he quarreled with his master, and had the supreme audacity to correct a drawing of his, which led to their separation. He was taken up by the de Medici, by Lorenzo the Magnificent, who saw in this youth an artist of promise, and he sent the boy to study in his school of sculpture in the de Medici gardens, where he had put Bertoldo, that old pupil of Donatello, in charge. There he began his career as a sculptor. He lived at the time as a house guest of the de Medici, coming in daily contact with the most brilliant minds of the Italian Renaissance, not only Lorenzo, but the great sculptors, great statesmen and great artists of that city, with its strong classical quality, and especially with its very great interest in the newly found Greek literature, Greek philosophy, and neo-Platonism. His temperament, naturally very serious, fastened at once upon the doctrines of Plato, and he fused in his mind the Greek philosophy with the writings of the ancient Hebrew prophets, at the same time reading Dante. Presently he came under another vital influence of the time, the preaching of Savonarola, whose sermons stirred the soul of the young Michelangelo. He kept the message of Savonarola in his heart all through his life, and we see it reflected in one of the last works of his old age.

These were the outer circumstances and the spiritual influences at work on Michelangelo's naturally melancholic temperament. A feeling ran through his whole life that things were going wrong, that "right was forever on the scaffold, wrong forever on the throne." Outwardly he was very successful. Because of his merits he received

attention and a certain share of commendation even while he was quite young. When only about twenty years old, he went to Rome and remained there for some years, but he returned somewhat disappointed. He did not attract the attention he had hoped to receive there, nor did he find the atmosphere he had expected to find. It is strange that the years this young artist spent in Rome, who was later to set his style on the Imperial City more than any other artist of his time, should have been rather uneventful.

Michelangelo arrived at Rome for the first time at the end of June, 1496. He became acquainted with a Roman nobleman, Jacopo Galli, and from him received a commission for a *Cupid* and a *Bacchus*, and through him he won the favor of the French Cardinal Jean de Villiers de la Grolaie, abbot of St. Denis. For the Cardinal he executed the famous *Pietà*, or Mary lamenting over the body of Christ. The two last named are preserved. Equal magnificence of technical execution mark these two contrasted subjects. The *Pietà* is one of his most beautiful and most admired works. It does not seem possible that this exquisitely designed and finished work should be the work of a youth. He was only a little over twenty-one when he executed this masterpiece. It demonstrates in the matter of handling marble that the sculptor had nothing further to learn; it is complete. Most noteworthy is the contrast between the dead Christ and the figure of the Mother, the contrast of the living figure of Mary with the pitiful figure of the dead Christ. The technic in the handling of these figures is very wonderful; the details are beautifully shown, as, for instance, the swollen veins in the hands and feet. The very dignity of Mary's sorrow adds to the emotional impressiveness of the subject. Only a profoundly devout soul could have conceived it with such a combination of realism and tenderness.

Michelangelo interpreted the subject of *Bacchus* in his own way; it is not the god of joy, the god of rejoicing, but rather the spirit of drunkenness, showing a young man already somewhat degenerated, with bleary eyes and uncertain carriage. It is a curious spirit, but his originality led him to do any subject as no artist before him had done it. Probably very few men were less interested in what others were doing than he.

He came back to Florence, as we have seen, somewhat disappointed that his genius was not recognized. We have from this period a number of very interesting and characteristic works. There is the famous *Madonna of Bruges*, so-called because it is in the cathedral of the Flemish city. It is one of his best known works. The familiar subject of the Mother and Child had been done a thousand times



A PIETÀ (*Michelangelo*)

"Is it nothing to you, all ye that pass by? Behold and see if there be any sorrow like unto my sorrow which is done unto me, wherewith the Lord hath afflicted me in the day of His fierce anger."


by artists of the Renaissance and was done by Michelangelo in his own way. It is a beautiful group. The Christ Child is wonderfully included in the mass of his mother's figure. It is as though he still were almost a part of her. We feel the singleness of mother and child. They look as though one soul were still in these two bodies.

Probably from this time is his famous *Madonna de la Scala*, or the Madonna of the Stairs. This is typical of Michelangelo's spirit as well as his technic, doing away with all the prettiness, all the charm, and all the lovely qualities which were customary to be drawn into such a figure at this time. Michelangelo wanted to make us realize that all those things were unimportant in giving us the grandeur of the Mother of God. The Madonna sits upon a plain block of stone. She needs no other ornament. On her lap is the Child presumably in the simple act of suckling at his mother's breast, and yet Mother and Child, again with the subjective treatment, are represented as though there was a premonition of the long series of troubles and trials destined to come into the lives of both, for Mary looks troubled, and the Christ Child turns and throws out one hand to suggest his restlessness.

Michelangelo's stay in Rome at this time lasted from the summer of 1496 till that of 1501, a period of five years. Having, after an illness, come home in 1501, he was requested by the cardinal Francesco Piccolomini to adorn with a number of sculptured figures a shrine already begun in the cathedral of Siena in honor of Pope Pius II. Only four of these figures were ever completed, and apparently only in small part by his hand, for a work of greater interest in Florence diverted him from his engagement to his Sieneese patrons. This was the execution of the famous colossal statue of *David*, which is popularly known as *the Giant*. It was carved out of a huge block of marble on which another sculptor, Agostino d'Antonio, had begun unsuccessfully to work forty years before, and which had been lying idle ever since. Out of this huge mass Michelangelo managed to create one of his most magnificent works, both in technic and spiritual appeal. It was pronounced as equal to anything in contemporary art or even in the art of antiquity. It is remarkable to see what an extraordinary appeal Michelangelo made with the Colossus, which is actually over ten feet in height. The critic Symonds says that Michelangelo has given us a hobbledehoy of a boy, who is just ceasing to become a boy, but has not yet become a man. Technically it is a marvelous demonstration of realism of anatomy upon a grand scale, but it is the spiritual conception of the subject which makes it so peculiarly impressive. Just before the great contest between Goliath

and David, David has stepped forth from the ranks of the Israelites. Michelangelo must have read very carefully those stirring words, and chosen the moment just after Goliath had hurled his taunts and insults not so much at David but at David's god, and then the youth hurled back that splendid response: "Thou comest to me with a sword, and with a spear, and with a shield: but I come to thee in the name of the Lord of hosts, the God of the armies of Israel, whom thou hast defied. This day will the Lord deliver thee into mine hand; and I will smite thee, and take thine head from thee; and I will give the carcasses of the host of the Philistines this day unto the fowls of the air, and to the wild beasts of the earth; that all the earth may know that there is a God in Israel. And all this assembly shall know that the Lord saveth not with sword and spear; for the battle is the Lord's, and He will give thee into our hands." David realizes that on the sling hangs not his own triumph, but the honor of God. One feels the tremendous inspiration despite the fact that the figure is so quiet. Although he does not move hand or foot, every muscle in his body seems tense with the emotion of the moment. It is so much more impressive than if David were actually in motion. It is wonderful to see how restrained Michelangelo's treatment of David is, and yet how powerfully he has carried it out. This work made Michelangelo's reputation; it established him at once as among the most considerable of the artists in all Florence and all Italy. From then on he never had to reach for recognition. In the *David* one gets clearly that quality which is instantly recognized as purely his, what they called his "*terribilita*," that sternness, that intensity of feeling and of emotion which he was able to impart to his figures, both in sculpture and in painting, which gives that touch of the sublime which is so uniquely his, and this quality increased with time. The result of this great, frowning colossus amazed every beholder by its freedom and science of execution and its victorious energy of expression. Among other works of sculpture belonging to the same period are a second *David* in bronze and on a smaller scale; and a great rough-hewn *St. Matthew*, begun but never completed, for the cathedral of Florence.

From this early Florentine period comes practically his only oil picture. Michelangelo remarked that oil painting was only fit for women and children. He thought that the art of fresco was so much more of a measure of a man's powers, and that oil did not have the same impressiveness. He very rarely used oil, but the *Doni Madonna*, so named from Angelo Doni who bought it, is an example of the increasing sternness of Michelangelo's method; it is singularly



DAVID. (Marble statue by *Michelangelo* now in the *Accademia Della Belle Arti, Florence*)

This interesting drawing is by *Raphael*, in the British Museum.

devoid of charm, with nothing of the mystery or the exquisite grace of Leonardo da Vinci's, and nothing of the spiritual grace and tenderness that Raphael would put into the subject. The subject is really that of the *Holy Family*. Mary, a great, brawny Tuscan woman, is seated on the ground, to receive the Christ Child over her shoulder, whom St. Joseph is handing to her. The Christ Child is almost commonplace. It is rather unimpressive on the spiritual side, but the group is drawn with such grandeur, force and energy that it is an arresting picture in spite of what we ordinarily associate with the subject, and is one of the great pieces of Renaissance art.

In the autumn of 1504, the year of the completion of the *David*, Michelangelo received from the Florentine state a commission for a work of monumental painting on a heroic scale, to be a companion work to that of Leonardo da Vinci who had been engaged for some months on his great cartoon of the *Battle of Anghiari*, to be painted on the wall of the great hall of the municipal council. Leonardo was a generation older than Michelangelo and was at the height of his fame and his powers. Michelangelo chose an incident which took place during the Pisan war of 1364—a comparatively unimportant subject in Italian history, when the Florentine soldiery had been surprised by the enemy in the act of bathing. He used that subject, not because of its importance, but because it gave him the supreme opportunity to do what he could do better than any other artist of the time, to draw the grandeur of the nude human form, especially the male form. We have in the central group in the cartoon which has survived of this work a hint of what the original work was. If even an unknown copyist could capture so much of the grandeur, what must the power of the original have been? It showed a grander style in handling the human body than any artist had previously accomplished. It is almost a revolution in the style of painting of the time. He went at the task with his usual fiery energy, and had carried a great part of the cartoon to completion when, in the early spring of 1505, he broke off the work in order to obey a call to Rome. His unfinished cartoon, in its power over the varieties and contrasts of energetic and vitally significant action, showed how greatly Michelangelo had profited by the example of his elder rival, Leonardo da Vinci, little as he yielded to his charm or could bring himself to respond to his courtesy.

The work of Michelangelo's youth is for the most part comparatively tranquil in character. His early sculpture, showing a degree of science and perfection unequaled since the antique, has also something of the antique serenity. It bears strongly the stamp of intel-

lectual research, but not by any means that of storm or strain. In the cartoon of the *Bathers* the tempestuous quality of spirit which accompanied his technical mastery and knowledge first found expression. He knew every secret that could be known to an artist about the human body. He actually practiced dissection. He learned all the parts of the bony structure and of the muscular arrangement over it, in addition to all the facts that could possibly affect his ability to make the body expressive, so that we have not only a wonderful portrayal of the surface, but he knew the details below the visible portions. But he does not go beyond the possibilities of nature. In his other drawings we feel this astounding realism, and this enormous sense of power which occupied his mind. It is a supremely powerful and energetic style strongly tinged with the sense of actuality. One of the most astonishing and impressive of these drawings is a work now at Windsor Castle, usually called *The Sharp Shooters*. Here we have an ideal portrayal of these people of Michelangelo's mind, a type of superman which he has created and which he makes sublime as the years go on. The enormous sense of stress and strain, the vigor in the group of figures is evident as they step forward to shoot at the mark. Another drawing also shows the exquisite power he is able to impart to his figures. It is representative of the Resurrected Christ. Christ is drawn as though the figure on the cross actually possessed explosive power, rising from the tomb and overwhelming the guard of soldiers.

With Michelangelo's departure to Rome in 1506 the first part of his artistic career may be said to end. In Rome he set to work for some years upon a mausoleum for Julius, who asked him to make for him the most magnificent sepulcher that had ever been devised. Julius, however, with his characteristic impetuosity, had hardly more than allowed Michelangelo to get well started on the scheme and to secure the marble, when he decided it was an ill omen to have his own tomb constructed during his lifetime, and he wanted Michelangelo to stop work on it and paint the vault of the Sistine chapel. It was a grievous wrong to the artist, and deprived him of his greatest chance, setting him at a task that was uncongenial to him. We find him at this period signing his works: "Michelangelo, sculptor." Throughout his whole life he was never allowed the opportunity to complete Julius' mausoleum as it had been originally conceived.

Let us turn to what are the grandest of all the paintings in the Sistine chapel, the series dealing with the opening chapters of Genesis: God is shown as a magnificent, powerful, middle-aged ath-



THE HOLY FAMILY (*Michelangelo*)

In the background of this painting we have an original touch. Michelangelo, as though not satisfied with what he could do with the main group, and showing his preoccupation with the nude male athlete, has introduced a group of otherwise purposeless undraped figures.

letic figure. There is a sense of enormous vitality and energy with which Michelangelo has made God tossing the sun and moon into their places. What are the sun and moon? They are mere things that God has created to take their stand in the universal scheme. What does the sun matter? It is God who has created the sun that matters. This is God, a man in God's form, and it is literally true that Michelangelo has given us a figure which is sublime in its suggestion of almost illimitable power.

In the scene of the creation of Adam, God took clay and made man in his own image, and so on the bare brown earth reposes the figure which God has just made, the figure of the first man, not so much a portrayal of the forefather of the human race as an epitome of all the capacity of mankind, also the physical and intellectual capacities of the human race in these magnificent terms. Just coming to life at that touch which God has bestowed on him, the figure of Adam rises somewhat reluctantly, almost responding to God's creative power with a sense of reproach, of protest, as though this strange gift of life and consciousness and power were received reluctantly, as though Michelangelo wished to remind us that God is responsible for this, and not Adam, as though the artist were insisting on shifting to the shoulders of Divinity itself the responsibility for the human race. This painting of Adam has but one other equal, and that is Zeus in the Parthenon. They are each worthy to stand as companion to the other.

In the temptation and the expulsion from the Garden of Eden, the female form of Eve is of Titanic build. We have Adam and Eve driven forth, unwilling, under the authority of the avenging angels, flung out from Paradise, going forth under the cross that God has laid upon them. It is characteristic of Michelangelo that he gave no hint of the possibility of redemption. The terror of the situation is what he has insisted upon almost exclusively. As one turns to some of the other figures which are purely decorative and act as ornaments, we find Michelangelo's extraordinary fertility of invention. Every conceivable attitude of animation, of dramatic feeling and form that these athletic figures can assume are shown. That grandeur, that almost disdainful power of body is suggested in these figures. In the triangles to the right and left of the prophets at the two extremities of the vault are depicted the death of Goliath, the death of Holofernes, the brazen serpent and the punishment of Haman. In the twelve lunettes above the windows are groups of the ancestors of Christ, their names designated by inscriptions, and in the twelve triangles above them are other kindred groups

crouched or sitting, shown in relatively simple human relations, heightened but not falsified by the artist's genius, and rising into majestic significance from roots deep in daily human nature. The Sistine ceiling represents all the powers of Michelangelo at their best. His imagination has conceived, and his knowledge and certainty of hand have enabled him to realize, attitudes and combinations of unmatched variety and grandeur, and countenances of unmatched expressiveness and power. As for the intellectual meanings of this vast design, over and above those which reveal themselves at first glance they are from their very nature inexhaustible. Michelangelo seems to have begun with what is chronologically the last subject of the series, the drunkenness of Noah, and to have worked backwards, increasing the scale of his figures for their better effect, and rising in ascending scale of majesty through the acts of Creation from the last to the first.

The Sistine chapel was no sooner completed in 1513 than Michelangelo resumed work upon the marbles for the monument of Julius. But only four months had passed when Julius died. His heirs immediately entered into a new contract with Michelangelo for the execution of the monument on a reduced scale. It was to consist of a great three-sided structure, two courses high projecting from the church wall and decorated on its three unattached sides with statues. On the upper course was to be placed the colossal recumbent figures of the pope, with a vision of the Virgin and Child above him, angels mourning at the sides, and prophetic and allegoric personages at the angles. The lower course was to be enriched with twenty-four figures on projecting pedestals and in niches, of Victories and Slaves, or captives, denoting it would seem, either conquered provinces or arts and sciences in bondage after their patron's death. A much injured and not indisputable sketch by Michelangelo at Berlin, with a copy of the same by Sacchetti, is supposed to show the design at this stage of its reduction, the entire work to be completed in nine years. During the next three years Michelangelo completed at least three of the figures, for which the blocks had reached Rome from Carrara as early as July, 1508; and they are among the most famous of all existing works of the sculptor's art, namely, the *Moses*, now in the church of San Pedro in Rome, and the two *Slaves* at the Louvre. The *Moses* was originally intended for one of the angles of the upper course, but is placed at the level of the eye in the center of the principal face of the monument as it was at last finished, on a deplorably reduced and altered scale, by Michelangelo and his assistants in his old age.

Michelangelo has chosen the moment when the prophet, fresh from contact with God, when he is still bearing the reflected rays of divine glory, has come down from the Mount with the tablets of the Lord in his hand and has seated himself on the judgment seat and has beheld the folly of the Israelites during his absence. Moses' soul rises up in wrath against this outrage to God. We feel that he will arise and curse his faithless followers. The figure is quiet, but very suggestive of danger. He has demonstrated this quality, using perfectly tangible and physical material, yet even through the limitations of the human body making us feel the sublime. One realizes in the muscular build of the body, and in such a thing as the cataract of a beard that tumbles down from the chin of the Prophet, that Michelangelo has made these things a sort of spiritual revelation. It is no wonder that this figure instantly produced an enormous impression.

Michelangelo executed other figures for the tomb from time to time, but some of these were never put on the tomb. Two of the most interesting figures are now in the Louvre. They represent what are usually called the *Bound Slaves*, those magnificent evolutions of Michelangelo's thoughts, sublime human forms that he has invented for himself; captives bound and joined. One superb figure shows the strife still actually strenuously going on; the other figure is not bound down, so that the actual bonds are mere ribbons. It is not physical force being brought to bear here. It is the struggle of the soul against adverse circumstances, too weak to overcome. In the figure, *The Dying Slave*, we have another suggestion of the spiritual quality of Michelangelo's mind. This is a tremendous, but futile protest, against things that are wrong. The glorification of the ideal of suffering shows that Michelangelo has profited by the long spiritual experiences of the world from the time of the ancient Greeks. They created figures as remarkable as his, but they never learned the meaning of the Christian doctrine of long-suffering for redemption's sake, which makes a combination of the greatest of the Greek with the greatest of Christian ideals. Michelangelo takes arms and legs and thighs and torsos and necks and uses them for the expression of a sublime spiritual ideal. He never struggles against the quality of the flesh. Through its limitations he carries us into the purely imaginative.

Julius II had been succeeded on the papal throne by Cardinal Giovanni de Medici under the title of Leo X. The Medici at about the same time reëstablished their sway in Florence, overthrowing

the free institutions that had prevailed there since the days of Savonarola. Here Michelangelo was in the service of a family to whom he owed so much in his youth, but who had in the meantime outrageously humiliated his native city. While the Medici were just about to impose their ownership on the city, Florence rose up for one last time in a burst of republican enthusiasm and cast out the Medici, and Michelangelo was one of the Committee of the Defense and was attending to the fortification of San Miniato. This occurred in the summer of 1529. Here we have him turning into a military engineer. The city seemed to be about to make good its independence. At one time it promised to hold its own against the Medici. Michelangelo, in one of his attacks of panic, used his influence as one of the members of the Committee to get out of the city. He actually fled to Venice, but came back once more into the city. We know Florence was most outrageously betrayed by one of the generals defending it, into the hands of the Medici, and the family wreaked vengeance on all those who were concerned with the revolt, so Michelangelo was obliged to flee for his life. Finally he was able to make his peace with the vengeful Medici, and on being assured of safety by the Pope, he came back. If his spirit had been wounded at the start, we can figure what it was after these events. Here he was in fear of his life and because of the personal protection of the Pope he returned to the task of completing the great tombs. The pain and perplexity of the conflict of his personal allegiance and his political sympathies cast their shadow over his art, and the rise to power of the Medici was a fresh interruption of his cherished work on the tomb of Julius. Leo X and his kinsmen were full of new schemes and projects for the adornment of the façade of their own family church of San Lorenzo in Florence; and Michelangelo, carried away by the idea and forgetful of his other great task, offered his services, which were accepted, although the idea had been entertained of entrusting the work to Leonardo da Vinci. Michelangelo soon produced for the San Lorenzo façade a design of combined sculpture and architecture as splendid and ambitious as had been that for the original monument of Julius. The contract was signed in January, 1518 and the artist went to Carrara to superintend the excavation of the marbles.

Michelangelo was now in his forty-fourth year. Although half his life was yet to come, its best years had, as it proved, been spent. His progress was beset with many obstacles. For the supply of materials for the façade of San Lorenzo he had set a firm of masons



SOLDIERS BATHING IN THE ARNO (*Michelangelo*)
The Cartoon of Pisa from the Engraving by Schiavonetti.

to work, and had himself entered into a kind of partnership with them, at Carrara. However, reasons of state induced the Medici to bid him resort to certain new quarries in the territory of Florence. To his own disgust and that of his old clients at Carrara Michelangelo accordingly had to transfer the scene of his labors. Presently he found himself so impeded by the mechanical difficulties of transporting the marbles, and by the disloyalty and incompetence of those with whom he had to deal, that he was ready to throw up the commission altogether. The contracts for the façade of San Lorenzo were rescinded in 1518, and the whole scheme came to nought. Michelangelo then returned to Florence, where proposals of work poured in on him from many quarters. All that we certainly know of his having done between 1518 and 1522 is the blocking out in the rough of four more *Slaves* for the tomb of Julius, and carrying out a commission, which he had received from three citizens of Rome as early as 1514, for a statute of the risen Christ. The roughed-out *Slaves* now stand immured in a grotto in the Boboli Gardens, Florence; the *Christ*, practically finished by the master but with the last touches added by pupils, stands in the church for which it was destined, of Sta Maria sopra Minerva at Rome; there is little in it either of devotional spirit or imaginative power, although, in those parts which Michelangelo himself finished, there is extreme accomplishment of design and workmanship.

The next twelve years of Michelangelo's life (1522-34) were spent at Florence, and again employed principally in the service of his capricious patrons, the Medici. The plan of a great group of monuments to deceased members of this family, to be set up in a new sacristy or mortuary chapel in San Lorenzo, was first broached to Michelangelo in 1520 by Cardinal Giulio de Medici. No practical impetus, however, was given to the work until Giulio, after the death of Leo X and the brief pontificate of the puritanical and iconoclastic Adrian VI, had in his turn become pope in 1523 under the title of Clement VII. Even then the impetus was a wavering one. When at last after many changes of scope and scheme the plans for the sepulchral chapel took shape, they did not include, as had been at first intended, memorials to the founders of the house's greatness, Cosimo and Lorenzo the Magnificent, or even to Pope Leo X himself, but only to two younger members of the house lately deceased, Giuliano, duke of Nemours, and Lorenzo, duke of Urbino. Michelangelo brooded long over various designs for this work, and was still engaged on its execution when political revolutions interposed. In 1527 the sack of Rome by the Austrians took place, and the appar-

ently irretrievable ruin of Pope Clement. The Florentines seized the occasion to expel the Medici and set up a free republican government once more. Naturally no more funds for the works in San Lorenzo were forthcoming, and Michelangelo, on the invitation of the new signory, occupied himself for a while with designs for a group of *Hercules and Cacus*, and another of *Samson and the Philistines*. For four years more he continued to work at intervals on the completion of the Medici monuments, with the help from 1532 of Giovanni Montorsoli and other pupils, and on the building of the Laurential library. In 1531 he suffered a severe illness; in 1532 he made a long stay at Rome and entered upon yet another contract for the completion of the Julian monument to be reduced now to a still more shrunken scale and to be placed not in St. Peter's as at first intended, but in the church of San Pedro in Rome. In the autumn of 1534 he left Florence for good. The statues of the Medici monument take rank beside the *Moses* and the *Slaves* as the finest work of Michelangelo's central time in sculpture. When we come to the tombs we see the most remarkably expressive of all Michelangelo's figures. The portraits are treated not realistically but typically. In the figure called Lorenzo but which, of course, is merely another one of Michelangelo's ideals, we have a suggestion of the life of contemplation. It is the most astonishing portrayal in sculpture that we have of the idea of a soul turning in upon itself, of the necessity of contemplating the practical issues of life and of death. It gives again the sense of protest; the sense that, even with reasonable philosophy, things are wrong. As one comes a little closer and looks up into the face, one sees again the magnificence with which Michelangelo has embodied the idea of the soul lost in thought. In that of Giuliano, we have the type of alert and confident practical survey which immediately precedes action. To this contrast of the meditative and active characters corresponds a contrast in the emblematic groups accompanying the portraits. At the feet of the duke Giuliano recline the shapes of *Night* and *Day*—the former a female, the latter a male; the former sunk in an attitude of deep but uneasy slumber, the latter, whose head and face are merely blocked out of the marble, lifts himself in an attitude of wrathful and disturbed awakening. The figure of *Night* has a sense of enormous strength, the frame is so huge that it seems essentially masculine, although it has feminine attributes. This figure attracted the notice of Michelangelo's contemporaries so that one of them wrote to him saying that it was "carved by an angel." But for Michelangelo's unfailing grandeur of style, and for the sense which his works convey of a compulsive heat and tempest of thought and feeling in the



MOSES (Marble statue in the *Church of S. Pietro* in Vincoli, Rome)

The artist has given a portrayal of divine anger of such sublimity that it seems comparable to nothing short of a sublime demonstration of natural power. In this figure one feels that quality of awfulness that is part of Michelangelo.

spirit that thus conceived them, both these attitudes might be charged with extravagance. As grand, but far less violent, are those of the two companion figures that recline between sleep and waking on the sarcophagus of the pensive Lorenzo. Of these the male figure is known as *Twilight* and the female as *Dawn*. The figure of *Twilight* is a sign of Michelangelo's mastery of anatomy. He knows his lesson so well now, and he is so sure of himself in handling the human frame that in order to get it to show this enormous sense of protest, that all the strength in the world is of no avail in struggling against the forces of wrong in spite of that splendid masculinity, he makes the figure of *Twilight* singularly quiet, characterized by a tremendous dignity. The face is interesting, because it was not finished by Michelangelo. When he had executed the body, he had accomplished what was interesting to him, and as in the case of many of these marbles, it never was convenient for him to finish them. He learned that his life was in danger, threw down the mallet, and fled to Rome, and never came back to Florence alive. These things were left instantly, but the fact that they are unfinished makes them all the more interesting. There is a certain stimulating quality in unfinished sculpture, and he realized that there is an astonishing contrast between the greatest finished and unfinished works of art. The suggestiveness is quite clear in this case. Michelangelo thought these things out in marble. He himself, with his own mallet and chisel, hewed these things out. Every step is exactly right so far as the process has gone; it has merely to be carried through.

Let us turn to the figure on the opposite base. This figure, which we call *Dawn*, is another one of those creations suggesting what was going on in his mind, protesting still as though the very necessity to arise were punishment in itself. This colossal figure comes back to consciousness of the dawn of a new day with that sense of terrible reluctance, appearing almost to protest against the return of consciousness with nothing but terror and reluctance. So *Dawn* arises, preferring to remain at peace with the forgetfulness of *Night*.

What remained to be done in the Medici chapel was done by pupils, and the chapel was not finally opened to view until 1545. The recesses designed for other figures remain empty. Michelangelo's obvious and fundamental idea was to exhibit the elements and the powers of earth and heaven lamenting the death of the princes.

Of other works of the period 1522-35 we have the *Victory* in marble, in the National Museum, Florence. A youthful conqueror stands over a bearded enemy, whose shoulders he crushes down with his left knee. It is a fine and finished work and is an interesting

portrayal of Michelangelo's subjective attitude toward life. Here this glorious figure of masculine strength and body seems to suggest the idea that even victory in the moment of its coming seems to be linked with defeat, particularly reflecting the strange qualities of the characteristic working of his mind.

We turn finally back to Rome once more. Michelangelo was well over his sixties when he was asked by Paul III to return to painting. He chose for his subject *The Last Judgment*, which artists of all schools up to that time had left absolutely alone. It was exactly the theme for Michelangelo to portray the necessary religious idea and at the same time ease his own spirit by giving him a medium through which he could express the long pent-up wrath and indignation of his own soul, as though all the wrongs and insults now needed to be discharged, as it were, in some supreme artistic endeavor. This fresco is the largest executed. It was taken by Michelangelo and interpreted in these terms. It is magnificently decorated. In spite of its enormous size, he has nevertheless seized and brought out a splendidly conceived whole. Every part of the *Dies irae* is made visible. We have not only the spirit of Jeremiah, and the spirit of Dante, but he has given us the spirit of Savonarola, and his own feeling that nothing short of God's wrath could ever have put injustice into this world. In the center, at the bottom, is a group of such tremendously muscular angels that we feel the sense of strenuousness there. We have Michelangelo using his accumulated knowledge and power of the human form in greater strength than ever before. He passes beyond the bounds of the actual, of the literal truth in the portrayal of the muscular strength of these many figures. We have in another portion of the field a suggestion of the almost numberless facets which Michelangelo throws on this theme. To the right and left of God we have enormous groups of angry saints. The motive is not God coming to reward the good, but to punish the wicked, and the saints are calling not for justice or mercy, but they call for punishment with the most vindictive intensity. They brandish the implements of their passion in the face of God. On every hand the saints cry out, "How long, oh Lord, how long!" It is as though the spirit of Savonarola had broken out. Here we have tremendous angels moving themselves off the ground as though by tremendous force, being swept upward by an irresistible force to the throne of the avenging God. These enormous angels have no need for such foolish devices as wings to move by. They just hurl themselves about. They remind God in the midst of the scene that now the time of vengeance is at hand, and, in the very center, we have an astounding portrayal of the figure of God, so terrible that

it seems with the very might of his uplifted right hand he were about to hurl down all the hosts of evildoers, into that Hell prepared for them from the creation of the world. Never has a great and universal theme been handled with such spirit.

This fresco is probably the most famous single picture in the world. In it Michelangelo shows more than ever the omnipotence of his artistic science, and the fiery daring of his conceptions. But the work, so far as its deplorably deteriorated condition admits comparison, is hardly comparable in the qualities of color and decorative effect to the earlier and far more nobly inspired frescos of the ceiling. It is to these and not to *The Last Judgment* that the student must turn if he would realize what is best and greatest in the art of Michelangelo.

For nearly all his great life-works, preparatory sketches and studies by the master's hand exist. These, with a large number of other drawings, finished and unfinished, are of infinite value and interest. Michelangelo was the most learned and scientific as well as the most inspired and daring of draughtsmen, and from boyhood to extreme old age he never ceased to practice with pen, chalk or pencil. He is said to have burned vast numbers of his drawings with his own hand and caused others to be burned by friends and pupils to whom he had given them, so that what we possess must be less than a tithe of what he executed. But there are some 250 sheets—enough to let us follow and understand all his modes of conceiving, preparing and maturing his designs at all periods of his life.* By means of these drawings and the many published facsimiles we are best able to trace the progress of the master's genius. We see him diligently copying in youth from the frescos of Giotto, Masaccio, and his own master, Ghirlandaio. At this date his instrument was the pen only, used in a manner of hatching; sometimes extremely careful and close, at others fiercely bold and free, and in either case all his own.

Turning to his latter years, after completing *The Last Judgment* Michelangelo did very little with his brush. The most important things deal mostly with scenes from the passion of Christ, of the Crucifixion, which he is stated to have painted with so much devotion for Vittoria Colonna, and as he came toward the close of his career he dwelt more and more on the thought of Christ suffering


* These drawings are scattered among various collections, chiefly public. Those in England, at the British Museum, the University Galleries, Oxford, and the Royal Library, Windsor, are quite half the whole number; other important examples remain still at what was for centuries the home of his heirs, the Casa Buonarroti at Florence; others are at the Uffizi, Florence; the Museum at Chantilly; the Berlin Museum; and the Teyler Museum at Haarlem.

for him. Michelangelo seemed to be convinced that the only chance of his salvation was through the suffering of Christ. Again and again he brings out the most tender and religious feeling. He found spiritual peace in his later years. In *The Last Judgment* he seemed to give relief to his spirit, and his last days were spent in spiritual peace, living as he did beyond Raphael. At the time he was appointed architect in chief of St. Peter's Cathedral he was the most conspicuous figure outside of Venice. The work on St. Peter's had not been carried very far forward, and finally Michelangelo was appointed as architect, giving practically all the remaining time of his life and his energy to this project. It was, however, altered after his death; the elongation of the nave, especially, was carried out directly contrary to his ideas. Otherwise the tremendous building as it stands to-day is all due to him, particularly the construction of the superb dome. Here Michelangelo had a chance to express once more his love of the colossal. That ceaseless searching for the sublime, even that magnificent terror which occurs so often in his art, we see expressed in purely architectural terms. It is 140 feet across, and is raised to the incredible height of 435 feet. Thousands of tons of masonry were used. It was a piece of engineering work that would make the boldest man of modern times hesitate to undertake it. The superb comes out here just as in his paintings and his marbles. To see the church as he intended it, one has to go around to the rear. Here we see the combination of the grandeur of the architecture of Rome with all the sense of power and might; it is an absolute triumph of architecture. Had Michelangelo only accomplished in his career his marbles, or only his frescoes, or only his work in this great church, he still would be among the immortals, he still would be ranked among the greatest in the field of art, and yet we have this great spectacle of his having triumphed in all three, with the art of poetry in addition. His love of power, sublimity and grandeur are constantly in his mind, and have been expressed all through his long and fruitful career.

Emotional Life.

We may now take up a consideration of the emotional life of this great master.

There is a tradition that the artist at the tender age of fourteen was deeply attached to Luisa de' Medici, daughter of Lorenzo, but the extreme youth of both renders it likely that his sentiments were only those of admiration and respect. Luisa died when she was about eighteen.



THE LAST JUDGMENT (*Michelangelo*)

There they lie, sorrowing, groaning, convulsively drawing their limbs up under them, or as if tired unto death; loathing all that night and day has to give them. One thing is common to them all: they suffer. They are genuine children of Michelangelo, of that artist who never represented happiness.—*Brandes*.

With the exception of this early incident, Michelangelo's life was singularly free of any associations with women, and no woman figures in his life until he had entered upon old age. In his correspondence he never mentions women unless they be aunts, cousins, grand-nieces or servants.

Romancers have therefore forced Vittoria Colonna to play a leading rôle in Michelangelo's life drama, although when he met this woman who was to have so striking an influence on him for the rest of his life, he was already sixty years old. Fanfani says, "I have searched, but in vain, for documentary proofs of the passion which Michelangelo is supposed to have felt for Vittoria Colonna, and which was returned with ardour according to the assertion of some critics. My own belief, concurring with that of better judges than myself, is that we have here to deal with one of the many baseless stories told about her. Omitting the difficulties presented by his advanced age, it is wholly contrary to all we know of the Marchioness, and not a little damaging to her reputation for austerity to suppose that this admirable matron, who, after the death of her husband, gave herself up to God, and abjured the commerce of the world, should later in life have carried on an intrigue, as the saying is, upon the sly, particularly as a third person is imposed on our credulity, acting the part of go-between and cloak in the transaction, as certain biographers of the great artist, and certain commentators of his poetry, are pleased to assert, without common sense and what seriousness I will not ask."

Michelangelo's best friend in Rome was a young nobleman called Tommaso de' Cavalieri. Several of his sonnets are addressed to him. The frank admiration for a youth of singular distinction which is expressed in these sonnets gave no offense to society during the period of the earlier Renaissance, but after the Tridentine Council social feeling altered upon this and similar topics. While morals remained the same, language and manners grew more nice and hypocritical. Cavalieri was a gentleman of good repute, whose affection was a credit to his friend.

Rolland states, "Michelangelo's love for Cavalieri is calculated to disconcert the minds of many whether honest or dishonest. Early in the Italy of the closing days of the Renaissance it gave rise to unpleasant interpretations, and Aretino made outrageous allusions to it. Michelangelo's great-nephew, in the first edition of the *Rime*, in 1623, did not dare to publish the poems to Tommaso de' Cavalieri exactly. He left his writers to believe that they were addressed to Vittoria. Until the recent works of Scheffler and Symonds,

Cavalieri was regarded as an imaginary name, hiding the identity of Vittoria Colonna. But the insults of an Aretino could not reach a Michelangelo. In a letter which Michelangelo wrote in 1542 he says, "They formed in their hearts a Michelangelo out of the stuff of which their own hearts was made." There was nothing literary and cold in this Platonic idealism; it was united to a frenzy of thought which made Michelangelo the prey of everything which he considered beautiful. He knew this himself, and said one day when refusing an invitation from his friend Gianotti: 'When I see a man who possesses some talent or gift of intelligence, the man who knows how to do or say something better than the rest of the world, I am constrained to fall in love with him, and then I give myself so completely to him that I no longer belong to myself. . . . You are so highly gifted that if I accepted your invitation I should lose my liberty. Each of you would steal a portion of myself. Even the dancer and the lute player, if they were skilled in art, could do what they liked with me. Instead of being rested, fortified, calmed by your society, my soul would be torn and dispersed to every wind that blows, so much so that for many days afterwards I should not know in what world I was moving.'* To this great creator of admirable forms, and who at the same time was a great believer, a beautiful body was divine—a beautiful body was God Himself appearing under the veil of the flesh."

The earliest of these ideal lovers was Gherardo Perini, whose acquaintance with the sculptor dates from about 1522. He was especially a mark for Aretino's attacks. Frey published a few very tender letters of his, of 1522, in which he says, "When I have a letter from you, I seem to be with you, which is my unique desire." Perini signed himself, *Vostro come figliuola* (yours like a son). A beautiful poem by Michelangelo on the sorrow of absence and forgetfulness seems to be addressed to him:

"Quite near here my love has ravished my heart and life.
 Here, his beautiful eyes promised me their aid, and then
 withdrew it.
 Here he bound me; here he unbound me;
 Here I have wept, and, with infinite sorrow,
 I have seen, from this stone, depart the one who has
 taken me from myself
 And who desires me no longer."

Poems, xxxv.

* Donato Gianotti's *Dialogi*, 1545.

Later, in 1533, Michelangelo became enamoured of Febo di-Poggio, and in 1544 of Cecchino de' Bracci. His friendship for Cavalieri was not, however, exclusive and unique, but it was durable, and it reached a height which, to a certain extent, was justified not only by Cavalieri's physical beauty but by his moral nobility. Henry Thode, in his work on *Michael Angelo und das Ende der Renaissance*, places Michelangelo's friendship for Gherardo Perini and Febo di Poggio in such an order as to rise by degrees to his friendship for Cavalieri, because he cannot admit that Michelangelo could have descended from the most perfect love to the affection of a Febo. But in reality Michelangelo had already been in relation with Cavalieri for more than a year when he became enamoured of Febo and wrote him humble letters and the absurd raving poems in which he plays upon the words Febo and Poggio—letters and poems to which the young scamp replied by demands of money. Michelangelo was at this time fifty-eight years old.

As to Cecchino de' Bracci, a friend of his friend Luigi del Riccio, Michelangelo did not know him until ten years after Cavalieri. Cecchino was the son of a banished Florentine and died prematurely at Rome in 1544. We have a letter of uncertain date, in which Michelangelo tells del Riccio that he has sent him a madrigal, begging him, if he thinks fit, to commit the verses "to the fire—that is, to what consumes me." Then he asked him to resolve a certain problem which has occurred to his mind, "for while I was saluting our idol in a dream, it seemed to me that he laughed and in the same instant threatened me, and not knowing which of these two moods I have to abide by, I beg you to find out from him." In memory of de'Bracci, Michelangelo wrote 49 funeral epigrams full of idolatrous idealism, and some of which are sublimely beautiful. These are perhaps the gloomiest poems which Michelangelo ever wrote. Vasari states, "But far above all others, he loved Tommaso de' Cavalieri, a Roman noble, a young man devoted to art. Michelangelo drew a life-sized portrait of him, his first and last, for he abhorred drawing anything that was not of the utmost beauty." Varchi adds: "When I saw Messer Tommaso Cavalieri at Rome, he was not only of incomparable beauty but possessed such grace of manner, such a distinguished mind and such nobility of conduct that he well merited being loved, and all the more so when one got to know him." * Cavalieri's letters ever maintained a tone of respectful and reserved affection. He remained faithful to Michelangelo until his last hour, at which he was present. He retained his confidence and was the

* Vebedetto Varchi, *Due lezioni*, 1549.

only one who was reputed to have any influence over him. But Michelangelo's friendship for him resembled a passion of love. He addressed friendly letters to him and made him superb presents. "Sooner can I forget the food which poorly nourishes my body only, than your name, which nourishes both body and soul, filling both with such sweetness, that so long as memory preserves it I can feel neither weariness nor fear of death."

The following sonnet has no address, but there can be no doubt that it was written to Cavalieri, from the play upon his name in the last line which is lost in the English version by the substitution of the word *knight* for *Cavalier*, used in the original:

"Why should I seek to ease intense desire
 With still more tears and windy words of grief,
 When heaven, or late or soon, sends no relief
 To souls whom love hath robbed round with fire?
 Why need my aching heart to death aspire,
 When all must die? Nay, death beyond belief
 Unto these eyes would be both sweet and brief,
 Since in my sum of woes all joys expire!
 Then, too, because I cannot shun the blow
 I rather seek, say who must rule my breast,
 Gliding between her gladness and her woe?
 If only chains and bonds can make me blest,
 Nor marvel if alone and bare I go,
 An armed *Knight's* captive and slave confessed."

It was in 1533 and 1534 that Michelangelo's friendship for Cavalieri reached its height. In 1535 he began to know Vittoria Colonna, who had great mental gifts; she suffered cruelly through the infidelity of her husband; nevertheless on his death in 1525 she was inconsolable. She sought solitude in order to be able to absorb herself in the recollection of her love and celebrate it in verse. She was associated with all the great writers of Italy. But in 1534 religion occupied her entire attention. Michelangelo was enamoured of her divine spirit and she amply returned his admiration. In 1544 Vittoria returned to live in Rome, in the cloisters of Santa Anna, and she remained there until her death. Michelangelo used to go to see her. She thought affectionately of him and tried to put a little pleasure and comfort into his life. She tried to make him a few little gifts, but the suspicious old man "who would accept presents from no one," refused to give her this pleasure.

Condiva, Michelangelo's pupil, states that Michelangelo deeply loved the Marchioness, while she tenderly loved him in return, and that after her death he still kept many letters filled with honest and sweet love, such as should issue from such a heart, she herself having written to him many sonnets replete with talent and sweet longing. He bore such a love for her that Condiva remembered to have heard him say that he grieved at nothing so much as that when he went to see her pass from life he had not kissed her brow, as he had kissed her hand. He had often heard him speak about love; and others could bear him out in saying that the only love of which he spoke was that kind which is spoken of in Plato's works. A priest one day asked him why he never married and he answered, "I have a wife who is too much for me already; one who unceasingly persecutes me. It is my art; and my works are my children."

Santayana states, "We find in Michelangelo's poems a few recurring ideas, or rather, the varied expression of a single half aesthetic, half religious creed. The soul, he tells us in effect, is by nature made for God and for the enjoyment of divine beauty. All true beauty leads to the idea of perfection; the effort toward perfection is the burden of all art, which labours, therefore, with a superhuman and insoluble problem. All love, also, that does not lead to the love of God and merge into that love is already the light of heaven, the fire of love is already the fire of Hell. These are the thoughts that perpetually recur, varied now with a pathetic reference to the poet's weariness and old age, now with an almost despairing appeal for divine mercy, often with a powerful and rugged description of the pangs of love, and with pious acceptance of its discipline. The whole is intense, exalted, and tragic; haunted by something of that profound terror, of that magnificent strength, which we admire in the figures of the Sistine Chapel, those noble agonies of beings greater than any we find in this world. What, may we ask, is all this tragedy about? What great sorrow, what great love, had Michelangelo or his giants that they writhe so supernaturally? As those decorative youths are sprinkled over the Sistine vault, filled, we know not why, with we know not what emotion, so these scraps of verse, these sibylline leaves of Michelangelo's, give us no reason for their passion. There is something impersonal and elusive about the subject and occasion of these poems. Attempts have been made to attribute them to discreditable passions, as also to a sentimental love for Vittoria Colonna. But the friendship for Vittoria Colonna was an incident of his mature years; some of the sonnets and madrigals are addressed to her, but we cannot attribute to her influence the passion and

sorrow that seem to permeate them. It is not necessary to find vulgar causes for the extraordinary feelings of an extraordinary man. It suffices that life wore this aspect to him; that the great demands of his spirit so expressed themselves in the persons of his world."

Michelangelo paid homage to the eternal beauty revealed in the mortal image of divinity. In one of his sonnets he says,

"As one who will re-seek her home of light,
Thy form immortal to this prison-house
Descended, like an angel piteous,
To heal all hearts and make the whole world bright.
'Tis this that thralls my soul in love's delight,
Not thy clear face of beauty glorious,
For he who harbours virtue still will choose
To love what neither years nor death can blight.
So fares it ever with things high and rare
Wrought in the sweat of nature; heaven above
Showers on their birth the blessings of her prime;
Nor hath God deigned to show Himself elsewhere
More clearly than in human forms sublime,
Which, since they image Him, alone I love."

The preternatural work to which Michelangelo had been condemned during nearly ninety years of life, without a day's repose or a day of real life, had not even served for the carrying out of a single one of his great projects. Having reached the end of life, Michelangelo bitterly contemplated his incompleted, destroyed and unaccomplished works. His desire, after the death of Vittoria, would have been to return to Florence, but after having served the popes all his life he wished to devote his last years to the service of God. In January, 1547, a month after the death of Vittoria, he was appointed prefect and architect of St. Peters', with full powers to erect the building. "Many think—and I myself think—that I have been placed in this post by God," he wrote. "Old though I am, I do not wish to abandon it, for I serve through love of God and place all my hopes in Him."

Towards sunset, on the 18th of February, 1564, Michelangelo said, "I give my soul to God, my body to the earth, and my worldly possessions to my nearest of kin, charging them through life to remember the sufferings of Jesus Christ." With these words on his lips, Michelangelo died.

At the time of his death Michelangelo was on such a pinnacle of fame as comes to few artists during their lifetime. His body was surreptitiously removed from Rome by his friends from Florence, for they knew the Romans would never consent to have his body removed. All Florence turned out to honor the remains, and in the right aisle of St. Peter's, the great church which he erected, he was buried.

Thus Michelangelo, driven compulsively to a life overburdened with work and unfulfilled desires, found rest at last. After a life of divine sorrow, he attained the object of his desires :

"Happy is the soul, where time runs no longer."

Poems, cix, 37

The Psychology of Michelangelo.

We have a contemporary portrait of Michelangelo, which gives a very interesting suggestion of his character, especially of the homeliness of his person. He loved beauty, and it was probably a source of sorrow to him that his own person was unbeautiful. He was of medium stature, broadshouldered and muscular. Deformed by work, he walked with raised head, hollowed out back and protruding stomach. His round head was covered with disheveled curly black hair; his eyes, speckled with yellow and blue, were small and sad; his square forehead was lined with wrinkles. His big straight nose had a bump in the middle. Among the young artists studying sculpture in the Medici gardens was Torregiani, who, being irritated by Michelangelo's sarcastic remarks, struck him so violent a blow as to break his nose and disfigure him for life. His mouth was delicate, with the lower lip slightly protruding. Scanty side whiskers and a thin beard framed his hollow cheeks and broader cheekbones. One may note in Michelangelo's sullen and morose features an exact portrayal of the anal character which Abraham has so excellently outlined—even to the widening of the nares associated with the raising of the lip, as though one were "sniffing something unpleasant."

Michelangelo and Raphael, the two foremost artists of the world, were brought together in the Vatican Palace and labored near each other for years, but never met as friends nor seemed conscious of their vicinity. They admired each other's genius and watched the other's developments and works with the keenest interest; but Raphael shrank from encountering the morose and savage temper of his great rival, and Michelangelo was prejudiced against the artist of Urbino because he was a friend of Bramante and a pupil of Perugino, whom Michelangelo despised so thoroughly that he was once arrested for

upbraiding him publicly. The separation thus formed between the two artists was widened by the talebearing of their followers, until it became impassable. Bramante even endeavored to have Raphael appointed to paint the remainder of the Sistine Chapel after Michelangelo had finished the first half; but the wronged artist made an impetuous appeal to the Pope himself. It is said that Raphael thanked God that he had been born in the same century as Michelangelo, but the less generous artist said that "All that Raphael has of art, he has from me." The Pope's remark to Sebastiano del Piombo helps to harmonize these statements: "See the work of Raphael, who, as soon as he saw the pictures of Michelangelo, suddenly abandoned the manner of Perugino and approached as near as he could to that of Michelangelo. But he (Michelangelo) is terrible, as you know, and no one can manage him."

Another story of Michelangelo's sudden outbursts of temper is told in a brief memoir of Leonardo da Vinci by an anonymous writer dated 1510, which is preserved in the National Library at Florence: "Lionardo passing together with G. da Gavina by Santa Trinita from the bench of the Spini, where there was a meeting of honourable men, who disputed regarding a passage of Dante, they called to Lionardo requesting him to explain the passage. It happened by chance that at that moment Michelangelo came in sight, and was called by one of those present, when Lionardo said that Michelangelo would explain the passage, who, fancying that was this was said in mockery angrily replied: 'Explain it yourself, who designed a horse to be cast in bronze which you could not cast, and shamefully gave it up.' And so saying he turned his back and went on his way saying, whilst Lionardo reddened at these words intended to wound him, 'And you were believed in by these Milanese blockheads.'"

Let us view carefully this old Florentine, filled with the pride of his blood and race. Although singularly careless of his attire, negligent of ordinary attention to bodily cleanliness, he was, mentally at least, an aristocrat, and possessed all the prejudices of his caste. He went so far as to say that "art ought to be exercised by nobles, not by plebians." He had a religious, almost barbarian conception of his family. He sacrificed everything to it and wished others to do the same. He said: "I have never, either as a painter or a sculptor, made a trade of my art. I have always exercised it for the honor of my family. I would sell myself as a slave for art's sake." His motive, however, was not guided by affection, for he despised his brothers, who well merited his scorn, and also his nephew, who was

his heir. But, as representatives of his family, he respected them. We find these words continually recurring in his letters: "Our family . . . *la nostra gente* . . . uphold our family . . . so that our family die not."

The compulsive activity of Michelangelo possessed none of the joyous enthusiasm of the natural gift of others of his time. His mood was ever overserious and his fine frenzy of creativeness was tinged with a sort of "terrible terror." Although the very excess of strength with which he worked was of the "internal suffering" kind, it permitted him a degree of ego cathexis to work ceaselessly without an hour's repose. "I am wearing myself out with work as never man did before. I think of nothing else save working day and night" is his written statement. His unhealthy craving for activity caused him to accept many more commissions than he could possibly execute and his restless activity actually degenerated into a sort of mania. He wished to sculpture whole mountains. When he had monuments to build, we find him wasting years in quarries selecting huge blocks of marble and making roads to convey them to his workshop. He literally wanted to do everything, acting in the capacity of engineer, workman, and stonemason, expending precious time and energy on work which could easily have been accomplished by others. He wanted to build palaces, churches, and huge works of art, all unaided so far as possible. When well over sixty years of age he painted for nearly two years lying on his back, covering thousands of square feet literally with his own hands, unassisted. The compulsive character of his make-up is seen in his letters, continually complaining: "I had hardly time to eat . . . I have no time to sleep . . . for the past twelve years I have been ruining my body with fatigue. I stand in need of necessities . . . I am without a penny . . . I am naked. I suffer a thousand ills . . . I live in a state of poverty and suffering . . . I struggle with poverty." These are but symptomatic expressions of the ever present perils of poverty—the time-and-money mechanism of the anal character.

That Michelangelo's poverty was imaginary is proven by substantial evidence that he was in fact very wealthy. He lived like a poor man, harnessed to his task like a horse to a millstone, yet no one could understand why he tortured himself in this manner. Yet it was out of his power *not* to torture himself. Even his father, who had many of his son's traits, reproached him. After his death there was found, at his house in Rome, from 7,000 to 8,000 gold ducats, equivalent to \$80,000 to \$100,000. Moreover he had already given his nephew 7,000 crowns and his servant Urbino 2,000. He had large

sums invested in Florence. The *Denunzio de' beni* for 1534 states that he then possessed six houses and seven estates. He had a mania for possessing land and was continually buying. This was a trait transmitted from peasant ancestors. However, though he amassed wealth, it was not for himself that he did so; he spent his riches on others and deprived himself of the bare necessities of life.

As a result of this terrible life he was, as his father prophesied, constantly ill. At forty-two years of age he had a sense of decrepitude and at forty-eight wrote that for every day he worked he had to rest four. Michelangelo's sonnet, *On the Painting of the Sistine Chapel*, expresses the hardships he suffered at the time he worked on this great fresco:

"I've grown a goiter by dwelling in this den
As cats from stagnant streams in Lombardy,
Or in what other land they hap to be—
Which drives the belly close beneath the chin:
My beard turns up to heaven; my nape falls in,
Fixed on my spine: my breast-bone visibly
Grows like a harp; a rich embroidery
Bedews my face from brush-drops thick and thin.
My loins into my paunch like levers grind:
My buttock like a crupper bears my weight;
My feet unguided wander to and fro;
In front my skin grows loose and long; behind,
By bending it becomes more taut and strait;
Backward I strain me like a Syrian bow;
Whence false and quaint, I know,
Must be the fruit of squinting brain and eye;
For ill can aim the gun that bends awry.
Come then, Giovanni, try
To succor my dead pictures and my fame;
Since foul I fare and painting is my shame."

His mind, more than his body, suffered from the consequences of this terrible life of work. He was consumed with pessimism, a trait inherited from his father. In his youth he wore himself out reassuring the latter, who at times suffered from attacks of persecutory delusions. Old Buonarroti, in a fit of terror, suddenly fled from his home crying that his son had driven him forth. We find a record of many illnesses during Michelangelo's lifetime. In 1517, at the time he was working on the façade of San Lorenzo and the statue of Christ in the church of S. Maria Sopra Minerva in Rome, he was "sick unto death." The following year, when at the Seravezza quarries, he fell ill through overwork and worry. He had a fresh illness in 1520, at the time of the death of Raphael. At the end of 1521, a

friend congratulated him "on recovering from an illness from which few recover." In 1531, after the capture of Florence, he could neither eat nor sleep, and his health was so poor that his friends concluded he was doomed. In 1539 he fell from his scaffolding at the Sistine Chapel and broke his leg. In 1544 he had a very serious attack of fever, and was nursed by his friend, Luigi del Riccio. When the fever returned in December, 1545, and January, 1546, it left him in a very weak state. Riccio again nursed him during this period. In 1549 he suffered cruelly from stone, and in 1555 he was tortured by gout. In 1559 he was again suffering from stone and pains of all sorts and was in a very weak condition. In August, 1561, he had an attack which was described as "falling into unconsciousness, with convulsive movements."

Michelangelo states that he was thirty-three years old before he was emancipated from his father. His letters to him are filled with unflinching patience for this man of narrow intellect and hasty temper, which no injustice of the father could wear out. He addresses him as "Most Reverend Father" and "Dearest Father," and when the latter died in his ninetieth year he had the body transported to Florence at considerable expense and grieved for the loss of a parent to whom he had been so devoted. Impatient as Michelangelo was in his dealings with others and subject to outbursts of passion, he was ever gentle and considerate of his father's faults of character, and from an early age he denied himself necessities that he might minister to his wants. But Michelangelo himself was more affected than the parent he sought to console. His ceaseless activity and overwhelming fatigue delivered him over without defence to all the aberrations of a mind filled with suspicions. He distrusted both his friends and his enemies, and to his friend Riccio, who had just saved him from a serious illness, he wrote:

"In the sweetness of a perfect friendship
A menace to honour and life is often hid."

Sonnet lxxiv.

He distrusted his relatives, suspecting that they were waiting for the opportunity to gain by his death. He said: "I live in a state of melancholy, or rather of madness." By dint of much suffering he ended in finding a sort of bitter pleasure in pain:

"Melancholy, that is my joy."

Poems, lxxxi.

"A thousand joys are not as good as a single torment."

Poems, lxxxiv.

His devouring energy almost entirely separated him from all human society. He stood alone. He hated and was hated. He was admired and feared, but in the end inspired a religious respect. He dominated his century. He was then assuaged a little. He saw men from above, and they saw him from below. A woman's love was refused him. Alone, for a moment, there shone in that solitary sky the cold pure star of friendship of Vittoria Colonna. Everything around was the blackness of night, traversed by the glowing meteors of his thought: his desire and his delirious dreams. Never did Beethoven know such a night as that. The reason is that this night was in Michelangelo's heart. Michelangelo's sadness, which provoked fear in men and made all instinctively flee, was part and parcel of his being. But this was nothing. The ill consisted not in being alone but in being alone with himself, in being unable to live with himself, in not being master of himself, in disowning, combating, and destroying himself. His genius was coupled with a soul which betrayed it (Rolland).

We find him irresolute in art, in politics, and in all his actions and thoughts. At the end of his life he had completed nothing. There have been many allegations that his tasks were imposed upon him by his patrons and the responsibility of this perpetual wavering between one project and another has been laid on the shoulders of his masters, but we forget the fact that Michelangelo could have refused the work and need not have accepted so many commissions which he had not the time to fulfil had he cared to do so, for there was no means of imposing them upon him. Through an exaggerated sense of responsibility he felt himself obliged to undertake mediocre tasks which any foreman could have done better. He tormented himself with a thousand scruples which a more energetic nature would have rejected. He tolerated insulting letters and replied to them humbly—such as the humiliating letter from Cardinal Julius de' Medici in 1518 in which he expressed the suspicion that Michelangelo had been bribed. Michelangelo bends the knee and replies that the only thing in the world he cares for is to please him.

The emotional arrest in the psychosexual life of the homosexual is strikingly shown in the absence of personal courage either to take a more determined stand against society for his own peculiar sexual desires or to withstand the shock of physical encounters. The former is less pathologic than the latter, for the effort to stem the tide of general condemnation of society toward homosexual relationships makes the individual's life truly miserable; to lack personal courage is the lesser burden. Almost all homosexuals are pacifists; the

converse is not always true although many of the homosexual traits are to be found in all pacifists. Michelangelo's lack of personal courage is strikingly shown. Terrified by a vision, in 1494 he fled from Florence. Again, in 1529, he fled as far as Venice and was on the point of escaping to France, but he became ashamed of his fear and returned to Florence, where he did his duty until the end of the siege. When Florence was taken and proscription reigned, he became weak and trembling, and even went so far as to disown the banished Florentines. The craven manner in which he humiliated himself by begging for release from proscription is classic of the homosexual. Some great generals, including Frederick the Great, were homosexual. The latter has recently been denied greatness: on his first command in battle he fell into a panic and deserted his army.

Michelangelo was mortally ashamed of his fear; he wished to die; but it seemed as though a force sprang up within him that he might live in order to suffer the more. He craved oblivion to bring his maddening slavery to an end, and spoke with envy of those who were dead. On the death of his father he wrote the following:

"You no longer feel the fear of a change of being and desire . . .
 The course of the hours lays not violent hands upon you . . .
 Necessity and chance guide not your steps . . .
 I can hardly write without envy."

The personal association of father and son may be a shorter cut than the longer road of inheritance to account for the mutual expression of a passionate temper in both Michelangelo and his father; both suffered from the paranoid type of make-up which exists upon a suppressed homosexual constitution.

We find the nursling reared upon the bottle, or even the breast of a foster mother, loses something of the emotional development attained by those nursed by the mother. That this interrelationship is mutual and biologic for all mammals, including human beings, may be shown in the lack of emotional stress in the absence of the nursing relationship which is experienced by both in the separation of the child from the mother. Days usually spent in mourning this mutual loss are bridged in a few hours.

Nor is this the only means of knowing that the emotional relationship is strong from the first day of birth, and that this almost fierce frenzy of possession serves a valuable purpose in the emotional development of the nursling. A careful study recently made in Sweden of various abnormal states of adults, showed that a pre-

ponderance of abnormal trends was to be found in the individuals who had been foundlings and who had been denied the warmth of mother love in earliest infancy. Again, pediatricists have been at a loss to account for the great importance of the infant nursing at the breast in terms of physical and chemical laws per se. Thanks to the new psychoanalytic data, they find that all the biologic reasons are founded upon sound psychologic laws, as laid down primarily in Freud's libido theory. This, in brief, is that primarily the newborn child turns to the mother for safety and security; the nutritional factor of the breast attachment is probably of secondary moment, for the majority of infants have to be taught to nurse at the breast. The attachment to the mother which has been broken by the process of birth is at once reestablished in greater part by the breast relationship. This biologic causeway is the bridge which leads to all other types of emotional relationships, and these, as we have already shown, are the beginnings of the sense of reality, and also the pathway of object love interests directed toward persons in the newly begun external life of the child.

From the foregoing hypothesis we may find some import in the fact that Michelangelo was not nursed by his own mother but by a wet nurse, and that his mother died when he was very young; throughout his life he is strangely silent of any mention of her. We also know in detailments of the homosexual constitution that soon after birth the subject replaces the mother by his own person (sexual organ), which either actively or passively functions as the loved object. The earlier and more primitive the identification, the more definitely will the individual play the passive or female rôle in the homosexual relationship. Michelangelo's love was directed toward his father in the same manner as the mother might have expressed it, and this attachment was not ended until Michelangelo's thirty-third year. Thereafter a series of homosexual attachments followed, and we may infer the probable repression of denial caused a compulsive neurosis of varied patterns throughout his life.

The purity of the subjective phase of the mother-and-child identification in Michelangelo's treatment of the Madonna subject speaks strongly for a completely homosexual character. His assumption of a protective attitude toward his father, on whom he lavished love and devotion to the point of personal sacrifice, proves much for the beautiful and unnatural love for his father, whose death at the age of ninety was a matter of deep sorrow.

In the light of psychoanalytic research, it is not difficult for us to see more clearly the signal strength and faults in the personality of

this great master. As we have seen, the strong elements in the anal character are pride, envy, and the whole gamut of the so-called unsocial traits. Indeed, these traits are masked and repressed in everyone and are merely more pronounced in neurotics and certain types of so-called normal but unlovely personalities. The dominant note is one of hate and distrust. In the stiffening of the character, determination deteriorates into obstinacy or downright headstrong defiance, which Michelangelo more than once illustrated. In a successful repression of the coprophilia one sees the urge to paint, model, and similar activities. If these manifold traits are not fully repressed, one sees the general disregard for dress and cleanliness of person, which Michelangelo so singularly showed. On the other hand, a too intensive repression of this coprophilic tendency may lead to a reactive attitude, resulting in scrupulosity, moralizing and pedantic prudery; of the latter trialogue Michelangelo seemed to have been more than guilty.

The well known relationship between feces and money gives us a strong hint of the hypochondriacal character of Michelangelo toward his gastrointestinal difficulties, and he was a martyr to renal and urinary disease as the result of his continued neglect of health. All of Michelangelo's letters to his father and brothers are filled with advices regarding money and how it should be expended. The anal character also carries an obstinate determination to accomplish all tasks by oneself. So marked was this trait in Michelangelo that almost all his architectural projects were carried forward single-handed so far as possible. While his painting and sculpture suffered not a little from delay and incompleteness, they were also woefully retarded by pontifical rebukes, which were met with such rebellion on the part of the artist that many a pope speedily learned to accept the choleric temper of their great subject and make the best of it.

One finds the anal character is also afflicted with the paradox of extraordinary assiduity and perseverance on the one hand, and procrastination on the other. This ambivalence is seen in Michelangelo's attitude toward Pope Julius' tomb.

In this character, one finds the pleasure of the act of achievement passing to the product or thing accomplished. Thus the wound to the self-esteem or narcissism in the loss of substance (feces) is compensated for by the immediate transference of the libido from the loss of the expulsive material to the thing achieved or produced; this is effected by way of the acceptance of the parental identification, and the value which the parent or nurse endows on the result of attainment. In the process of "doing it all alone," one sees the arrogance

and pretentiousness with which Michelangelo treated all his contemporaries and the furious acerbity with which he treated Leonardo da Vinci and Raphael. The signal handicap which all these antisocial attitudes had on his professional work is reflected still further in poor sexualization and socialization. The libido or love life, failing to pass from an anal erotism—not being successfully repressed, either being too prematurely cut off in development or disciplinarily fixed—makes the tranquil succession of a normal adult love life difficult of attainment. While Michelangelo suffered a sexual inversion as well, it made even his anal character seem more forbidding socially. His concern with the very rudiments of his work, as well as his interest in mathematical statistics and tabulations—which was even more elaborated in Leonardo da Vinci—made his life an unnecessary burden. It illustrates that sculpture is perhaps the most primitive art and is intimately bound up with the very sensation of form conception—the anal sphincter control itself, which is, after all, but a later formative sensation and feeling of an earlier infantile attitude toward the mother's breast in a mouth relationship.

What may we say in regard to the self torture and misery of Michelangelo? In the anal character there always exists a deep sense of hate and wrong which is born of the various deprivations or castrations and the giving up of infantile sources of pleasure. These pleasures are antipodal to the cultural and disciplinary repressions instituted by the mother or nurse. If these nursings and soilings are not acceptably repressed the attitude of injury and hate is thinly disguised throughout the life of such individuals. Naturally there result two attitudes which are now embraced under the one term of sadomasochism. The first, sadism, is one of hostility, revenge and destruction of things and people who oppose or stand in the way of a free gratification of the instinct. The failure to wreak vengeance in this manner calls for a repression of this desire and there often succeeds a form of self-punishment. In the cultural repression of sadism as in Michelangelo we have an intense and noisy detailment in verse and letters of his own truly pitiable plight. Nor are we to take Michelangelo's statements of his sufferings in any mere physiologic or biologic sense, but as being torments of the spirit or psychologic ailments, for after all he worked and lived robustly beyond the allotted three score years and ten of ordinary mortals. Michelangelo's multitudinous bodily complaints were often of the nature of chronic hypochondria, which we now know has just as truly a spiritual pathology as cancer of the stomach has in ordinary histo- or structural pathology; but this spiritual disease is

in terms of the libido a too intensive inbinding or damming up of feelings in these various organs of the body. Under favorable systems of treatment these clogged organs once more may be made to disgorge their high tension of feeling and the person may then escape from his truly sad plight. The fundamental cause for this clogging of too much feeling in the bodily organs is the absence of a normal sexual and emotional life as the psychopathology of everyday life of all individuals attests.

In all anal characters there is always the danger of the undue projection of the particular or personal interpretation and projection into the universal, thus marring, as in Michelangelo's art, the widest artistic appeal. It is always a nice question how much of the internally formed concepts and feelings may be allowed as an artistic urge and yet not allow it to distort the universality of the art abstraction which the artist may create. Both idealisms heavily biased by paganistic concepts and the early Christian doctrines entered into Michelangelo's creations. The intensity and distortion of the huge physical figures in all his works made his people Martians or supermen and women. His perfect frenzy of productivity is due mainly to the compulsive expression of the denied emotional outlets of a more normal sexual life.

It would seem that the illy repressed sadistic hate which Michelangelo felt all his life long broke loose in all its fury in his final portrayal of *The Last Judgment*. He places within the dome of St. Peter's not a gentle, loving God, but a God of vengeance who in long suppressed wrath breaks loose and fairly hurls human beings headlong into everlasting torment.

In conclusion we may say that the character defects of genius as illustrated by Michelangelo are glaringly marked, and the wonder is that such a neurotic makeup did not burden the productivity of his life more than it did. In spite of his sexual inversion, his analerotic syndrome and the various compulsions from which he suffered, he lived one of the most stupendous creative careers of all time. While the unsocial traits in Michelangelo's personality forbid an enthusiastic admiration of him as in the case of the magnetic personality of Leonardo, we have the deepest reverence and respect for his lofty idealism expressed in his art. We also feel a tragic pity for this immortal genius, who lived such a life of physical and psychic torment that its end carried almost its only real comfort.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE TECHNIC OF CHILD ANALYSIS

FOUR LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE SCHOOL OF INSTRUCTION OF THE
VIENNA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

BY
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I

INTRODUCTION TO CHILD ANALYSIS

It is difficult to say anything about child analysis unless a decision has been reached as to what cases it is advisable to treat, and what cases had best not be attempted. Mrs. Melanie Klein of Berlin has, as you know, occupied herself extensively with this question, both in her published works and in her lectures before the last congress. She maintains that every disturbance of the psychic or intellectual development of the child can be removed or at least be favorably influenced through analysis. She goes even further in her opinion that analysis is of great advantage for the development of the normal child and, in the course of time, will become an indispensable adjunct to all modern education. On the other hand, it appears, from a discussion of this question at one of the meetings of our society last year, that the majority of our Vienna analysts hold a different view and maintain that an analysis of a child is opportune only when a real infantile neurosis is actually present. In the course of my lectures I fear I can do little toward clarifying this issue. At best I can only report to you in what instances I have undertaken analysis where this decision has proven to be correct, and where its fulfilment has miscarried because of internal or external difficulties. Of course it is natural that in making new decisions one is guided by successes and deterred by failures.

On the whole, I believe that in working with children, one sometimes gains the impression that analysis is a method too difficult, expensive and complicated for them; that it is used too much, and still more frequently, in other cases, that straight analysis accomplishes too little. From this, it might follow that analysis, when it

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has to do with children, requires certain modifications and alterations or it can be applied only under definite precautions. Where there is no possibility of keeping these technical precautions, it is perhaps better to advise against the analysis.

In the course of these lectures, numerous examples will illustrate what the preceding remarks refer to. For the time being I will intentionally put aside the solution of these questions and occupy myself with the technical procedure of child analysis in cases in which it appears advisable to undertake analysis for some reason which need not be explained for the moment.

During the past year I have been invited several times to present the development of a child case before the technical seminar of the society and by means of it to explain the special technic of child analysis. Until now I have always refused this request because I feared that all that can be said on this theme would seem to you extremely commonplace and self-evident. The special technic of child analysis, so far as it can be termed special, may be deduced from a simple premise: that the adult—at least in the majority of cases—is a mature and independent being, the child, an immature and dependent one. Obviously enough when the object is so different, the method cannot remain the same. Many parts of it, which in the case of the adult are important and meaningful, lose their significance in the new situation, the rôle of the various methods is shifted; what was in one instance a necessary and harmless action becomes in the other a doubtful procedure. These modifications, however, arise naturally from the actual situation and scarcely need a special theoretic explanation.

During the past two and a half years I have had the opportunity to conduct protracted analyses of some ten children and in the following lectures I will endeavor to correlate the observations I was able to make and which, no doubt, would have occurred to any one of you under similar favorable circumstances.

We will, therefore, keep to the actual succession of events in the analyses and begin with the attitude of the child at the beginning of analytic work.

Let us first consider the analogous situation in the adult patient. An individual feels disturbed by some sort of internal difficulty which interferes with his work or his enjoyment of life; for some reason he gains confidence in the therapeutic powers of analysis or in some particular analyst and determines to seek relief in this way. Naturally I know that the situation is not always like this. Not always internal difficulties motivate the analysis but more frequently con-

flicts with the outside world, which arise from them. Moreover, the decision is not always arrived at independently; the insistence of relatives or other intimates plays a greater rôle than is often favorable for later work. Even confidence in analysis or the analyst is not always important. At the same time, in the interest of the treatment it remains an ideal and desirable situation if the patient of his own free will allies himself with the analyst against a fragment of his own soul life.

With the child, this state of affairs is naturally never found. The decision to be analyzed never proceeds from the little patient but always from the parents or from others in his environment. The child is not asked for his consent. Even if the question should be put to him, he would have no possible way of forming an opinion or finding an answer. The analyst is a stranger, the analysis itself something unknown. But, what carries even more weight: the ailment in many cases is not the concern of the child; he himself often feels nothing of the trouble; only his environment suffers under his symptoms or his outbursts of temper. Thus everything is lacking in the situation of the child, which seems indispensable to that of the adult: insight into the illness, the voluntary decision and the will to be cured.

But this does not impress every analyst as a serious obstacle. For example, you learned from the work of Mrs. Melanie Klein how she meets these circumstances and what technic she has founded upon them. For my part, it seems worth the effort to investigate whether the situation which has proven so favorable for adult analysis cannot be produced in the case of the child; that is, whether all the readiness and willingness, which are here lacking, cannot be engendered in some way.

As the subject of my first lecture, I will take six cases with ages ranging from the sixth to the eleventh year in order to show you how I succeeded in making the young patient "analyzable" in the adult sense, that is, producing in him an insight into his illness, arousing confidence in the analysis and the analyst, and transforming the decision to be analyzed from an outward one to an inner one. Given this task, it is necessary to have a period of preparation in child analysis, which we do not find in adult analysis. I wish to emphasize that all that is undertaken during this period has nothing to do with the actual analytic work; that means, there is as yet no question of revealing unconscious processes or of influencing the patient analytically. It is merely a matter of converting a definite undesirable condition into a desirable one by all the means which are at the disposal

of the adult in his relation with the child. This period of preparation—the “training” for analysis as one might term it—will last the longer the further the original condition of the child is removed from that just depicted of the ideal adult patient.

You must not, however, envisage this work as so difficult; the step, which must be taken, is often not a very great one. I am reminded here of the case of a little six-year-old girl, who was placed in my care for three weeks’ observation. I was to determine whether the difficult, taciturn and unpleasant nature of the child was the fault of a defective constitution and unsatisfactory intellectual development or whether the case was that of a particularly inhibited and dreamy child. Closer observation revealed the presence of a compulsion neurosis unusually severe and deep-seated for this age side by side with the keenest intelligence and sharpest logic. Here the whole beginning turned out to be very simple. The little girl already knew two children who were being analyzed by me, and, the first time—she came to the session with her somewhat older girl friend—I did not speak in particular to her but merely allowed her to become acquainted with the strange surroundings. The next time, when I had her alone, I began the first attack. I said that she must know why her two companions came to me; one because he could never tell the truth and wanted to break himself of the habit; the other, because she cried too much and was herself angry over this. Had she been sent to me for some such reason? To this she replied frankly: “I have a devil in me. Can it be taken out?” For the moment, I was amazed at this unexpected answer. Then I replied I thought it could be done, but that it was no easy task and, if I should try to remove it for her, she would have to do a number of things, which would be very unpleasant for her. Naturally, I meant by this that she would have to tell me everything. She paused a moment meditating earnestly. “If you tell me,” she answered then, “that this is the only way to do it and to do it quickly, then it will be all right with me.” By this she had, of her own free will, pledged herself to the basic analytic principle. More we do not require even of the adult at the beginning. But she also had a complete understanding of the question of how much time would be involved. After the three probational weeks had elapsed, the parents were undecided as to whether to allow her to remain in analysis with me or whether to have her treated in some other manner. She herself, however, was very disturbed, did not wish to give up the hope of recovery, which I had awakened in her, and continued to demand urgently that if she had to go away that I free her from her devil in the three or

four days that remained. I assured her that would be impossible, for she would have to remain with me a long time. I could not make her understand anything in numbers, for, although she was of school age she had no knowledge of calculation, because of her numerous inhibitions. Whereupon she sat down on the floor and pointed to the patterns in my carpet. "Will it take as many days," she asked, "as there are red spots here? Or still as many more as these green spots here?" I indicated by means of the many small medallions in the pattern of my carpet the great number of hours that were necessary. She understood perfectly and in the controversy that now followed she did her part to persuade her parents of the necessity of a long joint labor with me.

You will say that in this case it was the severity of the neurosis which facilitated the work of the analyst. But I believe that would be a mistake. As example, I will cite another case, where the initiation took place in a like manner, although in this case there could be no question of an actual neurosis.

About two and a half years ago, I made the analytic acquaintance of a girl almost eleven years old, whose upbringing caused her parents the greatest difficulties. She belonged to the well-to-do middle class, but her home environment was not satisfactory, her father weak and uninterested in her, her mother dead for some years, her relations with the second wife of her father and with her younger stepbrother disturbed by all sorts of troubles. A number of the child's thefts, and an endless series of crude lies, as well as concealments and deceptions big and little, had determined the stepmother, on advice of the family physician, to seek the aid of analysis. Here the analytic agreement was just as simple. "The parents can do nothing with you" was the foundation of our compact. "With their help alone, you will never get away from these constant scenes and conflicts. Perhaps you will try once with a stranger." Without more ado, she accepted me as an ally against the parents, just as the little compulsive neurotic previously described has accepted me as an ally against her devil. The insight into the illness which the compulsive neurotic had, was here replaced by an insight into the conflict, but the active factor common to both was the amount of suffering, originating in the latter case from external, in the former from internal causes.

My method of action in this second case was exactly that of Aichhorn's in his dealings with the delinquent pupils from the public institutions. The state educator, says Aichhorn, must first of all ally himself with his delinquent wards and assume that they are right in their attitude toward their environment. Only in this way

will he succeed in working with his pupil instead of against him. I would like to emphasize here that Aichhorn's position in this kind of work has advantages over that of the analyst. He is empowered by the city or the state to interfere and has the authority of his office to back him. On the other hand, the analyst, as the child knows, has been commissioned and is paid by the parents, and he is put in a difficult position, if he turns against those who have put him in charge, even in their own interest. As a matter of fact I never sat opposite the parents of this child in all of our necessary conferences without a bad conscience, and after several weeks, in spite of the best internal conditions, the analysis finally broke up over external matters on account of this unexplainable attitude.

In both of the cases at least the necessary preliminaries to the beginning of actual analysis were easily created; the sense of suffering, the confidence and the desire to analyze. Let us now jump to the other extreme, a case in which not one of these factors was present.

This is the case of a ten-year-old boy with an obscure mixture of many phobias, nervosities, deceptions and childish perverse actions. One large and several petty thefts had occurred in the preceding years. The conflict with parental authority was not obvious nor conscious, nor on the surface was there any insight into the whole unsatisfactory condition or a wish to change matters. His attitude toward me was completely antagonistic and mistrustful, and his efforts were directed entirely toward protecting his sexual secrets from discovery. Here I could make use of neither of the two methods, which had shown themselves to be so practicable in the other two cases. I could not ally myself with his conscious ego against a split-off fragment of his personality, for he was not even aware of such a splitting, nor could I offer myself as ally against the outside environment, to which, so far as he was aware, he was united by very strong feelings. The method I had to pursue here was obviously another, more difficult and less direct one. I had to inveigle myself into a confidence, which could not be won directly, and to force myself upon a person who was of the opinion that he could get along very well without me.

I now attempted this in several ways. First, for a long time I did nothing but adapt myself to his caprices and follow his moods through all paths and bypaths. If he came to the session in a cheerful frame of mind, I, too, was gay; if he was serious or depressed, I acted in the same manner. If he chose to spend the session under the table instead of moving about, sitting or lying down, I acted as if this were the most natural thing in the world, lifted the tablecloth and talked

to him below. If he came with string in his pocket and began to exhibit odd knots and tricks with it, I showed him that I was able to make still more curious knots and to do more remarkable tricks. If he made faces, I could make still better ones, and if he challenged me to tests of strength, I showed him that I was unsurpassably the stronger. Moreover, I fell in with him even in conversation on every subject, from tales of pirates and geographical information to stamp collections and love stories. In these conversations no theme was too grown up or too questionable, and his suspicion could not once detect any educational intent behind my communications. I acted much as if I were a movie film or a paper back novel, which has no other object than to attract the spectator or reader, and which, for this purpose, reduces its interests and aims to those of its public. My first intention was actually nothing more than to make myself interesting to the youngster. That at the same time in this first period I learned a great deal about his superficial interests and inclinations was an unreckoned but most welcome additional gain.

After a while I allowed a second factor to enter in. In a harmless way I proved useful to him during the session, wrote letters for him on the typewriter, was ready to help him in writing down his day dreams and his original stories of which he was very proud, and, during the hour, even manufactured all sorts of little things for him. In the case of a little girl, who was going through the same period of preparation, during the sessions I crocheted and knitted industriously and gradually clothed all her dolls and Teddy bears. Thus, one might say, I developed a second agreeable characteristic: I was not only interesting but I was also useful. As an additional gain of this second period, I was gradually introduced by means of writing letters and stories into the boy's circle of acquaintances and his phantasy activity.

Then something happened which was of even greater importance. I allowed him to observe that being analyzed had great practical advantages, for example, punishable acts had a much different and more favorable ending if first the analyst and through him the educator heard of them. Thus he accustomed himself to use the analysis as a protection against punishment and to seek my assistance in making good thoughtless acts, allowed me to restore pilfered money to its place, and transferred to me all unpleasant but necessary confessions, which were formerly made to his parents. Again and again, on innumerable occasions, he tested my abilities in this respect, before he decided to believe in them. Thereafter there was no more doubt: to him I had become, in addition to being an interesting and useful

companion, a very powerful person without whose support he could no longer manage. Thus in these three capacities I had made myself indispensable to him, or, as we might say, he had entered upon a complete relationship of dependence and of transference. I had been waiting only for this moment, in order to demand of him—not by means of words nor at one stroke—very extensive returns, namely, the surrender of his previously hoarded secrets, so necessary for the analysis, which now occupied the next weeks and months and with which the actual analysis began.

You see that in this case I did not trouble to produce an insight into the illness, which came about of itself in the course of the analysis in quite a different fashion. Here the task was merely the creation of an attachment, which would be strong enough to carry the later analysis.

After this detailed description, I fear you will have gained the impression that child analysis depends upon nothing else but this attachment. I should like to try to efface this impression by means of other examples, which hold the mean between the extremes quoted.

I was requested to analyze another ten-year-old boy who had developed symptoms most unpleasant and disturbing to his environment, namely, outbursts of noisy rage and temper, which occurred without any explainable, external occasion, and which were the more striking in an otherwise inhibited and timid child. In this case, it was easy to gain his confidence, for I was already acquainted with him personally. Also the decision to be analyzed was quite in accord with his own wishes, for his younger sister was already my patient and jealousy over the advantages, which she obviously gained from it for her position in the family, forced his inclinations in the same direction. In spite of all this, I could find no point of attack for an analysis. But the explanation of this was not far to seek. He had indeed a certain insight into his phobias and a certain striving to be free of them and of his inhibitions, but the reverse was true of his chief symptom, the outbreaks of rage. Of these he was unmistakably proud and regarded them as something which distinguished him from others, even if not in a very favorable sense, and thoroughly enjoyed them because of the worry he caused his parents thereby. In a certain sense, he felt in harmony with this symptom, and at this time would have probably fought for it, if an attempt had been made to take it from him by analytic means. Here, too, I seized upon a rather deceptive and not too honest remedy. I determined to estrange him from this fragment of his nature. I allowed him to describe the attacks as often as they occurred and appeared to be anxious and

thoughtful. I inquired if he were at all master of his actions under such circumstances, and compared his rages to those of a maniac, to whom my efforts to help could be of little use. Thereupon he became puzzled and apprehensive, for to be regarded as crazy was naturally not the goal of his ambition. He now tried of his own accord to control these outbursts; he began to oppose instead of as formerly to support them, and thereby became aware of his actual helplessness in suppressing them, and this realization greatly aggravated his feelings of pain and displeasure. Finally, as I desired, after many vain attempts, the symptom was transferred from a cherished possession into a disturbing foreign body.

- It will occur to you that in this instance I produced a condition which was already present in the case of the little compulsive neurotic: a splitting of the inner personality of the child. Also in another case—that of a seven-year-old naughty neurotic girl—after a long preparatory period similar to the one just described, I adopted the same trick. At one stroke I separated her from the entire personification of her naughtiness, gave it a name of its own, confronted her with it, and finally succeeded so well that she began to complain to me about this newly created person and realized the amount she had to suffer from it. Thus the ability of the child to be analyzed goes hand in hand with producing an insight into the illness.

But even here we must not forget another limitation. For a long period of analysis I had an unusually gifted and clever girl of eight years, none other than the previously mentioned oversensitive little girl who cried too much. She had every intention of changing, had the ability and the promise to make use of the analysis with me. But the work with her was always blocked at a certain point and I was about to content myself with the little I had accomplished—the disappearance of the most disturbing symptom. Then it became apparent that an affectionate attachment to a nurse, who was not friendly to the analysis, was the barrier which our efforts encountered whenever they began to actually sound the depths. She did indeed believe what occurred in the analysis and what I told her, but only up to a certain point which she allowed herself and where her fidelity to the nurse began. Whatever went beyond this met with a tenacious and unassailable resistance. It is true that she repeated in this manner an old conflict in the love choice between the parents, who were living apart, and which played a great rôle in the development of her early childhood. But even this discovery did not help, for the present attachment to the governess was in every way actual and habitual. I now began a stubborn and consistent battle with this

nurse for the child's affection, which was waged on both sides with every weapon, and in which I awakened her critical faculty, sought to shake her blind dependence and in addition turned to my own advantage every one of the petty conflicts which occurred daily in the nursery. I realized that I had won on the day that the little girl repeated to me one of the domestic incidents which excited her so much, but this time added to her recital, "Do you believe that she is right?" From then on the analysis began to sound the depths, and of all the cases mentioned it led to the most auspicious success.

The decision as to whether this action, the battle for the child, was permissible, was met without difficulty in this case: the influence of this particular governess would have been unfavorable, not only for the analysis but for the later development of the child. Consider, however, how untenable such a situation becomes if the opponent is no stranger but the parents of the child, or, if the question must be faced, whether it pays in the interest of the success of the analytic work to withdraw the child from the influence of another person which is otherwise favorable and desirable. We will once more come back to this point in detail with the discussion of the question of the practical carrying out of child analysis and its relationship to the environment of the child.

To close this subject, I will add further two short stories which will show you how the child is in a position to grasp the meaning of the analytic effort and the therapeutic task. In this the best was probably accomplished by the little compulsive neurotic girl already mentioned so many times. One day she reported to me an unusually successful struggle with her devil and suddenly demanded my recognition of it. "Anna Freud," she said, "am I not much stronger than my devil? Can't I control him very well alone? I do not really need you at all for this." I wholeheartedly confirmed her in this, that she was much stronger, even without my help. "But I need you anyway," she continued after meditating a moment. "You must help me, so that I will not be so unhappy, when I must be stronger than he is." I believe one could expect no better understanding even in an adult neurotic of the change which is hoped for from the analytic cure.

And now still a second story: My bad ten-year-old, whom I have described in such detail, in a late period of his analysis, got into a conversation in the waiting room with one of the adult patients of my father. The latter told him about a dog who had killed a chicken, and he, the owner of the dog, had had to pay for it. "That dog should be sent to Freud," said my little patient. "He needs anal-

ysis." The man did not reply, but later expressed himself disapprovingly. "What kind of an absurd idea had the youngster about analysis? There was nothing the matter with the dog. It wants to kill the chicken and it does so." I knew exactly what the youngster meant by it. He must have thought: "The poor dog; he would so much like to be a good dog and something in him forces him to kill chickens."

You see that here the little neurotic delinquent without difficulty shifts the insight into his naughtiness in place of the insight into his illness, and it becomes for him the complete motive for the analysis.

II

THE METHODS OF CHILD ANALYSIS

I imagine that my last conclusions have made a strange impression upon the practical analysts among you. All my acts as I have presented them to you contradict in too many points the rules of psycho-analytical technic as they have heretofore been laid down.

Let us once more glance over my different actions: I promise the little girl certain recovery out of consideration that a child cannot be expected to traverse a strange route toward an uncertain goal with a hitherto unknown person. Thus I satisfy her evident desire to be guided by authority and to be cradled in safety. I offer myself openly as an ally and, in common with the child, I criticize the parents. In another case I begin a secret combat against the domestic environment and with all sorts of means strive for the love of the child. I exaggerate the seriousness of a symptom, and frighten the patient in order to attain my end. Finally I insinuate myself into the confidence of the children and thus obtrude myself on human beings who are of the conviction that they can get along very well without me.

What is left of the prescribed tactful reticence of the analyst—the prudence with which he represents to the patient how uncertain is the possibility of recovery or even improvement, the full reserve in all personal matters, the absolute sincerity in the diagnosis of the disease and the full liberty which is given the patient to discontinue treatment of his own volition at any moment? Although the last condition is kept as regards the child patients, it remains more or less a fiction, just as school children are led to believe that they are learning for themselves, to get along in life, and not for the benefit of the teacher or the school. If the freedom which springs therefrom were taken too seriously, the classroom would probably be empty on the

following morning. I should defend myself against the assumption which may have arisen in you that I have acted thus in ignorance or unintentional neglect of the rules. In meeting a new situation I think I have only further developed certain attitudes which, without emphasizing it further, you have all adopted toward your patients.

In my first lecture I may have exaggerated the difference between the initial situation of the child and that of the adult. You know how uncertain, in the first days of treatment, the resolve and the confidence of the patient appear. We are in danger of losing him before the analysis is even begun and gain the foundation for our actions toward the patient only when we hold him definitely in the transference. In these first days, however, we set about working upon the patient almost imperceptibly—certainly without any special effort on our part—by means of a series of things which are not so different from my long persisting and deliberate efforts with children.

Let us take for example a depressive, melancholic patient. It is true that the analytic therapy and technic are not exactly suited for these cases. However, when such cases are undertaken a period of preparation is included during which the interest and courage of the patient for analytical work is aroused through sympathy and appreciation of his personal needs. Or let us taken another case. The technical rules do indeed warn us against interpreting dreams too early, thereby revealing to the patient insight into his unconscious processes, for which as yet he can have no understanding but only resistance. With a clever and educated compulsive neurotic who doubts everything, we should be glad to reveal to him right at the beginning of the treatment a particularly beautiful and impressive dream interpretation. Thus we arouse his interest, satisfy his high intellectual demands—and, at bottom, act in nowise different than the child analyst who shows a youngster that he can do better tricks with string than the child himself. For the case when we ally ourselves on the side of the rebellious and neglected child and show that we are ready to help him against his environment, there is also an analogy. We also have to show the adult neurotic that we are there for his help and support and we must take his part exclusively in all conflicts with his family. Here, too, we demonstrate our interest, and make ourselves useful. But the question of power and of outward authority also plays a rôle. Observation shows that the experienced and respected analyst finds it much easier to hold his patients and to protect them against “absconding” in the first stages of analysis than the young beginner; that even in the first sessions the patient

establishes far less "negative transference"—expressions of hate and distrust—than toward the former. We may explain this difference from the inexperience of the young analyst, his lack of tact in his attitude toward the patient, and his precipitation or overcaution in his interpretation. I believe that just here is where one must take into consideration the factor of external authority. Not without reason, the patient asks himself who this person really is who lays claim to becoming such a tremendous authority for him and whether his position in the outside world and the attitude of other healthy people toward him justify the claim. One does not necessarily have to deal here with a revival of old hate impulses but rather perhaps with an expression of sound common sense, which arises before the patient permits himself to be carried away by the transference situation. In this estimate of the state of affairs, the eminent analyst of name and reputation plainly enjoys the same advantages as the child analyst, who from the first is bigger and older than his little patient, and becomes a person of undoubted power, when the child feels that this authority is esteemed by the parents as greater than their own.

These could as well be the prerequisites for such a preparatory period of treatment in adult analysis, concerning which I have already spoken. But I think I have expressed myself incorrectly on the subject. It would have been more correct to say that in the technic of adult analysis we still find vestiges of the precautions which have proven necessary in dealing with the child. The measure in which we use them will probably be determined by the degree in which the adult patient whom we are treating has remained an immature and dependent being, thus, in this respect, approximating the child.

So much for the introduction to the treatment: the construction of the analytic situation. In what follows let us imagine that the child has actually gained confidence in the analyst, by means of all the indicated measures, and possesses insight into his illness, and now, out of his own resolve, strives to alter his condition. With this we reach our second theme: a survey of the methods which stand at our disposal for the actual analytic work with the child.

In the technic of adult analysis we have four such aids. We first use everything which the conscious recollection of the patient can supply, in order to reconstruct as fully as possible the history of his illness. We make use of dream interpretation. We digest and interpret the ideas which the free association of the analyzant presents. And finally, through the interpretation of his reactions to the transference, we gain access to all of those fragments of his past experience which in no other way could be brought into conscious-

ness. In the following you must allow me to make a systematic survey of these methods as regards their application and utilization in child analysis.

In the construction of the history of the patient's illness from his conscious recollections, we already encounter the first difference. In the case of the adult, as you know, we avoid asking for any information from his family and we depend exclusively on what the patient himself tells us. The basis of this deliberate restriction is the fact that communications of relatives are for the most part untrustworthy, defective, and colored by their personal attitude toward the sick one. But the child cannot tell us much about the history of his illness. His memory, before the analyst comes to his aid, does not reach far back. For the time being he is so absorbed by the existing present that by comparison the past fades away. Moreover, he himself does not know when his abnormalities began and when his nature began to differ from that of other children. As yet he has no sense of comparison with others and still fewer self-appointed tasks by means of which he can measure his failures. Hence the child analyst actually obtains the history of the illness from the parents of the little patient. There is nothing left for him to do but to take account of all possible inaccuracies and distortions based on personal motives.

On the other hand, in dream interpretation we have a field in which nothing new is to be learned by the application of adult to child analysis. The child dreams neither more nor less than the adult in analysis; as in everyone, the clarity or incomprehensibility of the dream content depends upon the strength of the resistance. The dreams of children are certainly easier to interpret, even if in the analysis they are not always as simple as the examples given in "*The Interpretation of Dreams*" (Freud). We find in them all the distortions of wish fulfillment corresponding to the complicated neurotic organization of the child patient. But nothing is easier for the child to comprehend than the interpretation of dreams. When the first dream is related, I say: "The dream cannot do anything alone. Every piece has come from somewhere," and then, in company with the child, I go in search of them. The child amuses himself with the search for individual dream elements as with a Chinese puzzle, following with much satisfaction the individual images or words into the situations of actual life. Perhaps this occurs because the child is nearer to dreams than the adult; perhaps it is only on this account that he is not astonished to find a meaning in the dream because he has never heard the scientific view that dreams are only nonsense. In any case the child is proud of a suc-

cessful dream interpretation. Besides, I have often found that even unintelligent children, who were in all respects as unsuitable for analysis as possible, do not fail at this point. I have carried out two such analyses over a long period almost wholly by means of the dream.

But even when the associations of the child dreamer are missing an interpretation is often possible in spite of this. It is so much easier to know the situation of the child, to oversee the day's experience, and the number of persons in his environment is so much smaller. Often one may venture to insert the missing associations in the interpretation from one's own knowledge of the situation. The two following examples of children's dreams, which offer nothing new, will merely once more demonstrate the conditions just described.

In the fifth month of the analysis of a nine-year-old girl I finally arrive at a discussion of her masturbation which, only with severe feelings of guilt, she is induced to confess. During masturbation she had strong passionate feelings and her repulsion against her activity with her genitals extended to these burning sensations. She began to be afraid of fire and rebelled against wearing warm clothing. She could not watch the flame burning in a gas water-heater, which adjoined her bedroom, without fear of an explosion. One evening, in the absence of her mother, the nurse wanted to light the bath heater but not knowing how called on her eldest brother for help. But he was equally unable to light it. The little girl stood there and had a feeling that she ought to know how to do it. The following night she dreamed of the same situation, only in the dream she was really helping them, did it wrong, and the heater exploded. As punishment, the nurse held her in the fire so that she must burn up. She awakened in great anxiety, at once aroused her mother, told her the dream, and added (out of her analytic knowledge) that it was certainly a punishment dream. She could give no further associations, which in this case, however, I could easily supply. Obviously playing with the stove stood for playing with her own body, which she also assumed in the case of her brother. The "wrongness" about it was the expression of her own criticism, the explosion probably the form of her orgasm. As a consequence, the nurse, who represents the admonisher against masturbation, carries out the punishment. Two months later she had a second fire dream with the following content: "On the radiator lay two bricks of different color. I know the house is about to burn down and I am afraid. Then someone comes and takes the bricks away." On waking, she finds her hands on her genitals. This time an association helps her

out in the dream fragment concerning the bricks: she has been told that if bricks are put on your head you do not grow. From now on the interpretation can be completed without difficulty. Not to grow is one of the punishments she fears for masturbation; the meaning of fire we know from the first dream to be the symbol of her sexual excitement. Of course she masturbated while sleeping, was warned by a recollection of the masturbation prohibition, and suffered fear. The unknown person who removed the bricks was probably myself with my quieting reassurances.

Not all dreams which occur in child analysis interpret themselves with so few difficulties. On the whole, however, the last mentioned little compulsive neurotic was right when she used to announce to me the dream of the preceding night in the following words: "To-day I had a funny dream, but you and I will soon find out what it all means."

Along with the interpretation of dreams, that of the day dream also plays a great rôle in child analysis. Several of the children from whom I was able to gather experience were great day dreamers; the narration of their phantasies became of the greatest aid to me in the analysis. It is usually very easy to induce children, whose confidence has been won in other fields, to tell their day dreams. They discuss them more readily and are obviously less ashamed than the adult, who condemns his fancies as childish. Whereas the adult, just because of his shame and condemnation, admits his day dreams only late and with hesitation into the analysis, with the child their sudden appearance in the difficult preparatory stage is often very helpful. The following examples produce for you three types of such phantasies.

The simplest type would be the day dream as a reaction following some experience of the day. For example, the little dreamer just mentioned, at a time when the struggle for supremacy against her brothers and sisters played the leading rôle, reacted against a supposed setback in the analysis with the following dream: "I wish I had never been born. I want to die. Sometimes I imagine that I am dead and born again into the world as an animal or a doll. But if I come back as a doll, then I know to whom I want to belong—to a little girl with whom my nurse used to live and who is very nice and good. I would like to be her doll and wouldn't object at all if I was treated as dolls are treated. I would be a charming little baby doll; she could wash me and do everything for me. The little girl would love me best of all. Even if she should perhaps again get a new doll for Christmas, I would still be her favorite. She would

never love another doll as much as her baby doll." It is probably superfluous to add here that two of her brothers and sisters, against whom her jealousy was most strongly directed, were younger than she. Out of no conversation or association could her momentary situation be more clearly realized than out of this little phantasy.

At the beginning of her analysis, the six-year-old compulsive neurotic was living with a neighboring family. She had one of her attacks of naughtiness, which was much criticized by the other children. Her little girl friend even refused to sleep in the room with her, which hurt her feelings very much. However, in the analysis, she told me that because she was so good the nurse had given her a present of a toy rabbit, and, at the same time, she assured me that the other children liked to sleep with her. Then she related a day dream that had suddenly occurred to her while she was resting. She had not known at all that she was making it: "Once upon a time there was a little rabbit to whom his family were not at all nice. They wanted to send him to the slaughter house and have him killed. But he found it out. He had an old automobile which, however, could still be driven. In the night he fetched it, climbed in, and drove away. He came to a charming little house in which a little girl lived (here she mentioned her own name). She heard him crying downstairs and went down and let him in. Then he stayed and lived there with her." Here there definitely breaks through her feeling of not being wanted, from which she would like to be spared, both in the analysis with me and manifestly before herself. She is twice present in the dream: on one side as the little unloved rabbit, on the other as the girl who is going to treat the rabbit as well as she herself would like to be treated.

A complicated second type is the continued day dream. With children who invent such day dreams or "continued stories" it is often very easy to put yourself enough in touch with them, even in the early period of analysis, so that you may hear daily the newly invented fragment of day dream. From these daily continuations the present inner situation of the child may be constructed.

As a third example I will mention a nine-year-old boy whose day dreams, although made up of people and situations that differed widely, always repeated the same result in innumerable situations. He began the analysis with the narration of an abundance of such fancies which he had stored up in him. In many of them the two principal persons were a king and a hero. The king threatens the hero, wants to torture and to kill him, while the hero escapes in all possible ways. The mechanical innovations, especially an air fleet,

play a great rôle in the chase. Of great importance also is a cutting machine, which sends out from both sides when it moves sickle-like knives. The phantasy ended with the victory of the hero, who does everything to the king which the latter wished to do to him.

Another of his day dreams depicts a teacher who punishes and strikes the children. Finally the children surround and overpower her and beat her to death. Still another has to do with a beating machine, in which finally, in place of the prisoner who was to be tortured, the torturer himself is locked. He had stored in his memory a whole collection of such phantasies in endless variations. We divine, without knowing anything more about the boy, that beneath all of these phantasies lies the defense and revenge for a threat of castration; that is, in the day dream, the castration is carried out on the one who originally threatened it. You will concede that, given such an analytic beginning, it is possible to construct an entire series of probable associations for the future course of the analysis.

A further technical aid, which next to the use of dreams and day dreams comes to the fore in many of my child analyses, is drawing, which for the time being in three of my enumerated cases almost replaced all other communications.

Thus the before mentioned girl who dreamed about fire, at the time she was occupied with her castration complex ceaselessly drew a fearful looking human monster with an exaggerated chin, long nose, and endlessly long hair and frightful teeth. The name of this constantly recurring monster was "Biter," his occupation manifestly the biting off of the virile member, which in so many ways he had developed on his own body. A series of other drawings, which during the session she completed either silently or as an accompaniment to her stories, portrayed all sorts of creatures, children, birds, snakes, dolls—all with endlessly long arms, legs, beaks and tails. On another sheet of the same period, quick as a flash she assembled all the things she wished to be: a boy (in order to possess a penis); a doll (in order to be the best beloved); a dog (which to her was the representative of virility); and a sailor, which she took from a phantasy in which she as a boy accompanied her father alone on a trip around the world. Above these figures was added still another drawing from an old fairy tale, which she half remembered and half invented—a witch who was tearing out a giant's hair—hence again a picture of the castration, for which during this time she reproached her mother. Very remarkable was the effect of a series of pictures from a much later period, where, directly in contrast, a queen was presenting a little princess who was standing before her with a

wonderful flower with a long stem (obviously again a penis symbol).

The pictures drawn by the little compulsive neurotic were very different. At times she accompanied the narration of her anal phantasies, which filled the first part of her analysis, with illustrations. For example, she drew a picture of an anal "Land of Cockagne" in which, in place of the mounds of porridge and tarts of the tale, the people were obliged to eat their way through enormous piles of excrement arranged in rows. In addition, however, I own a series of the most delicate and colorful pictures of flowers and gardens which she executed with tremendous care, neatness, and charm during the time she was unfolding to me her anal day dreams, which were "stiff with dirt."

But I fear I have sketched for you thus far a too ideal picture of the conditions in child analysis. The family readily supplies all necessary information; the child discloses itself as an eager dream interpreter, who produces an abundant flow of day dreams and, at the same time, furnishes a series of interesting drawings, from which conclusions may be drawn concerning its unconscious impulses. From all these descriptions it would be quite unintelligible why thus far child analysis has always been considered a particularly difficult field for analytic technic, or why so many analysts declare that they can do nothing toward the treatment of children.

The answer is not difficult to find. All of the advantages mentioned are annulled, because the child refuses to associate. The analyst is thus thrown into a dilemma, for the actual means on which the analytic technic is founded can scarcely be brought into practice. To assume the comfortable rest position prescribed for the adult, to eliminate consciously all criticism of the emerging associations, to exclude nothing from the communication, and in this way to skim off the surface of consciousness, manifestly contradicts the nature of the child.

To be sure, a child, with whom one has established a bond in the described manner and to whom one has become indispensable, can be induced to do anything. Thus occasionally, on request, he also associates for a short time and to please the analyst. Such an interjection of associations can indeed be of great usefulness and suddenly clear up a difficult situation. But it will always retain the character of an isolated aid, not the definite basis upon which the whole analytic work can be founded.

Occasionally when I was at a loss how to proceed, I used to ask a little girl, who proved to be especially obedient and compliant to my wishes in the analysis and who along with her great talent for

drawing had a decided visual gift, to "see pictures." Thereupon she would sit down in a peculiar squatting position and with closed eyes tensely follow the processes that went on within. Once in this way she actually gave me the solution to a long drawn out resistance situation. The theme at the time was the struggle against masturbation and the separation from her nurse, to whom she had retreated with redoubled affection in order to protect herself against my efforts of liberation. I asked her to "see pictures" and the first picture that emerged brought the answer: "The nurse flies away over the sea." That meant, according to further additional pictures, in which nothing but devils danced about me, that I would force the nurse to go away. Then she would no longer have any protection against her temptation to masturbate and would be made "bad" by me.

More frequently than these willed and requested associations, now and then there come to our aid unexpected and uncalled-for ones. I again take the small compulsive neurotic as an example. At the height of her analysis, the problem was to make plain to her her hatred against her mother, from which knowledge in the past she had protected herself by the creation of her "devil," the impersonal representative of all her hate impulses. Although up to this point she had accompanied me willingly, she now began to resist. But, at the same time, at home she got into all possible kinds of defiant naughtiness, by means of which I daily proved to her that one can only act that way toward a person one hates. Finally under pressure of constant reappearing proofs, she yielded outwardly but now desired to know from me the reason for such feelings of hatred against the mother, whom apparently she loved so much. Here I had to refuse further information, for I was at the end of my knowledge. Then, after a moment of silence she said: "I always believe that a dream, which I once had (several weeks before) and which we have never understood, is to blame." I asked her to repeat it, which she did: "All of my dolls were there and also my rabbit. Then I went away and the rabbit began to cry so terribly. At that moment I felt so sorry for the rabbit. I believe I am now always imitating the rabbit and for that reason cry just as he does." In reality, however, the condition was naturally reversed, the rabbit imitated her, not she the rabbit. In this dream she represents the mother and treats the rabbit as she had been treated by the mother. In this dream association she had at last found the reproach, which her consciousness had refused to make against the mother, that she had always gone away just when the child needed her most.

A few days later she reported the incident for a second time.

When after temporary relief, her whole mood was again gloomy, I urged her to contribute still more to the same theme. She knew nothing further but suddenly after deep thought began: "It is so beautiful in G— that I would like to go there once more." Upon closer questioning, it became apparent that in this summer resort she must have spent one of her most unhappy periods. Her older brother, because he had whooping cough, was taken back to his parents in the city and she was isolated with the nurse and two younger children. "The nurse was always angry when I took the toys from the little ones," she said quite spontaneously. Already at that time there existed the supposed preference of the parents for the older brother, and the still more actual one of the nurse for the younger children. On all sides she was neglected and reacted in her own particular manner. Thus again through recollection, this time of the rustic beauty of that place, she was able to find one of her heaviest reproaches against the mother.

I would not emphasize these three cases of astonishing association if similar ones were more common in child analysis. You know that in adults we are not accustomed to anything else.

This lack of voluntary association in the child has caused all who have thus far occupied themselves with child analysis to seek some sort of substitute. Dr. von Hug-Helmuth attempted to replace the knowledge gained from free association of the adult patient by playing with the child, visiting it in its own environment, and seeking to learn all its intimate relations in life. Frau Melanie Klein, as her publications describe, replaces the association technic of the adult with a play technic of the child. She starts with the supposition that action is more suitable for the small child than speech. For that reason she places a number of diminutive toys, in short, a miniature world, at his disposal, and thereby creates for him the possibility of acting in this play world. All actions which the child carries out in this way she places on a par with the spoken associations of the adult and accompanies them with interpretations, as we are accustomed to doing with the adult patient. At first glimpse, it would appear that a grievous defect in the technic of child analysis would thus be removed in an unobjectionable manner. However, I would like to reserve for the next lecture an investigation of the theoretic basis of this play technic and to place it in relation to the last point of our consideration, the rôle of transference in child analysis.

III

THE RÔLE OF TRANSFERENCE IN CHILD ANALYSIS

I shall permit myself to again sum up in a few words the contents of my last lecture.

We directed our attention to the methods of child analysis; learned that it is necessary to put together the patient's history from the statements of the family instead of depending upon the patient's information; we discovered the child to be a good dream interpreter and valued the significance of day dreams and free drawing as technical means. On the other hand, to your disappointment I was obliged to inform you that the child is not inclined to engage in free association, and, by this refusal, forces us to seek a substitute to this most important procedure in adult analysis. With the description of one of these substitute methods we finally halted in order to postpone a theoretic appreciation of it until this lecture.

Without doubt the play technic worked out by Mrs. Klein has the greatest value for the observation of the child. Instead of losing time and energy in keeping track of the child in its domestic environment, we transplant at one stroke its entire known world to the room of the analyst, and allow the child to move in it under the eye of the analyst without any interference for the time being. We thus have an opportunity to become familiar with its various reactions, the strength of its aggressive inclinations, its capacity for sympathy, as well as its attitude toward the different objects and persons which are represented by the dolls. As an advantage over an observation of actual conditions, it may be added that this toy environment is manageable and subject to the will of the child, and that it thus may carry out all its actions upon it, which in the actual world, because of its superior magnitude and strength in contrast to the child, remain limited to a phantasy existence. All these advantages make the application of the Klein play method almost indispensable for intimate knowledge of the small child, who is not yet sufficiently capable of expressing itself in words.

Mrs. Klein, however, goes an important step further in the application of this technic. She claims the same position for each of the play associations of the child as for the free association of the adult patient and continually translates the actions which the child produces this way into the corresponding thoughts. That is, she endeavors to discover behind every playful action the symbolic value which lies at its root. If the child overturns a lamp post or any other toy figure, she interprets this behavior in some way as aggressive

inclinations directed against the father, and if the child causes a collision of two wagons, as an observation of the sexual union of the parents. Above all, her activity consists of an accompanying translation and interpretation of the child's actions, which—similar to the interpretation of free associations in the adult—again prescribes the direction of further processes in the patient.

Let us once more test the justification of making the child's play activity equivalent to adult association. The associations of the adult are indeed "free," that is, the adult patient has excluded all conscious direction and influence on his thoughts, but, at the same time, he is seeking a definite goal; that is, he who is thus associating is undergoing analysis. But the child has no conception of the end in view. At the outset I explained to you by what means I endeavor also to concentrate the thoughts of the child patient upon the analytic goal. Those children, however, for whom Mrs. Klein has elaborated her play technic, above all, children in the first period of sexual maturity, are too young to be influenced in this fashion. Mrs. Klein feels that one of the advantages of her method is that in using it she is spared the necessity of preparing the child for analysis. Here we could also make an objection to contradict the correspondence which Melanie Klein proposes. If the play associations of the child are not dominated by the same end in view as that of the adult, it is perhaps not right to treat its actions always as such. Instead of having symbolic meaning, they could occasionally have harmless explanations. The child who overturns a lamp post could have had on the day before some kind of experience with such an object. The collision of the two wagons could perhaps have repeated something seen on the street. And the child who ran toward the visitor and opened her purse need not, as Mrs. Klein thought, have thereby expressed symbolically its curiosity as to whether a new little sister was concealed in the body of the mother, but have associated it with an experience of the preceding day, in which someone who entered had brought a small gift in a similar bag. Even in the case of the adult, we have indeed no right to impute a symbolic sense to every one of his actions or associations but only to those which originate under the influence of the analytic situation accepted by him.

But the objection which we in this way proffer against the analytical application of the Klein technic, may possibly be weakened from another angle. It is indeed true that the child's play activity likewise permits the just mentioned harmless interpretation. Why, then, does it reproduce out of its experience exactly that scene with the lamp post or the two wagons? Was it not the symbolic meaning

behind this observation which, in the analytic hour, caused it to be selected and reproduced ahead of others? It is consequently true, one might say further, that the child in its actions lacks the definite goal of the analytic situation which guides the adult. But perhaps it does not need it at all. The adult must eliminate the guidance of his thoughts by a conscious effort of will and leave the influencing of them entirely to the unconscious impulses working within him. But the child possibly does not need such an arbitrary change of its situation. Perhaps at all times and in every game, it is wholly in the grip of the unconscious.

You see the question whether the correspondence of the child's play associations to the idea association of the adult can be justified, is not readily decided by means of theoretic arguments or counter arguments. Here it is manifestly dependent upon a reëxamination by means of practical experience.

Let us venture with our criticism to still another point. In addition to the actions which the child performs with the toys that are given him, Mrs. Klein as we know makes use of all the undertakings which the child carries out upon the objects found in her room or upon its own person, for interpretation. Here, too, she strictly follows the example of adult analysis. We feel, therefore, entitled to include in the analysis the entire conduct of the patient, towards us in the session as well as all the trivial conscious and unconscious acts which we observe. We depend here upon the state of the transference in which the patient finds himself and which can give to even otherwise unimportant performances a definite symbolic significance.

The question arises here whether the child really finds itself in the same transference situation as the adult, in what manner and in what forms its transference impulses are expressed and in what way they permit being used for interpretation. With this we arrive at the fourth and most important point of our theme: the rôle of transference as a technical aid in child analysis. The decision of this question will at the time furnish us with new material for disproving or confirming the Klein point of view.

You will recall how in the very first session of the treatment I took great care to produce a strong attachment in the child for me and to bring it into an actual dependent relationship. I would not have followed out this intention with so much energy and so many means if I had considered it possible to carry through the analysis of a child without such a transference. But the affectionate attachment, the positive transference as the analytical term is, is the pre-

requisite for all subsequent work. In this the child goes even further than the adult, for it has faith only in the person it loves and then accomplishes something only out of love for that person.

Child analysis requires much more of this attachment than that of the adult. In addition to the analytical intention, it carries out part of an educational one, which we will take up more thoroughly later. Not only child analysis but the whole success of education stands and falls every time with the emotional attachment of the pupil for the educator. Even in the analysis of children, we cannot say that the production of a transference in itself alone satisfies our means of consistent interpretation and reference to its origin. But with the child the negative impulses directed against the analyst—no matter how revealing they may be in many respects—are above all unpleasant. As soon as possible we must seek to weaken and a negative transference, which we make use of for our purpose by intention, no matter whether it be of a friendly or hostile nature. We know that with adults we can get along over long periods with destroy them. The actual productive work will always go hand in hand with a positive attachment.

The creation of such an affectionate attachment was described in detail in the introduction to analysis. Its expression in phantasies and in trivial or important actions differs scarcely at all from the same processes in the adult patient. We are made to feel the negative reactions at every point where we wish to help liberate a fragment of repressed material from the unconscious and thereby draw upon ourselves the resistance of the ego. At this moment we appear to the child as the most dangerous and feared tempter and receive all the expressions of hatred and repulsion with which the child usually meets its own tabooed instinctive impulses.

In the following I reproduce in detail a phantasy of affectionate transference from the little compulsive neurotic patient mentioned so many times. The immediate occasion was manifestly provoked by me, for I had visited her in her home and remained to be present at her evening bath. The next day she began her session with the words, "You visited me in my bath and next time I will come and visit you in your bath." Some time afterwards she told me the day dream she had thought out in bed before falling asleep, after I had gone away. Her own explanatory marginal notes I add in brackets.

"All the wealthy people did not like you; and your father who was very wealthy also did not like you. [That means I am angry at your father, don't you think so?] And you did not care for any-

one and did not give lessons to anyone. And my parents hated me, and Hans and Walter and Annie also hated me and all the people in the world hated us, even the people who did not know us, even the dead. Therefore you only cared for me and I for you, and we always remained together. All the others were very rich but we two were quite poor. We had nothing, not even clothing, for they took everything away from us. Only the sofa remained in the room and we both slept upon it. But we were very happy together. And then we thought we ought to have a baby. Therefore we mixed number one and number two together in order to make a baby. And then we both thought it is not nice to make a baby out of that. So we began to mix flower petals and other things together and from that I got a baby. For the baby was inside of me. It remained inside of me quite a long time. [My mother told me that babies stay inside their mothers a long time.] And then a doctor came and took it out. But I wasn't sick at all. [Usually the mothers are sick, my mother says.] The baby was very sweet and adorable and that made us think we, too, would like to be as adorable and we changed ourselves so that we were very little. I was so big (t), and you were so big (T). [I believe that comes from finding out that I would like to be as little as Walter and Annie.] And because we had nothing at all, we began to build a house, made all of rose leaves and beds of rose leaves and pillows and mattresses all out of rose leaves sewn together. Where little holes remained, we filled them up with something white. Instead of wallpaper we had the thinnest glass and the walls were carved in different patterns. Even the chairs were of glass, but we were so light that we were not too heavy for them. [I think my mother does not figure at all because yesterday I was angry at her.] " There follows still another detailed description of the furniture and all the things that were made for the house. Evidently she continued to elaborate the day dream in this direction until she fell asleep. In it she laid special stress on the fact that in the end our original poverty was completely compensated for and that we then had much prettier things than the rich people first mentioned.

The same patient, however, at other times relates how she is warned from within against me. A voice says within her, "Do not believe Anna Freud. She lies. She won't help you, and will only make you worse. She will also change your face so that you will be uglier. All she says is not true. Be tired now, lie quietly in bed and don't go to her to-day." But she always orders this voice to be still and says to it, that all of this must first be told in the next session.

Another little patient pictures me, at a time we are discussing her masturbation, in all possible degrading figures—as a beggarwoman, as a poor old lady, and once as myself standing in the middle of my room with nothing but devils wildly dancing about me.

Thus you see, as in the case of the adult, we become the target at which, according to the circumstances, the friendly or the hostile impulses of the patient are directed. After these examples we would say that the child makes a good transference. Nevertheless, it is just in this field that another disappointing surprise awaits us: the child does indeed entertain the liveliest relationship with the analyst and, through it, expresses a number of reactions which it has acquired in its relationship to its own parents; and by the fluctuation, the intensity, and the expression of its feelings it gives important hints as to the formation of its character; but it does not form a transference neurosis.

You all know what I mean by this. The adult neurotic in the course of the analytic treatment gradually transforms the very symptoms for which he has undertaken the treatment. He gives up the old objects on which his fancies have hitherto been fixed and centers his neurosis anew on the person of the analyst. We say that he replaces his previous symptoms by transference symptoms, converts his previous neurosis, what ever kind it may have been, into a transference neurosis and now acts out in relation to the person of the new transference, the analyst, all his abnormal reactions. Upon this new foundation, in which the analyst feels himself at home, and on which he can, in common with the patient, investigate the development and the growth of the individual symptoms, upon this field cleared for operation takes place the decisive battle, the gradual insight into the illness, and the uncovering of the unconscious content.

We can suggest two theoretic reasons why this result cannot be directly produced in the little child. One is to be sought for in the structure of the child itself, the other in the child analyst. The child, unlike the adult, is not ready to undertake a new edition of its love relationships, because, as one might say, the old edition is not yet out of print. Its original objects, the parents, are actually in existence as love objects, not in phantasy as with the adult neurotic; between them and the child exist all the relationships of everyday existence; all gratifications and disappointments in regard to them are experienced as more than real. The analyst enters the situation as a new person, he will probably have to share with the parents the love or the hate of the child. There exists no need for the child

to immediately exchange the parents for him; in contrast to the original objects, he does not offer all the advantages which the adult finds when his phantasy objects may be exchanged for a real person.

Let us fall back upon the Klein method. Mrs. Klein thinks that when the child is hostile to her in the first sessions, repulses her or even begins to strike her, one may see therein a proof of the ambivalent attitude of the child toward the mother. The hostile components of this ambivalence are simply shifted to the analyst. But I believe the facts of the case are very different. The more affectionately the child is bound to the mother, the fewer friendly impulses it has toward strange people. We see this most clearly in the infant, who demonstrates only fear and dislike for everyone except the mother and the nurse. It is indeed even the reverse. Especially with children who are used to very little affectionate treatment at home and have not been accustomed to expressing or receiving any marked tenderness, a positive relationship is produced by the easiest means. Thus they finally obtain from the analyst that which from the first they have expected from the original love objects.

But, on the other hand, the child analyst is little adapted to be the object of a good interpretable transference. In adult analysis we know what attitude to assume for this purpose. We remain impersonal, shadowy, white paper upon which the patient can register all of his transference phantasies, much in the manner of the cinema, where a picture is thrown upon an empty screen. We avoid making prohibitions or granting gratifications. If, in spite of this, we appear to the patient as prohibitive or acquiescent, it is easy to make clear to him that he has taken the material from his own past.

The child analyst, however, has to be anything but a shadow. We have already heard that to the child he is an interesting person, endowed with all impressive and attractive qualities. The educational tasks which, as you will hear, are bound up with the analysis, result in the child knowing exactly what appears to the analyst desirable or undesirable, of what he approves and disapproves. But, unfortunately, such a clearly outlined and in many respects novel personality is a bad object for transference; that means it is of little use when it comes to the interpretation of the transference. To continue the former comparison, the difficulty arising here is the same as if we found a painting already upon the canvas upon which we are about to project a picture. The more elaborate and beautiful in color it is, the more it will contribute to efface the lines of the superimposed picture.

For these reasons the child forms no transference neurosis. In spite of all affectionate and hostile impulses toward the analyst, it continues to act out its abnormal reactions, where they were formerly acted out: in the domestic environment. On account of this, there arises the weighty technical demand in child analysis, that instead of limiting itself to analytical explanation of what occurs in associations or actions under the eye of the analyst, it must direct its attention to where the neurotic reactions are to be found: in other words, to the home of the child. Thus we arrive at innumerable practical and technical difficulties in child analysis, which I only wish to lay before you here without going into actual detail. If we remain at this point, we are obliged to resort to a continual information service concerning the child; we must know the persons of his environment, and to some extent we must be certain about their reactions toward the child. To illustrate with the ideal case, we share the work with actual educators of the child; thus, it is fitting, as has been explained before, that we share with them the love or the hate of the child.

Where the external conditions or the personalities of the parents do not permit such a mutual action to take place, then we are made to feel the end result in the form of a loss of material in the analysis. I recall instances of child analyses which for these reasons I carried on almost exclusively by means of dreams and reveries. Nothing happened in the transference that could be interpreted and of the neurotic material that appeared in the symptoms I lost more than I cared to lose.

Now even at this point—to compare the situation of the child with that of the adult, which is so much better suited to the carrying out of the analysis—there are ways and means, as in the introductory situation of the analysis, to force the child into a transference neurosis. That may become necessary where a severe neurotic illness must be dealt with in an environment which is either antagonistic to the analysis or to the child. In this case it will be essential to separate the child from the family and to place it in some kind of suitable institution. As there are no such institutions at the present time, we have full liberty to imagine one, such as an establishment presided over by a child analyst or—less fantastic—a school controlled by analytical principles and devoted to mutual work with the analyst. In both cases the first result would be a period free from symptoms, during which the child adapts itself to a new, favorable and, for the present, indifferent milieu. The better it feels in this period, the more unsuited and unwilling we will find it for analysis. At this

juncture, it would be perhaps best to leave the child severely alone. It will become analyzable again only after it has adapted itself, that is, when it has formed an attachment to the new surroundings under the influence of everyday life, whereby the original objects gradually disappear and when it again revives its symptoms in this new environment and groups its abnormal reactions around new persons—in short, when it has formed a transference neurosis. In an institution of the first type, which a child analyst would preside over,—as yet we are not even able to judge whether such a form would be desirable—we should then have to do with an actual transference neurosis in the adult sense, centered about the person of the analyst as its object. In the other case, we would merely improve the domestic environment artificially, thus creating a substitute home, such as we deem necessary for analytical work and which would allow us to peek inside and whose reactions toward the child we can control and regulate.

Hence the removal of the child from the parental home seems to us technically the most practical solution. But when we speak of the termination of the analysis, you will see how many considerations mitigate against it. By this action we forestall the natural development at a crucial point; we force the premature detachment of the child from the parental objects at a time when it is not capable of independence in its emotional life nor, as a result of external circumstances, has it at its disposal any freedom in the choice of new love objects. Even if we require very long periods of time for the analysis of a child, in most cases there still remains a gap between its termination and the development of puberty during which period the child needs education, guidance and protection in every sense. But who can give us any assurance that after the breaking off of the transference has succeeded, the child will find its way alone to the right objects? It thus returns to the parental home at a time when it has become a stranger there; its further guidance is now, perhaps, confided to individuals from whom we have previously detached it with effort and force. For internal reasons it is not yet capable of independence. Thus we place it in a new and difficult position, in which, moreover, it again finds most of the conditions of the original conflict. Now it can once more travel the old way of the neurosis or, if this route is barred by a successful analytical cure, it can take the opposite course of open rebellion. From the viewpoint of the illness, this may seem an advantage; from the viewpoint of the social order, which in the end counts most with the child, it is no such thing.

IV. THE RELATION OF CHILD ANALYSIS TO EDUCATION

You have thus far accompanied me two steps of the way into child analysis. In the last lecture of the course I will ask you to take the third and perhaps most important step of all.

Allow me first to once more make a résumé. As you perhaps will recall, the first section was occupied with the introduction to the treatment of children. We may say that, viewed from the standpoint of analytical theory, its content is completely neutral. I did not describe to you all these petty, childish, and child-like occupations—crocheting, knitting, playing—all the different varieties of courtship in such detail because I consider them so important for analysis, but, on the contrary, in order to show you what a stubborn object the child is, how it refuses to conform to even the most approved methods of a scientific therapy and throughout demands that one meet it in accordance with its own child-like peculiar nature. Whatever we begin with a child, whether we teach it arithmetic or geography, whether we wish to educate or analyze it, we must first of all every time produce a very definite emotional relationship between us and the child. The harder the work we have before us, the greater must be the carrying capacity of this attachment. The introduction to the treatment, that is, the production of this attachment, follows its own rules, which are determined by the nature of the child and which, for the time being, are independent of analytic theory and technic.

The second part of my subject dealt with the actual analysis, whereby I endeavored to give you a survey of the paths by which one can approach the unconscious of the child. As I could not help but notice, this was disappointing to you, inasmuch as it demonstrated that just the very best and most specific methods of adult analysis are inapplicable for the treatment of the child. Thus we must cast aside many of the requirements of science and obtain the material from wherever we can get it. This is not so very different from what usually happens in everyday life, if we wish to get to know an individual in his most intimate existence. Your disappointment is due, I think, to still another consideration. Ever since I have occupied myself with child analysis, I have repeatedly been asked by analyst colleagues if I have not had the opportunity to approach the developmental processes of the first two years of life, upon which our efforts at analytic discovery are ever more and more urgently directed, in quite a different fashion than is possible in adult analysis. The child, they assume, is still so much nearer to that important period that all repressions must be that much less sharply defined and the

material that overlays these strata must be that much easier to penetrate. Thus, perhaps undreamed of possibilities are offered for investigation. Up to the present I have always been obliged to answer this question in the negative. As you perhaps noted from the small examples cited, the material which the child furnishes us is indeed clear and unequivocal. It gives us all possible clues as to the contents of the infantile neurosis, the presentation of which I will reserve for another time. It supplies us with many welcome confirmations of facts which up to the present moment we have only been able to maintain by reference to adult analysis. But as far as my previous experiences reach with the technic here described, it does not lead us beyond the boundary where the child becomes capable of speech; in short, that time from whence on its thinking becomes analogous to ours. To me this restriction does not seem difficult to understand theoretically. What we learn in the analysis of adults concerning this remote period is brought to light just by means of free association and the interpretation of transference reactions, hence with the aid of the two means which fail us in child analysis. In addition, our situation here may be compared to that of the ethnologist, who would vainly attempt a shorter cut to prehistoric life from the study of a primitive people than can be had from that of a cultured race. On the contrary, he would miss among the primitive people all those aids of myth and legend formation from which in a cultured race he could draw conclusions about the historic early periods. Hence in the small child we miss the reaction formations and cover memories which are first formed in the course of the latency period and from which later the analysis can obtain the material condensed in them. Instead, then, of being superior to adult analysis, also at this point in the output of material from the unconscious child analysis stands far behind.

And now as to the third and last section of these lectures: the application of the analytic material which we have unearthed after so much arduous preparation on all the paths and bypaths here described. From my previous explanations you will be prepared to hear from me much that is surprising and that deviates from the classic rules.

Let us first consider again in some detail the corresponding situation of the adult. His neurosis, as we know, is completely an inner concern. It takes place between three factors: his instinctive unconscious, his ego, and his super-ego, which last represents the ethical and esthetic demands of society. It is the task of analysis to elevate to another level the conflict between these powers by bringing the unconscious into consciousness. Up to the present the instinctive

impulses have been withdrawn from the influence of the super-ego through a condition of repression. Analysis frees them and makes them accessible to the influence of the super-ego, by which their further destiny will now be determined. There now appears in place of the repression conscious criticism, the rejection of one portion while the rest can in part be sublimated and diverted from their sexual goal and in part be permitted to find gratification. This new favorable outcome is due to the circumstance that the ego of the patient has gone through its whole ethical and intellectual development from the time when it brought about the original repressions up to the time when the analysis carries out its work of liberation; so that now it is in a position to make its decisions in another way than was formerly possible. The instinctive life must now put up with various restrictions and the super-ego must give up many of its exaggerated claims. On the common foundation of conscious activity there comes about a synthesis between the two.

Let us compare this with conditions present in the child patient. The neurosis of the child is just as much an inner concern and is also determined by the same powers, the instinctive life, the ego and the super-ego. But in two respects we are already prepared to find that with the child the external world projects far into its internal relations—a factor which is analytically disturbing but organically important. In the discussion of the introductory situation of child analysis, we were obliged to ascribe such an important point as insight into the illness not to the child but above all to the environment. And in the description of the transference situation, it became apparent that the analyst is forced to share with the child's former objects the impulses of love and hate which it has at its command. We are therefore not surprised that the external world reaches further into the mechanism of the infantile neurosis and the analysis than is the case with the adult.

We stated above that the super-ego of the adult has become the representative of the moral requirements of the community which surrounds the individual. We know that it owes its origin to the identification with the first and most important love objects, the parents, to whom again society transfers the task of carrying out its current ethical demands toward the child and of enforcing the instinct restrictions which social custom demands. Thus, that which originally was a personal demand, proceeding from the parents, becomes, in the course of development from object love of the parents to the identification with them, an ideal ego, which is independent of the external world and its prototypes.

In the child, however, there can as yet be no question of such independence. The separation from the loved first objects still lies in the future; the identifications are only completed slowly and piecewise. A super-ego is indeed present and already at this early period many of the relations between it and the ego appear analogous to those of later mature life. The constant reciprocal relations between this super-ego and the objects to which it owes its origin are not to be overlooked: we could compare them to those existing between two intercommunicating vessels. If the good relations to the parental objects in the external world rise to the surface, there arises with it the authority of the super-ego and the energy with which it puts through its claims. If these relations are made worse, the super-ego is weakened.

Let us take the youngest child as the first example. If, after the first year of its life, the mother or nurse succeeds in accustoming the young child to the control of its excretory processes, we soon obtain the impression that the child fulfils this requirement of cleanliness not only for the adult—that is, out of a desire to please or out of fear of the nurse—but because it has gained a relationship to it, so that it enjoys its cleanliness or is vexed if, in this regard, an accident happens. But we notice again and again that an ensuing separation from the person from whom this cleanliness has been learned—such as a temporary absence of the mother or a change in the nurse—calls into question the new acquisition. The child again becomes as dirty as before its education in cleanliness and reacquires the control which it once had only if the mother returns or if a bond is formed with the new nurse. Nevertheless, the impression that the child has already set itself the task of cleanliness is no complete disappointment. The demand is present but it is only of value to the child if the person responsible for its establishment remains intact as an object in the external world. Where it loses the relation to the object, it also loses the pleasure it had in fulfilling the requirement.

Even at the beginning of the latency period the conditions are as yet no different. Many times in the analyses of adults we can find confirmed how dangerous for the morale and character formation is any disturbance in the attachment of the child to its parents. If, at this time, it loses its parents through any sort of separation, or if they are depreciated as objects—perhaps lowered in its estimation by some mental disease or criminal action, it is in danger of both losing and depreciating its super-ego, many parts of which are already formed, so that it can now no longer oppose to the instinctive impulses which urge for gratification any efficacious inner power. The origin

of many anti-socialities and character abnormalities may possibly be explained from this.

To characterize these conditions even at the close of the latency period, I will cite an instance from the analysis of a boy in the pre-adolescent stage. Once at the beginning of the treatment for some reason I asked whether he had any thoughts which one would prefer not to think. He replied: "Yes, when one wishes to steal something." I asked him for a description of such an occasion. He said: "If, for example, I am alone at home and there is fruit on the table, but my parents have gone out and not given me any. Then I can't help but think how I would like to take some. But then I think of something else because I do not want to steal." I asked him if he were always stronger than such thoughts. He affirmed this, saying he had never thus far stolen. Then I asked, "But if your thoughts become too strong for you, what do you do then?" "Still I do not take anything," he added triumphantly, "for then I am afraid of my father." You see his super-ego had arrived at a far-reaching independence, which is expressed in his own desire not to pass for a thief. Where the temptation becomes too great, he must call for support upon the person who is responsible for the presence of this demand, that is, the father and the warnings and threats of punishment which come from him. Another child would, perhaps, in a similar situation have recalled the love of its mother.

To this weakness and dependence of the child ego ideal demands which I maintain here, there belongs still a further observation, which on closer inspection is found to repeat itself at will: the child has a two-fold morality, one for the world of adults and another for itself and its companions of the same age. We know, for example, that the child begins at a certain age to feel shame, that is, he avoids showing himself naked before strange adults, later also before those closely akin to him, and shuns performing his excremental needs before them. But we also know that the same children undress before other children without shame, and it is by no means easy to prevent them from going to the toilet together. Likewise, to our astonishment, we can establish the fact that the child is disgusted with certain things only in the presence of adults, hence, as if under pressure from them; whereas when alone or in company of other children these reactions are absent. I remember a ten-year-old boy who, while out walking with me, suddenly pointed to a heap of cow dung and exclaimed with interest: "Look, what a funny thing that is!" A moment later he recognized his mistake and blushed. He excused himself to me with the remark that had he at first seen what

it was he would not have spoken. But I know that this same boy with his boy associates speaks of excremental processes with pleasure and without shame. The same youngster also assured me on one occasion that when he is alone he can touch his own excrement without feeling any kind of emotion, but when an adult is present it becomes very difficult even to speak of it.

So shame and disgust, these two most important reaction formations which are destined to keep the anal and exhibitionistic strivings of the child from breaking through to gratification, are even after their development still dependent for support and control upon the adult object.

With these remarks on the dependence of the childish super-ego and the two-fold morality of the child in relation to shame and disgust, we have arrived at the most important difference between child analysis and that of the adult. Child analysis is in no wise any longer a private affair which takes place exclusively between two people, the analyst and the patient. In so far as the child super-ego has not yet become the impersonal representative of the requirements taken over from the external world; in so far as it is still organically bound to the external world, will the objects taken from this outer world still play an important rôle in the analysis itself and especially in the last part of it—in the employment of the instinctive impulses liberated from the repression.

Let us once more return to the comparison of the child with the adult neurotic. We have said that in the latter's analysis we have to reckon only with his instinctive life, his ego and his super-ego; we had no need to trouble—if conditions were favorable—with the fate of the impulses which are freed from the unconscious. These came under the influence of the super-ego which bears the responsibility for their further use.

To whom, however, shall we surrender this decision in child analysis? Taking the above into consideration, we must conclude that it should be the educators of the child, to whom its super-ego is still so inseparably bound; thus, in most cases, the parents.

Let us, however, not forget with how much danger this situation is fraught. The same parents or other educators were the ones whose excessive demands have driven the child to an excess of repression and into a neurosis. Here there is not the great interval between the formation of the neurosis and its liberation through analysis, as with the adult patient, who between these two points of time goes through his entire ego development, so that the individual who first made the decision and the one who has gone through this

revision can hardly be termed the same person. The parents who allowed the child to become ill and those who should help it to recover are actually the same people with the same views. Only in the most favorable cases are they sufficiently enlightened through the child's illness to be ready to mitigate their demands. Thus it seems dangerous to yield them decision over the fate of the now liberated instinctive life. The prospects are too great that the child will be obliged to return once more the way of repression and neurosis. Under such circumstances it would be more economical to spare entirely the tedious and laborious analytical task for liberation.

What may be the alternative? Would it perchance be permissible to declare the child, by reason of its neurosis and the analysis of it, prematurely of age and to expect of it even the most important decisions as to how it will now proceed with the impulses placed at its disposal? I do not know on the basis of what ethics and with the aid of what criteria or practical considerations it would be able to seek a way out of these difficulties. I believe that if the child is left alone and every support withdrawn, it can find only one short and convenient way—that to direct gratification. We know, however, from analytic theory and practice, that the child in the very interest of preventing neurosis should be held back from experiencing actual gratification at any stage of his necessarily perverse sexuality. Otherwise fixation on the once experienced pleasure becomes a disturbing obstacle for the further normal development and the urge for its revival, a dangerous stimulus for regression at later stages of development.

It seems to me that in this difficult situation there remains but one way out. The analyst must claim for himself the freedom to direct the child at this important point, in order to insure, to a certain extent, the results of analysis. Under his influence the child must learn how to behave in respect to its instinctive life. His point of view will in the end decide what part of the infantile sexual strivings must be repressed or rejected as is applicable to the cultural world and how much or how little can be permitted direct gratification, and what, in the interest of sublimation, must be repressed, for which all aids of education are at his disposal. We can say in short: during the course of the analysis the analyst must succeed in putting himself in place of the ego-ideal of the child and he must not begin his analytical work of liberation before he is certain that he can completely control the child at this point. At this crisis the position of authority becomes important to him, as was already mentioned in the introduction to child analysis. Only when the child feels that the

analyst's authority can be placed above that of the parents will it be ready to yield the highest place in its emotional life to this new love object, which ranks along with that of the parents.

If the parents, as stated above, have learned something from the illness of the child, and are inclined to adapt themselves to the analyst's demands, it is possible to have an actual division of the analytic and educational work between the home and the analyst's office, or rather, a coöperation between these two factors. Thus the child's education experiences no interruption even after the completion of the analysis, but goes direct from the hands of the analyst wholly into those of the now more understanding parents.

But if the parents work against the analyst, as the child is bound by its feelings to both, there arises a situation like that in an unfortunate marriage where the child becomes an object of strife. We must not be surprised if there result all kinds of injuries to the character formation such as we know about from the marriage situation. The child plays the father against the mother, the analyst against the parental home, and utilizes the conflict between them in both instances in order to withdraw itself from all demands. This state of affairs will be dangerous if during a resistance situation the child contrives to prejudice the parents against the analyst so that they are induced to break off the analysis. The control of the child is lost at the most unfavorable moment, in resistance and in negative transference, and one can be sure that the child will utilize all of the liberations received from the analysis in an unfavorable way. To-day I would undertake no child analysis where the personality or preliminary analytic training of the parents does not appear to give a guarantee against such a termination.

The necessity of full control of the child by the analyst may be seen in the following example. It has to do with a six-year-old patient, the already mentioned compulsive neurotic. After I had brought her in the analysis to the point of allowing her "devil" to speak, she communicated to me a large number of anal phantasies, at first hesitatingly, then more and more boldly and in detail, as she saw that they elicited no expressions of displeasure on my part. Gradually the session became devoted entirely to anal matters and the office became a place to deposit all of the day dreams which otherwise oppressed her. During these talks with me the oppression, which was constantly present, was removed. She herself designated the time with me as her rest hour. "My hour with you, Anna Freud," she said once, "is my rest hour. There I do not need to hold back the devil. But no," she added, "I have a second rest period: when

I am asleep." During the analysis and during sleep she was evidently freed from that which is equivalent in the adult to the constant expenditure of energy in maintaining repression. Her liberation showed itself above all in an altered, attentive and lively nature.

After some time she went a step further. She began to reveal likewise at home some of her previously strictly guarded phantasies and anal ideas. When, for example, certain foods were placed on the table she made a half audible comparison or a "dirty" joke directed to one of the other children. The foster mother of the children then came to me in order to obtain advice. At this time I did not have as much insight into child analysis as I now possess and took the situation somewhat lightly, giving the admonition that one should neither approve nor disapprove but allow such small defects to pass unheeded. The effect was entirely unforeseen. Under the lack of criticism from without the child lost all moderation, gave utterance to expressions at home which were formerly spoken only in the office and revelled completely as she had done with me alone in her anal ideas, comparisons and expressions. The other members of the family soon felt it to be intolerable and especially because of her behavior at the common midday meal lost all appetite. It came about that first one and then another, children as well as adults, left the table in silence and disapproval. My little patient had behaved like a perverse person or like an adult subject to a psychosis and had thereby placed herself outside of human society. If one failed to punitively remove her from the others the only result was that she was avoided by everyone. At this period every inhibition even in other respects had vanished. She had in a few days been transformed to a bright, arrogant and naughty child who was not entirely displeased with herself.

The foster mother now came to me a second time to complain. The situation was unendurable, she thought, and disturbed the life of the home. What should she do? Could she tell the child that the narration of such things was not so evil in itself, but ask her to refrain from it in her house out of love for her? This I refused. I was forced to realize that I had committed a blunder and had imputed to the super-ego of the child an independent inhibitory strength which it did not possess. As soon as the important people in the outer world had relaxed their demands, the once so severe ego ideal of the child, which had been strong enough to bring forth an entire series of compulsive neurotic symptoms, became compliant. I had relied on this compulsive neurotic rigidity, had been imprudent, and

had, as a result, achieved nothing for analysis. For the time being I had made—one might say—a bad perverse child out of an inhibited compulsive neurotic. But, at the same time, I had spoiled the situation for my work. For this liberated child had her “rest period” now the whole day long, lessened considerably her appreciation of the joint labor with me, and no longer supplied the proper material, for she scattered this throughout the entire day in place of holding it for the session and had lost momentarily the insight into the disease so necessary for the analysis. For child analysis, the maxim counts in much greater measure than in adult analysis, that analytic labor can be carried out only in a state of dissatisfaction.

Fortunately the situation presented itself as dangerous only in theory, for in practice it was easy to remove it. I told the foster mother to do nothing at all further and to have some patience. I would again bring the child to order, only could not promise how soon the result would be attained. In the next session with the child I spoke very emphatically and declared that there was a breach of all agreement. I had believed that she would relate to me those filthy things in order to be free of them. Now I saw that this was not at all the case. She would like to say them to every one in order to derive pleasure from it. I had had nothing against it but then I could not perceive why she still needed me. We might as well give up the sessions and let her have her amusement. But if she held to her first intention, then she must tell these things to me alone and no one else; the more she withheld from mentioning them at home, the more they would occur to her in the session and the more I could learn about her and thus free her from them. Now she must decide. She thereupon became very pale and thoughtful, looked at me and said with the same degree of earnest understanding as in the first analytic session, “If you say that is so, then I will say nothing more about it.” Whereupon her compulsive neurotic conscientiousness returned. From this day on no word on such subjects crossed her lips at home. She was again transformed back, but she was also changed from a bad and perverse child to an inhibited and disinterested one.

The same transformation I was forced to undertake on several other occasions with the same patient while under my treatment. Invariably after analytic liberation from her unusually severe compulsive neurosis she escaped to the other extreme of naughtiness or perversity. There was nothing left for me to do but to bring about the neurosis myself and to restore once more the “devil” to his rights, each time, naturally, in smaller amounts and greater caution

and gentleness than the present educational system would have done it, until finally I brought the child's behavior between the two possible extremes.

I would not have imparted this example to you in such detail were it not for the fact that it illustrates all of the circumstances asserted in this last section on child analysis: the weakness of the child ego-ideal, the dependence of its demands and therefore of its neurosis on the external world, the inability of self-control of the liberated impulse and the resulting necessity for the analyst of having the child in his power in the interests of education.* The analyst therefore combines in his own person two difficult and diametrically contradictory tasks; that is, he must analyze and he must educate, must in one breath permit and forbid, loosen and hold in check again. If he does not succeed in this, the analysis will be a charter for all of the bad habits banned by society. If he does succeed he makes retrogressive a bit of missed education and abnormal development and provides for the child, or for whomsoever decides the fate of the child, the possibility of once more improving its behavior.

You know we do not compel any adult patient even at the end of the analysis to become healthy. It is up to him what he will do with this possibility newly offered him, whether he will once more follow the neurosis, whether his ego development permits him to take the opposite course to far-reaching impulse gratification, or whether he will bring about a middle course, the actual synthesis between the two forces present within him. Nor can we force the parents of our little patient to start anything reasonable with the child when it returns to them. Child analysis is no insurance against all the damage which the future can inflict on the child. It works preëminently in the past; thereby indeed it creates a purified and better foundation for the future development.

I believe the conditions already described point to certain important factors. These factors are indicated not only by a definite ailment of the child. Child analysis belongs above all in the analytic milieu, and must provisionally be limited to the children of analysts, of analyzed patients, or parents who contribute to analysis a certain trust and respect. Only here will analytic education during treatment allow itself to be transferred to home education without a break. Where analysis of the child cannot be organically one with other

* This educational authority offers still other advantages to the child analyst. It makes possible the application of the "active therapy" of Ferenczi, a repression of individual symptoms which will then increase the libido stasis and should supply to the analysis more abundant material in this manner.

living conditions, but, like a foreign body is injected into other relationships which are thereby disordered, one will probably create for the child more conflicts than treatment in the other direction will be able to dissolve.

I fear that I have again prepared a disappointment in making this assertion to those of you who were already prepared to bring a certain amount of confidence to child analysis.

After I have told you so much about the impossibilities of child analysis, I would like before closing my lectures to speak further of the great possibilities which, despite all its difficulties, seem to me to possess great advantages over adult analysis. There are above all three. We can in the child produce quite other alterations of character than in the adult. The child who through the influence of its neurosis has trodden the path to an abnormal character development need only go a short distance back to enter again the normal road adapted to his real nature. Unlike the adult, he has not yet built up his entire future life, chosen his calling on the strength of his abnormal development, established friendships on this basis, nor any love relations on this foundation which, projected into identifications, influence the development of his ego. In the "character analyses" of the adult we must really shatter his entire life to accomplish the impossible, especially to make actions retrograde and make effects not only conscious but abolish them, if we will really have actual success. Here child analysis has illimitable advantage over adult analysis.

The second possibility concerns influencing the super-ego. The moderation of its rigidity, as you know, is one of the requirements for analyzing the neurosis. But here adult analysis encounters the greatest difficulties and has to battle with the oldest and most important love objects of the individual, the parents, who have introjected themselves through identifications, and, moreover, the remembrance of whom is in most cases protected by piety, which makes it so much more difficult to handle. In children, however, as you have already seen, we have to do with living persons who are actually present in the external world and who are not glorified by memory. If we add to the internal work external effort, and not only attempt to alter through analysis the already present identifications, but at the same time through human endeavor influence the actual objects, the effect will be telling and astonishing.

The same holds true for a third possibility. With the adult we must limit ourselves to aiding him to adapt himself to his environment. It is beyond us and in fact stands wholly outside our intention or the sphere of our power to transform the environment to meet the

patient's requirements. But in the case of the child we can do this very thing without great difficulty. The needs of the child are more simple, easier to satisfy and to supervise; our power combined with that of the parents, under favorable conditions, easily suffices to procure for the child at every stage of its treatment and progress exactly, or as nearly as possible, what he requires. We thus lighten the labor of adaptation by trying to adapt the environment to the child. Here, too, is a double labor, from within and from without.

I believe, despite all the difficulties enumerated, it is to these three points we must ascribe the fact that in child analysis we attain alterations, improvements, and recoveries of which in adult analysis we cannot even allow ourselves to dream.

In closing, I am prepared to hear the practical analysts among you say, in respect to what pertains here, that what I have accomplished with children has had, with all of these variations from adult analysis, nothing at all to do with actual psychoanalysis. It is a "wild" method which borrows from psychoanalysis but without proving just in any way to strictly analytic prescriptions. However, I pray you to consider the following: If an adult neurotic should come to your office for treatment, and if on close inspection he should prove to be so impulsive, so undeveloped intellectually, and dependent to such a degree on his environment as are my child patients, you would probably say: The Freudian analysis is an excellent method, but it is not adapted to such people; and your treatment would be a mixed one. You would give him as much pure analysis as his nature could tolerate while the rest would be child analysis, because on account of his quite infantile character he would deserve nothing better. I think it could not injure the analytic method if one should seek to apply it in modified fashion to other objects than strict adherence to a peculiar and definite object like the adult neurotic. It cannot be deemed a reproach if one adapts it for once to a different purpose; but the analyst should recognize fully just what he is doing.

THE POSITION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE INTERNIST CLINIC¹

BY

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My purpose is not to unfold the problem of the body and soul, nor to discuss experiments which concern psychophysical events. Nor shall I take up the general aspects of psychotherapy in internal medicine, but only emphasize the current results of psychoanalysis, in compressed form, in so far as they are of value for the internist. The problem will be discussed from the angle of the internist clinician, not from that of the analyst. This contraction and limitation to a narrowly circumscribed subject may entail the consequence that what is here brought forward will appear onesided in many respects. On that account it should be pointed out that the exclusive emphasis upon the analytic standpoint will exclude a criticism of other psychological methods.

The requirement that internal medicine direct its attention to psychoanalysis can only have come about in the hope that many advantages may be gained from this field of study. We are aware that there are gaps in our present knowledge of internal medicine. The anticipations associated with psychoanalysis may have a diagnostic, prognostic and therapeutic goal. If something new in the diagnostic field is to be supplied one must ask himself, what can psychoanalysis contribute as a method of investigation to throw light on disease? The claims made on all methods of exploration are, first, that they be simple to carry out and second, that they be exact and free from defects. Internal medicine is a specialty in which methods of exploration occupy an unusually large province—much larger than in any other branch of medicine; and to enrich this by another new method must in any case introduce a new burden. It is obvious that the deceptions—none too few—which must be experienced in connection with a long series of very complicated modes of investigation, in order to apply them, have made them distrusted. This skepticism asserts itself as resistance and repulsion toward the employment of new

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methods. During recent years, we have all experienced this negative attitude on the part of the authoritative circles of medicine. Into the other motivations of their behavior we will not enter here. The anticipatory ideas which associate themselves with what psychoanalysis can contribute to internal medicine must be satisfied in some degree, which should be transcended if one were to place value on the conversion of skeptics. But that would be possible only if a presentation of analytic methods—as far as they come into consideration for internists—should, first, enter into competition with other methods of internist diagnosis and treatment and prove its superiority over these; and second, with premeditation should conceal its weaknesses and crudities. But this ephemeral success should never be the object of present day expositions.

As internists we imagine that analytic methods are a mode of exploration of the soul and associate the idea that they are dependent on the communications of the patients and hence, on accidental conditions in a much larger degree than is the case with any sort of laboratory investigation. For the examination is wrecked at the very moment in which the patient declares that he is not in accord with his examination, or in other words no longer talks. For several reasons this conclusion will not hold water. For instance, we might not be able to make an examination of the feces because of the patient's constipation and refusal to take a laxative and refusal to provide material for investigation in any other connection; so that psychic examination is not different in this respect from any other. The patient must always be in accord with the physician. But this very inability to procure a stool is of diagnostic value, and so silence, or the incapacity for verbal communication, is likewise utilizable from the diagnostic standpoint. There is a further misunderstanding if one believes that the patient analytically investigated is dependent only on verbal communications. In such a case one is rather in a position to draw conclusions, from processes in the physical body and from actions, concerning psychic processes. I need in this connection only to recall blushing, outbreaks of perspiration during examination and the objectively demonstrable palpitation of the heart, which allow us to assume the presence of anxiety states.

Analysis is now in a position to recognize psychic content of a quite definite character from organic processes. How is that possible? Analysis assumes that every organ is affected with a definite psychic content and that the organs receive this content in the course of the individual development of the organic and psychic life. This is not mere speculation but an empirically discovered fact. The development of human instinctive life comes about normally, only the

quantities change. We may therefore assume as known a definite established psychic development system—if not in all details at least in the rough. During its building up it unites with certain organ systems—the mouth zone, the gastrointestinal or tracheobronchial—then the anal zone with the skin and muscle systems, and finally the genital and urogenital organs. The analytic comprehension holds that the entire body presents an outlet for the instinctive life until the complete genitosexual organization is created and up to and as long as the full possibility of sexual gratification is at hand. To this course of development there remains adherent in all organs a psychic content urging toward gratification, which fluctuates according to the tempo, kind and direction which the psychic development progressively or regressively takes. The reinvestment of the somatic organs with psychic content now expresses itself functionally as far as functions are possible—or where one can speak less about functions, for example, in the muscular system, which is subordinate to the will in actions. We will not decide here as to what gives the direction from the somatic to the instinctive life and how far the somatic anlage refuses the course of psychic development, and enforces fixations, etc. In any case it is true that we can draw conclusions from the psychology of instincts and characterology from somatic processes. According to the laws of the conservation of energy which unconditionally hold good in the psychic world, there remains adherent to each organ only as much psychic content as adds up to the sum of the energy of desire, present and self-forming, in an economic distribution. We know from experience that an organ disturbed in its function draws to itself psychic energy from other sources. We can thus recognize this application and impoverishment from the alterations of function and must say that every displacement of psychic energy is associated with definite reactions in the organic. If one is familiar with or accepts these experiences, then the organic findings made conspicuous in the examination tell more than those obtained from mere consideration of the organs as such.

Here we should interpolate that to assume the correctness of the above deductions is possible only to him who will either straightway give due credit to authority, one who has already mastered the method himself, or one who has experienced in his own person that which will make these connections apparent. To sum up briefly: the body contains psychic content which adheres to it throughout, which it receives during the development of the instinctive life and which in every organic process is reanimated, even if it does not become conscious and demonstrable. It may be recognizable from the kind of organic process or from the combined somatic attitude.

Let us assume that a patient (a woman) consults us for constipation which has resisted all treatment and that organic causes such as ileus, Hirschsprung's disease or gross adhesions may be excluded. We have to ask ourselves, what is the latent and what the actual psychic content of this disturbance? It should be pointed out that no significance should be imputed to that psychic actuality in the analysis which one is perhaps otherwise accustomed to include in reference to a psychic trauma. For one is of the opinion that one experience, which produces an actual conflict with organic disorders, only gives the outlined traces of the psychic past. Its action therefore lies less in the weight of its content than in the direction which past experiences have created. Viewed from this angle, such an intestinal disturbance must be valued variously. If, for example, it has developed recently in a child it may be regarded analytically as a sign that an instinct has temporarily gained the upper hand and seeks its gratification by the anal route. Here it should be stated that in those life periods of the child which have been termed the period of latency, in which therefore the final adjustment of the instinct gratification has not been produced, this form of intestinal disturbance is ordinarily of psychic origin and that too much attention and importance is placed on the organic aspect of the disorder. One may say that the organic treatment and mistreatment directed toward this zone of the body gives rise to fixations, the harm of which will be manifested often years after the first appearance of the disorder.

If the symptom mentioned develops at the time of puberty, especially in girls just before the appearance of the menses, it is seen psychologically that this disturbance is the last effort to disavow the genital organization. As every psychic disorder which makes the symptom has a long period of development behind it before it becomes manifest, so constipation in this period, viewed psychologically, is of major significance. For we know that even when the adjustment of the instincts finally enters in favor of the genital position or if the actual conflict responsible for the appearance of the symptoms can be settled, later conflicts will always seek the same way for adjustment. Certainly it is permissible to say this in advance of the period of life which is richest in conflicts, to wit, the climacteric. For in this period of life in which the retreat of the engrossment in genital activities takes place former positions become drawn upon for the purpose of gratification. To these belongs the anal zone. From the symptom of constipation, from the obstinate effort to combat the same, from the interest which the patient devotes at this period to the disturbance, one may recognize that there is transpiring a displacement of the libido. The more this effort of the patient is backed up the more one works in the direction of psychic error. Provision-

ally we will not decide whether this is good or bad, or whether it is a matter of indifference how one behaves or what is done for the patient. Only one thing is to be maintained, that the symptom can be explained purely by analysis and that its presence permits of a diagnosis of a transformed instinct. Further, we may suppose that the symptom of constipation represents a former successful substitute gratification. It is, moreover, not only interpretable through the physiology of instinct but also characterologically; that is, we know that with the recession quite definite character traits must become evolved. Just why this organic symptom is brought into the foreground is determined both psychologically and somatically. That which interests us here and must impress you is that so banal a symptom as constipation has come to the fore. Here we may observe (1) that what is to be ascertained from this disturbance of intestinal function holds just as good for every other somatic process, be it a stomach symptom, a sweat secretion, a migraine, a compulsion to drink, an urge to urinate, etc., etc. (2) At the same time it should be noted that every part of the body has a psychological or meta-psychological significance in the psychic life which gives to the processes in the same a quite definite direction firmly established in the entire life. This symbolic significance attached to every portion of the body is extremely ambiguous, but nevertheless remains the same in most of mankind and is transparent to him who is experienced in analysis. The analytically schooled draws them into calculation in all organic investigation. For him therefore every process in an organ has a double content. It is comprehensible that he sees more here than the inexperienced. (3) So simple an example as the above (constipation) was chosen in order to make it manifest with what petty things analysis is associated, mostly in fact even more insignificant than the above example. Such a mode of thinking completely alters the attitude of the physician to the patient, for he must deduce his diagnosis from processes which must remain quite hidden from the ordinary practitioner. (4) In taking up a symptom which in itself alone may present a disease picture—while it also comes into consideration in the frame of a disease merely as an insignificant associated process—it should be suggested that the analytically thinking man reads in every disease a number of symptoms which possess meaning and importance for him quite apart from the causes of the disease. Symptomatology here is more essential than etiology perhaps because we still know so little of the causes of psychic maladies.

We have now discussed the psychological explanation and importance of organic symptoms which we can comprehend without information from the patient concerning his psychic life; hence purely

from visible organic processes. Fortunately we have been guided not only by our psychological penetration but we also receive from the patient information which may be necessary and valuable for diagnosis. Here may be interpolated that an analytically thinking physician takes down the personal history of the patient in a manner quite unlike the usual method, for several reasons:

The interest of the psychologically experienced physician in the communications of the patient begins, to speak paradoxically, at the moment when the latter becomes silent, for that knowledge which the patient imparts on the causes, beginning and connections of the ailment, even when it appears very plausible, is constructive and proceeds from his conditional affective constellation. It is not difficult to reverse the entire personal history, even when it appears to be ever so free from gaps. The communications of the patient are exposed to those same mechanisms of repression which become known from the analysis and it comes about that the unessential seems prominent while the essentials do not play a rôle. One may therefore maintain that an anamnesis presents itself with radically different content, whether it is taken by an analyst or by one whom in this connection we may style a medical layman. Moreover, we know that the recording of the family history also depends on what the examiner will give ear to. The analyst listens between the words. Whatever he gets to hear is ambiguous, he pays heed to the affect situation of the patient at different moments during his communication, on the distribution of the emphasis, on the pauses which he makes; when he is garrulous and when taciturn. The analytically experienced physician interrogates much less, is more accustomed to wait. Pauses for him are not suggestions to enable the patient to force his recollection but rather a direct invitation, while holding himself in expectation. He inquires always in the direction of his own ideas, as to what he will give ear to and not what the patient has to say. Hence pauses do not frighten him and he is also protected against many false inferences. For him as an internist there can be no separate somatic and psychic anamneses for they coincide. The patient gives information and may not know at all that he is doing so. It is then often easy to dumbfound the patient by a knowledge of matters which concern him but which naturally he has no recollection of having imparted. This form of anamnestic investigation has nothing to do with the analytic method but can be obtained only through analysis, and is so to speak, applied analysis. It will be our task to make this knowledge the property of all younger physicians.

What are the advantages of this method of inquiry into the history of the patient? It overlooks nothing, for everything is of importance.

For example, in our history-taking one sentence which we are accustomed to see does not occur, to wit, "family history unimportant." I do not refer here to gross oversight but only to that customary stipulation of the fact that the other members of the family are in good health. Here one seeks information as to the family constellation, the station of the patient in his family, his place in the series of brothers and sisters, the somatic and psychic similarity to the members of the family, the relation to the parents and to the brothers and sisters. Here one often is accustomed to learn of factors which can cause the disease in question, which present an important supplement to the foundation of disease as supplied by the constitution; especially those causes which proceed from the psychological process of identification. This is an unconscious tendency on the part of the individual to be like one of the parents or an image of the same in every respect, not only psychically but also somatically as well. This unconscious play with the organs which serve for identification, which often allow themselves to be followed up well before the beginnings of the disease, is, one might say, the psychological reverse side of the constitutional organic anlage. Moreover, it shows that much which is regarded as constitutionally determined is often no more than a fruitless attempt at identification of the individual who exhausts himself in symptoms without actually being ill. The knowledge of the reciprocal relations between the parents or brothers and sisters and the patient gives information also concerning the motivation of the disease, over the readiness for disease and the conditions for its development which do not lie in the patient but in complexes of individual members of the family which have worked and still work in the preparation for and causation of disease. They allow the illness to be understood by the others, for we know that unconscious reciprocal attitudes occur between the individual family members which aim at disease of the others and still more permit attitudes and counter-attitudes which do not become healthy to the others. That which has been said here over the relations between parents and children, holds good also for married people among themselves, for the relations between husband and wife. It is not possible to go into this subject here but many obscurities in regard to sickness, invalidism, double illness, etc., find their explanation in the careful investigation and rapid comprehension of these concatenations.

The second advantage of this form of inquiry into disease is the recognition of a psychological boundary for the beginning of the disease, a limit which is never absent, the significance of which is naturally fluctuating, but which nevertheless always plays a rôle. It

explains in one relation why the patient is precipitated into the disease without any resistance and develops such a wealth of symptoms; betrays even at the outset that he will resist giving up his symptoms. This psychological boundary coheres with the actual material of the conflict which is actually present in every life but does not work pathogenetically until a motive enters, whether organic or psychic in nature. It becomes, however, interwoven into the organic disease and lends to the disease its peculiar coloring. This fact is important, for its solution is always attempted by the patient through the disease actually present.

This happens probably in disguised form and by a false route, especially in the organic. It makes the relation of the patient to his disease more intelligible. Still a third important gain is obtained through this subtle method of anamnesis taking. Not only do we become acquainted with the relations of the relevant persons, but it also procures for us a glimpse into the psychic reactions which are necessarily present although not visible, through the reciprocal attitudes. Three important results proceed from these attitudes to the external world: anxiety, sense of guilt, and need of punishment. All of these three factors work themselves out in the organic. We know that we have to reckon with them not only in diagnostic but still more in prognostic and therapeutic relationships. I do not hesitate to state that this triad of psychic basic content is no less important as an excitator to disease than an infection. On the latter may depend the fate of the patient; so may the consequences of these psychic processes decide between life and death in an organic disease. However, we will report here the position of analysis in the internal clinic in general only, and cannot go into the details of these processes. That the vegetative nervous system can be drawn into sympathy with anxiety states is only too well known, but its importance in the course of diseases of the heart is still greatly undervalued. Less is known as to how influential are sense of guilt and need of punishment in the causation of organic disease and in making the most of it, as the patient may become driven by them to flee again into the disease, seeking it as a means of freedom or deliverance from sense of guilt. This also urges them to operations and to a certain extent they transfer the punishment to the surgeons, which for a time unburdens them psychically.

The more an individual suffers in a way not quite adequate to the objectively demonstrated organic process, the greater share of these psychic forces can be attributed to them. Whether therapeutic possibilities can accrue to the internists from the knowledge of these processes, can only be discussed elsewhere. The fourth important

stipulation which a case history obtained through analytic viewpoints gives us, is a glimpse into the given sexual attitudes. The significance of masturbation, the attitude to the opposite sex, or the form of sexual intercourse, does not need to be emphasized. As frigidity and impotence can work out in the organic, it is equally known in what reciprocal activity these stand to organic symptoms. The diagnostic value which the knowledge of these functional disorders should possess for the internist is not to be overrated. One thing is certain, however, that every deviation from the genital attitude must bring with it a displacement of psychic energy to other organs of the body, although as such it need not work out pathogenically. In many circles of practitioners shyness over such matters still prevails, with the need of going into so many things laden with inhibitions. To make inquiries of patients on such matters may be very painful to themselves, about which they do not speak unless requested. The impression could be awakened that analysis forces the physician to unveiled questions somewhat as in the case of inquiries as to the evacuation of urine and feces. If this were the case, the information given by the patient would have but little value, would be given hesitatingly and would be intentionally incorrect. But the very opposite is the case. The analytically schooled conducts the history taking in such a way that the need of the patient to impart to the analyst the facts of his sexuality is greater than the desire of the latter to listen to him. The art of the matter lies herein that these statements of the patient are allowed to appear as a self-intelligible part of the history which he can give without compulsion and give correctly. A much more important question is whether in general the statements of the patient can be utilized. Here one may calmly maintain that the majority of patients are quite unoriented as to what is to be understood by masturbation. For example, women often state that they have normal sexual feelings although they are to be designated as frigid. Or men state that sexual intercourse is normal although precocious ejaculation is present. These may be of masturbatory significance. Since we know that there are disturbances in the direction of hyperpotency, to be comprehended as a morbid state of sexual life, for the patient to say that he is sexually normal states little. Therefore we can only utilize statements as to great deviations from the norm. Naturally an inquiry into traumatic sexual experiences of the present or past is of importance. I would like, however, to depreciate the value of communications on disturbed or altered sexual function still further in adding that their value for the diagnosis and prognosis of organic disease does not lie in the fact itself but rather because it refers to a past, to a development

which can remain not without influence on the psychic content of the organic. This is essential. To the experienced, then, the behavior of the patient, his somatic reactions, unessential acts and mistakes can often impart more information than the communication of the naked fact of a disordered sexuality. This knowledge one draws, however, even from ordinary empirical analytic data. Once more it is analytic thinking and not the method which shows up fruitfully in the internal clinic.

Before we go into the position of analysis as therapy in the internal clinic, let us review what has been previously stated. We can then conclude that it is not the method of analytic investigation in itself which comes into consideration in diagnosis and prognosis, but only our knowledge of analytic results and the thereby influenced medical thinking, which brings with it a valuable enrichment of internal medicine.

Analysis as a method of treatment must, to the internist, seem foreign throughout. It differentiates itself essentially from its treatment tendencies and from the problems which are usually laid upon it. A plan of treatment must be judged by what it would and what it can accomplish. The therapy of the internists has a twofold aim. First, whenever possible a specific etiologic treatment must be pushed, and second, the disease of the patient must as far as possible be alleviated and shortened. The very opposite is seen in analysis which employs the same method for all patients; they are treated without any regard for the cause of the disease or its form, nor does it trouble itself about the disease *per se*. On the contrary it places new affections on the patient and even prepares him for them. To the patient's question as to when his troubles will disappear, one may but call his attention to the fact that it will be a severe test of patience. It is difficult for the physician with the organic disease attitude to understand what types of internal disease, real or supposed, can be treated in this manner at all or with a better outlook than under the ordinary treatment. Here one possibility, which is not readily imagined, comes into consideration, namely, that the disease would be welcome as an experience of suffering, and again, as a result of this attitude of the patient, recovery does not take place. This is true in not a few instances. We know from analytic experience that there is in all human beings an indwelling tendency to escape psychic conflicts, so that there is a flight into disease, and one may say that a man is never more unfortunate than when he dare not become organically ill. However, one may make the observation that organically diseased patients, when it comes to questions about their psychic life, conduct themselves in a manner quite refractory. This attitude is

not wholly unreasonable, for the psychically sound are sound because they have a favorable solution for all of their conflicts and in a direction which they will not change and desire still less to have stirred up. It is also certain that a revival of the same could sooner make the patient organically ill than its absence, even without any advantage to be gained thereby. However, it is not a question of these patients but the sort who welcome sickness, who cling to their disease because they punish themselves thereby, because they draw profit from their disease. For in their organic symptoms a feeling is hidden which they cannot or will not make conscious. These subjects are resolved not to give up their symptoms because they would be proffered others as substitutes. It is comprehensible that in these cases all efforts toward an internal therapy would be wrecked for they run counter to the intentions of the patient when they aim at removal of the affection or rather affections. In a certain sense the organic neuroses belong in this category of diseases which hitherto have been reckoned wholly in the domain of internal medicine.

In accordance with the foregoing, analysis ought to be applied to these cases although several difficulties are encountered. First, it is worth while to make it intelligible to the patient that the source of his organic disease is to be sought in his organic ailment—a procedure which often comes up against insurmountable difficulties. This is partly due to the fact that the patient knows of the organic nature of his disease and how it lies in the neurosis, and will not give it up because it serves for the discharge of many neurotic conflicts; and partly because the importance of his organic disease has been confirmed by physicians and he places himself behind their authoritative diagnoses. The second difficulty consists in the fact that with the beginning of an analysis the organic treatment must be quickly abandoned, a procedure which the patient does not understand. In addition to this it lies in the nature of analytic treatment for the analyst to hold himself passive in the highest degree toward the patient's ailment; in other words he avoids all treatment directed against the organic symptoms. This is of all the greater weight for the complaints of these patients refer persistently to their organic ailments and they now apply for comfort and advice to divert the physician from the, to them, unpleasant psychic processes. The attitude of refusal on the part of the physician soon brings about a resistance which often causes the patient to flee from the treatment. As a third difficulty we find that even when the first period of treatment has succeeded in removing the organic symptoms and the patient feels himself recovered and delivered, there may appear, with the starting up of new laden psychic material, a recurrence of his

organic ailments which causes the patient to tumble from his heaven and to despair of the consequences of treatment.

But all of these difficulties may be circumvented. It is certain that the one last mentioned is the most important to be reckoned with because one can impute to the patient only a definite amount of capacity to endure organic difficulties, even when he is so far along in advanced analytic treatment as to recognize the connection between the psychic complaints actually present and the newly acquired organic ones. The importance of recognizing all of these possibly impending difficulties for the internist hardly needs to be emphasized for it is he who must decide whether the patient confided to him shall be referred to analytic treatment. We must therefore emphasize once more that the problem and the aim of analysis go far beyond the ordinary measures of treatment. As the somatic processes, as already mentioned, are observed only in connection with the total instinctive life, upon the new construction of which its effort is directed, the disease symptoms seen under purely organic viewpoints shift back from the center of observation into a level in which are shown the associated psychic complexes; that is, since for those which arrive at investigation in an analysis of all the strata of instinctive life, and likewise have only a limited intimate association with organic life, there is no possibility of a permanent application of attention to the organic system; exactly as in the case of the physician who is exploring the abdominal cavity and cannot at the same time determine the processes in the thorax. For these reasons the appearance during an analysis of organic symptoms by no means startles the analyst and is not conceived by him as an aggravation of the condition, for he knows that his momentary entrance into the psychic processes is in the end to the advantage of the organic disease processes. Essentially it is a matter of loosening those psychosomatic unions, of laying bare to some degree the organs of its psychic superinvestment and of securing its organic function unburdened by pathologic instinctive influences.

Let us illustrate with a case of bronchial asthma, a disease which to-day one may assume to be reckoned among the organic neuroses. From the form of the ailment and the fear developed thereby, from the occasions under which it arises, from the alarming symptoms which it produces, it manifests sufficient visible psychic content and appears to indicate a psychic form of treatment. Through what influence can psychoanalysis reach it? Popularly speaking we may say that through the re unfolding of the total instinctive life of the adult personality of the patient, he is once more opposed by his instincts, confronted with them and an agreement with them is in-

cited. Here the physician stands beside the patient and takes a stronger or more moderate position against the mobilized instinctive claims. This arrangement does not progress without violent scenes, up to the time that it comes to a final reconciliation. Cure results when the psychic alteration of the patient comes to expression in his conduct toward the external world. If this is reached, then anxiety becomes superfluous, the need of punishment declines, the sense of guilt is lightened, the disease loses its origin and the symptoms their meaning. The psychic education of the organ functions is the somatic expression of the healing process. We have to imagine this as follows: The displacement in psychic economy draws psychic energy from the ailing organs of the body, so that as a result these are more favorably provided for. This is the way of penance which the patient has to go and along which there are so many stations of suffering, and here the physician furnishes the patient with no visible aid.

It is the basic condition of the treatment that in the course of the same every organic intervention must be omitted. This attribution of the energy of the patient when we think of asthma is obviously a large one. It cannot be avoided that this kind of attack must repeat itself as often as it comes to an adjustment between the ego and its instinctive complexes with the resulting development of anxiety. The one comforting thing is that the more the discord in psychic economy diminishes with the progress of the analysis, the weaker the asthmatic attacks become until they are finally extinguished. What has been discussed here in this example will hold good for other organic neuroses, as migraine, mucocolitis, certain cases of angina pectoris, intermittent claudication, etc., etc.

Rearrangement of the strata of the instinctive life, the detachment of function-disturbing complexes from the ailing portions of the body, the alteration of the attitude to the disease, create conditions under which the patient no longer feels himself ill. These are not theoretic considerations but in this very example of asthma analysis we can look back on favorable experiences. When I mention that I myself can refer to a two-year success with an asthmatic patient who for a period of thirteen years roamed over half the world in order to be freed from his ailment, who could not approach his own neighborhood without developing attacks yet now lives there free from the same, I do not quote the case because of the success mentioned. Analysis is not proud of these results; it is essentially a method of cure which comes about from a method of investigation. Analysis distrusts its own results for it sees into the deepest associations of the disease.

Analysis has remote aims, will make us sound and not merely free from symptoms. It knows its weaknesses. It beholds discharge phenomena yet cannot measure them, for it does not dominate the quantities which will remove them. It often sees symptoms disappear yet knows not the wherefore; but intends to know how this comes about.

This weakness of analytic therapy therefore becomes emphasized because it ought to show the attitude of the method, so entirely dissimilar, to the problem of recovery, in contrast to the internists. The latter must cure and as quickly as possible, and the patient must not be allowed to suffer. For him who makes these claims in the interest of psychotherapy, analysis is not a method of treatment. There are other methods for obtaining quick results whose value we will not discuss here. It may be assumed with reason that the results depend almost entirely on what is known in psychoanalysis as the result of transference. We refer to those recoveries which are observed in the course of an analysis, and indeed usually at the beginning of the same, and which break down so soon as the core of the ailment is reached. To sum up briefly, analysis as therapy plays a not too insignificant rôle in the internist clinic. Its application will depend on the aims which it sets itself in its endeavor to cure.

A special question is that of the collaboration between the analyst and internist. As already deducible from what has been said, a patient is turned over to the analyst for treatment because he has been drawn far away from the responsibility of the ordinary practitioner. The latter cannot become oriented as to the condition and progress of the analysis for the patient utilizes this for extensive resistance.

Even when an ailment requiring organic treatment is present or appears during the analysis everything has to happen in order to complete as rapidly as possible the necessary organic treatment, and avoid the strong fixation on the physician which must act as a disturbing factor on the progress of the analysis. For the patient often endeavors to utilize the organic disease in order to postpone as long as possible the settlement of any actual conflict situation which has been mobilized by analysis. For the most part diseases appear during analytic treatment in periods of resistance. Moreover, it is a well known fact that patients seldom develop organic diseases during analysis. This is very striking and at times the reason is that in an advanced analysis the patient shows the tendency to depreciate his present organic difficulties and give to the same a psychic interpretation. He frequently succeeds in deceiving even the analyst in regard to the organic disease present. In many instances the analyst

escapes such deceptions only by unusual foresight. The danger lies here, that every organic symptom inserts itself according to the direction of the present psychic situation which stands exactly for settlement and can be completely determined psychologically. As analysis is accustomed to the over-determination of a symptom and rather assumes it to be self-evident, it may transpire that the psychological sense of the organic disease is completely analyzed, the libidinous gain is depreciated and the actual basis of the present troubles recognized only at a relatively late date. Add to this that the analyst during the analysis never investigates organically but as soon as examination is necessary turns the patient over to the designated internist.

I recall a case of a tumor of the brain which was analyzed for a long time before the analyst recognized its presence. The blame did not rest on the analyst for a neurologist had diagnosed the condition as of psychogenic origin and had referred the patient to the analyst. It may be added that the patient had received benefit rather than harm from the treatment for the organic disease had mobilized a small neurosis, had given rise to loss of personality, and to symptoms the treatment of which in any case was beneficial. It has already been stated that the patients with organic ailments for which analysis is applied declare themselves to be cured at a period in which there could have been no objective alteration in the organic disease picture.

The internist should be oriented in all of these possibilities for he can render a patient a great service in explaining to him the disadvantages of a premature interruption of analytic treatment. This presupposes that the analyst himself has a clear realization that analysis is a scientific method which should be learned like any other special province of medicine—for example physiological chemistry or bacteriology. To learn analysis from books, however, is just as impossible as to learn organic chemistry in this manner. It may perhaps suffice to see its results demonstrated on patients in order to obtain a certain understanding of the same. An actual surety to have grasped it is given only after one has experienced a self-analysis. In every case this is a prerequisite if one desires to employ analysis for curative purposes and, moreover, if one would put it to scientific use.

PRELIMINARY PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS OF MODERN ART

BY

J. FROIS-WITTMAN

Introduction

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MODERN ART

The old antagonism between the artist and the public, which always terminates in the victory of the former, has come in recent years to a new turning point, owing to the more thoroughgoing attack on the traditional conception of the arts that has occurred just before, during, and after the war (cubism, expressionism). The critic, poor relation of the artist, is easily disposed of. But the Word of the Man of Science, who is able to conjure the unknown forces of nature, will be respected as long as man begins his life as a child, and grows up as a death-fearing animal. The most reputable oracles, though, age and go out of fashion, and so we have long ago parted without regret from that alert contempter of the artists, Max Nordau.

To-day a new science has been organized. Psychoanalysis, grown from the limited therapeutic technic which it was in the beginning, has been successively applied to the elucidation of various problems in the mental sciences, *e.g.*, in criminology, folk-psychology, religion, art. With such a method at their disposal to improve on the utterances of the above mentioned author, it would seem that psychoanalysts would have been tempted to apply it, this time, to the modern movement in art. Very few books or articles, however, have appeared on the subject.

Still, even if the modern artist has not aroused much sympathetic interest on the part of the analyst, it is only natural that the latter should have been attracted to study artistic personalities and productions in general, since art has been traditionally considered as dealing with the emotional side of human life. The psychoanalytic method has been applied both to the artist (*e.g.*, Freud's "Leonardo") and to the work of art (*e.g.*, the numerous studies of Rank, Sachs, Jones, and others). Yet, after these studies from the dynamic standpoint (*i.e.*, treating artist and product as case material) one is spurred to gather from the data, if not exactly a *Kunst-Philosophie*, at least some

generalizations helping to make clear one's own attitude and help the public in its constant demand for "understanding" the artist and his art. This has been done by Rank,¹ Pfister,² v. Sydow,³ who have stepped out of a strictly technical treatment in order to draw theoretical conclusions, the former in favor of the romantics, the latter, of the classics, and Pfister, against the expressionists.

Must we think that our *desire that psychoanalysis define its attitude toward modern art* is fulfilled by Pfister's book? The affirmative would mean that this attitude is one of opposition to the modern, and of siding with the traditional, artist. The present paper has been written in the hope that the answer is not final, and has, as its aim, a reconsideration of the conclusions arrived at. Why is it, for instance, that they have, so far, not been favorable?

The tendency to treat psychic content as analyzable material (search for latent content and diagnosis) carries with it a predisposition to view the product as a collection of symptoms, and the producer as a neurotic. This is warranted in psychopathology, and Freud, in treating the accidental mistakes in mental functioning as symptoms, has shown there is no sharp differentiation between the neurotic and the normal. The universality of psychological development makes it possible to find evidences of regression and of fixations in any so-called normal person, and the same is true of any artist, modern or not. The question is one of economic distribution (quantity) of the libido. *The very fact that the artist in general has been found to be near the neurotic ought to make one cautious before diagnosing as pathological a certain kind of artistic expression.* The important thing is to pay attention to the conclusions reached: an artist cannot be condemned on the basis of his work evidencing "symptoms," but of which cultural and artistic value are the trends evidenced. It would seem, however, that after having recognized the dependence of artistic creation on unconscious phantasies, *psychoanalysis would favor especially those artists who make a more extensive use of them.*

The present study attempts a systematic revaluation of what might be expected from persons who manifest their activity in the field of art. The method used is one of critical comparison and differentiation of analytic findings pushed to their logical consequences, with a view to arrive at new definitions. No new interpretation has been made of any productions from artists or patients; the analyses found in the literature on the subject of art, together with those of seven patients, including my own, have been, on the contrary, taken for granted. This is equivalent to saying that the various symptoms

¹ O. Rank, "Der Künstler," Int. Psychoanal. Verlag, 1925.

² O. Pfister, "Expressionism in Art," translation.

³ E. von Sydow, "Die Kultur der Dekadenz," Dresden, 1921.

(exhibitionism, narcissism, manifestations of individual complexes) are admitted without discussion, and that one will find here only theoretical considerations on material already at hand. Only the *conclusions* are questioned, one of which being the rejection of modern art as evidencing neurotic symptoms, which rests on the premise (false as it will be shown), that the artist is expected to be normal, and that the traditional artist is so.

The question to be answered is whether modern art is legitimate on the basis of psychoanalytic research; it tends to involve other questions, as: whether all forms of art are equally legitimate,⁵ and, if not, which one is best suited to win the adherence of the analyst. The justifiable form of art is taken to be that which is *truest to the nature and purpose of artistic creation as elucidated by psychoanalysis*. But the claims of both the modern artist and his critic, the analyst,⁶ must be subjected to the same test before either can be validated. For this purpose, well agreed upon data concerning the psychology of artists and their art will be compared with the leading ideas (explicit or implicit) of modern artists on the one hand, and the theses of psychoanalysts on the other.

The meaning given to the words: modern art, aesthetics, etc., unless especially restricted in the text, is a very broad one. A few definitions will help:

Art: a generic name covering such activities as painting, sculpture, poetry, literature, music, etc.

The artist: a person indulging in any one of the above-mentioned activities.

Aesthetics: a generic name for the postulates formulated or implicit (discoverable) in a given work or set of works of art.

Modern art: that form of art that since the years around 1900 has broken with the traditionally accepted esthetic values (postimpressionism, cubism, expressionism, surrealism, etc.)

Speaking in terms of such *types*, based on differentiation, is of common occurrence in psychopathology: *e.g.*, the hysteric vs. the obsessional neurotic. Besides, in analysis, all types are mixed types. The words "must" and "should" that may occur here and there refer to definitions previously given and merely indicate relations of *implication*.

⁵ Or no art is legitimate. This question is not examined here.

⁶ The "character" of the analyst no doubt plays an important part in his formulations. The present work is evidently influenced by previous artistic activities; studies in artistic creation by Russian psychoanalysts (*e.g.*, under Ermakoff), with which I regret that I am not acquainted, would be interesting to compare with those of Pfister. Although complete objectivity is the goal, the extent of the individual's ego excursion is proportional to the lack of data on the territory to explore.

I. THE ARTIST AND ARTISTIC CREATION.

Out of the three courses open for the resolution of an early conflict: a perversion (direct expression), a sublimation (acceptable activity), a neurosis (symptom), we learn from psychoanalysis that the path leading to art, as to scientific research and other socialized activities is through sublimation.

The play of children, dream and day-dream are allied phenomena, fundamental in the human mind, resulting from a failure of the wish to find gratification in reality. The artist's work, which has always been recognized to be imaginative, betrays easily its unconscious origin when subjected to analysis, and evidences the same causation and *modus operandi* as the productions of those who seek satisfaction by means not included in the reality-principle: image, hallucination, phantasy, symbol, dream, play, myth, fetish, delusion. Thus the "imagination" of the artist bears a close relation to the "phantasy-thinking" (thinking with images or symbols) of the dreamer, the primitive, the child; that is, to the primary process of the Ucs instead of to the secondary process (reality-thinking) of the Pcs.

The energy of the creative impulse is supplied by unconscious phantasies of childhood (Freud). Clark⁷ thinks the strength of the "primary identification" plays the important rôle of furnishing the individual after the weaning-trauma, with demands for further identifications (sensitivity). In one way or another, the essential fact is the lack of satisfaction of the libido in reality and its subsequent "introversion" (regression to imaginary objects); which is equivalent to saying that perhaps a *slight schizophrenia* is presupposed in the case of the artist.

But there is a second tempo in artistic creation, *viz.*, the creative process as such, the shaping of the phantasy through an alteration of reality. What prompts the child to draw or model? Evidently there must be special constitutional dispositions resulting in a variable erotic emphasis on the sense of touch, lip and mouth activity, tendency to smear, to peep, etc., as the differentiating factor between the various arts.⁸ Exhibitionism seems primordial. But this is not all that is necessary to cause the phantasy to be made manifest; it requires some object libido, together with "a certain weakness in

⁷ L. P. Clark, "A Psychological Study of Art vs. Science as Illustrated in Leonardo da Vinci," Arch. of Ps., Vol. I, No. 3, and "The Psychological Significance of the Madonna-Child Relationship Represented in Classic Art," this issue.

⁸ Cf. O. Rank, *op. cit.*

making the repressions."⁹ The artist incidentally is seeking his way to reality. The creative process is what distinguishes him from the day-dreamer and the neurotic. His introverted libido does not proceed all the way back to symptoms (neurosis) nor to the ego (psychosis), but it turns toward reality again by way of the ego, upon which an excitation elicited by the conflict is projected. Freud and Rank describe the more elaborate mechanisms (fore- and end-pleasures) through which gratification is obtained. But neither the affective cathexis on the unconscious phantasy nor the latter's elaboration in the conscious system would be sufficient for putting the individual again in contact with reality through creation: it seems reasonable that the libidinal excitation needs for its expression the assistance of fairly well-organized ego-tendencies, and a certain degree of cathexis on reality, partly because the phantasy, as in the play of the child, is so well distinguished from reality (Freud), partly because, again as in play, it is fashioned into a product, thus involving an actual objective rearrangement of reality, and finally because both play and art involve the doing of work. The schizophrenic, for instance, who has lost all interest in changing the outside world, has correspondingly lost all interest in creation. Sachs emphasizes the social factor as distinguishing writing from day-dreaming: making a positive effect on others, overstepping the limits of the ego is what dissipates the sense of guilt. Alexander, quoting Sachs, adds that "the artist's creative difficulties show how the interest which should be dedicated to the work is replaced by more narcissistically toned emotions (rivalry, prestige, etc.); in short, how the *genital* character of creation is overlaid by the symptom-complex of the conflict with the father."¹¹ It is probably the weakness of the repressive mechanisms, which in precluding a severe conflict, makes both for genitalization and sublimation, so that the libido can be redirected from the phantasy to objects. Thus when Rank says that the artist "stands midway between the dreamer and the neurotic," it would be just as true to say that he stands between the neurotic and the normal: the artist cannot transform reality to meet his grandiose wishes and consequently retreats into phantasy,¹² but the

⁹ S. Freud, "Introduction à la Psychanalyse" (translation), Paris, 1923.

¹¹ F. Alexander, "Neurosis and the Whole Personality," *Int. J. of Ps.*, Vol. VII, pts. 3-4. *Italics mine.*

¹² "Art and Action." The compensatory function of art, as a substitute for action, is well shown by the fact that it is inhibited by the latter (the same applies to play). The best example of this is perhaps A. Rimbaud, whose short-lived literary career, intrinsically bound with his life, is a rehearsal of his long and indomitable revolt against reality; not only does he stop writing, but he burns his work when he starts carrying his quest in action. The more recent poets have very little use for the professional

further linking of his phantasy to reality for its objectification, even if only for narcissistic gain, and obtained by a "short-cut," involves work, socialization, "alloplastic" transformation—all obediences to the demands of reality. The involvement of object-libido and genitality is further pointed out by the presence of the same economic variations of the libido in social efficiency, object-love, and artistic production, and by the strictly reversible libidinal investment of artistic work and of the loved object.

Such are the characters that distinguish the artist: he lives in phantasy, sublimates in creation and is socialized in that way. I think no modern artist, even the most extreme expressionist, does exactly the reverse of what is required by the very comprehensive definition of Freud and Rank. The additional observation that the egoistical character of the day-dream," according to Freud, must be "softened" by "changes and disguises" so as to "conceal their suspicious origin,"¹³ cannot be used against modern artists, for which ones among them give a faithful reproduction of their day-dream as the patients do in an analysis? They lack the technique to do so, and it is not their aim, anyway. Nor can be used the statement that the artist's phantasies must be conceded by other men as being "valuable reflections of actual life,"¹⁴ the obviously broad significance of which should not be immoderately restricted to the extent of holding the artist to the representation of the object's specific characteristics. As most modern artists bother very little with reality-representation, practically the whole quarrel as regards modern art centers around this point, which is nowhere mentioned in Freud except as I have indicated.

Before condemning the neglect of the object, it must be proven that the representation or imitation of reality is an indispensable part

literateur who does not "practice" (in the Greek sense) his poetic attitude in life. But this is, naturally, at the cost of production: they produce relatively little, some not at all. The question is how much the making of poems is necessary for poetry. If action and poem stand in a reversible relation (are interchangeable), it means that action may have a poetic character. It would be interesting to know whether great men of action, if inhibited, would not have been great poets. Perhaps some accessory predisposition is necessary. One fact is certain: that the written work of such men is a dry and cold statement of fact—a "commentary": cf. Caesar, Napoleon, and, recently, Lawrence and Lindbergh. Libido is left for writing the book, but the phantasy has been gratified by, and its driving force used up in, the action. The public, making use of its own phantasies, is able to recapture in the dry words the lyricism of the act, but the same reversal occurs in its case, and Lindbergh's book is not read, for the simple reason that the public has exhausted its poetic experience during the "lyrical moment" par excellence of the flight it witnessed.

¹³ S. Freud, "Collected Papers," Vol. IV, IX (translation), London, 1925.

¹⁴ S. Freud, "Collected Papers," Vol. IV, I.

of the work of art. If, on the contrary, it could be shown that it is only an accessory part, which may, or may not, be present, and really belongs more to other mental activities than to artistic creation, then the conclusion would be reversed, and it would be better understood how the artist, in developing to their limits features that are most desirable for his work, has been somehow compelled to give up some others.

In order to obtain that proof, the characteristics of an art must be reduced to their fundamentals, *i.e.*, elements belonging to other fields must be eliminated as untrue to type (the type having to include the observations just stated); if elements different from anything used so far in the field of art are found to help artistic creation to be truer to type, they must be accepted; and a work presenting those characteristics will be justified.

Most important, for instance, is the question of the *expressive* value of the work as against its informative value, left undecided by the considerations mentioned above. Most psychological investigators have seen as a dominant motive for artistic activity in children and primitives the tendency to convey information (together, of course, with other impulses such as imitation, self-exhibition, etc.). Yet by following in their observations the stages and the characters of the development of drawing in children it is the expressive factor that comes to the fore. The drawing arises from the first scribblings which are mere manipulations satisfying the child's rhythmic motor activity; the pleasure of moving the hand is greater than the interest in the result on the paper. A tendency to produce form soon becomes manifest, but only consists, in the beginning, of an optional meaning read into the scribblings (perhaps occurring through the recognition of form-background structures in Koffka's sense).¹⁵ Then the drawing proceeds to the schematic or notional stage in which the meaning is helped by the fact that there is a correspondence, not with the object, but with the concept of the object, *e.g.*, a man seen in profile may have two eyes and two ears because these are "contained" in the concept Man, etc. Moreover, the phantasies accompanying such drawings show that their primary purpose is expression, and neither copy nor information. It is only through the insistence of adults and the desire to attract their notice that the child uses his drawings at all for information. Most children like to draw solitarily, in some corner of the room, showing that they are satisfied with the reality they have made for themselves by means of their drawn phantasies, just as they are with that other similar phantasied reality, play.

¹⁵ G. Paulsson, *Scandinavian Review*, Sept.-Dec., 1923.

Freud says, that "a child does not conceal his play from adults, even though his playing is quite unconcerned with them."¹⁶ The same thing is true of his drawings. If any information is conveyed at all, it is mainly to himself, as part of his phantasies, and also as a means to master the excitations derived from the perpetual wonder at the external world, a function that is also true of play, as Freud has shown. The "repetition compulsion" which obtains in play could explain the stereotyped character of the schematic drawings.

The question is infinitely more complicated in the case of primitive art, as it is so closely connected with ritual and magic (*e.g.*, propitiation ceremonies), self-decoration, hunting necessities (mimicry), etc. Jean Harrisson has pointed out that at least the drama, through the dromenon, has developed straight out of ritual.¹⁷ Other arts may have had many other derivations, yet in all we find the emotional, phantasia and expressive character, but nothing definite as regards communication. Even the Cro-Magnon painter may well have been, like the leader of the choral dance, only a gifted specialized representative of the group who did nothing but express the feelings of all the participants (himself comprised) united in some ritual ceremony. Art is an appendage to the expression of the emotions as truly as are gesture and language, and as the tool is to practical motor activity. The social origin of art must not be taken as contradicting what has been said of the child's drawings as a private performance: in spite of the points of resemblance between primitive and infantile thinking, secrecy is forced upon the child by his antagonism to the parents (the "hate" of the ambivalence); the primitives, on the contrary, being all at the same level of development, are bound together by their collective emotions, their common attitude toward natural forces, the dead, the totem animal, etc.

Art for the purpose of information, making use of a more or less conventional basis, like language, is only a late development. The perfect circle of the ritual situation where all were actors, participants, became elongated until separated into two, performers and onlookers. Hence the spectator lives in the illusion of the priestly character of the artist towards him. But it is never so: art, like science, retains from its origin in ritual to be esoteric in nature, and it is only when it becomes vulgarized that it seeks to be readily "understood" by the crowd. Moreover, every artist retains toward the public the ambivalence of the child-drawer toward the parents, of the primitive performer toward the onlookers, who were first the

¹⁶ S. Freud, "Collected Papers," Vol. IV, IX.

¹⁷ J. Harrisson, "Ancient Art and Ritual," Home Univ. Library.

uninitiated (and so are the parents to the child). The artist must win the favor of the public, he must be loved, and yet must preserve his own private world and express it as he chooses: *genus irritabile vatum* defies the public that it seeks. This double attitude must be kept in mind if one wants to understand that communication is not a primary purpose of art.

The evolution of modern art shows a sustained fight for freedom from the demands of the public, and freer self-expression; which in turn implied more and more independence from the *medium* imposed by the public for its understanding of the artist, *viz.*, the latter's representation of the external, social reality by means of imitation of the object, and of logical-intellectual (realistic) thinking. This was given up when the necessity to do so arose from other sources. In this respect the arts have followed the road opposite to that of science, although both were prompted by the same reasons: freedom from public demand and obedience to the sole necessities of the subject matter (knowledge of external reality in the case of science). Science has progressed to complete objectivity; philosophy and art, on the contrary, to complete subjectivity,—philosophy comparatively early with the Sophists and Socrates in part of his teachings, then with Bergson and James (philosophy of consciousness), after several eclipses,—the arts very slowly, because so intimately linked with the senses.

As a result of this heightened subjectivity, the artists have grown conscious of some sides of their nature and rôle greatly overlooked previously: The artist always was defined in contradistinction with the scientist and the "man of action." As a matter of fact, he has some points in common with both: although his great mark consists in his richer phantasy-life, it must not be forgotten that phantasy formations also play a prominent part in the search of the scientist, the undertaking of the man of action; both are actuated by (elaborated) wishes: of inventing flying machines, of becoming emperor, etc. But a great affective cathexis on reality is necessary;¹⁹ the slightest shift of equilibrium in favor of the phantasy, and the would-be great men are doomed to be stigmatized as failures, dreamers, neurotics, epileptic personalities. Moreover, associative thinking, which is the form of thought favored by the dreamer, is extensively used by the scientist and the man of action, a point no more to be proven since Ribot's essay on Creative Imagination. Both start with logically arranged problems: of the possible order of the solar

¹⁹ Also in the case of the artist, as has been seen,—but only for his *work*. The development of his phantasies can, on the contrary, depart from reality without serious consequences.

system,—of the possible ways of conquering Europe, and then proceed with more or less phantasia associations, which however, must be submitted at each step of their development to the most rigid control of reality. This is why Rignano, elaborating Mach's ideas in his *Psychology of Reasoning*, postulates two tendencies, one checking the other, at work during the *Gedankenexperiment*. But then if both, like the artist, like the child in his play, have in common associative thinking and a rearrangement of the unsatisfactory reality to gratify a phantasy of unconscious origin, then clearly the difference between men indulging in various activities must lie mostly in the degree of reality testing and logical thought necessitated, and in the material made use of: the man of action rearranges objects of the external world; the scientist, concepts relating to objects; the mystic, subjective (projected) realities; the artist, phantasia material not mistaken (theoretically) for reality. Finally, the recognition of the creative nature of phantasy-thinking, as the responsible agency for the scientific discovery (Ribot) gives it new credentials and emphasizes the fact, too often forgotten through the ages, that the artist, like the scientist, is a discoverer, a man who invents. Although the Greeks even compared him to Nature, as both have the capacity for creating things, this, as well seen by Plato, is not possible with the copy of reality demanded for purposes of information. The artist, therefore, is tempted to strive after more genuine, freer *creation*,²⁰ but an effort in this direction will be marked by a complete *change of attitude toward the object*, which is sacrificed and subjected to the necessities of invention.

The above points make a new set of conclusions possible, which can be formulated as follows: The artist's task is the expression of his phantasies; he will tend to utilize the system responsible for the phantasies (the Ucs); to lay stress on the character of inventiveness which marks their functioning; to express them as genuinely and directly as possible, since he (unlike the scientist) is free from reference to reality in the form of their expression; the Ucs making no use of reasoning, its greater utilization in creation will require a new technique, and yield new forms of expression.

In this attempt at reduction of the elements of artistic creation, a fundamental core has been found by its similarity with all creation, but the process of differentiation must follow: since objectification distinguishes the artist from the neurotic, then this is expected of him.

²⁰ The words, to create, creation, are used alternately in the double sense of the verb *ποτέω*: (1) to execute; (2) to create, invent. In this paragraph for instance, the second meaning obtains; in a former paragraph on the artist objectifying his phantasy, the first meaning obtained.

Since phantasy marks him from the scientist, then he should be granted the exclusive use of phantasy and of the Ucs. On the contrary the description of reality, shared by any branch of informative knowledge, should not be required of him as *not typical*. I believe that we have now the *differentia specifica*, the characteristic of the artistic function: emotion, creation, expression.

If modern artists should present these features to a greater extent than the classics, it would mean that the critic's insistence on academic standards takes into consideration the points just mentioned less than does the artists, and thus demands from them things which are extraneous to the specific nature of artistic creation.

After all this purposely theoretical argumentation, a brief historical sketch (limited to painting as more universally known and more striking) and an equally brief survey of the main features of modern art will show what has actually been done, *i.e.*, the determinism of the new values in the process of their intuitive discovery.

II. THE MAIN FEATURES OF MODERN ART

"I do not like the fields or the trees, since fields and trees have nothing to teach me."—Plato, Phaedrus.

"As an imitator, the poet is removed by three degrees from the philosopher."—Plato, Republic.

Development of Modern Painting.—From Delacroix to the Cubists—not a long period—painters began to realize the philosophy, the style of their art, to go to the essence of it and question the old dogmas. They progressively freed themselves from the object, of which they were supposed to be the humble servants. This war has taken such proportions that it is to-day a war with reality; but it is the same war of liberation.

The first effort was to upset school formulae and to claim the artist back to himself. We can date the movement from the romantics in the nineteenth century; then suddenly tradition since the Renaissance is broken for transition, evolution follows stagnancy; something is stirred up anyway and the spirit of art changes. I think we must date it from the romantics, if only for one thing, their spirit of revolt. Delacroix, with his researches in color technic and his freedom of composition, paves the way for the impressionists. Courbet and the naturalists give a blow to classic politeness and nice painting. With the impressionists the classic element has completely disappeared although they are still realistic, but theirs was the first of that long list of innovations, namely, an effort at *subjectivism* in their giving the passing impression of the object instead of its static copy. They grew conscious of the fact that the personality of a

painter was as important as the object. Nature is no more as it is, but as it is *seen*. This was putting into practice more than two centuries later the doctrine of the subjectivity of the sense qualities (red and green are not in the object) for which Mme. de Sevigné had humored Malebranche and his "green and pink souls." For the first time an education of the public was attempted, it was asked to collaborate with the painter in the interpretation of reality. Then comes Cézanne, the springboard of the later revolution, who was after something else, which only el Greco had attempted before him: the disregard of sensory data and the *organization of masses in their intrinsic relationship* ("realization"). For the first time the painter is free to really create. He is no more enslaved to the object which is copied or distorted according to the necessities of composition, *i.e.*, according to whether it fits into a whole, a unity of volume which is imposed by the painter on a world of forms and colors. Cézanne has not only a technique, but a method. He is the Francis Bacon of painting. From Cézanne on the art becomes freer and freer. Matisse full of a deep science of painting, claims all license for the artist, if necessary for the expression of his sensibility. This is the third innovation, when the painter strives to *express his feeling toward the object* without any intellectual guidance or visual accuracy. At this point the movement branches off: the ones, working out Cézanne's ideas, emphasize the *constructive* side, until, by elimination of all the accidentals (likeness, subject matter, etc.), a purely mathematical world of forms is arrived at in place of the world of sensory data (Cubism).²¹ This is the beginning of the fourth great innovation: *abstraction* and the *picture-object*. In all its developments cubism puts in place of the copy of the object a new object as such: the picture. The object is either kept as an excuse, as furnishing the elements of the future product, or disappears completely to leave room for colors and forms of emotional structural value.

Another group of painters, continuing along the lines of Matisse, aim less at construction than at the expression, by any means, of their subjective phantasy, *i.e.*, *pure inspiration* more than organization. The object may be present or absent; if present, it may be neatly copied and used as element of a more or less "meaningless" whole, looking like the representation of a dream or the hallucinatory drawings of the insane.

One who cares for generalizations could detect in these two groups tendencies of far-reaching consequences. The first one, *e.g.*, could be called form-expressionism: whether using an object or

²¹ Braque and Picasso, 1908, 1912.

"pure" abstraction, *form* is sought, together with some architectural organization. This is evidenced in the "Machine Age" enthusiasm, the various utilizations of synchronisms, rhythms, etc., in which the painter is still, in a certain measure, objective. He still holds to the plastic realm of form, *i.e.*, cubism and its offshoots are still, somehow (not, of course, in any absolute sense), in the Classic, Greek, Mediterranean tradition. The abstract form is a subtilized survival of the object, its quintessence.

The other group, on the contrary, could be called subject-expressionism, because of the emphasis on the self—on the vision that must be expressed with as much immediacy as possible. The painting has a childlike, or rather, dreamlike quality that can be recognized quite definitely in Chirico, Chagall, Campendonck, Klee, Ernst, some of Fr. Marc, etc. H. Bosch and Breughels the younger, who possess many similar qualities, are precursors in the same vein. This kind of painting appears romantic, German, Oriental, when contrasted with the other. The highly significant fact, that the most extreme in that group are the French Surrealists shows a tendency among the French to completely renounce the standards of French culture, and acknowledge the value of Germanic subjectivism.

These differences, however, must not be too much emphasized. The two groups have several things in common, and above all both are *expressive*, instead of imitative, painting.

This evolution has been more or less paralleled in the other arts. In their war of liberation from the logic of reality, they all hold together. In music and literature there has been the same steady progression toward subjectivism and the unconscious. From Wagner, and Debussy to Stravinsky; from the German Romantics (*e.g.* Novalis), de Musset, E. A. Poe, Baudelaire, the Symbolists, to the Surrealists,—the same steps can be found as in painting, with the same results. I propose, now that the necessary character of this evolution has been shown, to deal with some of the most conspicuous features of the modern aesthetics.

Beauty.—It is perhaps time to ask what has become of Beauty, a word which in this study in Aesthetics, has not yet been pronounced. Beauty, Art, Aesthetics, all are logical formulations. A universe definable in terms of Beauty and Ugliness (and what ensues) is an easy dichotomy for minds that have gone their limits when they have formulated a dilemma. Beauty once well defined is discoverable; when the various attributes, *i.e.* the various "reasons why" are known, a view of Nature is easy: the painter can put Beauty into his work, and the spectator extract its divine taste. But if the

proper responses have not been built, then clearly neither aesthetic experience nor admiration is possible, and the results may be disastrous. An artist-patient had been told as a child that if he looked for it he would find it, but where was it? Perhaps deeply buried in some corner of the picture, hidden in the lines of the landscape like a rabbit or a farmer in the Sunday paper's illusions. "I was cramped by my conscientious watchfulness to recognize it; I was bored and dreamed and hated my mother for falling into ecstasies at my side, and hated myself for looking like a moron who was always missing it." . . . IT!

Not until Rimbaud and Lautréamont (around 1870) was complete independence claimed from the old cult and its standards: "One evening I seated Beauty on my knees . . . and I found her bitter . . . I insulted her. . . . For a long time I boasted of possessing all possible landscapes and found the celebrities of modern painting and poetry derisive. I loved idiotic paintings . . . canvases outside the circus tents . . . signs . . . out-of-fashion literature, church Latin, misspelled erotic writings . . . fairy-tales, children's books."²² Lautréamont further ridicules the goddess by choosing the most capricious standards: "Beautiful like an eminently putrefiable liquid . . . like a premature burial . . . like the law of developmental arrest in adults whose growth propensity is out of proportion with the quantity of molecules that their organism assimilates . . . like the fortuitous meeting, on an operating-table, of a sewing-machine and an umbrella."²³ The concluding paragraphs of this chapter, however (on the surprise-quality), will show that there is also in these comparisons something very different from satire. The Dada attack on all intellectual values naturally gave the poets a new freedom regarding Beauty, which could be denied or decreed according to whim: "They stopped suddenly before the Arc-de-Triomphe: 'It is good, because it was meant to be good, and it is good really,'—even if their next start was for Luna Park: 'How good, because it's bad!'"²⁴

The very practical result gained is *not* the revelation of *new Beauties* in the world, as is frequently misunderstood, *e.g.*, by those who find "beauty in ugliness,"—but the disappearance of the bugbear of Ugliness together with its soul-stirring contrast, Beauty. The two heads of the twin monster had to be chopped off in one blow, the

²² J. Rimbaud, "Une saison en Enfer," 1st ed. 1873, new ed. Paris, 1918.

²³ Comte de Lautréamont, "Les Chants de Maldoror, 1st ed. 1873, new ed. Paris, 1925.

²⁴ P. Drieu la Rochelle, "La Valise Vide," Nouvelle Revue Française, Aug. 1923.

criteria dissolved, the material for art made formless that the laws of art could be resuscitated by a direct contact with the unconscious. Of course this means that modern art is no more "Art" in the old sense of the term, that the modern artist is an outlaw, out of the bounds of the realm of Aesthetics, the Science of the Beautiful. All this is granted. Hence we shall inquire next into what has taken the place of Beauty in the scheme of life of those who, now as of old, but with new means at their disposal, have chosen to devote themselves by pen, brush, etc., or action, to the exaltation of life.

Modern and Psychotic Art.—It does not seem useless from the beginning to do away with the popular charge that modern artists are either insane or else just like the insane. However interesting the latter may be, we should expect a great difference in their productions, since in the psychotic the unconscious excitations have subdued the Pcs and through it "dominate speech and actions, or enforce the hallucinatory regression, thus governing an apparatus not designed for them."²⁵ So that whatever similarity there may be between the two kinds of products, they cannot be identical. The psychotic makes use of few images,—he shows a constant effort at logic, at disentangling thoughts which seem to him self-evident, and so his text or picture is easily comprehensible with the interruption here and there of some inscrutable absurdity due to the unconscious suddenly laid bare. The artist, on the contrary,²⁶ not having his unconscious at his disposal (since he is *not* insane) uses artificial means to hunt it out (uncontrolled drawings, free associations, etc.). The result is a seeming effort to entangle, a deliberate refusal of logic, and a wealth of images in which his product far outbids the psychotic's. With these reservations there is, nevertheless, a certain resemblance, consisting, for instance, in a great earnestness, and a great degree of apparent absurdity and arbitrariness.

And now let us proceed with the transvaluation of aesthetic elements.

De-intellectualization of Thought.—The critique of Newman, Bergson, James, Poincaré, has assigned to intelligence its real limited place; a reversal of terms has taken place: the world of objects is really a world of abstractions, *i.e.*, of data abstracted from *concrete* experience, which alone truly comprehends reality, while intelligence is cursed with a "natural incomprehension of life" (Bergson). In the face of this, the thirst for genuineness led the artists to trust

²⁵ S. Freud, "The Interpretation of Dreams," chap. vii, translation, New York, 1923 (new ed.).

²⁶ Cf. J. Epstein, "La poésie d'aujourd'hui un nouvel état d'intelligence," Paris, 1921.

nothing but the unconscious. Maeterlinck and some of the symbolists, although in a sentimental way, were among the first to seek the "inner world," the true individuality, etc. When the French condescended to read the Russians, they found a confirmation of the poetic value of more *elementary*, unorganized personalities than those of Bourget. To-day, after the war, and the Dada revolution, a radical anti-intellectualistic attitude exists: to the artificially coherent unity of consciousness, fruit of a civilization that has signally failed in all its enterprises, the natural complexity of mind is substituted. In his fervent search for authenticity, the artist gives up everything he suspects to be in the nature of a trick, and has become convinced that imagination and expression are his first function.

There is a de-intellectualization of conduct, also; the duty is first to be true to oneself, *real*. "An instinct, if pure of all alloy, has something strong, virginal, that forces admiration."²⁷ It is behind repressions and conceptualizations, in the depth and purity of the bare springs of action that the authentic individual is to be found. What works in the poem must work in the act. Skepticism, with its aloof intellectualism and positivistic irony, its paralysis of action and of imagination as a dogma, is repelled, and truly French heads like Renan and A. France are loathed to-day by those who are not willing to remain on the side of things. Already in the midst of the mincing manners of symbolism some had had a glimpse of the virtue of a lyrical theme in one's life, and the influence of the Romantics and mainly of Nietzsche is obvious in the will to believe, to action, to enthusiasm: "There is none better than you, but you are impotent," Barrès, quoting Ibsen, had said to the doubters. But the disappearance in them of "Art for art's sake," of the artist's "Ivory Tower," of the detached aesthete flirting with "belles-lettres" was far from accomplished, and the great rebels, the firebrands in art were satisfied with brandishing a pen. Even when they did get a taste of action, it was to extract therefrom *motives of art*. The difference with Rimbaud, for instance, lies in this absence of impulsive sincerity which makes mere busybodies of them: better rest than action, if the man is made for thought, but better any trade than the "career" proposed to our unconditional admiration, as if the poet were the supreme arbiter of life and a perfect sonnet the ultimate goal of organic evolution. The insupportable pretentiousness and artificiality of most conventional poets, together with the old standards of imitation of nature, make it easy to understand the refusal of several modern poets to be termed poets or artists, and also the severe judg-

²⁷ J. Kessel, "Les Coeurs purs," Paris, 1926.

ments of Plato, Pascal, or St. Just—lyrical poets of first magnitude who despised poetry.

*Intelligibility and Realistic Description.*²⁸—The desire to be intelligible tends to act as a censor on the associations, thereby depriving the work of much of the poetic qualities potential in the Ucs. The strongest aesthetic emotion appears here and there, independently of the intellectual contrivances. On close inspection we find that the “beauty” of most great poets is due to a factor which remains to be explained, while most of their work is nothing but a concession to a realistic description of facts which adds nothing to its value (it was supposed to provide the “real atmosphere,” to render life, etc.), but rather subtracts a lot by deflecting the associations on reality-details. While artists are supposed to look at reality through their dreams, most have so far been content with seeing their dreams through glasses on which snapshots were glued. “I did not like to read the newspapers,” an artist-patient says, “they were too realistic, spoke of things so alien that it gave me a feeling of frustration; I didn’t get any image from all those descriptions of drunks and murderers, just words—meaningless—like faces in the subway—like some boring description of Tolstoi or Dostoevsky: ‘Man blows his nose in tablecloth; woman brushes her teeth in the room and goes away,’ etc.—no *drama*—just the dead realistic detail.” One may blame this boy’s schizophrenic trend for causing him to prefer his dream to reality, as the interest in the details of other people’s lives requires an amount of object-libido that the narcissist is far from possessing. But in the majority of cases this patient’s criticism is, in my opinion, absolutely valid. The newspapers, for instance, offer just as much material for “identification” as any work of art, yet even those most capable of it prefer a novel to the logical sequence, the accumulation of facts, the answer automatically given in each line of the reporter’s “story,” the solid grasp of which on

²⁸ I regret that I can offer only a few examples. But this article is not meant to be a technical exposition of modern art and I must suppose the material to be at hand, or refer the reader to books on the subject. The literature I am most familiar with is in French and difficult to translate. Besides, what is said here of the movement in France holds good in most Western countries (Germany in particular) and one can easily find in the art of one’s own country examples fitting the text, and comparable to those given here. In England and America, for instance, painters and writers like John Martin, Georgia O’Keefe, Gertrude Stein, Ezra Pound, James Joyce, E. E. Cummings, afford in one way or another a correspondence with French artists. Indeed, one of the surprising features of modern art is the wide spread it had from the start, independently of race or cultural past, showing how deep and universal was the need it answered and how much it was the product of a collective state of mind. This is the reason why it appears so alive in the face of all attacks.

reality-thinking prevents feeling and phantasy. Only the adventure (unreality) behind may be material for the dream. The novel, however realistic, is still *play*. Yet the average books cannot be read twice, for the phantasy and the surprise which sometimes (rarely) obtain on the first reading and constitute their sole interest have disappeared. The purity of the work of the best writers is marred by their insistence upon useless circumstances, and their accuracy. Three-quarters of poetry have retained the didactic character it once had so that its only difference from the most banal prose is in the rhyme—a mere technical artifice. To-day description appears as extraneous to the intrinsic needs of the work of art as are instructive or moralizing passages. Poetic facts—not just facts—are wanted. An individual thing can be “described” otherwise than by fully cataloguing its innumerable particulars—on the contrary, it would gain by being rather isolated, treated elliptically, condensed. An image makes us *feel* the object better than any description because it allows room for the *specific emotional knowing* of that object that was demanded by Newman and James (concrete, immediate experience; intuition, lyricism). Comparisons are not used to relate the unknown to the known, but the abstract (intellectual) to the concrete (emotional). In the metaphors, “candy as sweet as mother’s love” (adv.), “clouds in the sky, like so many hopes,” the abstract words Hope and Love make the concrete words Clouds and Candy more concrete. But concrete does not mean logically distinct, as shown by the loose symbolism and vocabulary of the primitives. Poe was one of the first to see that a poem differs from scientific or prose writing in having an *indistinct* pleasure as its object. Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Valéry, isolated more and more that which in poetry is itself; for the two latter, the words were used to *suggest* a mood, a *rêverie*: for this a certain obscurity was necessary and the poem increasingly approached the character of unreality.

Logic and Reality.—In its radicalism the modern attitude shows admirably the profound dichotomy between the conscious and the unconscious systems, concerned, respectively, with the objective and the psychic reality, and how antithetical are the items comprised in these two great categories.

For instance: an almost mystical distrust of the senses is an implication of anti-intellectualism, since it is out of sense-data bunched together once for all (Locke, Mill) that rigid, sharply defined concepts are evolved. Sight, for instance, as the instrument of knowledge par excellence in man, binds him to conceptual objects. The

latter being in space, suggest the *externality* of a world of space and forms²⁹ into which he is pulled, at the cost of the perception of his inner experiences. This is true of painting, not of music, which is the most subjective and the least conceptual of all the arts.³⁰ Patients during the analysis often close their eyes without being asked, to avoid remaining "at the surface of themselves," so great is the connection of sight with objectivity and intellectual thought (one may remember that eye-movements are always present in reasoning or active memory-recall, and also that the word Mystic is derived from *μύω*: to close one's eyes).

So the *illogicality* of the modern arts is as much expressed by the flight from object-reality (as seen in painting and in the unrealistic, wonder-like unfolding of many writings), as by the absence of logical constructions, the avowed preference for *fancy*, the denial of any reality-testing or ego-criticism, the arbitrary distortion of grammar and of perspective, both of which express logical relationships.

The fact that invention, creative spontaneity, and feeling are more than ever the artist's aim, means the recognition of the ultimate unconscious character of creative thought, and that intellectual control and presentation are fatal to the spontaneous irruption of thought-elements into consciousness, the expression of which is demanded by poetry. The poet wishes to speak the language of the Ucs as the Sybil that of the god. How it can be intercepted, and what material it will yield, has been the problem of the artist in his art as of the psychoanalyst in his science. There is more than one analogy between the methods followed and the results obtained. Associative thinking, for instance, is made use of as much as possible. But then we should expect illogicality and a great quantity of images. Indeed, the latter has taken such an importance that one could speak of the Doctrine of the Image in modern poetry.

The Image and the Ucs.—The image must be distinguished from the metaphor. The latter is a sort of topical deduction of one term out of the other because of some consciously perceived common quality, the *tertium comparationis* (e.g., cheeks as pink as roses). Such minor premises are of course implied in the image, but they are more unconscious; still, like the dream symbol, it is a comparison, while conversely any comparison, the metaphor included, may be

²⁹ Cf. J. Benda, "Belphegor," Paris, 1918.

³⁰ Sounds have not been conceptualized as have visual perceptions, and for this reason music, except a few feeble attempts at "imitative" music in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries, does not copy sound-wholes. When it has tried to make direct use of sounds occurring in everyday life (as in George Antheil's "Ballet Mécanique") the public has violently protested, which points out to tradition as the main factor in the appreciation of art.

unconsciously determined.³¹ The difference between image and metaphor is one of the degree of the censorship and elaboration to which the thought is submitted in view of its logical fitness. In the image the comparison may be reduced to a mere allusion, and the latent content so increased that a good deal of it may serve as substratum for one image, and furnish elements for the next, the reasons for which will not be accessible to consciousness. The method of the poets in question is to lay very little stress, or none at all, on the "story" or the arrangement of parts, and to allow associations and phantasy-images to proceed in a more or less undirected manner ("gratuitous" character).³² For some poets self-criticism is never quite lost, and retains its function of exclusion and choice. Others give the material in its raw state. Of course, even where the associations are most free, they are not of quite the same nature as they would be either in cryptolalia or the association-experiment; many influences interfere, one of them being the setting of the problem: the *Aufgabe* is here to write a poem. Still, the dispersion of attention adopted means a certain indifference of the censorship which is favorable to the influencing of consciousness by the Ucs. Thus the image will tend to resemble dream- and wit-material and to proceed similarly from condensation and displacement of unconscious thoughts, and on any basis, from similarity to mere clang. Many strange features in the image would betray its unconscious origin and mechanism; like the dream symbol, it is liable to a number of meanings, showing that it refers to several agents or levels; its great vividness, lack of intelligible connection and frequency of occurrence, the foreignness of the whole and presence of neologisms show a regression from logical thought to something similar to hypnagogic hallucinosis or flight of ideas, which warrants that infantile content has been transformed into plastic images (as in the dream) or words,—a fact that cannot be expected from directed thinking any more than from the superficial logical associations like "heat, stove, coal, mine, etc.," given by patients and attributed to resistance. A poetry with such claims is a depth-poetry in the truest

³¹ Cf. S. Ferenczi, "The Analysis of Comparisons, in Further Contributions."

³² All that is said of poetry obtains also in painting: The assemblage of the compositional elements in cubism may be disinterested enough to obey only their own rhythm and the expressiveness of the painter. In expressionism this is still more evident. As the Ucs tends to come to the surface in proportion to the carelessness (and therefore the indifference) of the drawing, the surrealists have tried to get pictorial elements corresponding to free associations, but this is difficult.—For the conception of the image in Surrealism, Cf. A. Breton, *Les Pas Perdus* and *Manifeste du Surrealisme*, Paris, 1924.

sense of the term. In the image, "a wingéd graveyard" (Saint-Pol-Roux) for a flight of crows, a number of elements enter, and the satisfactoriness comes from feeling rather than from understanding. Similarly when a flying lark is likened to an arrow, the simile is conscious and useless; to "scissors cutting up through the sky" (Saint-Pol-Roux) the association is more remote and more satisfactory; to a "cloud of fire" (Shelley),³³ the intellectual judgment has completely disappeared and we are dealing with an unconscious identity. Such images have the greatest emotive power and poetic reality. Many metaphors probably originated that way, but either because thoroughly tested with reality or simply because becoming banal through constant usage they lose their strength and the mind requires relations between terms wider and wider apart, more and more unusual (the factor of habit and reawakening of interest cannot be denied here). Since the symbolists (Mallarmé), more freedom from reality-fitness has been gained, but their "symbol" was still in the nature of an elliptic and cryptic metaphor intellectually calculated to *hide* one term: it stood *for* something, and could, like the hieroglyph, be deciphered and the "common attribute" perceived. Rimbaud, on the contrary, who could be called the Cézanne of poetry (for his influence, if he did not surpass the latter by the completeness of a poetic spirit covering all phases of his life),³⁴ for the first time used the image and the unconscious in the sense that I am trying to make clear: "I accustomed myself³⁵ to simple hallucination: I saw quite clearly a mosque in the place of a factory . . . coaches on the highroads of Heaven, a drawingroom in the depths of a lake. . . . I finally came to regard sacred the disorder of my mind. . . . I envied the contentment of beasts,—the caterpillar, which reflects the innocence of limbo, the mole, the sleep of virginity! . . . Hallucinations are countless. . . . I shall unveil all the mysteries: mysteries of religion or nature; death, birth, future, past, cosmogony, nothingness. I am master of phantasmagoria. Hear me! . . . I possess all the talents! There is no one here and there is someone:

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"Higher still and higher
From the earth thou springest,
Like a cloud of fire."—Ode to a Skylark.

The fact that images like this one offer a complete similarity with the type of images described here, shows in an interesting way that their poetic worth was well sensed by poets still restrained by conventional technique.

³⁴ The poet, for Rimbaud is a seer, an "alchemist" who transmutes the elements of the world but in answer to the most insistent urge of finding the supreme secret.

³⁵ J. A. Rimbaud, *op. cit.*, in various places. If I have committed the crime of those few translations, it is because in this exposition it is above all necessary for the quotations to be understood.

I would not care to waste my treasure. Would you have negro songs, a dance of houris? Do you wish me to disappear, to dive in search of the *Ring*? Do you! I will make for you gold, remedies. . . . I became a miraculous opera. . . . To each being, I thought, several *other* lives were due. That man knows not what he does: he is an angel. That family is a litter of dogs." The metaphor has disappeared. The fitness of the image is in its hallucinatory character. Again, Rimbaud's synaesthesia in his "Vowels" sonnet is probably based on similar mechanisms. The letter "O," for instance:

"O, supreme trumpet full of strangest shrillness,
Silences shot through by Worlds and Angels;
O, the Omega, violet beam from His Eyes!"

Finally, the following is an example taken from a poet of the super-realist group:

"Sabres.

"Sadness undressed and showed all the minutes. The sun is lost. It lived in a woman's body, where the coolness of the street helped the march of the shadows. At the roadside near the mills, it so happened that the reality of blood excited the thirst for grandeur in a dissolute race which reproduces itself no longer. Cruelty developed into the most silent of spheres, and the sabres cutting all the dykes of life were but definite signs of the movements of love."³⁶

What we perceive at first inspection is a meaningless logorrhea. But if the text is read again, until our own associations can operate, then changes occur: an emotional, rather than logical, meaning appears, together with a few astonishing images here and there and a strong impression of unexpectedness, of never-seen. Intellectual significance may soon be present, as the search for meaning is a general tendency of mind, but this is not necessary, and we may remain without really quite knowing what we are enjoying. Relations *occur* suddenly to one,—or they do not: one does not *guess*, but sometimes affirms, with no other ground than conviction. The reader ought to refuse to be the prisoner of any art that, like exact science, prevents the escape of associations. The very vagueness of the analogy makes for invention; if all the terms are taken for granted, carry their own meaning, there is an economy of thinking which proceeds with automatized concepts while associations are short-circuited. If, on the contrary, the terms are far apart, they first strike and arrest the attention, paralyze it by their meaninglessness,—and the door is opened for the dream. "The creation of the image is thus a power-

³⁶ Marcell Noll in "Transition," April, 1927 (trans. by Eugene Jolas).

ful poetic means, and we should not be surprised at the great part it plays in a poetry of creation."³⁷

This state of affairs results from the nature of the Ucs. Built out of the interpenetration of the infantile psyche and the world, it is a vast reservoir filled with but one chaotic reality,—with few terms, moving among inexhaustible relations. A term, for the Ucs, is not a fixed concept, but a center of forces, a vortex (in Ezra Pound's sense), a point through which an infinite number of lines may pass. For the Ucs anything may stand for anything else, *i.e.*, a term is capable of entering into any relation with any other term,—a condition perhaps necessary for the comprehension of the "Universal Analogy" (Baudelaire).^{*} The Ucs flatly denies the principle of identity ("a thing is what it is and is not what it is not"), as it denies the principle of reality. Were it not for this very fact, invention would not be possible. The scientific discovery, like the image and the symbol, may arise from dissociations and reassociations of all kinds.

The Surprise-Character.—Because of the mutual implication of novelty and creation, the character of surprise, of unpredictability (Bergson), the taste for the wonderful and the unexpected are very marked in modern aesthetics: "There is the surprise, the joy of facing a novel thing."³⁸ Baudelaire's statement, "The beautiful is the astonishing," is thus adopted, a statement meaning that surprise, which is a break in the intellect through which the unconscious tends to irrupt, is a condition for the aesthetic experience. The interest in surprise-situations is not the same as the "search for sensations, for thrills" of some romantics or post-romantics (*e.g.*, Huysmans' *des Esseintes*) which would be again confusing the object, here any interesting unexperienced sensation, with the novelty or unexpected-

³⁷ P. Reverdy, "Nord-Sud," March, 1918.

^{*} The emphasis on the relation seems to me to have been much underestimated by writers on modern aesthetics, and yet it is a most significant fact, not only because, as has been pointed out, the relation is more material for the unconscious, and the term ("thing") for the conscious, but also because the state of mind of the artists thus proves to be consonant with the two great philosophies of today: pragmatism and neo-realism. However dissimilar they are, each strikes great blows at the post-aristotelian intellectualism. It is interesting to recall that the old logic contained within itself the germs of its destruction, as is shown by the attacks which assailed it as soon as it was born: if not for its emphasis on the terms, the Sophists would not have opposed the predicate to the subject, the particular to the general, in order to deny the possibility of judgment. Bergson, James and Bertrand Russell, even if each has a different view of the nature of relations, agree on the fact that the relation defines the terms. Their criticism also bears on the stable concepts, the static "things," the properties of which can be "deduced" from a knowledge of their "essence," in short, on the static logic of classes, terms, inclusion and causation.

³⁸ P. Reverdy, *loc. cit.*

ness itself. Baudelaire knew this better when he said in his "*Fleurs du Mal*," "We want to . . . plunge to the depths of the abyss, Hell or Heaven, what matter—To the depths of the unknown to find what is new!" A new relation, however banal the terms, means a discovery in the realm of the never-seen, a new aspect imposed on the world, something moulded into the $\mu\eta\text{-}\delta\nu$; in short, an enlargement of reality. It may seem somewhat exaggerated to say that the "fortuitous meeting on an operating table of a sewing machine and an umbrella" makes us "apprehend the infinite in a passional moment" (to use Wordsworth's expression)! Yet it has this lyrical quality, in so far as it is a springboard for phantasy, as it involves a *transformation*, even the most illogical and illegitimate, of the world of facts. Indeed, almost any weird bringing together or displacement of elements can do that. *Wit* comes to mind immediately: In the misprint in the report of a speech quoted by Jones:³⁹ ". . . nor did he derive income from American trusts (loud daughter)," the image offered here is new and not consciously calculated. Thus a *chance or unconscious bringing together of terms is productive of novel wholes satisfactory for their meaningfulness or simply for the affect and the associations aroused*.⁴⁰ In this way the world of reality can constantly be enlarged. Complete situations may be involved:

I look before me, through my window. In the house across the street I see a queer piece of reality: three truncated ladies, each one consisting of only head and shoulders, in three golden frames, or windows, gracefully overlapping and displaced. The background,

³⁹ E. Jones, "Papers on Psychoanalysis," chap. III, 1913.

⁴⁰ Chance is the form of humidity spots furnished Leonardo with strange figures, and Turner found new color schemes in letting children play at random with colors. Chance is creative, as organic evolution amply proves (Mendelism). Nothing else is meant here by the creativeness of the Ucs. It is true that no intellectual operation is performed, but as judgment and reasoning are reduced to association by experimental psychology, certainly the Ucs has that much in common with the Pcs. Jones' statement (op. cit., chap. XV) that "no creative work whatever is carried out by the process of dream-making" cannot be therefore accepted unconditionally: even if the dream is "nothing but transformation of previously formed mental processes," this transformation may lead to novel connections, and reasoning does not consist, ultimately, of anything else. The Pcs has the advantage in its hypercathexis of the thing-idea through the word. But the same mechanism, association, is used in all cases, only both the material, and whether the connections are controlled by the reality- or the pleasure-principle make the difference. The concept has lost all connection with what it stands for, and has become a mere Word. The regression of the modern poets to the organic basis of concepts means creation as truly as a child's images,—like "the bottle's key" for a corkscrew,—rediscover the discoverer's invention. All this, and also the chance character of invention, and its frequent occurrence in states of fatigue (when associative thinking predominates), should be of interest for a theory of intelligence.

which is pitch-black, extends under their breasts. I can see their lovely faces only dimly, yet I notice that while one is facing me, the second shows her profile, the third, her back. I look at the third one, and presently I see her face, while the first lady has now turned her back on me. They move, but without synchronism. Have they survived some horrid crime? Where am I? In Paradise, and those charming angels have forgotten their wings?—Unless they be dancers so spirited that they have rid themselves of the weight of their hips?—etc., etc. Associations continue. Now what is the “real” situation? The reflection in the shop-window opposite my rooms, of *two* rotating wax busts in a hairdresser’s shop on my side of the street (the birth of a new bust just from the trip across the street is in itself a poetic fact). *But* it is not so much my day-dream which is important (for it was *not present* in consciousness at the time of the “aesthetic” experience), but rather the change of plane,—the rupture occurring in my well organized perpetual world. This is the novel, wonder-like stimulus, and the release of unconscious phantasies (incestuous, sadistic, etc.) which *later* (after a variable time) came to consciousness in the disguised form of the associations given above.

One more example to show that the most banal terms, the vulgarest material will do: A. Breton cut headlines out of a newspaper and brought them together in a way as gratuitous as possible. I select two examples:

A BURST OF LAUGHTER
OF SAPPHIRE IN THE ISLAND OF CEYLON

MADAM
A PAIR OF SILK STOCKINGS
is not A LEAP IN EMPTY SPACE
A DEER

An American paper furnished the following:

DEATH IS NATIONAL LOSS
MAN REFUSES IMMUNITY
FOR SEWER SYSTEM

FIND BIBLICAL MANNA
BEAMS UPON MONTICELLO

Now how does this differ from the headlines we so enjoy when, over the breakfast table, we get our daily dose of information? Here the terms are presented isolated from any context. All we must do is to read a certain item until we *feel* that it is satisfying: we have validated it as an image, *i.e.*, established between the terms some new relation which *does not need to be formulated*. In the above material there is a little of everything: some terms are far

apart, others nearer; some wit or irony, others "noble" poetry. The important thing to keep in mind is that the logically unpremeditated bringing together of the two terms (as sapphire in Ceylon and burst of laughter) has resulted in an image completely new, such as *no common comparison would have yielded, and thus stirs associations that would never have been mobilized otherwise*. Each word ought to be the spark sufficient for the deflagration of the phantasy. Most artists do not give the reader enough credit for making associations, a mistake that the great classics, just because of their narrowness, ("only the real, but not all the real") knew at least how to avoid. Well known verses of Racine are self-sufficient (the proof is that the context is generally forgotten) and gratify for reasons hardly different from those of the last of the above newspaper items. "There are too few obscure writers in French," Remy de Gourmont complained. His ghost is no doubt satisfied to-day.

The majority of civilized men, because of the anxiety attached to feeling and impulse, show a compulsive preference for relating fresh forms to a few concepts stored in the Pcs, in terms of which they "think." A failure to understand is itself felt by the ego as a narcissistic wound, and lets out the hate affect. The scientist, too, accustomed to reasoning, asks for intelligibility: Pfister complains that he "does not understand what the pictures are supposed to represent," "cannot solve the meaning of the puzzle-pictures," etc., to which the answer is that there is nothing to be understood. The drama is between the public who wants to understand and the artist who wants to feel and to express. The one living in reality wants to dictate to the one living in phantasy. So the appreciation of modern art needs a profound change in the æsthetic attitude. This complete transformation of modes of thought is more difficult than exchanging one sense for another. A psychologist might say that the question is one of habits of thought, and no doubt the factor of familiarity with new forms or new concepts (like those of psychoanalysis) is important. The eye has to a large extent become "adapted" to the distortion of the object, and the ear to harmonies other than the octave: being exposed long enough to any stimulus will do that. This is not going farther than technique, though: the real solution needs other means. The only way out is for the spectator to allow more flexibility to his own day dreams, *i.e.*, a certain degree of de-intellectualization and subjectiveness of his thought, as has been done by the artist. Only when he can put something in the work will he be able to make a real identification. This is applied successfully in psychoanalysis when the analyst "achieves the correct

interpretations not by logical efforts only, but rather by allowing his ideas free play, for which *a certain indifference to the patient's ideas is necessary.*"⁴¹ This is exactly what is meant here.

Aesthetic Pleasure in Modern Art.—The peculiarities found in an art that has come to lyricism as an end, to wonder and surprise as a model, to the mechanism of the dream as a means, should be expected to determine important modifications in the aesthetic experience aroused.

The enjoyment of the work of art as such Freud believes to be of the nature of the fore-pleasure,⁴² the end-pleasure proceeding from the release of tensions ("saving of inhibition") and the irruption of day-dreams and impulses that results. Now it is very significant that in the newer works there has been a complete shift in the stimulus for the fore-pleasure, whereby the response, from the mere understanding of the subject and the recognition of the satisfactory arrangement of parts that it was, has shifted to a quality very rarely found before—that of surprise and of discovery. Who could experience surprise in a book the denouement of which is foretold in the "exposition," with characters so "real" that, after a glance at them, we have no more curiosity about them than about our family circle? The pleasure thus closely resembles that found in the making and perceiving of witticisms⁴³ and comparisons between apparently disparate things:⁴⁴ Impulses of mastery are satisfied by the discovery, the conjuring up of two ideas into one whole; but here it would be wit or comparison of the subtlest kind and working at high pressure, a mode of thought for which the distaste of positivistically minded people is well known.

As to the end-pleasure: in wit and comparison, "other, hitherto severely censored complexes are freed from the oppression weighing upon them, and this saving of inhibition is the essential pleasure that is attributed to the comparison."⁴⁵ In the modern works there is,

⁴¹ S. Ferenczi, *The Analysis of Comparisons*, in op. cit. Italics mine.

⁴² Many components of the aesthetic experience such as empathy, distance, etc., the analysis of which belongs to experimental aesthetics, are comprised in the fore-pleasure. Most works in that field admit end-pleasure components (cf. H. S. Langfeld, *The Aesthetic Attitude*). The aesthetics of A. C. Barnes which, like that of so many technicians, deals exclusively with the relation of parts between themselves, is only valid for technique and is dangerous for a more general understanding, as one soon comes to see no difference between a still life by Cezanne and an entombment by Titian, a negro sculpture and one by Michelangelo. This similarity exists, but composition is not all. An inner unity in the diversity of works is possible in *one* artist, who imposes to various objects his peculiar rhythm, but this cannot be said of artists deeply unlike in *spirit*.

⁴³ S. Freud, *Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious*, trans.

⁴⁴ S. Ferenczi, *The Analysis of Comp.*, op. cit.

⁴⁵ S. Ferenczi, loc. cit.

again, a shift in the impulses used for the end-pleasure. Traditional literature and painting, with their imitation of "life," appeal to impulses that have been directed in the individual's past to objects analogous to those depicted. This is why the lower literature is so sentimental. Moreover, as both the artist and his public belong to a repressed society, the work remains within very limited categories: adultery, various conflicts between children and parents or the individual and society are offered by writers,—portraits of nice persons or of nice landscapes by painters, to the public for identification. The newer works, on the contrary, rarely employ such stimuli. According to various types of products, three sorts of impulses seem to me to be distinguishable: (1) Indifferent. By this I mean that the frequency, diversity and obscurity of the form-combinations or images makes for impulses to be constantly liberated, and in a constantly different manner. Moreover, it seems that in this case, due to the enjoyment in following one's acrobatic associations as such, the impulses concerned with the fore-pleasure have the upper hand on the others. (2) Obscene, primitive, anal-sadistic. This is well marked in paintings of the "*Fauves*" and of some expressionists, with their smearing of violent colors and distortion of the object, also in syncopated polyphonic music, etc. (3) The revolt against reality (already found in some of the romantics) is behind a whole trend of works and forms the direct theme of many of them; as in Rimbaud, Lautreamont, the expressionists and surrealists. An interpretation of such works, and of the dreams which are occasionally published, often shows a strong Oedipus complex and castration anxiety followed by sadistic aggressiveness toward the father, masochism, or regression to uterine phantasies of omnipotence. It is probable that in categories (2) and (3) the end-pleasure predominates.

Yet the remarkable thing happens that in all three cases the impulses used for the fore- and the end-pleasure coincide: in the fore-pleasure freedom is gained in the wonder, the dream, the enlargement of the world of facts, the mockery of reason by all sorts of illogicalities. In the end-pleasure are to be found either the infantile simplicity and omnipotence, the crazy childhood eluding the censor, the denial of the father and of reality, or the recapture of the lost paradise, the tendency to submergence of the ego by the id, (in lyricism). In traditional art a conflict exists between fore- and end-pleasure, since the impulses mean disorder, while the technical "beauty" of the work means logical order, harmony of balance, etc. Only in the realm of the "Sublime" (so called by

the textbooks since Burke and Kant) is the conflict abolished, and regressive impulses giving rise to the sense of infinity and union, similar to those of the mystic, are expressed in the experience;⁴⁶ but this is almost never found in the majority of the accepted works of art. In modern art, on the contrary, the Ucs everywhere reigns supreme, and as the ultimate end of all impulses called forth is the denial of reality, they all reinforce one another; whereby a certain degree of unification between the two kinds of pleasure is reached. It would seem, therefore, that also from the point of view of the aesthetic experience the modern works of art like those of the primitives in the various cultures, have a great value of purity.

III. NEUROSIS AND THE ARTIST

The art, the main features of which have just been described, is generally called morbid, dangerous, etc., on the ground that it evidences on the part of the artist a lack of the proper adjustment to reality. The examination of this criticism will be two-fold, and bear on (1) the adequacy for the individual and for art of the representation of reality by the phantasies of a system limited to wish-fulfillment; (2) the adjustment of the artist, as artist, to reality.

The Ucs and the Representation of Reality.—On the question of the adaptation to reality of the pleasure-principle (which seems a contradiction in terms), the negative answer obtained from the consensus of opinion may be due to the layman's habit of forming judgments based on his own present pattern, and of viewing himself as a static "substance" whose past is truly past, *i.e.*, *gone* (as seen by the resistance to the concept of the Ucs). If he can be convinced of the existence of the Ucs, then he views it in terms of *adult-defined* adaptation, and concludes that it is completely unadjusted to reality, just as are, he thinks, the child, the idiot, and the savage. The products of the Ucs, the phantasies, are "nothing but imaginations," *i.e.*, they have become not only disconnected from reality, but truly unreal, since, as Ferenczi says, "Only such things are held as 'real' . . . that 'force' themselves independently of our will . . . upon our sense perceptions. 'Seeing is believing.'" ⁴⁷ The first complaint of many patients is that "they want to acquire a better

⁴⁶ "Du sublime au ridicule il n'y a qu'un pas," as the proverb has it. We should not be surprised to find a similarity in the effect produced by the "craziest" and the most "sublime" works,—both being a deliverance from the real. The child illustrates this paradox, as he pursues in all its forms the joy of the unreal: in the bliss of the mother's arms, his play, his jokes.

⁴⁷ S. Ferenczi, *Belief and Conviction*, in *op. cit.*

judgment in order not to follow their imagination"—not to speak of the symptom itself being called "imaginary."

The analyst recognizes a psychic reality as against another, external, reality for the testing of which the ego has been evolved. How much of this testing is done by the ideally objective ego and how much by the third instance, the super-ego,—itself deeply irrational in its roots,—is again a question. The latter, through its easy access to the ego, appears to monopolize the reality-testing function (Freud),⁴⁸ the fitness of which is thus impaired since it shows no freedom from the wishes, but is influenced by the products of their repression. The evolution of civilizations shows how little the reality-principle operates. Its success would result in "Truth" being perceived in a universal way. Its failure, in the various prejudices ("Verité en deçà des Pyrénées . . ."). The sexual function is certainly part of reality. Yet the "problem" of Sex has been met in incredibly different ways. Dollar, Factory, Bible, Prohibition, Chastity, are still held by some to be the products of the "true" way to adjust to reality. The "eclectics" rationalize the failure by saying that "Truth has many facets." However, these few points show that, practically speaking, it is not so much to the ego that the id must be opposed in the present connection, as to the super-ego.

The purest application of the reality-testing intelligence is to be found in science (objective and neutral). In consequence of which the representation of reality obtained need not have any degree of correspondence with the world of senses or that of individual needs. But the coldness and depersonalization of the intellect have resulted from the flight of the ego, in its adaptation to the external world, from parts of the id that it refused to help in obtaining satisfaction (Freud⁴⁹). The fact that the ego has been evolved through modification by reality of the external stratum of the id shows that, even if it has gained different aims, it need not be antagonistic to a system from which it was originally undistinguishable. "To be able to choose the line of greatest advantage instead of yielding in the direction of least resistance,"⁵⁰ ought to mean a collaboration of the two systems. But this is seldom the case. The ego's growth has been, in fact, more dramatic: it has depended upon successive traumatic splittings from the id through the various castrations, and so has gained a high degree of detachment from the individual's needs.

⁴⁸ Cf. S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, translation, London.

⁴⁹ Cf. S. Freud, *The Question of Lay Analysis*, abstracted in *Archives of Psychoanalysis*, April, 1927.

⁵⁰ G. B. Shaw, quoted by S. Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, chap. i.

This detachment, however, would be enough to make the ego-adaptation insufficient to operate *alone* as a directing principle for individuals provided with impulses, emotions and wishes which, in the form of the Ucs, represent the driving force and most fundamental part of the psyche and do nothing but express the great bodily requirements for the satisfaction of hunger and love. It follows that the Ucs methods: hallucinatory wish-fulfillment, symbolization, phantasy, projection-identification, in short, distortion of reality according to the wish, are as valid as are the ego-methods, and more so than the super-ego's, as the latter involve just as much distortion of reality as the id's, and with less justification. As a matter of fact, the id-adaptations persist after the stage of magic gestures, at a time when the still weak ego allows relatively free communication from the id. This obtains in the child; and the primitive people (in whom the latency period is much reduced or absent) do not progress very much beyond that stage, nor do probably the European peasants. The fact that various portions of the human race have been satisfied in dealing with reality by these methods and the original impulses (what Stärcke, I believe, calls *ortophrenia*) shows that they must not be disposed of as entirely valueless for the sole benefit of the civilized ego methods. To hold to this too rigidly would mean falling back on the building up of series toward perfection by the "comparative method" used by Spencerians in anthropology to establish the various degrees of civilization by comparison of social development(Goldenweiser⁵¹). The superiority of the industrial repressed Western civilization on that of *e.g.* the South Sea Islander rests more on postulates than on proofs.

The survival of this early organization in civilized man is on the contrary well proved (indestructibility of the Ucs), and makes it possible for him to regress following the slightest shift of potential in the two systems, as the regression tendency is still stronger than the tendency to fly from the id-impulses. Freud says that the Ucs is not done for like a vestigial organ, but is active, like a primitive population in the midst of a civilized state. When the adult is not busy responding by means of the super-ego, then it is the id-responses that come forth, *e.g.*, in laughing, playing, obscene words, jokes, "perverse" satisfactions, etc.⁵² Even the convictions and interpretations which may have been merely "overcome," ceased to be believed in (*not*

⁵¹ Cf. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilizations*, New York.

⁵² On the subject of the Id, cf. Groddeck, *The Book of the It*, this Journal, Vol. I.

repressed), may be reanimated, as in the experience of the uncanny (Freud⁵³).

The conclusion arrived at is that the world of childhood, the product of the interaction of the environment and an organism provided only with those responses that are of universal human occurrence, affords a view of reality which is certainly as true to the human type as the later data of exact knowledge (even if they afford a less *accurate* representation of reality), and should not be denied expression, even in the civilized adult. There appears to be different levels of reality-interpretation—different in *kind* although dealing with the same reality, but each valid within its own “universe of discourse” (like the Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometries, or psychoanalysis and neurobiology), and which will be preferred according to whether one system or the other will be given the upper hand.

A sense perception like that of a stick in the water will illustrate: here is a piece of reality that needs to be interpreted, since the data furnished by the first system (Percept. cs.) are contrary to other sense-experiences of the same stick. The system Ucs may respond by various preconscious phantasies (a snake, something broken, etc.) derivative of unconscious castration-phantasies. Finally the system Pcs may either possess no concept ready to be applied, which gives rise to a baffled attitude, or respond with concepts which then come unhindered to Cs as a satisfactory and “real” explanation: stick is bent because of the laws of refraction. Only the total situation can decide which view is more valid: an examination in physics would prefer the last interpretation, the making of a poem, the other.

The ego and the id coexist in man, but have proceeded in their adaptation more by division of labor than by teamwork. Both methods of response are legitimate as long as the two principles (pleasure and reality) continue to function. Science and art correspond to the two needs of pleasure seeking and reality adjusting, and they must use as material the peculiar kind of data, different in quality, furnished by the respective systems concerned. Freud lays great emphasis on the phantasy in the relation of the artist and the public: “. . . he procures to others the means of drawing relief and consolation from the sources of pleasure in their own Ucs which have become inaccessible [due to repression].”⁵⁴ “He moulds his phantasies into a new kind of reality, and men concede them a justification as valuable reflections of actual life. But this he can only attain because other men feel the same dissatisfaction as he with the

⁵³ Cf. S. Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, chap. xxii.

⁵⁴ S. Freud, *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*.

renunciation demanded by reality, and because *this dissatisfaction*, resulting from the displacement of the pleasure-principle by the reality-principle, *is itself a part of reality*.”⁵⁵ The thesis presented here seems to be in full agreement with this statement.

If the occurrence of irrational actions where rational ones are needed is to be avoided, then the Ucs ought not to be denied expression whenever in life strict logic is not necessary. Let us remember Rimbaud: “This gentleman knows not what he does,—he is an angel. . . .” If this view of reality is not maintained, I do not see where poetry is to be found. Clearly poetry must lie *beyond the reality-principle*.

The Artist and Reality.—It has frequently been said that the artist does not copy reality because he is not adapted to it as a man. This is the attitude taken by Pfister: “(1) Art gives the “real” artist a “release,” a “liberation” from his conflict, while apparently the expressionist does not find any more release than the cryptographer from his drawings. (2) This is because the expressionistic pictures are “soul-portraits,” “caricatures of reality,” into which he puts his own “disruption and weakness.” He is an “autist” whose ultimate goal is the Nirvana. The “real” artist is not satisfied with reality either. But (a) he has great, not petty, sufferings, and connects them at once with those of mankind as a whole, of which he is the sensorium. (b) He does not withdraw within himself, offering his psychic reality, but portrays conventional reality as it ought to be, *i.e.*, he gives a model overcoming the present imperfections.”⁵⁶

I think there is a serious confusion in the points at issue:

(1) The assimilation of the expressionist to a pure narcissist has been examined in Section I, and it was shown that it is the fact of creation, and *not* the content of the work, however subjective, that must be compared with the neurosis. A productive artist like Baudelaire may have had the Nirvana as a poetic theme,—he evidently did not have it as a complete *goal*, since his libido could stand the pull of objectification. If the artist creates, it is that his libido is completely held neither by the symptoms nor by the ego. If it be so held, we then have the neurotic artist, whose first complaint is disorders of creation. This may happen, as is evidenced by the numerous cases known, to *any* artist, irrespective of whether he is an “expressionist” or a “real” artist. If the artist comes to us

⁵⁵ S. Freud, Collected Papers, IV, i; italics mine.

⁵⁶ O. Pfister, loc. cit. The quotations are abridged and their order is changed.

for treatment, we do our best to solve his social and creative difficulties, and in order to do this we have to treat him like any other neurotic, *viz.*, to readjust him to reality. The great phobia of most artists of being robbed of their inspiration by an analysis does not seem to be justified in most cases. This is an important question which, unhappily, cannot find place in this paper. The only point I wish to make is that the adjustment to reality that is required of them, as patients, is *not* required of them in their work. There is in Pfister an unwarranted assimilation of two realities: the one to which the artist is demanded to adjust as a man, and the other, which he is supposed to represent as an artist. We treat their compulsive neurosis or their narcissistic trend, as the case may be, but we are unconcerned with the content of their work. There our jurisdiction ends. So that when Pfister says that the expressionist's pictures are the "self-development of his mind," "*cause pleasure* traced to autistic satisfaction of instinct," and that the "distress is elaborated subjectively instead of objectively on an object," he is confusing the issues between creation and content. If what has been said in Section I is correct, then we cannot ask the artist to relinquish such pleasure as Pfister mentions, since the picture, as an expression of the phantasy, obeys the pleasure principle. It is the ability to work it out that obeys the reality principle. Finally, since we have analysis at our disposal, we cannot be concerned about the degree of deliverance from his conflict brought to the patient by his art: we should not advise an art cure any more than we should admit religion as a therapy.

(2) As to the "petty sufferings," "purely subjective feelings"—not universal, must we agree that the hatred of a father or a nurse, the helplessness in the face of the demands of reality, the desire to return to the peace and omnipotence of the womb—are not universal, when we can apply to them such words as Oedipus-situation, primary narcissism, etc. Are they not the ailments of mankind that most artists have shared? Let us see if it is not something else that shocks Pfister.

(a) The phantasies are too directly represented (in their primitive form)—not enough elaborated in consciousness—not enough "sublimated" through the representation of the object as it is, therefore similar to any compromise formation. This point is not clear to me: it is true that Freud says that the suspicious origin of the phantasy must be "disguised." But I have not found that he connects sublimation with elaboration of the phantasies in consciousness or with representation of the object—for him, I think, artistic

creation, in any form, is a sublimation (cf. pass. Sec. I), *i.e.*, a socially acceptable activity instead of the reverse,—the only definition of the word sublimation that I could find. This certainly cannot be equated with the degree of indirectness of the expression of the phantasy (which simply means the degree of symbolization or displacement), and therefore cannot be used as a standard to decide between expressionistic and conventional art. An artist is a sublimated person by definition, *i.e.*, by the fact that he is an artist. He is unsublimated in the measure as he exchanges creation for symptoms, and *vice versa*: “according to whether sublimation will have been complete or incomplete, we shall have variable relations between creation, perversion and neurosis.”⁵⁷

As for expressionistic drawings “satisfying symbolically unconscious phantasies,” it seems that this is the universal lot of works of art: Leonardo’s “elaborated” vulture-phantasy is just as disguised, and just as satisfying a wish-fulfillment as the distortion of Pfister’s features by his sadistic portrait-painter. The disregard for the object cannot be due to the necessity for “unsublimated” expression of the phantasies, since Zola and de Toulouse-Lautrec, for instance, who have been accused of “unsublimated” satisfaction, have nevertheless been radically descriptive realists,—while on the other hand we find disregard for realistic expression at a very “sublimated” level, *e.g.*, with Claudel. It is the function of any work of art, it seems to me, to be “similar to any compromise-formation,” and that equivalence is the very thing which is meant by the Freudian definition of sublimation.

(b) The expressionist projects his own childhood feelings instead of identifying himself with the object. According to the popular definition, the great artist is essentially sensitive and emotional: he suffers or enjoys where the average person is not moved. He behaves in this respect like the transference-neurotic, with his well known capacity for exaggerated pleasures or sufferings. The explanation is that things in the environment are felt as part of the ego. They are introjected. This taking-in within the ego coincides with an enlargement of the ego-limits: “The psychoneurotic suffers from a widening, the paranoiac [who on the contrary is withdrawn from the outer world], from a shrinking of the ego.”⁵⁸ In virtue of the latter mechanism, subjective experiences are felt as happenings

⁵⁷ S. Freud, *Trois Essais sur la Théorie de la Sexualité*, Pt. iii, translation, Paris, 1923.

⁵⁸ S. Ferenczi, *Introjection and Transference*, in *Sex and Psychoanalysis*, new ed., Boston, 1916.

outside of the ego-limits, and are thus ascribed to the environment (projected), *e.g.*, voices, hallucinations. Such a person, according to the popular definition, is the reverse of the artist. Of this, however, Freud says nothing. He starts, as I have tried to do here, from the parallel between the artist and the day-dreamer, and merely says: "He possesses the mysterious power to fashion given materials to the point of making them the faithful image of the representation existing in his unconscious phantasy."⁵⁹ H. Sachs, on the contrary, agrees with the traditional definition: "To transform your own soul into that of another so as to be able to divine not only the desires and cares of the day, but also the flickering phantasies, even down to the dreams, and afterwards to retain this state of identification so that others may see the miracle with their own eyes—that is without doubt the greatest work in the liberation of man."⁶⁰ Certainly this capacity is a most useful gift for the artist: in identification, individual attributes of the object tend to be absorbed,—so new qualities are acquired, and the ego changes its shape. Such a capacity for repeated identifications means a widening of experiences which makes for greater understanding, taking in of new patterns and growth,—all this provided the individual does not remain crucified on them (here the fate of the identification—what is done with it—is of extreme importance to decide whether the psyche will not be, on the contrary, impoverished and the libido fruitlessly immobilized).

However, it is a platitude to say that the most imitative artist always described nature through his own temperament. Wilde⁶¹ quotes the case of a painter accused in 1847 of having "contrived to put the expression of his own wickedness into the portrait of a nice kind-hearted girl." There necessarily must be in the object a *basis* for identification, which must in turn depend on previous experiences of the subject,—so that how much of the qualities proper to the object will be introjected, or conversely, how little of the qualities foreign to the object will be displaced on the latter previous to the identification, is far from guaranteed. In hysterical identification, for instance (and it would seem that theoretically the identification made use of by the artist might resemble this variety more than the narcissistic one), the process occurs on the basis of displacement of wish-emotions by virtue of an analogy with some previous object or situation. While the result is a widening of the sphere of affective significance of the environment (in opposition to

⁵⁹ S. Freud, *Introduction à la Psychanalyse*, loc. cit.

⁶⁰ H. Sachs, *The Tempest*, in *Int. Jour. Psa.*, Vol. IV, Pt. 1-2.

⁶¹ O. Wilde, *Intentions*, new ed., London, 1909.

the withdrawal of the schizophrenic), still the "exaggerated reactions" often present show that the identification in this case tends to be with the object as altered by the original wish or affect displaced on to it, rather than with the object as an independent entity.

On the other hand it seems probable that much narcissistic identification is also present in the artist. Freud remarks that "the psychological novel in general probably owes its peculiarities to the tendency of modern writers to split up their ego by self-observation into many component egos, and in this way to personify the conflicting trends in their own mental life in many heroes."⁶² A. Gide's notes on his art offer a confirmation of this: "It is certainly easier for me to make a character speak, than to speak in my own name. . . . Everything we like is that which resembles us and which we imagine easily," and concludes: "What is lacking in most of my heroes, whom I have cut out of my very flesh, is that modicum of common sense which prevents me from pushing their follies as far as they do."⁶³ The identification of these artists, although they describe characters and situations with great accuracy along the traditional line, is more with the object as altered, this time, by the original part of themselves projected on to it.

Thus, in one way or another, in the object of the identification of the traditional artist there is a telescoping of persons, wishes and affects through displacement or projection, which makes it impossible to oppose his attitude to that of the expressionist as one of identification and transference to one of projection and narcissism. A few remarks may be added concerning what is behind the desire sensuously to characterize the object.

(1) The choice of an object is a prerequisite; it is effected in the same way as in love: *viz.*, according to the subject's complexes (the object being a substitute for sexual objects of childhood, or satisfying special impulses). Any object which does not resemble the ideal will arouse no desire to copy it, while everything that fits into the ideal is intensely sought after for enjoyment and description (interesting heads, long legs, big breasts, no breasts, etc.). The narcissistic type of object-choice is often the case, as has been mentioned in connection with identification, and thus follows from the libidinal investment of a narcissistic projection. An artist patient (compulsive) who says of herself: "I hated to look at myself in a mirror as I thought my face was so ugly; I wanted more than anything to be beautiful," says on another occasion: "The bodies of

⁶² S. Freud, *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, chap. ix.

⁶³ A. Gide, *Journal des Faux-Monnayeurs*, Paris, 1926.

Matisse's women are all distorted, and it *hurts like the dickens*: I like beauty more than anything."

(2) The child gains power over reality by knowing all about it. The relation to the scientific quest is evidenced by Leonardo, in whom the desire to know obtains in both fields of art and science. Moreover, drawing the object of various feelings is an excellent form of magical satisfaction: the drawing *is* the person, it can be destroyed, taken care of, made more beautiful, uglier or older. A good deal of the child's sadism will thus use drawing as an outlet. Debasement of the object, however, requires a far greater degree of likeness than its idealization, as it is in the very accuracy of the defects revealed that the sadistic enjoyment lies. This explains the vogue of caricature with the public, and also why most good portrait-painters, so-called wonderful observers of their times, have a tendency to caricature and critical witticism, *e.g.*, Whistler, Degas, Sargent.

(3) The child's sexual curiosity for the parts covered by clothes can be sublimated in the sense of art (Freud); conversely, the eagerness with which the "keen observer" looks, not only at his model, but at everything and everyone, takes "mental notes," turns back on every "interesting" man or woman in the street, makes it possible to suspect in his case a strong peeping impulse. But seeing ("anticipatory touching") may become an end in itself instead of being a preparation for the sexual act (hence the voyeur perversion)—just as narcissistic self-observation, although of an opposite nature, stands in the way of easy objectification of thoughts and moods in stage-acting. The impulse to characterize may well bear such a relation to expressiveness: perhaps the artistic voyeur should be cured, and reclaimed for expression.

For the three reasons stated above, I seriously think that less observation of the external world would furnish the artist with more libido for impulsive creativeness and originality in his work. By being less fixed on a pattern, he would be nearer the unconscious source of invention. And if he wants to sometimes describe nature,—then by first learning not to look, he will look better, *i.e.*, more naïvely, more meaningfully, when he does look. Picasso's line drawings, for instance, are immensely more sensitive than Sargent's.

This discussion makes the question at issue easier to understand, as the following points have been cleared up: Identification in the artist is not a simple process;—in the case of narcissistic identification (with a projected part of the self) the representation of the object may be retained, so that imagination or distortion of the object is

not necessarily correlated with projection;—nor with an especially unsuccessful adjustment of the individual to reality;—the faithful picturization of the traditional artist is not a simple manifestation of object-libido. Nothing has been gained through the foregoing survey as to the absolute desirability of object-representation, so the answer must lie elsewhere. There remains, however, only one possibility,—the demand made by the public, which will soon be examined.

Classicism.—These remarks on modern works of art would be left quite incomplete if a short estimate of the other extreme of art was not added for comparison. In so doing I feel justified in selecting classic art as being more outstandingly different. Moreover, there is the lasting quarrel between the classics and the Romantics: v. Sydow, for instance, says that “the critique of Rank’s aesthetics will have to point out that the romantic artist is not the only type for the classicist is more comprehensive and more significant.”⁶⁴ But this latter point remains to be proven. Criticisms of the psychology of expressionism and of “degenerate” or “decadent” culture have been volunteered, but no attempt has been made to denounce the neurosis of classicism,—it would have seemed sacrilegious. Yet, if the taboo is removed, an examination of classic works and theories reveals, as in the case of dogmas and religious formulations, features analogous to secondary formations found in the obsessional states. The postulates of classicism (not easily separable from those of intellectualism) can be summarized as follows:

Beauty: Nature purified from its imperfections.

Perfection: The product must be finished, perfect. Preference for static dogmas and idealized patterns for the world and the self: Essence vs. Process, Being vs. Becoming. Criteria of excellence for the description of things as they ought to be (*e.g.* Beauty).

Logic: Preference for conceptual values; formal and objective aspect of things viewed from the outside. Appeal to the intellectual element in the work as in conduct. Beauty, as Virtue for Socrates, is Knowledge. Dilemmas: Beauty-Ugliness, Order and Law vs. Variety and Disorder.

Measure: Calculating; dividing, proportions (cf. the Golden Section); symmetry; regularity. Also Measure in the sense of abstraction of the mean, or “best of everything”: the “happy medium” (*οὐδὲν ἄγαν*), the static olympian equilibrium combining two attitudes.

Criticism: the artist separated from the object judges it in terms

⁶⁴ v. Sydow, *Primitive Kunst und Psychoanalyse*, Int. Ps. Verlag, 1927.

of preformed standards and judges himself in the same terms: self-restraint is opposed to enthusiasm. This may result in a narrow denial of all that falls short of the standard,—but also, if the latter is doubted, in universal skeptical examination as vs. apostolic spirit. "The Greeks were a nation of art critics" (Wilde).

In the above can be at once recognized: protective measures against the impulsive and the subjective (feeling); strong super-ego with a set of ruling patterns, sadistic criticism and guilt sense; analerotic fixations: scrupulousness, compulsion toward the perfect product; defense-reactions: Jones says that "the stimuli for aesthetic feeling (contemplation of beauty) lies in the rebellion against the more repellent aspects of material existence which arises from the reaction of the child against its original excremental interests";⁶⁵ doubt and ambivalence: dilemmas, equilibrium, eclecticism; ambivalence and difficulties of choice are also found, *e.g.*, in the Greek ideal of beauty which Clark thinks is based on the colligative functioning of male and female characteristics due to homosexuality.⁶⁶

Finally there is an important parallel between this set of postulates and religious dogmas. The latter are not spontaneous manifestations, but compromises between repressed and repressing ideas; hence they are akin to compulsive thinking.⁶⁷ Social dogmas (hygiene, the cult of time and money, etc.) have been found to have the same character. There are dogmas in art, too, of an exactly similar sort, as could be expected since they are a product of the same society. This last fact explains why academic art appears more "normal" than any other form: it *is* more normal, if by word is understood the central tendency of a group. And equally normal are the religion, morality and logic of the said society. The group, however, can be a pathological one.

How does this "clinical picture" compare with that of romanticism and expressionism? What von Sydow and Pfister had to say about the latter has been taken for granted. So it seems that, in face of the generally depressive or narcissic-exhibitionistic symptoms that have been recognized in romantic and modern art,—obsessional symptoms can be observed in the case of classic art.⁶⁸ The conclusion for our

⁶⁵ E. Jones, *The Madonna. Conception through the Ear*, in *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis*.

⁶⁶ L. P. Clark and H. R. Cross, *Sex Balance in Greek Art*. *Med. Jour. & Record*, Feb.-Mar., 1924.

⁶⁷ Cf. T. Reik, *Imago*, Vol. XIII, p. 2-4.

⁶⁸ In the Greek civilization, the alternate expression of a conflict is to be found everywhere: in the people itself, divided between Dorian and Ionian elements, the masculine cult of Apollo with male priests and the feminine cult of Bakkhos with priestesses, the esoterism of the mysteries

problem is that, regarding the presence of symptom-like traits *in his art*, the classic artist is just as close to the neurotic as are the romantic and the expressionist, and his set of "symptoms" is neither more nor less favorable to the production of work. On the other hand, as the expression of the day-dream and the emotion, when they are present, takes place at a repressed level and is controlled by the dogma, it cannot be said that, at a certain height, the classic and the romantic forms disappear into a common art. The restraint of Racine, for instance, prevents him from being assimilated to Shakespeare, and the reading of his plays remains confined to the French. It is rather in the measure that he has been nearer the romantic or expressionist that the classic has been most artist: a pure classic is hard to find among the greatest. So rare are the great artists possessing a complete Olympian balance that it cannot be held to be favorable for art. Even the very few pillars of classicism, like Phidias and Goethe owe their profoundest appeal to romantic features in them. Those who cannot be claimed because they are too primitive, disorderly, obscure, etc., like Homer, Gothic artists, Dante, Shakespeare, are great not for their harmonious perfecting of reality or their resemblance to it, but for their remoteness from it, their phantasy and inventiveness and nearness to the unconscious sources. Moreover many great artists besides the expressionists have used integration and expression and even the great works of analysis and description (Dostoevsky, Proust) appeal not because they are "perfect copies of life" but because of the lyrical quality inherent to the development of a character and of the great psychic depth to which they are carried. The aesthetic ideal invented by the Greeks and which is now called classicism was too deadly to suit any great artist; it soon degenerated into the academic tradition and is to be found in its strictness only among second-raters, student-minds satisfied with guide-lines and restrictions, the Roman or Alexandrine, or our own Beaux-Arts schools, for instance. In really creative minds, on the contrary, the impulse has broken through the discipline of the intellectual formulations.

The sadistic iconoclastic impulses of modern artists toward classic culture ("Those damned Greeks," the sculptor Gaudier-Brzezka

and the codified values of social and artistic life (Pallas); in particular individuals like Socrates, whose *daimon* contrasts with his conceptualism, or Plato, whose phantasia productions contrast with his realism. Greek sculpture itself, at first submitted to the spiritual necessities of primitive art, soon becomes merely naturalistic through the influence of the stadium, until it ultimately dies, like all Greek art, of criticism. That is, at a certain stage, the libido tends to attach to the criticizing agency instead of to objects, and the impulses tend to be repressed in exchange for the narcissistic satisfaction of self-criticism.

said) must be understood as an effort to wean themselves away from mother Greece to conquer their masculinity for genuineness and freedom of creation.⁶⁹ The academicians and the public still live in fear of the weaning trauma. The change of some artists to mother India,—a foster mother at that—is of course no sign of growing up.

In leaving the field of neurosis and the artist, I readily admit that among modern artists a great number, although doing work show many symptoms the most fashionable of which are dipsomania and homosexuality. That the majority of them are not great artists does not suffice to invalidate modern art, which can boast of men of the size of Cezanne, Matisse, Picasso, Strawinsky: like any other period of production, modern art has its minor artists, its "*precieux*" minds. But it only reinforces what was said in Section I, *viz.*, that the great artist, like any other man who counts, needs a good deal of object libido for his task, however severed from reality his art may be. Many "geniuses" are near-neurotics but, in diagnosing them, the fact is often overlooked that they were giants. The most obvious cases, like great captains or founders of religion, are often men who, owing to a strong mother-fixation, have failed to make the father their ideal, and have rebelled against him or even sought a heavenly father-imago. However infantile the great artist may be in his phantasies, some traits in him must have overcome the castration-anxiety and must have grown to maturity and masculine aggressiveness and responsibility. A creating giant cannot be a sweet hermaphrodite. This is where psychoanalysis can help the artist far from being a hindrance to him. An analysis can restore depth to the work of one who doubts, save what can be saved of the phantasies which in another have eliminated too much of reality, *i.e.*, help the artist to capitalize his unconscious for his art. In psychoanalysis the artist for the first time can find a discipline which, being on the borderline between a science and an art, can take account of him and give him recognition.

IV. MODERN ART AND THE PUBLIC

The Public and the Artist's Intention. After trying to exonerate the artist from the charges of the critic, the next problem is to interest the public in the expression of the artist. One method of approach is to determine whether the spectator's phantasies need be similar to the artist's, or meet the latter's intention in his work.

⁶⁹ The nursing character of education is well expressed in the language. Cf. Descartes: "*J'ai été nourri aux lettres dès mon enfance*"; du Bellay: "*France, mère des lettres . . . tu m'as nourri longtemps du lait de ta mamelle,*" etc.

Freud has clearly stated the question in his "Moses": "What moves us so violently cannot be anything else than the artist's intention. . . . There must be reproduced in us the state of passion, of psychic emotion that has aroused in the artist the creative impulse." Yet in "some of the most grandiose and imposing works of art there can be no question of intellectual understanding. . . ." and from this obscurity, there results "a superabundance of diverse interpretations impossible to conciliate. . . ."; only, then, through an analysis of the work can we "solve the enigma of the powerful emotion produced in us."⁷⁰ The first point to note is the enigmatic character of most great works, which shows that the phantasy of the artist, instead of mere imitation, has been paramount. The second is that the public's unconscious phantasies may correspond more or less universally to the artist's own, while their preconscious derivatives, or the conscious impression of a work may be strictly individual. If this is so, the spectator should not look for any *conscious correspondence* with the intention or emotion of the artist, but accept the loss of that part of his customary fore-pleasure. The question reduces itself, therefore, to the clues necessary in the work for a certain universality of appeal: would not a greater latitude of obscurity hinder the unconscious phantasies? I do not think so. On the one hand, the Ucs of two people can "completely understand each other," as in what Ferenczi calls unconscious dialogues;⁷¹ on the other, since the conscious impression of a work does not duplicate that of the artist, why should a correspondence be any more required in the case of the unconscious phantasies, as soon as some emotion is released. Any material is good for the Ucs, if the work is only taken as a stimulus for day-dream and feeling. Of course, the fewer clues for conscious interpretation, the more does the public need to release its own phantasies. The question of the object and of the subjectivism of modern art, however, needs further elucidation at this point.

Contemplation of Nature.—Let us recall that the dogma of the function of art to imitate nature rests on a *petitio principii* and is correct, neither for the primitive nor the child. Music was never realistic: it could represent much less objectively than painting or literature a given theme to be described (the death of Orpheus, the birth of Venus, etc.) and this is why it could not win the favor of the classic

⁷⁰ S. Freud. *Rev. Franc. de Psa.* Vol. I, 1, trans.

⁷¹ There are dream-dialogues, too, showing that material traditionally held meaningless can arouse an adequate answer: a patient's wife tells him that she dreamt he lost his teeth;—the husband goes back to sleep and manufactures a dream acknowledging his impotency.

XVIIth century. To ask of the artist the kind of thinking which is the apanage of the scientist, as some exponents of the classic culture do, is confusing two kinds of activities: it would be as reasonable to ask the scientist to use nothing but imagination and analogies. All aesthetics rest on the fact that there always is some projection on the part of the painter. A complete imitation of nature would be impossible, and, if possible, useless, as it would *be* reality and therefore destroy itself as a work of art. The consensus of opinion favors Bacon's "*Homo additus naturae*." But "*Homo*" in the academic tradition was not allowed to overstep certain limits: the public, since the Renaissance, has had the portrait as a criterion for art, a portrait both lifelike and slightly idealized according to conventional standards of beauty.

It is true that never before has there been a completely abstract art, and that the art of primitives and children somehow deals with natural objects. But it is also true that they take with the object the greatest liberties, for the reason that their view of nature is different from ours. Their "*contemplation of nature*" which is said to be at the basis of art,⁷² is something else than an objective view of things and could not lead to an accurate copy of the object, since the latter *does not stand for what it is*. The lack of separation of the ego from the external world prevents sense-perceptions from being correctly interpreted: a shadow may be a bear; a bear the spirit of a dead man. Nature worship, the identification of human clans with natural species (totem) are instances of the general introjection of nature into society. Lost in the world, man reads human meanings into natural forms and forces: Bright spots stare at one, arches are confining, etc. Next comes the abstraction out of them of geometrical forms to which magical or symbolic value is ascribed, while all along animals and objects are kept as fetishes or symbols (a lion, a lotus, a dove), the form of which can again be abstracted. This state of affairs is hardly favorable for an imitation of nature, which, personalized, animated, forming a whole with the dream or the magic, cannot escape being falsified and distorted. As a matter of fact, what seems to distinguish such contemplation of nature is an emphasis on the phantasy-end rather than on the nature-end.

⁷² It may be that the contemplation of nature itself arises from the desire to recapture the curves of the breast, or the peace and the quiet of the primary unity with the mother (Clark), or the womb (Cf. G. Roheim, *Int. Jour. of Psa.*, Vol. II, pt. 2: "*Primitive man unconsciously regarded the world which envelops him as a second womb*"),—and thus art would ultimately spring from that trend. But this is not to be taken in a narrow sense, as the drive for creation can be furnished equally well by the regressive tendency still more directly expressed, *i.e.*, by phantasies based on the distrust of nature and on death.

Nevertheless the subject matter of phantasy and distortion consisted of natural objects. How does the situation stand to-day? We are beyond the stage of animism and no longer concerned with ritual necessities. Our dance is still expressive, but no more through identification with the emu-bird. Our view of nature has become completely materialistic, and too much objectivity has killed the object. It is against this submission to the dead object that the modern artist has rebelled. For him, as for the primitive, nature is again either animated by his feeling or taken as "a repertory of forms and colors" (Delacroix) for the expression of a feeling. The magic is absent, it is true; but the distortions are directed, as they were also for the primitive, by plastic purposes, empathy, associations, and phantasia meanings, even if these factors have a different content. Besides, we still have contemplation of nature,—only the natural objects have changed: the machine has taken the place of the tree, the mountain, the bison, as material for wonder. New forms have risen from the steam engine, the skyscraper, the aeroplane, the typewriter, the fountain pen—forms determined by their function—and which move us as a Greek vase or a lake moved former artists. But the content of the modern mind has changed further still. It is no more before the outside world that we feel astonishment and terror, but before the inner world, which thus has become material for lyricism and expression: the wonder is now directed on ourselves. Such subjectivism and self-awareness cannot help changing the direction the phantasies and their products.

The Factor "Nature."—The rights of the artist (*homo*) have been more or less recognized to-day, and the problem has shifted to what amount of *natura* is necessary and whether it could not, in some cases, be completely relinquished. The spectator asks for the presence of some object, but his progressive surrender makes one suspect any criterion he imposes. Once the distortion of the object has been granted, its absence ought not to make much difference, as one is looking for something else than a copy. A more significant approach is from the point of view of *meaning*, which is equally important for the public and for the artist. We know that most forms are meaningful, and experiments on perception and imagination show that the search for meaning is a general tendency of consciousness, even if the meaning consists only of vague associations; even when one attempts to draw in a more or less automatic fashion, the difficulty is that a meaning is soon read which changes the course of the drawing. Our object-orientation is further shown by the fact that we think in terms of objects and persons in dreams and phantasies (dramatization), sometimes of words, but very rarely

of abstract forms. It may be that a compromise between representation and expression is necessary by somehow keeping some sort of object in the picture, as do the majority of modern painters. In this case, however, the object must never be taken as a meeting ground for the painter and the spectator, an algebraic symbol for the painter's intentions,—but only as a rudimentary *tertium quid*, a basis for the spectator's phantasies, *i.e.*, for a purely subjective meaning. It may be, on the contrary, that pure forms (either geometrical or abstracted from objects, as machine forms) can be used for their decorative worth, and that formal and chromatic values can operate emotionally independently of their suggesting any object. The question, a subsidiary one which might easily degenerate into technical quarrels, is pending. Our minds being still occupied with objects of the external world, they certainly may be used (but should not be indispensable), while the objects of the Ucs, which are not the same as reality objects, should not be denied expression. The greatest freedom should be present everywhere: here exact representation, here distortion, here condensations, illogicalities, free association material.

Modern Art and Convention.—An easy criticism is that modern art repudiates all other forms of art merely to establish a new orthodoxy, —only exchanges one formulation for another, with its own criteria of perfection.

It is not the idea of discipline that is fought here, as any sustained production leads to some formulation; but the aesthetic conventions have been of a very different sort, and the important thing is how they admit the expression of primary impulses and the freedom of creation. Before the repressed stage, for instance, the abstract ideal of artistic beauty can play no part, and is not found in the child or the primitive: the features held sexually beautiful by the various tribes are seldom present, and are subject to the same distortions as indifferent ones. That is, distortions are not effected according to observation, characterization, or idealization, but according to magic (to scare away evil spirits, etc.), or to the concept of the priest (as in the case of the Egyptian artist whose sculpture had to obey sacred shapes); and also according to schematization and the bringing of natural forms back to geometrical ones owing to the search for the essential, the notion, out of the accidental, the perception (patterns for galloping horses, flying birds, etc.). While these codifications establish an orthodoxy of distortion, they are no more a hindrance to creation than narrow realism or the Greek idealization of the natural object, and as they distinctly lead to abstraction of forms, they maintain the freedom of the artist in regard to the object.

But the conventions of primitive art (Negro, *early* Egyptian, Greek, Chinese, Gothic),—and of modern art, rest on something more: the object is distorted, as Barnes says, for the sake of design. Now we must not forget that this distortion of forms exists for psychological reasons: what it answers, and what is enjoyed (particularly now, when the magical meaning is absent), is the child's notional way of drawing, and his way of expressing forms according to structure, rhythms, etc., *i.e.*, the creative impulse in its purity. The child's creation is a free one: he distorts where he most feels; his arbitrariness and overestimation of parts is due to the passing mood, the erotic interest, the dream he pursues (a giant, a princess, etc.). Yet his art, too, is conventional, although he knows nothing of convention. But a high degree of individualism is possible because the Ucs is conservative in its form, yet creative in its force. I think, therefore, if we neglect the academic tradition, there is another, impulse or phantasy-tradition,—one of phantasied reality in which all primitives are linked in all civilizations (the Gothics, for instance, were the products of a barbaric race as well as the early Greeks and the Negroes). Modern art, which has pushed freedom farther than ever before, is no more exceptional, "outside of all tradition," but holds in authentic art quality with the great tradition of the race. It is also interesting to note that all primitive arts have great points of resemblance and that the greater differences along diverging lines appear with the intensification of the formula: Giotto and an early Chinese artist would recognize each other, but Burne-Jones would be a dead letter to both of them.

The most usual theories of art critics: that the formulations of a school are not more important than a pencil or raw material, as only the artist counts; or that there is only one Art which took different forms, all valid in their multiplicity because suited to the personality of the artist, the period, the civilization,—are true, but not sufficient, as they view the problem in a technical, historical, or pragmatic sense,—and not in the psychological sense adopted here. If *laissez-faire* and the denial of psychology are to be avoided, those civilizations, those rules, must be examined. We cannot say that there are complete cycles, and that art-forms and civilizations die or "return": there are periods when the impulse is more freely expressed, others where the repressing agent has the upper hand. Not only, therefore, cannot all arts be tolerated any more than all civilizations, but we may have to admit that there ultimately is only one form of each: the one true psychologically, *i.e.*, near the law of the impulse. Perhaps after all we should be conservative and follow at least where

emotional relations are concerned, the old biological truth, the real tradition, which is that of the Unconscious.

What the next step in art will be is hard to say: cubism and expressionism are not definitive, and will evidently not remain as they are to-day. Art as practised by the primitives is not any more suited to modern man than is their religion. Perhaps art will in the future disappear together with religion, unless it should take the latter's place. Perhaps it will always be necessary for a certain liberation of the emotions. Perhaps not, if the Machine Age continues and if its intensity (hurried rhythms, etc.) is sufficient. Whatever happens, if art survives it will never be again in the Greek tradition, and at least the spirit of liberation will remain. Ultimately it is the emotion that directs art and molds the material; decadence occurs when the emotion dies out, and any art, through emphasis on the empty formula, becomes academic. Greek art died of intellectualism and sensuous copy; Chinese and Japanese art, of decorative stereotypy; Egyptian art, of its rigid search for the absolute; modern art may die of its abstraction and its dream. The ideal formula, therefore, so well applied by Picasso, would be to have no formula, no crystallized technique. The ideal art would keep in the process. The ideal tradition would make room for *variations*, and for this it would be ceaselessly renovated by a direct contact—not with "life" or "nature" (which means nothing) but rather with that ultimate interpreter of nature, the Unconscious. A great mistake is to oppose, as Nordau did, progressive intelligence to static habit in connection with art, and to forget that the Ucs is never static, but is a source of energy, of creative change and variations. Logic can only *apply* knowledge to reality; but the Ucs has the power of subjectively *transforming* reality.

Conclusion

MODERN ART AND SOCIETY

"Les personnes religieuses vivent d'une ombre. Nous vivons de l'ombre d'une ombre. De quoi vivra-t-on après nous?"—Renan, Feuilles détachées.

There are many reasons besides those mentioned above why the modern artist should have been opposed by the public: the older (father) generation always tries to repress the younger one; on every new idea there is the "Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns." The bourgeois fears disorder, which in upsetting his bodily comfort or his idealistic pattern threatens his own ego with destruction. The "Intellectuals" blame the "degenerates" who live according to the emotions rather than to the intellect: "Emotion is more

agreeable and easier than cogitation" . . . it makes use of "the automatism," of "very low centers."⁷³ The public does not forgive the ambush of being made to meet with unpleasant subjects, *i.e.*, with its own impulses, unless the subject is presented in a way to avoid the guilt feeling, otherwise the private enjoyment of masturbatic phantasies or activities is preferred. Thus the attitude of the public has deep roots. The change has not been obtained when the spectator, who first went to the galleries and laughed, has grown tolerant and says: "Now tell me what there is in it; I'll try to understand." He has then reached the point of one who has a reading knowledge of psychoanalysis,—but has yet to be analyzed. His resistances, which are the origin of his repugnance, have been displaced,—they have not been removed: like the bulk of a fat man in a drill line; when he suppresses it in front, it protrudes in back. The change must be a real one.

One cannot escape feeling that modern art has met with such opposition because it struck at the same repressed impulses as psychoanalysis, and that the same resistances are at work. The childish and animal lack of self-consciousness of some painters and sculptors, their laughing at perspective, frequent overestimation of erotic zones (breasts, buttocks) notwithstanding a general delight at deformations, their reversion to mud-color or violent daubing; the autoerotic character of popular dancing and music (syncopation and rhythm in jazz), and even of concert music, as in the primeval *Sacre du Printemps*; the reversion of the cinema to preverbal communication, —to a gesture-language of the whole body, often at the exclusion of even facial expression (Charlie Chaplin, as Spencer says of the child, "laughs with his whole body"); finally the general denial of rules, of logic, of perspective for the benefit of the phantasy or the notion of all modern art; all this enrages the critical super-ego of civilized narcissists, who cannot bear this sense of freedom, this direct and impulsive stream of creation.

However near the infantile-erotic this art may be, the word *decadent* hardly applies to it, since it strives to go back to the emotional and impulsive source of all art. It may well be wondered, therefore, whether an art based on the repression of Dionysian by Apollinian values and criticisms is not really decadence, instead of the reverse, a question which has not been solved as regards society. A decadent art is one which is dying, *i.e.*, where no more powerful variation or talents occur, where there is, as Sainte-Beuve said, "a lack of har-

⁷³ M. Nordau, *Le Génie et le Talent*, Paris, trans.

mony between the real inspiration and the apparent result." The intense production and enthusiasm of the present period, its renewal of most great forms means that, like Romanticism, not only is modern art not decadent but it is a manifestation of life and of health. To destroy the resistances to modern art we must bring the spectator nearer the artist by destroying in him more and more of the super-ego values and by restoring life and mobility to his libido.

The adoption of modern art by the Russian Republic is a significant fact. One may say that the anti-bourgeois purpose of this art determined the choice. But the main reason is that there is between the proletarian movement and the modern movement in art a true affinity, a "like-mindedness" ⁷⁴, as both have tried to use the energy of the Ucs and to find and liberate the authentic individual cramped by industrial civilization. Sorel ⁷⁵ has shown how religions, morality, aesthetics, have evolved into purely intellectual values, pragmatic and opportunistic, culminating in the skepticism of Renan, with no belief or enthusiasm: the shadow of a shadow. The true decadence is in this impotent order, which is being shaken by the young and the strong, those who are willing to "live dangerously" and possess the heroic lyrical spirit. Although the artist and the revolutionist represent forces directly contrary to the civilization they live in, they nevertheless express the need of a period far more than one thinks,—before they are intellectualized, when they are only dimly felt. This is why we cannot return to classic dogmas and restraint unless society does likewise. One thing is certain to-day: our impulses refuse our civilization. We must therefore hope for a society which will be "reconciled with the Ucs" (Stärcke), *i.e.*, with the needs of the real individual and with their expression.

So, if one wants to understand the real significance of the whole movement in the arts, one must leave the field of art. I think Pfister is right in giving to his criticism an ethical flavor. I mean that obviously questions of technique are very little nowadays in art, which is, as it should be, only one aspect of an attitude in life, and one method of living it out. Some of the Romantics had a glimpse of that, and their red waistcoat was much of a social protest. Without a philosophy, Taine said, "the scientist is a mere craftsman, and the artist a mere entertainer." The expressionist and surrealist movements are not jokes, and far more than an adventure in thought: they are part of this vast undertaking of recreation of the universe

⁷⁴ Just as there is one between conventional art and repressed persons,—even if the latter purchase paintings by Picasso, on the theory that the artist can be allowed any extravagance because art can do no harm to the spectator.

⁷⁵ G. Sorel, *Réflexions sur la violence*, Paris, new ed.

to which they have given themselves in their own way, as the revolutionist in his.⁷⁶ Both participate in the changing of reality. Audacity and recreation in art would be puerile otherwise. The "reform of style," the war on logic, are a phase of the war on the conception of life based on the super-ego values. Those who were accused of withdrawing from reality, of crying, "O my soul, let us flee in the deserts," should not be reproached with having achieved an effective contact with reality.

Psychoanalysis is only a practical therapy, and the reality to which it seeks to readjust the patients is *any* reality. But to qualify it would make a difference and perhaps it is time to do so, as Stärcke⁷⁷ has shown, and to diagnose the civilization of the period of industrial production, which constitutes the reality "on which patients are wrecked." Science has been looked up to by the bourgeoisie as an instrument of omnipotence to solve its problems magically, and generally in a sense flattering to its own ego (*e.g.*, eugenics and the social and racial problems). Not so with psychoanalysis, so deeply concerned with the individual. For the first time in the course of historical times, the existence of the Ucs is consciously recognized: prodigious event the significance of which cannot be grasped just now, and can be measured only by the amount of resistance aroused. The irruption of more of the id into human affairs might change from top to bottom a civilization built up on the conscious level. "To the neurotic the disadvantages of the pleasure-principle are made clear," Stärcke says, but "to society the disadvantages of a too exclusive homage to the reality-principle must be brought forward."

After dealing with the Ucs exclusively, a new step in the progress of analytic understanding has been reached to-day, and more and more interest is concentrated on the repressing forces. It seems that the psychoanalyst could watch sympathetically the efforts of those who, in art and in action, have tried to restore depth and dignity to the human life, beyond the stage of "lies and dissimulations." It does not seem that he could ally himself with what he tries to defeat in the individual neurotic, the super-ego morality,—that, having denounced the censor, he can side with the censor.

⁷⁶ Cf. A. Breton, *Légitime Défense*, Paris, 1926.

⁷⁷ A. Stärcke, *Psychoanalysis and Psychiatry*, Int. Jl. Ps., Vol. II, pt. 3-4.

THE BOOK OF THE IT
(DAS BUCH VOM ES) *concluded*

BY

GEORG GRODDECK

(Authorized translation furnished and revised by the Author)

LETTER XVI

It all strikes you as being very complicated? So it does me, but it can't be helped. The Es is always in eruption, and never for a second is there any peace. It bubbles and boils, and casts up now this bit of experience, now that. Just when I should have started this letter to you, I tried to make out what was going on within myself. Although I did not get down to the deepest levels, here is what I found:

In my right hand I hold a pen; with my left I am fondling my watch chain. I am looking at the wall opposite on which is hung a Dutch etching, a reproduction of Rembrandt's "*Circumcision of Jesus*." My feet rest on the floor but my right heel is tapping the rhythm of a march which the Kurhaus orchestra is playing below. Simultaneously I hear the cry of an owl, the horn of a motor car, and the rattle of a tram. I have no definite impression of smell but I feel that my right nostril is a little stuffy. My leg itches near the right shin, and I am conscious that to the right of my upper lip, perhaps a quarter of an inch from the corner of my mouth, there is a round red spot. My mood is uneasy and I have cold fingertips.

Let me begin, my dear, at the end. My fingertips are cold; that makes writing very difficult, and therefore means: "Be careful, or you'll write nonsense." And so with the uneasiness, too. It strengthens the warning to proceed with caution. My Es is of the opinion that I ought to be doing something else. What this is, I do not yet know. Meanwhile I will assume that in conjunction with the vessels of my fingertips and the disquietude of my mood, it expresses the feeling: "Your correspondent will not understand what you are telling her. You would do better to make some methodical preparation." A fig for that! I will take the leap.

That I am playing with my watch chain will provoke a smile from you. You know this habit, and have often teased me about it, with-

out knowing yourself what it meant. It is a masturbation symbol, like the playing with the ring, of which I recently spoke. But the chain has its own peculiar properties. The ring is a woman-symbol, and the watch too, like every machine. The chain, to my idea, is not: rather it symbolizes what comes before the actual sex-act, *i.e.*, before the play with the watch. My left hand betrays to you that I find more joy in the preliminaries to the actual union of man and woman,—in the kisses, the stroking, the undressing, the playing, in the mysteriously exciting pleasure-feeling, in the things that a boy loves; and indeed you've long known that I am a boy, at least on my left side, the love-side, the side that carries the heart. What is to the left is love; what is to the left is forbidden and blamed by grown-ups: it is not to the right, it is wrong. There you have a new motive for the uneasiness that bothers me, for the cold fingertips. The right hand, the hand that produces, the hand of authority, of the right and good, has stopped its serious work of writing, to threaten the left, pleasure-loving child's hand, and from right and left come a wavering and an unrest which disturb the centers of blood-control, and make my fingers chilly. "But leave the child alone," one voice from the Es hushes the unwilling right, which represents my grown-upness, "You see he is playing with the chain, not with the watch." By this it means that the watch represents the heart, as in Löwe's ballad. This voice deems it wrong to play with hearts. In spite of its reassurance I am still ill at ease, and the Es of my right hand at once tells me how objectionable are the doings of my left. "You need only play with a little extra force, and you drag out the watch, let it fall, and a heart is broken."

All sorts of memories flash through my mind in the shape of girls' names, Anna, Marianne, Liese and others. Of the bearers of all these names, once upon a time, I thought that through my playing I had wounded their hearts. But suddenly I grow calm. Since I have gone into the depths of the maidens' souls, I have known that such play was pretty in itself, and only became painful to them because I took the adventure seriously, because I myself had a bad conscience and they divined it. Because the man makes the girl think she must be ashamed, she really is ashamed; not because the thing is evil, no, but because a moral purity is expected from her that she does not possess. Thank God she doesn't. But there is nothing more injurious than being supposed to be nobler than one is.

In spite of this self-defense in the matter of playing with hearts, the fact remains that I do not set the pen into action, and I try to understand why not. There come to me memories, if they can

properly be called so. People with writer's cramp whom I have treated have, without knowing about each other, given me the following explanation as regards writing: "The pen is the male organ, the paper the woman who receives, the ink the semen which flows out in the quick up and down movement of the pen. In other words, writing is a symbolic sex-act. But at the same time it is a symbol for masturbation, for the fantasied sex-act." That this interpretation is correct appears to me to follow from the fact that these patients lost their cramp so soon as they had discovered the associations. May I play with a few ideas on this subject? The German script is more difficult than the Latin for people with writer's cramp, because the up and down strokes are much clearer, more strongly marked, more distinct from each other. A thick penholder is easier to use than a slender one, which more easily symbolizes the finger or the too-weak penis, than does the thick. The pencil has the advantage of avoiding the loss of semen; with the typewriter, although the erotic up and down motion on the keyboard is retained, the hand does not directly grasp the penis. All this accords with what happens in a case of writer's cramp, when the sufferer is led first to abandon his customary pen for a pencil, to adopt the Latin script, then to take to typing and finally to dictating.

So far I have not mentioned the part played by the inkwell, concerning which the symptoms of the disease are so obliging as to give me information. The inkwell with its gaping throat which leads down into black darkness, is a mother symbol; it represents the womb. Suddenly the Oedipus complex appears, the command against incest. And now we get "a certain liveliness" among the little writing demons, who climb up out of the inkwell, the black womb of hell, and warn us of the close relationship between the thought of the mother and the kingdom of evil. You would never believe, dear one, what funny leaps the Es will take when it is so inclined; how it will unite earth and heaven and hell with the urine and the penholder of the sick man, and how finally it makes a poor wretched doctor-brain so crazy that it seriously believes that inkwell, womb and hell are close connections.

There is more to the story. From the pen flows out the ink which fertilizes the paper. When it is covered with writing, I fold it up, put it in an envelope, and send it to the post. You open the letter, I hope with a kindly smile, and then you guess, shaking your head dubiously, that what you are about to read deals with pregnancy and birth. And then you think of the many people who are scolded for writing so little, and you understand why they find it so hard to write. All these people have in their souls the unconscious power of

reading symbols, and all of them suffer under the terror of childbirth. In a happy moment there comes to you the recollection of our mutual friend, Rallot, who used to carry every one of his letters from the house to the letterbox and back again a dozen times before he sent them off, and you will be able to understand how it was I succeeded in freeing him, in half an hour's conversation, from this symptom of his disease, though not from the disease itself. Knowledge is a good thing, and you will become as God, knowing good and evil.

If I were not afraid of tiring you I should now like to venture further on the question of handwriting, and to say one or two things about the letters of the alphabet. I cannot promise you that I shall not take an opportunity to come back to that subject again, but now I prefer to ask you to recall that, as children, we had for an hour at a time to draw a's and o's and u's, and in order to have made that bearable, we must have invested these signs with all sorts of forms and symbols. Try to be a child again, and perhaps you will get all kinds of ideas about the origin of the writing of characters, and you will wonder whether they are any more stupid than those of our learned pundits. With learning alone no one will get on terms with the Es, and, yes, I have little opinion of science!

A few incidents come to my mind which have to do with the masturbation complex. I once had an argument with a good friend of mine—you do not know her, but she is no fool—because she did not want to believe my contention that illnesses were creations of the Es, that they were desired and brought on by the Es. "Nervous conditions, hysteria, I grant you," said she, "but organic diseases too?" "Organic diseases too," I replied, and then before I could bring out my favorite argument, that in the distinction between organic and hysteric the doctors are accusing themselves, are wanting to say, "We know little about the chemical, physical and biological processes in nervous conditions; the only thing we know is that such processes go on but they cannot be detected in our examinations; we therefore use the expression 'nervous' to inform the public of our ignorance, and to get rid of such an unpleasant proof of our incapacity"—before I could say all this, she asked again, "And accidents as well?" "Yes, accidents as well." "I am curious to hear," she then said, "what purpose my Es had in making me break my right arm." "Do you still remember the circumstances of the accident?" "Certainly. I was in Berlin, in the Leipziger Strasse. I wanted to go into the Colonial Products shop, when I slipped and broke my arm." "Do you remember what you may have been looking at, at the time?" "Yes, in front of the shop was a basket of asparagus." Suddenly my antagonist became reflective.

"Perhaps you are right," she said, and then she told me a story which I will not broadcast, but which turned on the similarity of asparagus and the penis, and a wish felt by the victim of the accident. A repressed masturbation-fantasy, no more. The breaking of the arm was a successful attempt to bolster up morality. If one has a broken arm, desire vanishes.

A second incident at first seems far enough removed from the masturbation complex. A woman slips on the smooth frozen street and breaks her right arm. She states that in the moment before slipping she had a vision. Suddenly, right before her eyes, she saw the form of a lady, dressed as she had often seen her for the street, only under her hat was not a living face but a skull. It was not difficult to guess that this vision contained a wish. The lady had once been her most intimate friend, but the friendship turned into bitterest hate, which in the very hour of the accident had received fresh stimulus. The belief that here we had to deal with a self-inflicted punishment for a murder wish was at once confirmed, the patient telling me that once before she had had a similar vision of another woman, who in that very moment had died. There seemed, then, sufficient motive for the broken arm, sufficient even for such a searcher of souls as I. But the sequel taught me better. The fracture healed smoothly, but for three years afterwards, from time to time, pains set in which were attributed to the change in weather, or to overexertion. By degrees there came to light a well-marked masturbation complex, into whose territory the murder fantasies had been drawn, and which was so objectionable to the patient that she preferred to conjure up the vision of murder and so win a certain freedom from her desire to masturbate, without ever letting this become conscious.

And with this I come to a point worth noting. On my watch chain hangs a little skull, the gift of my dear friend. I have often thought that I was done with the masturbation complex, that at least so far as my own person was concerned I was rid of it. Such a little incident as that of to-day, however, when I am hindered in writing by the playing with my watch chain, proves to me how deeply I am still involved in it. Onanism is threatened with death: that is given in its curious derivation from the name connected with an entirely different occurrence, which is remembered only because of the sudden death of the man concerned. The skull on my watch chain warns me, it repeats urgently to me the many warnings of the masturbation-idiot, that one gets ill, goes mad, dies, if one allows this instinct free play.

The anxiety connected with onanism eats deeply into the heart of

man. I have already told you why, because, before the child knows anything at all of the world, before even it can distinguish between man and woman, before it knows the meaning of near and far, while it still grasps at the moon, and thinks its feces are to play with, the threatening mother-hand interrupts that voluptuous playing with its sex-organ.

But there is yet another connection between death and sensual pleasure, more important than the anxiety, and this shows with some impressiveness the symbolizing property of the Es.

For the harmless man who has not yet grown pale with thought, death appears as the flight of the soul out of the body, as a giving up of himself, a separation from the world. Now this dying, this stepping out of the world, this giving up of the "I," occurs at moments during life; it comes when man has let himself go in sexual pleasure, when he becomes senseless, unconscious in ecstasy, when he, as the traditional phrase has it, dies in another. In other words, love and death are alike. You know the Greeks gave Eros the same features as death, but put in the hand of one the uplifted, erect, flaming torch, while the hand of the other is drooping, loose, extinct—a sign that they recognized the symbolic resemblance, the resemblance felt by the Es. And we all know it, even as they. For us, too, the erection is life; the life-expending effusion of semen is the dying into sleep, and the sleeping is death. And according to the direction of our feelings concerning the idea of death in the woman, so there will arise in us a belief in an ascension to a heaven of the blest, or a sinking into the pit of hell, for heaven and hell are derived from man's death during the embrace, from the giving out of his soul to the woman, either in the hope of resurrection in the child after three times three months, or in dread of the everlasting fires of desire.

Love and death are one, of that there is no doubt. But whether anyone has come to actual death by giving himself up, the man to the woman, the woman to the man, I do not know. In the dead level of our own stage of civilization I think this is extremely unlikely. In any case the event is so rare that I can say nothing about it. Perhaps the people whose imagination pictures the coming of death during the embrace are nearest the possibility of this symbolic death, and since there have actually been cases of death at the climax of enjoyment, one might well suppose that in such cases the symbolic love-death was also lived through. The yearning for it expressed in music, poetry and oratory is widespread, and gives us starting points for the tracing of the paths between death and love, cradle and grave, mother and son, cross and resurrection.

Those people come close to this symbolic death who have an attack

of hysterical cramp, which indeed, to all appearances is a masturbation fantasy.

But I have wandered far. It is to be hoped you will read this through, and that you will be patient and let me, next time, return again to my subject. I attach importance to your learning, for once, everything I am conjecturing whilst my writing is delayed.

Affectionately yours,

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XVII

I do not wonder, my dear, at your not sharing my views. I asked you a little while since to read my letters like a traveler's guide book; but I did not want you to attribute to this travelogue any greater value than to that of the Englishman who, after a stay of two hours in Calais, maintained that all Frenchmen were red-haired and freckled, because, as it happened, the waiter who served him was like that. You are amused at my ascribing to the Es a purposefulness which is able to bring about a fall and the breaking of a limb. I arrived at this conjecture—it is no more than that—through finding that it works. For me there are two kinds of opinions, those that one holds for one's own pleasure, luxury-views therefore, and those that one uses as an instrument, working hypotheses. Whether you are right or wrong is a matter of secondary importance to me. I take my stand by the answer Christ gave to Pilate's question, "What is truth?", as it is recorded in one of the Apochryphal Gospels. "Truth is neither in Heaven nor on the earth, neither is it between the heavens and the earth."

In the course of my soul-searchings I have had to occupy myself now and again with giddiness, and in that way I have been led to believe that every attack of dizziness is a warning from the Es: "Take heed or you fall." If you want to enquire into the matter yourself, you must be so good as to bear in mind that there are two sorts of fall, a bodily fall and a moral fall, the nature of which is indicated in the story of the Fall of Man. The Es does not seem to be in a position to distinguish sharply between these two kinds of fall, or as I would rather express it, the one fall makes it at once think of the other. Dizziness therefore always signifies a warning from both sides, is used both in the real and in the symbolic sense. And if the Es believes that a simple giddiness, a false step, a stumble, a knock against a lamp-post, the pain in a corn, or the treading on a sharp stone does not convey a sufficiently sharp admonition, it throws the man to the ground, makes a hole in his thick skull, injures his eye or breaks one of his limbs, the limb with which he wants to sin.

Perhaps it even sends him a disease, gout, for instance; I shall soon return to that.

But first I should like to make clear that it is not I who regard as sinful a murderous thought, a wish to break the marriage-vow, an imagined theft, a masturbation fantasy, but the Es of the person concerned. I am neither priest nor judge, but physician. Good and evil are none of my business, I have not to give a verdict, but merely to state that the Es of this or that person considers this or that to be a sin, judges thus or so. So far as my part goes, I endeavor to obey the edict, "Judge not, that thou mayest not be judged." And I carry the sense of those words so far that I now try to refrain from acting as a judge towards myself, and induce my patients likewise to give up judging themselves. That sounds either very pious or very frivolous according to what one wants to make of it, but fundamentally it is only a technical medical trick. That any harm could come of it I have no fear. If I say to people, and I do say it, "You must become so that in broad daylight you could crouch down in the middle of the street without embarrassment, undo your trousers, and evacuate," then the emphasis is on the word "could." To keep the patient from ever doing it there is the safeguard of the police, of custom, of the anxiety bred in him for centuries before. In this matter I feel quite unperturbed even when you call me Satan, or Destroyer of Morals. In other words, one may go to any amount of trouble to cease judging: one never succeeds. Ever and always the man gives a verdict as to worth, it is part of him like his eyes and his nose, yes, just because he has eyes and a nose he has always to say: That is bad. This he requires because he must worship himself, even the humblest must, even Christ Himself did on the Cross in uttering the words, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?", and in the others, "It is finished." To be pharisaical and always to say, "Oh God, I thank thee I am not as other men" is human. But equally human is the "God be merciful to me, a sinner." Like everything else, man has two sides. Sometimes he shows one, sometimes another, but both are always there. Because man is obliged to believe in free will, and to take merit to himself for certain parts of his nature, therefore must he also find guilt, in himself, in others, in God.

I am now going to tell you a story which you won't believe. But it amuses me, and because a good deal is compressed in it which I have not yet, or have not sufficiently clearly, explained, you are to listen.

Some years ago a lady came to me for treatment who suffered from chronic inflammation of the joints. The first beginnings of the illness lay eighteen years back, during adolescence. At that time the right

leg began to be painful and swell. When I first saw her the joints of her hands, fingers and elbows were almost useless, so that she had to be fed; the thighs could only be slightly moved apart and both legs were perfectly stiff; she could not turn or bend her head, one could not get a finger between her teeth because the joints of the jaw were diseased, and she was unable to raise her arm to the level of her shoulder. In short, as she said, with a turn of wry humor, if the Kaiser came riding by she could not wave to him and call "Hurrah" as she had done as a child. She had been bedridden for two years and had to be fed; altogether, her condition was discouraging. And even if the diagnosis of consumption in the joints, which had for years been made to her, did not turn out to be right, still one had every reason for describing it as arthritis deformans of the worst type. The patient is now able to walk again, she can feed herself, she can dig in her garden, can go upstairs, she bends her legs sufficiently, turns and bends her head in whatever way she wants, can spread out her legs as far as she likes, and if the Kaiser were actually to come she would be able to shout "Hurrah!" In other words, she is cured, if one can call full capacity for action a cure. One surprising thing is that even now she walks in a curious way, with her buttocks pushed out almost as though she wanted them to be smacked. And all those torments she endured because her father was called Friedrich Wilhelm, and because she had been told in a joke that she was not her mother's child but had been found behind a hedge!

This brings me to the subject of what my Freudian friends call the "family romance." You will recall times in your childhood when you took a lively interest in playing or fantasizing that you had been stolen by gypsies from your real parents, who were people of high degree, and that the father and mother with whom you lived were only foster parents. Every child indulges in these or similar fancies. At bottom they are repressed wishes. So long as, from the cradle, we can lord it over the household, we are pleased with our relatives, but when training comes with its legitimate and illegitimate claims to interfere with our favorite habits, we find at times that our parents are quite unworthy to have such a superior child. We want to preserve the illusion of our own importance, in spite of our childish weakness and dependence, so we degrade them to the position of step-parents and witches, while we ourselves appear as the tormented prince. All of that you can read for yourself in the legends and fairy tales, or if you wish to get it with less trouble, you can find it in the valuable books of the Freudian school. And you will also read in them how, to begin with, we all look upon the father as the strongest, best, most highly placed of men, but that gradually we see, as he

looks subdued before this person or that, that he is by no means the absolute master we had thought him. But because we want at all costs to keep to the idea that we are children of great parents—for respect is just as hard to renounce as vanity—we fantasy for ourselves the kidnapping and the substitution, our fairy-tale life. And in order to be able to continue to tell ourselves that, since even the king at last is not sublime enough to satisfy our restless craving for greatness, we decree that we are the children of God, and produce the idea of God the Father.

Such a family romance lived—unknown to herself—in the mind of a patient of whom I want to tell you. Her Es made use of two names for this purpose, that of her father, Friedrich Wilhelm, and her own, Augusta. Finally it had drawn in also the childish theory that a girl is made out of a boy through castration. The train of ideas was as follows: I am the child of Friedrich Wilhelm, at that time Crown Prince, and later Kaiser Friedrich; I am really a boy, the rightful heir to the throne and now by rights the Kaiser, with the name Wilhelm. Immediately after my birth I was stolen away and a witch-child was laid in the royal cradle in my place; he has now grown up and seized the Imperial throne for himself as Wilhelm II, wrongfully and to my hurt. I myself was put behind a hedge and, so that every hope might be lost to me, I was made into a girl by the cutting off of my sex-organ. As the sole sign of my position I was given the name Augusta, the lofty one.

One can date the beginnings of the unconscious fantasies pretty definitely. At latest they must have started in the year 1888, and therefore at a time when the patient was not yet four years old. For this idea of belonging to the Hohenzollern family was grounded on the name Friedrich Wilhelm, which the fantasied father only bore as Crown Prince. The discussion over his being ill with cancer, concerning which the four-year-old would scarcely grasp anything except that the word crab (cancer) linked up with the idea of shears, of cutting, of castration, is of some importance here. It is connected with personal experiences of the cutting of nails and hair, the association of which with the castration complex is strengthened still further by hearing *Strupelpeter* read aloud, and being shown the pictures: there is still to be found in this immortal book the story of Konrad the thumb-sucker, a story which arouses the old yearning for the mother's breast and the painful memories of the weaning, that unavoidable castration by the mother.

I briefly indicate all this, so that you may think it out a little for yourself. For only through your own reflection can you be convinced of this, that just in that age between three and four the ground

is prepared for a fantasy that has so tremendous a result as this in my patient. Give ear only to this: the Es of this woman is convinced, or rather it wishes to convince itself, that it is the Es of a rightful Kaiser. The wearer of a crown looks neither to the right nor to the left, he judges without side glances, he bows his head before no earthly power. "Therefore," the Es commands the body and blood of this person it has bewitched, "carry your head firmly to hold the crown. Close up the jaws so that they cannot shout 'Hurrah.' They did that once, they hailed and acclaimed the usurper, the witch's changeling. Lame the shoulders, so that never again with upraised arm they can do homage to the false Kaiser; your legs must grow stiff, for never should a mighty Kaiser kneel before anyone whatsoever. Press together the thighs, that a man shall never be able to lie between them, for that would mean the success of this most devilish device, if this body, which vulgar hatred and pitiless envy have transformed from a male to a female, were made to bear a child. It would be the frustration of every hope. Hold yourself so that the body is drawn backwards, that no one may find the entrance; be careful to arch the body, force it to stand and walk with the sacrum pressed backwards. There is still no reason to suppose that the secretly stolen proof of manhood may not grow again, that this Kaiser may not actually become a man. Show to this castrated being, O body and blood, that it is possible to make lax members stiff, by making it impossible for the legs to relax, to kneel; teach him to show in the symbol that he is a man."

I can imagine, honored lady, how indignantly you exclaim "What nonsense!" And then you come to the idea that I am really recounting to you the delusions of a lunatic. That you must not think. The patient is as sane as yourself; what I was telling you are some of the ideas—very far from all—which can bring an Es to the point of producing gout, of lamming a person. If what I have said led you to ponder on the onset of mental disease, it would become clear to you that the lunatic, considered without prejudice, is by no means so mad as at first sight he seems to be, that his fixed ideas are such as we all have, and must have, since they are the foundation of human life. But why the Es builds out of such ideas, for one the religion of God the Father, for another, rheumatism, for a third, madness, why in yet another it produces the founding of a kingdom, scepter and crown, for brides the bridal wreath, for us all the striving after perfection, ambition and heroism, these are questions with which in hours of boredom you might occupy yourself.

You must not believe that I found this royal romance in the mind of my patient as smoothly as I have presented it to you. It was torn

into a thousand tatters, which were hidden away in the fingers, the nose, the bowels and the abdomen. We have between us patched them together, and have intentionally left out many, while still more have been stupidly forgotten or never traced. Indeed I must even confess, in conclusion, that I have put aside everything that was not clear—and that was certainly the most essential part. For in the last resort—and you must never again forget what I say now—everything one thinks one knows about the Es is only conditionally right, is only right in that moment that it is expressed by the Es in word, gesture or symptom. Even in the next minute truth has flown away and can no more be found, neither in Heaven, nor on the earth, neither is it between the heavens and the earth.

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XVIII

As an earnest pupil, my dear, you desire to be informed why, instead of continuing to give you my ideas about the play with the watch chain, I tell you stories that have nothing whatever to do with it! I can give you an amusing explanation. Recently, when I began this little bit of self-analysis, I wrote to you: "In my right hand I hold a pen; with my left I am fondling my watch chain," and then I worked it out that both were masturbation-complexes. The next words were: "I am looking at the wall opposite on which is hung a Dutch etching, a reproduction of Rembrandt's '*Circumcision of Jesus*.'" That is quite wrong; the etching reproduces a picture of the *Presentation of Jesus in the Temple*, among a crowd of people. I must have known this, in fact I did know it, for many times have I contemplated this etching with interest. And yet my Es forced me to forget this knowledge and to convert the Presentation into a Circumcision. Why? Because I was entangled in the masturbation-complex, because masturbation is punishable, because it is punished with castration, and because circumcision is a symbolic castration. My unconscious, in reacting from the masturbation idea, grasped the castration idea; on that account it rejected altogether the idea that the Infant Jesus should be presented in the Temple before the eyes of all men; for this baby boy, like every other, is a symbol of the male organ, while the Temple is the symbol of the mother. Had the subject of the etching succeeded in reaching my consciousness, it would, in close association with the penholder and the play with the watch chain, have signified, "You are carrying on the play with your member in front of everybody, and you are showing them that in its final meaning this masturbation play is concerned with the mother-imago, as Rembrandt has symbolized it, in

the form of the Temple in his mysterious chiaroscuro." That was unbearable to the unconscious because of the double prohibition of masturbation and incest, and it preferred at once to put forward the symbolic punishment.

That the rite of circumcision really has some connection with castration I am inclined to believe, since its inception is associated with the name of Abraham. In Abraham's life we read the strange story of the sacrifice of Isaac, how the Lord commanded him to slay his son, how he is willing to obey but at the last moment is prevented by an angel; in Isaac's place a ram is sacrificed. With a little good will, you can see in this story that the sacrifice of the son signifies the cutting off of the penis, which is indeed represented symbolically by the son. In this way the story would mean that instead of the self-castration of God's servant, which has its fulfillment in the Catholic priests' vow of chastity, at some time or other there has been substituted the sacrifice of an animal; the ram is especially appropriate to this solution of the symbol, since at all times castration has been customary in sheep breeding. If one understands it so, the story of the covenant of circumcision between Jehovah and Abraham is only a repetition of the symbolic legend in another form, such a duplication as one frequently meets with elsewhere in the Bible. Circumcision accordingly would be the symbolic remnant of the religious castration. But, however that may be, so far as my own unconscious is concerned—and that is the only thing in question in this conversion of presentation into circumcision—castration and circumcision are very nearly related, indeed identical, for to me, as to so many others, the fact first became clear comparatively late, that a castrated man, a eunuch, is something distinct from a circumcised man.

For the rest, these associations between circumcision and castration have a special significance in the Freudian teaching, and I must advise you to read Freud's book on *Totem and Taboo*. For my part I only want to give you at most a little fantasy from racial psychology, out of which you can make what you like. It seems to me that in times when marriages were still consummated at an early age, the eldest son must have been a pretty unwelcome inhabitant of the father's house; the differences of age were so slight that the first born was in everything the natural rival of his father, and must have been specially dangerous for the mother who was not so much older than himself. Even now, indeed, father and son are natural rivals and enemies, and again in relation to the mother, whom the one possesses as wife and the other desires with his most ardent love.

But at those times when the superiority of the elders was not yet so clearly acknowledged, when instincts and emotions were still more violent and uncontrolled, the father felt a conscious desire to kill the inconvenient son, a thought which has now been long repressed, but which is still operating frequently and markedly in manifold relationships of life and symptoms of disease. For father-love, looked at closely, seems no less curious than mother-love. It would then appear that it was a primitive custom to slay the eldest son, and, because man is an actor and a Pharisee, the crime has been converted into a religious rite, and the son has been offered up as a sacrifice. This had, in addition to the ennoblement of the action, the further advantage that one could eat the sacrifice after the murder, and so might carry out the childish idea of the unconscious, that pregnancy arises from the eating of the penis, the symbolic son. With the gradual repression of the hate instinct other methods were adopted, and with the growing need for labour, simple murder was wasteful. A man then got rid of his rival in love by castrating him; he need fear him no longer, and without trouble he had obtained a slave. If the population grew too dense, then man adopted the means of driving the eldest-born into exile, a procedure which was still recognized in historic times as the *ver sacrum*. And finally, when the needs of agriculture and the foundations of nations through the joining together of tribes required the preservation of all sons for the sake of labor and defense, man symbolized the murder and invented circumcision.

If you now want to close up this circle of fantasy, you must take the son's point of view, who certainly had no less hatred against his father than the father had against his son. The murder-wish against the father is turned the other way round in the castration idea as we meet it in the myth of Zeus and Chronos, and there comes out of that the religious castration of the priest, for as the penis is symbolically the son, so is it actually the begetter, the father, and its castration is the murder of the father in symbolic form.

I fear to tire you, but I must again return to my watch chain. By the side of the skull which is attached to it, hangs also a tiny globe. As my thoughts skip about, it occurs to me that the earth is a symbol of the mother, and that accordingly my playing with this represents symbolic incest. And since the skull is threatening near by, the explanation of my halting pen is that it did not want to be at the disposition of the two sins, onanism and incest.

And now whither lead those sound perceptions of which I wrote to you, the march-music, the owl's cry, the motor and the electric

tram? For the march we get beat and rhythm, and from the word rhythm my thoughts pass on to reflect that every activity is easier if carried on with a rhythmic beat; every child knows that. Perhaps the child can also give the answer as to why this is so. Perhaps beat and rhythm are old acquaintances, inevitable habits of life, from the life in the womb onwards. Probably the unborn child is restricted to a small number of perceptions, and among these the feeling of beat and rhythm takes first place. The child swings within the mother's body, now less, now more, according to the mother's movements, according to her manner of walking and the rapidity of her steps. And without interruption the heart goes on inside the child, beating out, in accent and rhythm, strange melodies to which it listens, perhaps with its ears, certainly with the general sensation of the body, which feels the vibration and stores it up in the unconscious.

I am very much tempted here to give a little consideration to this phenomena, how not only man's conscious deeds are subject to rhythm, his work, his art, his gait and his actions, but also his sleeping and waking, his breathing, his digestion, his growth and decline, yes, everything. It seems that the Es expresses itself in rhythm just as it does in symbol, that it is an absolute property of the Es, or at least that we, in order to be able to contemplate the Es and its life must ascribe rhythmical properties to it. But this leads too far away from my subject, and I would rather direct your attention to the fact that the march brought me to thoughts of pregnancy, a note already sounded in the mention of the globe on my watch chain. For this globe, I scarcely need to say, is certainly indicative of the expectant mother, as one may see from the expression "Mother Earth," and from the roundness of its surface.

And now I understand why I tap the beat with my heel instead of with my toes. The heel stands, for everyone, from childhood on, in an unconscious relationship to child-bearing, for we have all grown up familiar with the story of the Fall of Man. Read it over once again. The surprising thing in it is that after the eating of the apple, Adam and Eve were ashamed of their nakedness. That proves that we have here a symbolic narrative concerning the sin of sexual indulgence. The Garden of Eden in the midst of which "stands" the tree of life and of knowledge—"to know a woman" means to sleep with her—speaks for itself. The snake is a primitive phallus-symbol everywhere repeated: Its bite is poisonous, it impregnates. The fruit picked by Eve, which, by the way, has been significantly represented for hundreds of years as an apple, although the word apple is not given in the Bible, this fruit which is beautiful to

see and good to eat, stands for the breast, the scrotum, the buttocks. If one grasps these associations it is at once clear that the curse, "The woman shall bruise the head of the serpent and the serpent shall bite the woman in the heel," signifies the relaxation, the death of the member through the outpouring of the semen, and the "stork-bite" of our childhood, birth. That I am using my heel to tap out the beat shows how deeply my unconscious is engaged in thoughts of pregnancy. But in thoughts of castration too, at the same time. For in the bruising of the serpent's head are contained both relaxation and castration. A man is made shorter by a head, the member is shorter by a head when its tip slips back into the foreskin after the act of begetting. You can follow this up further, if it gives you any pleasure, in the legends of *David and Goliath*, *Judith and Holofernes*, *Salome and John the Baptist*.

Sexual intercourse is a death, the death in the woman, an idea running through the stories of all time. And Death cries sharp and shrill to my hearing, with the hoot of the owl: "*Komm mit, komm mit.*" ("Come with me.") And then again the masturbation motif is heard in the motor's horn: is not the motor a recognized symbol of masturbation, even if its very invention is not due to the urge to self-gratification? That the electric tram—through the association of friction-electricity and human transport—combines within itself the symbols of masturbation and pregnancy, may be deduced from the fact that women, more sensitive to symbols than men, more closely akin to art, always step wrong in getting out of an electric tram—in order to fall.

And now another aspect of the march problem becomes clear to me. Many years ago I used to hear this rhythm on returning from an officer's funeral. It always gave me an extraordinary pleasure, that soldiers who had just buried a comrade should come back into life with gay music. So it should be everywhere. So soon as the earth lies over the dead, there is no more time for mourning. "Close the ranks."

Do you think me hard? But I think it hard to wish people to be sad for three whole days. Indeed, so far as I have learned to know men, even three days are intolerable. The dead are always right, according to the proverb, but fundamentally they are always wrong. And if one looks into it a little, one discovers that the whole business of mourning is pure dread, the fear of ghosts, on the same ethical plane as the custom of carrying the dead man feet first out of the house: he is not to return. We have the feeling that the spirit of the dead stays near the body. One must weep or one offends the

ghost, and ghosts are revengeful. Once the body lies deep underground, no ghost can come forth any more. For greater assurance a heavy stone shall be rolled on his breast. The phrase about a weight pressing on one's chest proves how convinced even we moderns are, of the continued life of the dead within the grave: how we picture to ourselves the weight of the gravestone on the dead, and transfer that feeling to ourselves, probably as a punishment for the cruel incarceration of our dead relatives. In case a dead man should really rise up, foot-traps in the shape of wreaths are laid on the grave, and these will keep him from escaping.

I do not want to be unjust. The words "rise up" prove that yet another train of thought is revealed in the choice of the three days that elapse before the burial of the corpse. Three days are the period before resurrection, and three times three are nine, the number of pregnancy. And the hope therein, that the soul of the dead man has meantime found the way to heaven, where it is truly far distant, happily placed and out of the way, also has a meaning.

Man does not mourn the dead; that is not true. And if he does mourn in his inmost soul, he does not show it. But even then it is doubtful whether his mourning is for the dead or whether his Es is sad about something else and only takes the fact of the death as a screen in order to rationalize its grief, to find a reason to suit Mrs. Grundy.

You don't believe it? Men are not so wicked? But why do you call it wicked? Did you ever see a little child mourn for the dead? And are little children wicked? My mother once told me that after my grandfather's death—I was then three or four years old—I ran around his coffin, clapping my hands and shouting "There's grandfather inside." My mother did not think me wicked on that account, and I do not think I am entitled to be more moral than she was.

But why, then, do people mourn for a whole year? Partly to vaunt themselves before other people, but more than all, before themselves, in the manner of the Pharisee, to deceive themselves. They vowed to this dead man and to themselves that they would always be faithful, would never forget him. And a few hours after his death we are already forgetting! So it is well to keep ourselves reminded by black clothes, by memorial announcements, by the setting up of effigies, and by wearing the lost one's hair. Mourning makes us seem good to ourselves.

Shall I give you a little hint in private? Two years after the death of husband or wife, look for the grief of the afflicted survivor;

either he (or she) is also dead, that is not uncommon, or the widow is a buxom, happy lady, and the widower has married again.

Do not laugh at that! It has a deep meaning and is really true.

Ever yours,

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XIX

Again you have all kinds of things to which you take exception. That doesn't please me, and I am therefore going to speak plainly. Why do you think it far-fetched that I should compare Eve's apple with the buttocks? That is no invention of mine. The German language invented the simile, and the Italian and English as well.

I will tell you why you are irritated and scold me. The mention of Eve's "popo" reminds you that at times your loved one took you from behind, while you were kneeling or sitting on his lap, and of this you are just as much ashamed as if in your own person you were German science which so prudishly refers to this mode of pleasure as "more ferarum," in the manner of beasts, and does not blush in this way to give a slap to its adherents. For it knows perfectly well that all these young men have loved "more ferarum," or at least that they have wanted to. And it also knows—at least it ought to know—that the masculine weapon of love is three-sided, and the feminine sheath is the same, and that the weapon fits the sheath quite perfectly only when it is thrust in from the back. Do not give ear to the chatter of Pharisees and hypocrites. Love does not exist for the sake of reproduction. Sexual intercourse ought to bring pleasure, and in all marriages, with the most chaste of husbands and the purest of wives, it is practised in every conceivable form, in mutual masturbation, in exhibitionism, in sadistic pain, in seduction and rape, in kissing and sucking the voluptuous parts, in pederasty, in the exchange of rôles, the woman lying above the man, while standing, lying and sitting, and also "more ferarum." Only certain people have not the courage for that and merely dream about it instead. But I have not noticed that these people are any better than the others, who do not conceal their childlike naiveté from their loved ones. There are those who speak of the beast in man, and they understand by "man" what they call noble, but what on closer inspection turns out not to be noble at all; intellect, for instance, or art, or religion, in short everything that they can place for any reason in the brain or the heart, above the waist; and "brutish" they call everything they find in the abdomen, and above

all, what is between the legs, the buttocks and the sexual parts. If I were you I should consider such people very carefully before making friends with them. May I make another ill-tempered remark? We educated Europeans always behave as if we were the only people on earth, as if what we did was right and natural, and what other races, other ages did, was wicked and perverse. But read Ploch's book about woman. There you will find that hundreds of millions of people have different sexual customs, different modes of intercourse from ourselves. However, these are certainly only Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, or even negroes. Or go to Pompeii. There a dwelling house has been excavated—the house of Vettier it is called—in which the common bathroom used by parents and children is adorned with a frieze representing every kind of sexual indulgence, even that of animals. Certainly, these were only Romans and Greeks, but they were almost contemporary with St. Paul and St. John.

All these things have importance. You do not guess what a rôle they play in our daily habits and in disease. Take only that phrase “more ferarum.” No one would have had the idea of the enema if it had not been for this “animal play.” Neither would fever temperature have been tested from the anus. And the childish theory of birth from the bowel which in a thousand forms has entered in the healthy and pathological alike—but I will not speak of that, it would take me too far afield. I would rather give another example. Can you recall in what manner a girl runs? She keeps the top part of her body straight, and kicks her legs backward, while a boy thrusts his thighs far out and bends his body forward as though he wanted it to pierce his quarry. You make great use of the word atavism. What do you think; could not this curious difference in running be atavistic, a heritage from primeval times, when man hunted woman? Or is it the Es that think the sexual attack must come from behind and it is therefore good to kick out? That is difficult to decide. But that brings up other differences that are amusing to note. In building with blocks on the floor the boy kneels, but the girl squats down with knees outspread. The little boy will fall forwards, the little girl backwards. If a man who is seated tries to catch an object falling from the table he closes his knees together, whereas the woman will jerk them apart. In sewing, a man makes big side-way stitches while the woman stitches delicately from below upwards, exactly corresponding to their movements in sex-intercourse, and the child sticks its needle in without any skill, and, in accordance with the childish theory of impregnation through the mouth, from above

downwards. Have you ever observed, by the way, the connection between sewing and the masturbation complex? Think about it. You will find it useful in either case, whether you suppose that sewing recalls symbolically onanism, or whether you believe, as I do, that sewing was derived from onanism. And if you are thinking about dress, devote your attention for a moment to the heart-shaped line of the girl's décolletage, to the rose and the brooch, to the necklace, and the frocks, which are certainly not worn to put obstacles in the way of the love-act, but to accentuate it, to challenge it. Fashion teaches us to recognize the characteristics of those periods of which we should otherwise know nothing. Long ago women wore no drawers, man and woman came to their pleasure without delay. Then it seemed to be more fun to rouse excitement in play, and drawers were designed which only half concealed the secrets and finally, now everyone wears the elegant lace-edged, closed bloomers. The lace is to allure; the closed opening to prolong. Do note also the trouser flap of the man that emphasizes where the horse stands for riding; look at the modes of hairdressing with parting and curls; all are creations of the Es, the Es of fashion, and the Es of the individual being.

To return to the trivial distinctions between men and women. The man bends if he wants to lift anything up, the woman crouches. The man raises and carries with the back muscles, the woman, in symbol of motherhood, with the abdominal group. The man wipes his mouth towards the side, away from him, the woman brings her table napkin from the corners to the middle of the mouth; she wants to receive. The man trumpets like an elephant when he blows his nose, for the nose is a symbol of the member and he is proud of it and will not conceal it; but the woman uses her handkerchief with cautious daintiness; she lacks what the nose stands for. The girl fastens her flower safely with a pin, the man carries it in his buttonhole. The girl carries a nosegay pressed against her breast, the boy holds it hanging loosely from his arm: he shows thereby that the budding maiden has nothing that struggles upward, is not a man. Men and boys spit, showing that they have a flow of semen; girls cry, and the overflowing eyes symbolize their orgasm. Or do you not know that the pupils signify children, that the eye is a symbol of the woman in which one sees oneself again, mirrored in miniature? The eye is the mother, the eyes are testicles, for the testicles also contain the babies, and the ray of passion shining from the eye is a masculine symbol. The man bows, makes himself a servant and says thereby: "The sight of you brings me the utmost pleasure so

that I now relax, but in a few seconds I stand upright again, since the desire for fresh pleasure possesses me." But the lady curtsies, meaning, "Because I see you, all resistance vanishes." The little girl plays with her doll, the boy does not need it: he carries his puppet on his body.

There are so many habits that we never notice, so many that are well worth noticing. What does the man desire when he strokes his moustache? The nose is the symbol of the member, as I have already mentioned, and the dawning moustache draws our attention to the fact that we have before us a sexually mature man who possesses pubic hair; but the mouth is the symbol of the woman, and the stroking of the moustache accordingly signifies, "I should like to play with a woman." The smooth-shaven face accentuates childishness, harmlessness, since the child has not yet grown pubic hair, but at the same time it is to signify potency, since the man, as an upright being, is the phallus and the head symbolizes the hairless tip in erection. Do not forget that when you see bald-headed people, or when your women friends complain of loss of their hair. Either the potency of the man is there represented, or childishness. When a woman sits, she draws down her skirt. "You may see what my feet are like," says this action, "but I do not permit you to see more, for I am modest." If she lies down in the presence of a man she invariably crosses her feet. "I know that you are desiring me," that means, "but I am armed against attack. Only try it." All this has a double meaning, a playing which entices while it recoils, allures, yet forbids, and is the parallel in action of the curious "No, but!" with which the maiden wards off the caressing hand. Or take spectacles; one wants to see better but not to be seen. Here one is sleeping with an open mouth; he is ready for conception. There lies another all huddled up like the fetus. Every old man walks with short steps, he wants to prolong the way which leads to its end in the grave; he sleeps badly, for his hours are numbered, and soon he will have to sleep only too soundly; he gets long sight, he will not see what is close to him, the deadly black of print, or the thread so soon to be cut by the Fates. The woman is afraid she will be ill if she stands for long during her period; the bleeding reminds her that she has nothing that can stand up, that to her the best is lacking. She doesn't dance at such time; it is forbidden to carry out the sex-act even in symbolic form.

Why do I tell you all this? Because I am wanting to escape from a tedious explanation about the apple of Paradise. Still, I shall have to give it to you some time. But no, I can first tell

you a little about fruits. There is the plum; it conceals the kernel, the child, inside, and shows its feminine character in its lightly marked cleft. And here is the raspberry; does it not look like a nipple? Or the strawberry; it grows deep hidden amid the green grass, and you must seek before you can find the sweet secret in the woman's keeping. But beware of the strawberry; the bliss of desire eats ever deeper into man's being, it is ardently longed for and yet fled from as guilt, and then one gets nettlerash, which is a manifold reproduction of the emotion, with its torment of irritation. The cherry? You find it on the breast, the man also carries it on his trunk, for all symbols are bisexual. And now the acorn. That receives scientific recognition (*Eichel* is the technical term in German for the gland of the penis), although it is so closely associated with the pig, that bears so many secrets in itself. Shall I reveal one to you? The reproving mother calls her dirty child a little pig. Do you then wonder if the child makes the mental reply, "If I'm a pig, then you are the sow"? And in fact, however difficult it may sound to you, the sow is one of the commonest mother-symbols. That has a deep significance, for the swine is slaughtered, its belly is slit open and it squeals. And one, perhaps the most frequent, of childish birth theories is that the mother's body is cut open for the child to be taken out, a theory which is based on the existence of a strange line between navel and pubis, and which finds support in the crying of woman in labor. From the association sow-mother an astonishing connection is found with religion, at any rate in Germany, where the butcher hangs the pig up in his windows for show. There is a symbolic association with the Crucifixion. What a caprice of the Es! Pig—Mother—the Christ. Sometimes it is shocking. Like the mother, the father is also made into an animal; he is an ox, obviously. For instead of approaching the child in love, he remains unmoved by his advances, and must therefore be castrated. Finally, I ought not to forget the fig, in every language an emblem of the woman's sex-organ. And with that I return to the legend of Paradise.

What can it mean that the first human couple sewed themselves aprons of fig leaves, and moreover, why should the century-old tradition have made out of this apron a single fig leaf? I cannot read the thoughts of those story tellers of the Bible; about the fig leaf with which bare nature is covered; I can but hazard a guess. There are five divisions in this leaf, and the hand has five fingers. It is conceivable that it was a hand that covered what was not to be seen. But the hand by the pubis? There, where it ought not

to be? It seems to me like a joke of the Es. "Since you are not allowed to live freely in Eros, do as nature teaches you, use the hand."

I know I'm being frivolous, but now I must become serious at last. You know that the projecting larynx of the man is called "Adam's apple." The idea of that would be that with Adam the apple stuck in his throat. But why only with him and not with Eve, who also ate of the fruit? She swallowed the fruit, so that a new fruit might come out of it, the child. Adam, however, can bear no child.

And there we are unexpectedly in the midst of the maze of ideas which children have about pregnancy and birth. You are genuinely of the opinion that a good child believes in the stork, and he thinks so, too. But do not forget that a child believes in Santa Claus and yet at the same time he knows that the presents from Santa Claus were bought by his parents in the shops. The child has considerable capacity for belief and nothing stops him from honoring the stork while knowing that the baby grows in the mother's body. That he knows, he must know, for two or three years ago he was still inside this body. But how did he get in, and how did he come out? Those are questions which have pursued us all, with wavering, but, little by little, with ever increasing urgency. As one of the many answers, we all of us found, since we knew neither the womb nor the vagina in childhood, that the child was born out of the opening which lets out everything in the body, out of the bowel. For that also there are many explanations in children's minds. The majority think that the seed of a child is swallowed, just as milk is sucked from the breast. And out of these reflections, this never ending, exciting self-questioning and self-answering of the child, there grows the wish to suck the member of the loved one, to smell, to kiss, a wish which is doubly compelling because it receives in its fulfillment the mother's breast and the happiness of childhood; from the same source comes also the idea of naming the man's larynx "Adam's apple." And finally, one may even say that the same source accounts for the onset of goiter, which troubles you so much in your small daughter. Believe me, you, as a schoolgirl, had the same thickened neck. A thing of this sort disappears with time. Only with those people whose Es is altogether possessed with the idea of conception through the mouth, and with the horror of carrying a child in the belly, it actually develops into goiter and into Graves' disease.

Thank heaven, I'm finished for today!

PATRIK.

LETTER XX

Certainly, my dear, I promise you to bring the story of the pen-holder and the watch chain to a conclusion today.

I must try to make out why my right nostril felt stuffy. Either my Es wished not to smell something or other, or else it wanted to wash out of the nose a smell I had perceived. The latter is my own particular case. Many people get little impressions of smell: driven by what has become a fanatical frenzy for protection from disease, above all by the dread of tuberculosis, crowds of people have come to the conclusion that the nose is to be regarded primarily as a respiratory organ, since they imagine that it is tempting Providence to breathe through the mouth. For others again the nose is indisputably a phallus symbol, and so with various patients the purpose of the Es in producing results must be understood in various ways. But in my own case, if something goes wrong with my nose, I have to look for what it is I am not to smell, and since it is the right nostril that is stuffy, whatever is objectionable to my sense of smell must be on my right. However, I fail, in spite of any amount of trouble, to find anything with an evil smell on my right. But my long years of wishing to believe in the purpose of the Es have made me cunning, and I have devised all kinds of ready justifications of my theory. So now I say to myself: if there's nothing there that has a bad smell, perhaps there is something which reminds you of a smell in times past. At once I think of an etching by Hans am Ende, which is hanging to my right and represents a coast scene, with reeds and a sailing boat in shallow water. Venice suddenly stands in front of me, although I know that the subject of the etching is taken from the North Sea, and from Venice I go to the lions of St. Mark and thence to a teaspoon I used a few hours before. And at once I think I know what smell I am fleeing from. Many years ago, when I became nephritic after a severe attack of pneumonia, my sense of smell grew so acute that it was intolerable for me to use a spoon, since, in spite of the most careful cleansing, I could still smell what it had been used for, hours or days beforehand. So may it be that I am fleeing from, even now in my thoughts, the illness, the kidney trouble? As a matter of fact, a few hours ago I unriddled the story of a young girl's illness, in which figured an evil-smelling bed chamber. I myself, however, am indifferent to the smell of urine. It cannot be that. But memory takes me back to my school days, to the common urinals inside the school building, the sharp odor of ammonia which is still distinct in my memory. And the thought of this school period still depresses me. I told you

once that I had forgotten almost everything belonging to those days. But I know that during that time—I was all of thirteen or fourteen years old—I was still in the habit of bed-wetting, that I was frightened that my school fellows would make game of me on that account, a thing which can almost never have really occurred, and anyhow never amounted to more than a mild teasing. Thoughts emerge of emotional attachments to one or another of my friends, attachments whose sexual content, though suppressed, nevertheless found expression in fantasy. The moment revives when I learnt to masturbate; then an attack of scarlet fever which led to my first kidney-trouble comes to mind; I remember that Hans am Ende was my chum and that he, too, caught scarlet fever; and behind all this rises the shadowy but ever-brightening Mother-imago. I was a "mother's boy," a petted nestling, and the separation from my mother when I went to school brought real suffering.

Now I'm stuck, but even so I am helped by an experience I gained in my struggle to preserve my theory of the Es: there, where the associations come to a full stop, is the solution of the riddle. With my mother, then. That, I might have been able to think out for myself, since everything that is to my right is associated with my mother. But, however much I think about her, I do not remember ever perceiving any revolting smell in connection with her; on the contrary, I have certainly no smell-perceptions at all associated with her.

I try with the name Hans (Hans am Ende). One of my elder brothers was so called, and he was closely connected with my school life. And suddenly there thrusts itself in front of his, another name, Lina. Lina was my sister, the same of whom I told you when I was speaking of my sadistic inclinations. And there also the smell-impression comes up, though truly not a revolting, but a soothing one, unforgettable. I can remember of that time—we were eleven and twelve years old—only the excitement, but I met this smell once again, and from that I know how overpowering for me is its impression. And alongside that comes a second memory, that Lina shortly afterwards initiated me into the secrets of menstruation. She pretended to me that she was consumptive, showed me the blood, and laughed at me when she saw my horror, explaining to me the meaning of the bleeding.

When I got so far, the stuffiness in my nose disappeared; what I now add, serves only to clear up the associations. And first I have thought what Hans am Ende signifies. All my family have died, my brother Hans last; Hans at the end. With this brother I made my

one and only sailing trip, which links up with the sailing boat at the side of the etching.

Then the darkness clears up which lies over the connection with the mother-complex. My mother had the same name as my sister Lina. Then my astonishment grows that I have no smell memories associated with my mother when they are so strong in connection with my sister, and again I begin all sorts of juggling with ideas.

If two dogs meet each other, one begins snuffing at the hinder parts of the other; obviously they discover with the nose whether they are sympathetic to each other or not. Whoever has a sense of humor laughs at this doggy habit, as you do, but people who have not, think it disgusting. But does your humor hold, when I maintain that human beings do the same? You will know from your own experience that a man who smells horrid, whatever may be his good qualities, will be regarded as fundamentally unsympathetic; only it should on no account be forgotten that what is an evil smell to one person, is attar of roses to another. As a keenly observant mother, you will also have noticed that the child judges objects and people by their smell. Science, it is true, behaves as though mouth and tongue were used as the touchstones of what is pleasant and unpleasant, but science upholds many things, and we need not worry ourselves about it. I maintain that man uses his nose more intensively, and, if you like, more disgustingly than the dog, to find out what pleases him and what does not.

First there is the smell of the woman's body and of the blood flowing out from it, one of the first perceptions which man has. I mentioned that before, in making clear the significance of the monthly period. Then follows a time when the little citizen's nose busies itself with the smell of his own urine and feces, changing at times to the scent of his mother's milk and of her axillary hair, while the penetrating and unforgettable smell of the lying-in bed lasts on and has its influence upon him. During the time after his birth the mother renews her own memories of the infancy which gives her the opportunity of transferring her self-love to the baby. The long-forgotten enjoyment of the smell of the baby's wrappings revives. At the same time she breathes in the odors that come from the little one's hair and from its whole body. And that goes on for some time, for the child is small and the mother big, so that every time she has to do with him she first sees and smells his hair, a fact of some importance since around the organs of love is just such another growth of hair. But for the child, the field of operation is changing. In the first years it is the feet and legs that he smells, for the child

is short and grown-ups are tall. Keep it in mind, dear, that the child first learns to recognize and love people's legs. It is significant, it explains a great deal, and it is never remarked. Then come years, long years, and if you were to count up every fleeting moment that dogs are smelling each other, you would still be far short of the period of years in which the child must be almost uninterruptedly smelling what is in front of it, that is, people's stomachs and round about. And that gives him great pleasure. And it is even discovered to be appealing, for what emotional writer forgets to mention the boy—or the man—who buries his face in his mother's—or his sweetheart's lap? Which, disrobed of its romance, says in effect: he puts his nose between her legs. That sounds crude, but it explains the beginnings of childish love and of love for woman. Nature has marvelous paths of bringing men to the arms of women, and this is one that everybody treads.

What has that to do, you will ask, with the fact that I retain no smell-memories of my mother? That is quite simple. If the child is indeed compelled by the force of circumstances for years to go on smelling all the mother's abdominal activities, it must necessarily perceive the remarkable difference of smell which recurs every fourth week. It must share in the emotional disturbances of the mother during the time of the period. The fervent atmosphere affects him too, and heightens his incest wish. All sorts of inner conflicts arise from these exciting experiences, all sorts of vaguely felt, but deeply painful disappointments are associated with them, and are strengthened by the grief caused by the mother's caprice, ill humor, or migraine. Is it any wonder that I chose to take refuge by repressing?

Is what I am saying obvious to you? But think then, there are people who maintain that they knew nothing about the period until they were grown up. If I am not mistaken, many people say so, or indeed all people. Where, then, did everyone leave his nose? And what is happening to man's memory, when he forgets such experiences, must forget them? One is surprised that man has so weak a sense of smell, but how it might develop if he did not stop up his nose with all the might of his unconscious! He is compelled to do that through the command of the grown-ups that he shall know nothing of sexual matters, and through the prudish modesty of the mother who is embarrassed if the child is inquisitive, for nothing gives one a greater sense of shame than to see that a loved person is ashamed of something one speaks of oneself with embarrassment. It does not need words for a child to be intimidated; involuntary movements, slight, hardly noticeable gestures and embarrassments

have sometimes a much more serious effect. But how shall a mother avoid this appearance of embarrassment? It is the mother's lot to wound her own child in its deepest feelings, it is her destiny. And no amount of good will or forethought can alter it, not even in the very slightest degree. Alas, dear, there is so much tragedy in life awaiting the poet who will be able to express it. And perhaps this poet will never come.

One forgets what is hard to bear, and what we don't forget was not unbearable for us. That is a statement on whose content you should ponder, for it upsets a great deal of what is current opinion. We forget that we once sat in the mother's body, for it is terrible to think that we were driven out of Paradise, but also terrible to think we were once in the darkness of a grave; we forget how we came into the world, for the dread of suffocation was intolerable. We forget that we once learned to walk, for the moment when the mother's hand let go of ours was horrible, and the blessedness of this first independent achievement so overwhelming that we cannot preserve it in our memory. How should we bear to know that for years we dirtied our baby napkins and drawers? Just think how ashamed you are if you find a tiny brown spot on your linen, and think of the horror that descends upon you if in the street you cannot keep back what belongs to the closet. And what should we do with the memory that there were people so terribly strong that they could throw us up in the air, who scolded us, without our being allowed to reply, who smacked us and put us in the corner, we who are town councillors, or doctors, or even Fourth Form men. We could not bear it that this being whom we call "Mother" once denied us her breast, this person who claims to love us; who taught us to masturbate and then punishes us for it. And alas, we should weep ourselves to death if we remembered that once there was a mother who tended us and sympathized with us, and that now we are lonely and have no mother. And through our own fault!

That we forget our acquaintance with menstruation—of which we must have learned through the smell-perceptions of early childhood, if not through the sight of the blood, the towels, the bed-chamber, the little discords, the migraine, the doctor's treatment, that we completely forget this knowledge is not more wonderful than that we also lose all recollection of masturbation, the masturbation of our first years. And at last one ground is common to both these gaps in our memory,—the dread of castration. You remember that I held our castration-anxiety to be associated with a sense of guilt, arising out of masturbation and its prohibition. But the thought that the

member can be cut off springs from the ideas of earlier years concerning differences of sex, because as children we take the vulva for a wound: the woman is a castrated man. This idea grows to certainty through the perception of the bleedings, which we smell. These frighten us because they arouse the fear that we ourselves can be made into women. In order not to be reminded of these bleedings, we must destroy our sense of smell and get rid of the memory of that smell of blood. That we cannot do, we can only repress. And life uses this repression and builds upon it the prohibition of sex intercourse during the period. Since the bleeding woman arouses the repressed castration-complex, we avoid fresh contact with her.

Here a second repressed complex comes into play which is similarly bound up with the sense of smell, the birth-and-pregnancy complex. Do you remember me once asking you whether you had never noticed anything of your mother's periods of pregnancy and of her accouchements? You had just been visiting your sister-in-law Elizabeth to pay your respects to the new baby, and the characteristic smell of the lying-in bed still clung to you. "No," you answered, "never." You were even surprised at the arrival of your youngest brother, although, at fifteen years of age you had long been enlightened on such matters. How is it possible that a child should not see that its mother is growing fatter? How is it possible for a child to believe in the stork?

Both things are impossible. Children know that they come out of the mother's body, but they are forced, both by themselves and by grown-ups, to believe in the fable of the stork. Children see that the mother grows fatter, that she suddenly has body-pains, brings a child in the world, bleeds, and, when she gets up, is thinner again. Children know whenever the mother is pregnant, and the birth never takes them by surprise. But all this knowledge and all these perceptions are repressed.

If you reflect what force must be employed in pushing aside all these impressions and the conclusions drawn from them, you will have a little insight, perhaps, as to what I mean by insisting that repression is the chief business of life. For what I am saying here in connection with the particular case of pregnancy and birth, is happening every minute of our lives with other complexes. You cannot go into a room without setting the mechanism of repression in motion, without dismissing from your consciousness this or that perception of the furniture, of its colour, design and ornament. You cannot read a book, or see a face, or listen to someone speaking without

continually repressing, without pushing away memories, fantasies, symbols, affects, hatred, love, contempt, shame and emotion. And now, dear, think; what is repressed is not destroyed, it stays there, only it is pushed into a corner, out of which one day it comes of itself, or perhaps is only dragged out of its position, no longer glittering red in the sunshine but seeming to be black. Repression works its changes unendingly in these phenomena; what is now for the eye a picture by Rembrandt, is repressed and reappears the same moment as a play with the watch chain, as the spot by the mouth, as a treatise on castration, as the foundation of a state, a declaration of love, anger, fatigue, sudden hunger, embraces or a blot of ink. Repression is transformation; it builds up civilization and destroys, it composes the Bible and the legend of the stork. And looking into the secret of repression so bewilders the brain that one has to close one's eyes and forget that there is such a thing as repression.

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XXI

You blame me, my dear, for not keeping my promise, since I still am not finished with my watch chain story. I should never have thought that you were stupid enough to believe in my promises!

Far more just is your reproach that I digress and fail to carry to a conclusion what I have started to say. I was speaking about the repression of smell-sensations connected with a birth, and neither proceeded to point out that the penetrating smell of the lying-in bed, even if everything else is carefully hidden, must be perceived by the child, so that he inevitably gathers experiences of birth by means of his nose, nor did I make it sufficiently clear why the perception of this smell is banished from the conscious mind.

Why is this so? First, because the mother, the parents, and grown-ups generally, forbid the child to understand things of this nature; perhaps they do not forbid it expressly with words, but there it is in the tone of the words, in the expression of the voice, or in a curious, and, to the child, a surprising embarrassment. For it is the predestined fate of man to be ashamed of having been, in human fashion, begotten and born. He feels his vanity threatened by the fact, his divinity. He would like so much to have been divinely begotten, to be God, because he was almighty when he was in his mother's body; he establishes the religious cult of the Heavenly Child, he invents a Heavenly Father, and exalts his incest-repression until he has found consolation in believing in the Virgin Mary and the Immaculate Conception, or in some branch of science. He contemptuously calls begetting and conception animal acts, so that he can say, "I am not an animal, I have not the form of an animal;

I am accordingly a child of God and divinely begotten." Since he does not succeed in believing this, he surrounds these processes with a hypocritical pretense of mystery, in doing which, like Judas, he must betray love. Yes, he has gone so far that he is not in the least ashamed to bespatter the moment of human union with evil-sounding lies, as if this moment were not heaven. Man would like to be anything else but mere man.

The second reason why we repress the smell-complex connected with birth, and so deny a gift peculiarly human, our nose—for, first and last, it is the nose which distinguishes us from the animals—the second reason is that we cannot bear the thought of having a mother. Oh, pray understand: if she pleases us, so long as she is what we want her to be, we gladly acknowledge her as our mother. But so soon as we are reminded that she has borne us, then we hate her. We do not want to know that she has suffered for us, it is unbearable to know that. Or did you never see the distress, the torment, of your children when you were sad, or when you even wept? Certainly, it is a fact known to me that my mother bore me; I speak of it as if it were the most natural thing in the world. But my heart does not acknowledge it, it cries out against it and says no! At times it weighs upon our breast like a stone. That is the unconscious memory of the struggle for breath during birth, say our know-all analysts. "No," whispers the defiant soul, "it is your sin against the mother who bore you, the mortal sins of ingratitude, of incest, of bloodshed, of murder. Did you do the things you ought to have done that all might be well with you, and your days be long upon the earth? This hand caressed me, gave me meat and drink, and at times I have hated it, have often hated it, because it guided me; this skin warmed me, and I hated it because I was too weak to renounce willingly its warmth and its alluring softness, and because of that, against my better knowledge, I imputed to my mother all kinds of wrinkled ugliness in order to escape temptation, I, Judas! This mouth smiled upon me and spoke, and I often hated it because it scolded me; these eyes smiled upon me and I have hated them; these breasts nourished me, and I have bitten them with my teeth; in this body I dwelt, and I have torn it. Matricide! You know it, you feel it as I do. There has never been a human being who would not have murdered his mother, and it is because of that, that we do not acknowledge that our mother bore us. The blood we shed cries to heaven, and we flee from it, from the fumes of the blood."

A third reason comes to me, why we struggle away from the memories of birth and prefer to destroy our most distinctive sense, the sense of smell; that is the dread of castration. I know that bores

you, but what am I to do about it? Since you want to learn what I think, I must repeat. For the castration idea runs through our lives like the sounds of speech. Just as the "a" and the "b" are always coming over and over again in speaking, so is this complex of being made into a woman continually coming up in us. And if you put "a" and "b" together you have "ab" (cut off), and I hope you laugh as I do over the joke in the associations of the unconscious.

But it is time to make a few final remarks on the birth theories of children, or we shall never get out of this tangle. I told you before that the child knows that one lives in the body of the mother before coming into the world; yes, the younger he is, the better he knows that. And so it should not be forgotten that the Bible reminds us with, among other things, the words, "The babe leaped in her womb." Sometimes the place in which the unborn sits is quite clearly localized at the pit of the heart, that is, in the stomach. And that tallies well with our phrase, that the woman carries the child under her heart. Take an opportunity to tell that to your doctor; it may be useful to him, especially in treating stomach troubles, from sickness to cancer; and for you, too, it will be useful, that you may get to know your doctor. If he shrugs his shoulders and goes off, get another doctor, for yours is out of date, however able he may be. I know nothing is more unpleasant for you than to be behind the times. Among other ideas there occurs to me the one that pregnancy can take place in the heart itself. I told you of a case where this belief led to illness and retained its power up to the time of the analysis. People who believed in this sort of thing in childhood are the worse for it. For with this absurd idea, which is derived from such words of love as "I bear you in my heart," or "you are the child of my heart," is bound up the dark and dreadful consciousness that one has in truth torn the mother's heart. And that, too, should your doctor know, for his heart cases. To reveal the whole foolishness of the child I will add what I know from eye patients, that the idea of eye pregnancies exists. Think of the word "pupil" only—the mother calls the child the apple of her eye. Or has the phrase "apple of the eye" arisen because the theory is general, and has established itself in the language? I know not.

Enough, the leading idea in any case is that of pregnancy in the stomach. And if I omit reference to the fantasies about the bursting or cutting open of the body, and about birth through the navel or in vomiting, there remains over and above for the child, the view that babies come to light through the anus. I told you this before, but you must stamp it well on your memory, for to this are due all cases of constipation, and thence arise as well all parsimonious traits, and

therefore barter and exchange and ideas of property, and thence, as a good wind-up, all neatness and orderliness—and many a thing besides. You must not laugh, dear, when I speak thus. It sounds monstrous even to me, as soon as I say it aloud. And yet it is true. The Es doesn't bother itself the least little bit about our esthetics, our intellect, our thoughts. It thinks in its own way, independently, makes game with ideas so that all reasoning becomes foolish. "For me," it says, "a child is the same as the sausage, which you men produce, and the same as the gold which you possess. Yes, and something I was nearly forgetting; a child is also the same for me as the little tail that distinguishes the boy from the girl, which I have brought from the back to the front to suit my own fancy. At the back I let it fall out once in every twenty-four hours; I castrate it. At the front I leave it with those whom I recognize as men; from the others I take it away, I force them to rub it off, cut it off, tear it out. For I need maidens too."

This I have told you many times before. So much the better for remembering. Now we will see what the child thinks about conception.

But first we must get it clear how it is that he finds time and opportunity for thinking over things. The outside world offers so much that interests a child's brain that already some impulsion to quietude must be in operation, if all impressions are to be worked over. And there I should certainly remind you of that little throne from which the household is ruled, as soon as its walls enclose a child. I have long wondered why no sage has yet given his learned attention to the significance of the bed-chamber, and it is doubly surprising since Busch has recorded it in classic verse:

*Der Mensch in seinem dunkeln Drang
Erfindet das Appartement.*

His dark mysterious urge, that would not be prevented,
Has forced man on, and so the closet was invented.

Seriously, you cannot overestimate the importance of this vessel, which adapts itself throughout life to physical requirements, and through the voluntary prolongation of the business serves the desire for meditative solitude. And first of all, there is the daily ritual of the infant.

I cannot tell you how often, either of my own wish, or because I was obliged for some reason to stay, I have seen families, stern father, decent mother, pleasant children, watching the baby's delivery, in dumb devotion, broken only by one or the other giving at times an encouraging grunt. And if I am not mistaken, it was

your little Margaret who knew how to arrange things so that she had to use the chamber every time visitors were in the house. How cleverly she understood how to win the attention of everyone present by a quiet but firm refusal to finish her task! And then at the end, with a graceful lift of her nightdress, she would show her hidden treasures, in doing which she did not fail, as a final item in her performance, to call attention to her bottom by its pleasing exhibition.

Such a procedure is common, is the rule, with children. And because we invent learned names for things we are unwilling, for reasons of propriety, to recognize as part of the Universal Good, in order that we can treat them as morbid desires, from which we ourselves, while full of pity, are far removed, we call this urge to display our sexual secrets, exhibitionism. I've nothing to say against that, but now medicine, the law, the church, and unfortunately also that chaste prostitute, society, have decided that there must be people who are "exhibitionists," that is, people in whom the desire to exhibit their sexual organs has been exalted into a disease. You must let me quarrel with that. The truth is that the exhibitionist is in the same class as all those other people labeled with the final "ist," with the sadist, the masochist, the fetichist. They are in essence the same as ourselves, who call ourselves healthy; the sole difference is that we allow our desire to play only where custom permits, while the "ist" is out of date.

Some years ago a man went from house to house at about six o'clock in the morning, would ring the bell and when the maid opened the door would throw back his long military cloak, which was his only garment, and present to the horrified girl his erect member, to which for its better showing, he had tied a lantern. That we called morbid, that we named exhibitionism. But why do we not give the same name to evening dress, which seems to reveal a good deal, or to dancing which is quite certainly a representation of sex intercourse, or at any rate of erotic behavior? Certainly there are fanatical and pharisaic hypocrites who maintain that people dance merely for the sake of the exercise. I might answer this one-sided, exaggerated defense of morality with an equally one-sided, exaggerated attack on morality, and say: "Exercise itself, whether it be walking, fencing or dancing, is for the sake of its erotic quality." To-day, unfortunately, people wear full trousers, but a few decades ago one could not wear them tight enough, with the result that the shape of the masculine organ could be distinguished even at a distance, while at the time of the Reformation the soldiers had the shape of the scrotum marked fairly big outside their armor, and to this they sewed a wooden stick, the tip of which was covered with a red cloth. And

to-day? The walking stick and the cigarette speak clearly. Notice how a beginner starts to smoke, how quickly he puts his cigarette into his mouth and out again. Watch a lady getting into a carriage and then talk about the disease of exhibitionism. Women crochet, that is exhibitionism; men ride, that is also; the girl puts her arm into her lover's, that is exhibitionism; the bride wears wreath and veil, it is an exhibitionist symbol of the approaching bridal night.

You will have noticed how closely related are the impulses of exhibitionism and symbolism for me, for I feel justified in calling crochet exhibitionistic in character, since the needle, the member, is put into the stitch, the hole; riding has the same significance for the identification of horse and woman is deeply planted in the unconscious of all thought; and it is hardly necessary for me to say that the bridal wreath stands for the vagina, the bridal veil for the hymen.

The purpose of this digression into exhibitionism is probably clear to you. I wished to convey by it that there is no essential difference between sick and healthy, that it depends on the choice of every doctor, and every sick man, what he will call diseased. That is for the doctor a necessary view. Otherwise he gets lost in the impassable tracks of the desire to heal, and that is a fatal mistake, for in the last resort it is the Es which heals, the doctor merely gives treatment. We can discuss that at some other time. To-day something else is on my mind.

There is a sort of counterpart to exhibitionism, that is, voyeurism. One understands by that, it seems, the impulse to catch a glimpse of sexual objects of one kind or another. And this impulse has been raised in the case of the so-called voyeurs, to the dignity of a disease. That is, as I said, a matter of taste. I have not much use for people who ignore the erotic side of life, and I do not believe in the sincerity of the boarding school mistress who saved herself from the sight of the boys' swimming bath by means of her open sunshade. It is certain that these two impulses, to show and to see, play a great part in human life, and have an influence upon what is human, as well as upon what is all-too-human.

Suppose these two impulses, which are so perverse, were absent from the life of humanity, what would happen then? Where would be the drama, with its theater and up-drawn curtain, where the church with its festivals, the garden with its flowers, and the house with its treasure of furnishings and pictures? Believe me, there are times when I do not know whether I ought to laugh or cry. And when I am in this state, my eyes get keener, and I gradually compose myself with the reflection that these things provide me with interest, and with material for my discussions with you.

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XXII

Thanks, my dear, this time you have arrived quickly at the heart of the matter. The story of little Else coming in her nightdress into the drawing room to say good night and, on being reproved by her mother with "Shame on you, Else. When visitors are here you oughtn't to come into the room in your nightdress," immediately lifting up this last little garment, in order to bring shame on herself, fits well into our little collection; and Ernst, who cut a hole in his sister's little frock, so that he should always be able to see how a "she" looked down below, is an excellent parallel to the stage custom of making a spy hole in the drop curtain. Perhaps this will help you to understand why I brought the stage into connection with exhibitionism and voyeurism. The "act" is truly an act, a symbolic sex-act.

There you have also at the same time my answer to your contentious point about the multiple perversion of the child. I stand by my opinion, that this multiple perversion of the child is common property of human beings at all ages, and in that I will not allow myself to be in the least confused by what you say. Both perversions, exhibitionism and voyeurism, are certainly to be found in every child, of that there is no doubt. And I am not in the least mistaken as to the significance of the fact, that, up to three years of age, children show a special preference for such perversions. I shall return to that, for I must certainly tell you in my most moving language about the way in which Nature uses those first three years that can never be remembered, in order to make the child a servant and an artist of love. But what is right to the child is approved also by the grown-up. It cannot be denied that the lover likes to see his mistress naked, and that she is not unwilling to be seen, yes, that it is even an unmistakable sign of disease if she be unwilling. And I do not need to tell you that in this the little chamber plays no small rôle. But isn't it funny that the sages, the judges, the ladies, in the serious business of the day, completely forget what they have done by night? And even with a doctor, who prides himself on being free from prejudice, this holds good. The dictum, "Whatever you blame, that you have done yourself," is absolutely true, true in the very smallest detail. We humans always act on the principle of the man who has stolen something, and then is the first and loudest to cry, "Stop thief!"

Furthermore, the perversion is not limited to the sense of sight. It sounds mad if I talk about exhibitionism of hearing and smell, of voyeurism of taste and feeling, but it means something definite and actual. It is not only the boy who passes water with audible force,

in order to prove his manhood; the grown-up will do it, too, in his game of love. The curiosity, or the rage, amounting to disease, with which people will listen to the love whispers and moans of a honeymoon couple in the adjoining room of a hotel; the splashing when washing, or the characteristic slam of the door of the bedside cupboard, and the rustle of urination, you will know from your own experience. Mothers realize it, too, when they use their special whispering words "Wsh, wsh," that the child may ejaculate his urine, and we doctors all use the trick of turning on the water-tap when we see that a patient is ashamed to use the chamber in our presence. And what a part is played in life by the letting out of wind! You are not the only one, my dear, to give a pleased smile in reading this sentence, at the memory of some amusing explosion. Truly, I am convinced that if you give this letter to your friend Katinka to read, she would utter an affected "Fie!" and be willing to read further, and that Councillor Heavyliver, since he has long ago buried his sense of humor in the dirty folds of his scandal-loving mouth, would censoriously denounce the word "swine." But anger proves, just as laughter does, that the emotional response is there, that the hearing-exhibitionist has met the hearing voyeur.

Beginning with fecal gas one may without trouble find plenty of examples in the zone of the sense of smell. I leave you to think out for yourself the repulsive and the attractive smells which are given out by man himself, or which he attaches to himself, and will merely add a few observations on this subject. First, as may be deduced from the foregoing, the production or perception of smells by no means always bears the character of a sexual challenge. Here, too, the law of contraries is valid. In certain conditions the smell is produced to express hatred, contempt, aversion. You will admit that an evil smell given by the Es to the mouth, to hands, to feet, to sexual parts, arouses more emotional response than a pleasant smell. I may remind you, to make clear this curious freak of the Es, of a friend of ours called Anne. You know that she has wonderful hair, perhaps the most beautiful that I have ever seen. But I distinctly see you make a wry face. This lovely hair stinks like the plague. Or rather it used to, for now the most fastidious nose would find not the slightest ground for complaint in the scent of this hair. Anne has easily and quickly lost this fatal combination of the ugly and the beautiful, since she became aware that her Es was particularly sensual, and had on that account created this beautiful hair, just as the most sensual of sensualists, the consumptives, do with their hair and eyes and teeth. On top of this Es, life placed a second moralistic,

anxious Es, which created the smell in order to mar the seductive beauty with its repulsiveness.

One more remark on this point. You always maintain that people smell who don't wash. I have often heard you try to impress this view on your boy, who at ten years is suitably shy of water, and you drive your words home by means of a thorough examination of hands, ears and neck. May I ask you how often you wash your hair? And I can assure you it smells like new-mown hay. The Es does not trouble itself at all with the foolish views of men. It stinks if it wants to, and it changes the evil into a good smell, if it so pleases. Now and then I am inclined to believe that people wash, not because they have a horror of dirt, but because, like Pilate at the Judgment Seat, they want to assume a spotlessness which is by no means theirs. The little boy's protest, "I'm not such a pig as to need washing every day" is not at all so stupid. It is the same with the horror of dirt as with the horror of "Aa" and "Wee-wee." People wipe themselves very carefully, wash themselves whenever possible after every evacuation, whether solid or liquid, and never reflect that inside the body man carries these supposedly dirty substances around with him all the time. O thou wandering closet that callest thyself man, the more horror and disgust thou showest at feces and urine, the more clearly dost thou prove thy pleasure in these things, and the more thou wasthest, the better I know thou dost believe thine own soul to be filthy. But why swallow thy spittle, if spittle is disgusting?

I won't torment you any longer with paradoxes, but will rather bring to your notice a curious type of exhibitionism, exhibitionism to oneself. You think of the mirror, and then of narcissism—for Narcissus invented the mirror—and masturbation—the mirror is a masturbation symbol, and if you have the same sort of juggler's brain as I have, you will reflect that people even make grimaces in front of a mirror, so an act of exhibitionism can be double-sided, can be both alluring and ugly.

But I was speaking of the closet and of smell, and if you will, please name any one of your friends who does not look at her evacuations in the closet—for consideration of health, be it understood. I don't suppose any one of them holds her nose while doing that, and possibly there are some among them who, at night, in bed, when hot air has been emitted, creep under the coverlet to make sure what sort of gas it is that has been produced; perhaps when the paper supplied is not very thick, one or another will sniff at her fingers. And certainly, believe me, there are refined people who bore in their

noses when they are alone, for a hole will not rest until something is stuck in it, and the nostrils are no exception.

What could I not tell you of those acts of exhibitionism in gestures, in the voice, in personal habits! "Seek and ye shall find," it says in the Bible. But it also says, "They have eyes and see not; ears have they, but they hear not."

The associations of the sense of taste with unconscious erotism are difficult to bring to consciousness. It will be easiest to follow up the associations of children's comforters with the act of sucking. If one goes out from this starting point, with a little trouble one often finds lovers' habits which can be classified under the heading of taste. Thus the sucking of the other one's finger is an action which can be frequently observed. But the secrecy of such caresses tells clearly how greatly they are prized. One may be ever so modest, yet the sucking of the skin, the breast, the lips, the neck, will accompany the love-act, and the tongue for everyone, and not merely in the wonderfully changing expression of the word "love," is a voluptuous organ. But above all, it seems to me, the exposing of the breast is a challenge to taste, associated, it is true, with touch and sight, in the way all these sense functions are associated. And that leads me to point out a genuine act of exhibitionism on the part of the Es, the erection of the nipples, which happens to the most chaste of maidens quite independently of any will of hers, and at an agreeably gentle tickling smiles at the clever folk and at you, my dear, who brand as a perversion, an unnatural desire, what nature herself does. For the time I will leave it to you to make conclusions about the man's erection from what you know of the nipples, but later, however strictly forbidden the subject, I must come back to it.

One thing, however, I have still to mention, in the sphere of taste-erotism, and that is people's favorite foods. The preference for sweet, sour, bitter, fat, salty, for this food or that beverage, the offering, the pressing, the manner of eating, and the composition of the menu, show desires of curious kinds. Keep that in mind, and—do not forget this—it is just the same whether anyone is fond of roast pork, or whether it makes him sick.

Shall I now add some observations on the sense of feeling? You can fit these together yourself, can think them over and try them out for yourself. The offering of the hand, or of the lips, to another, the insinuating knee, and the foot-touching under the table. But there are other things more difficult to understand. Certainly the erotic purpose of a stroking hand is quickly felt and quickly interpreted, but how does the matter stand with a cold hand? "Cold

hands, warm heart," says the proverb, and proverbs seldom err. "See, I am cold," says such a hand, "warm me, I need love." The Es lurks concealed behind, cunning as ever. "The man pleases me," it thinks, "but perhaps I do not please him, we shall see. If my cold hand does not frighten him away, if he takes loving hold of this wretched thing I offer him, then all is well. And if he stays remote, cold as my hand, then still he may be loving me, and only be frightened by the coldness." And then, too, for the Es is subtler than you think, it will make the hand damp, and so will it really be the "touchstone" of love; for to want to hold a damp, cold hand, one must indeed value the owner. This exhibitionist hand says openly and frankly, "See, even in the coldness the love-fluid is flowing out of me, so ardent is my emotion. What floods of love will I pour over you, when you bring me warmth!"

You see, dearest, I am already in the deep levels of unconscious erotism, in the interpretation of the physiological processes, and there I should like to linger for a moment. For to me, as a physician, the unconscious exhibition of sexuality offers more of interest than instinct working simply in the conscious mind.

I find a convenient example in skin-processes, which have given me considerable trouble. You know that, as a pupil of Schweninger's, I am still sought out now and then by patients with skin trouble, and among them there are always some who suffer from chronic, irritating eruptions. In earlier days I took no particular notice when I heard them say, at some point or other, in describing their symptoms, that they had a sensitive skin. But now I know that their eczema ceaselessly repeats the same assurance, only that it speaks more clearly, and also describes the type of sensitiveness. It says—at least I think I hear it, and the results seem to bear me out—"See how my skin longs to be gently tickled. There is such wonderful charm in soft stroking, and no one strokes me. But understand me, help me! How should I better express my desires than through the scratching I force upon myself?" That is pure exhibitionism in the realm of feeling.

We have talked long enough, and the baby whom we left sitting on his little throne in solemn meditation, has meantime finished his business. I wanted to tell you what he was thinking of during this time, but have not done so because it isn't certain whether he was occupying himself just at this moment with thoughts about conception. I will make up for that later. But there is one thing more I must say before taking leave of you: the chamber—or the closet, it is the same—is an important bit of furniture, and there are many,

many people who occupy three quarters of their lives with it; not that they are literally sitting there, but they wake up in the morning with the thought, "Shall I have a movement today?" And a few hours after this mighty deed is done, they start again to think—and even to talk about it, generally at lunch—"Shall I have a movement tomorrow?" It really is a funny world!

Only think now: the little child likes to accompany father or mother, and to watch their doings in this quiet place. When it is bigger it seeks other children, that it may pursue its investigations and solve more riddles. Then comes the time of puberty, and again the most engrossing experience of these years, perhaps of the whole of life, is carried on in the closet, masturbation. After adolescence people begin to grow stupid, and are content, instead of pursuing the wonders of life, to read the paper in there, or to improve their minds, until finally old age comes, and then, not infrequently, a seizure in the bathroom makes an end of all. From the cradle to the grave!

With affectionate regards,

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XXIII

I grant you, my dear, that it was wrong to say so much about exhibitionism, and I also agree that I stretched unwarrantably the meaning of the word. Let me explain that just at this moment I have one or two patients who indulge this instinct to the point of virtuosity. I had hoped you would overlook the form for the sake of the substance.

So, today, instead of trying to force into a system that which is without system, I will only set forth a few observations. You may draw your own conclusions.

The next time you have an opportunity, please observe your friend Helen's mouth and you will be able to learn a good deal. You know everyone thinks her mouth is particularly small; it looks as if a coin could be passed into it only with difficulty. But mention the word "horse" in her presence, and her mouth gets wide and she gnashes her teeth just like a horse. Why? Behind the house where Helen's parents lived there was a drilling ground used by a dragoon regiment. From the horses she derived her knowledge of male and female, and on one of these, as a tiny girl, she was lifted up by a petty officer and so apparently had her first experience of voluptuous sensations. Imagine a five-year-old child standing by the side of a gelding; there she sees in front of her the great belly with a thing hanging to it which suddenly extends to double its length and lets a mighty flow of urine stream forth, truly an overpowering sight to a child!

There is a folk saying that from the size of a woman's mouth can be judged the size of her vagina. Perhaps they are right, for there is some parallel between the two openings. The shape of the mouth varies with sexual excitation, and if it does not do so, the repressions are revealed in the play of the muscles. And yawning tells not alone of fatigue, but also that the yawner, at the particular moment, is a desirous woman, and the same is true of one who sleeps with the mouth open.

So watch people, and you will read in their faces, the shape of their heads, the moulding of their hands, their gait, a thousand tales. One man has protruding eyes; you may be sure he wants to show you from afar his curiosity, and his horror at the remarkable discoveries he has made. In another, the deep-sunken eyes withdraw themselves when his hatred of mankind grows great; they do not wish to see, and still less to be seen. The tears that are shed are not dedicated only to pain and grief; they imitate the pearl which lies hidden in the shell, in the woman's mother-of-pearl shell, and every tear is full of symbolic sensuousness; always, without exception. Every poet knows that; for centuries they have known it and told about it without consciously expressing it. Only those who should know it do not. Eros uses the eye for his service, and it must give him pleasing pictures. If too many are given he washes them out; he lets the eye overflow because the inner tension is too great to be released by means of the genital secretion, because the childish method of getting rid of excitement by urinating is not open to him, or because he is depressed on account of morality, he wants to make the person do penance in symbolic form for being ashamed of being erotic. Eros is a strong, zealous god who knows how to punish cruelly and mockingly. "You think it dirty," he rages, "that I have united the wetness between the thighs with man's greatest achievement, the union of man and woman and the creation of a new being. You shall have your way. You have mucous membrane in the bowel and elsewhere, so henceforth your ejaculations shall be diarrhoea, excrements, sneezing, sweating of the feet or under-arm, and above all, urinating."

I understand that you will find all of this strange, but who shall stop me from fantasizing as I like; from calling Eros today what I yesterday called the Es; from conceiving this Es as a wrathful god, although I described him as pitying, gentle, and tender; from ascribing to him a power that urges here and forbids there, and ever again seems to be meeting itself in contradictions? In this I act no differently than men have always acted. And it seems to me to be

good for our well ordered, superficial thinking, to have things thrown into confusion. "Everything must be revolutionized" is a stupid aim, but a just observation.

Shall I fantasy further? I spoke just now of the comparison between the mouth and the vaginal opening. Similarly,—for our Es has grown capricious and its power is boundless,—the nose is the male member, and consequently it makes the nose grow big or little, pointed or snub, plants it straight or awry, according to whether it wants to express this or that desire. And now please make your conclusions as to the cause of nose-bleeding, which is common at certain ages, of the hairs that grow out of the nostrils, of polypus and a scrofulous stench. The ears again have shells, and the shell, as I said before is the symbol of the woman. The ear is a receiving organ,* and its shape is not without interest for imaginative observers.

But you must not think that I want to give explanations. Life is much too multi-colored for us to be able to recognize it, much too smooth for us to seize it. Perhaps I only want to poke a little fun at logic. Perhaps there is more behind it than that.

Have you ever noticed how difficult it is sometimes to get children to let you look into their mouths? The child is still naïve. It believes the mouth is the opening to the soul, and that the doctor, whom fools, young and old, consider to be a magician, can see all their secrets. And indeed something is sticking in his throat which no child likes to reveal; his knowledge of man and woman. At the back of the mouth are two arches (or are they two tonsils?)—which surrounds an opening that leads into the depths and in between them a red structure is palpitating, getting shorter, getting longer, always changing; it is a little tail that hangs there. "The man with glasses, the Uncle Doctor, will know how I lie in bed watching when papa and mama believe I am asleep, and they play games with the opening and the piston that I ought not to know about. And, who knows, perhaps it is also written there what I did myself without anyone finding out." The throat inflammations of children are very instructive; you would not believe all that one can read in them.

And now, let us consider, first, measles and scarlet fever. "I burn, I burn," the fever tells you, "and I am so ashamed! Only look how I have got red all over the body." Of course you need not believe this, but from whence comes it, then, that out of three children, two catch scarlet fever and one remains well? Sometimes a fantastic explanation is better than none at all. And it is not so altogether stupid. You must remember, however, that the age of

* The German word *Empfangen* means both to conceive and to receive.

passion is not youth, but childhood. But the blushing conveys a double meaning from the Es: it draws a veil over the face so that no one sees what is going on behind it; one also sees how the fire of sensuality is blazing and how the piously trained Es is driving the hot blood away from the bowels, from the sexual parts, from hell and the devil, up to the head, in order to cloud the brain more thickly.

I might go on telling you more, about pneumonia and cancer, about gall stones and haematuria, but we can talk about these later. For today, only one word more on the exhibitionistic impulse and its strength. A century ago there were as yet no women's doctors; today in every little town and at every street corner in a big city you will find a specialist. That is because, except in marriage, the woman today has no opportunity to reveal herself. But illness excuses everything, and since the illness takes revenge for the guilty wishes, unconscious, half-conscious and wholly conscious, it saves the victim from eternal punishment.

There is one form of exhibitionism which is historically important for the outcome of our correspondence, namely, hysteria, and in particular, hysterical cramp. I have already mentioned Freud's name, and I should like to repeat what I said in the beginning: Everything that is correct in this medley of letters goes back to him. Now, it is more than twenty years since Freud made his first basic observations on the Es of an hysteric. I do not know how he now regards these phenomena, and so I cannot count on his support when I say that the Es of the hysteric is more cunning than that of other people. Among other things, this Es gets pleasure from reproducing publicly the secrets of Eros, before the eyes of all men. Compared with these performances the nude or the belly dances are as naught, and to give them undisturbed by self-reproach or by the outraged anger of those around, the Es brings about a loss of consciousness and dresses the erotic behavior symbolically as cramps, horribly distorted movements of the buttocks, of the head, and of the limbs. Things go on then as they do in dreams, only that the Es invites a respectable public to its exhibition over whom it lustily makes merry.

I am again drawing near to the subject of the theories of begetting and conception as conjured up by the child, as you once imagined them, and I, too. But first I must put one question to you. When, do you think, did you first learn of the difference in the sexes? Please don't answer, "At eight years of age, when my brother was born." I am convinced that at five years of age you could already distinguish a naked little girl from a naked boy, and even at three

years, and perhaps still earlier. It will finally come out that you know just as little as I do about it. No one knows anything about it. I know a little boy of two and a half called Sam, who watched his baby sister being bathed and then said, looking down between his legs, "Sammy has," and turned his back on the baby girl.

And so we know nothing at all about the point of time at which the child comes to recognize the difference between the sexes, but that he has a lively interest in making sure of the matter before he is four, that he ponders over it and asks questions about it, even mothers know,—an incontrovertible proof, for me, that this interest is extremely vivid. I told you before that every child, under the pressure of the castration-complex, believes that all people are originally provided with the little tail, are male, and that those who are called girls and women are castrated males, castrated for the purpose of bearing children and as a punishment for masturbation. This idea is by no means stupid and is of incalculable importance in its results, since upon it rests the man's feeling of superiority, the woman's feeling of inferiority, and for this reason the man lies on top, the woman underneath, and for this reason again the woman strives towards higher things, towards heaven, towards religion, while man strives ever towards the things ahead, towards philosophy, and searching the depths. This idea is associated in the tangled and yet so logical thinking of the child, with the attentive examination of the male organ. In our primitive, economic fashion we meditate—you and I have done so, and everyone does—on what use can be made of these amputated sex-organs. The use of the appendage itself is the first mystery. Under certain conditions it appears to prolong its existence in the appendix. But then there are, in the testicles, two structures which are decidedly like eggs,—but eggs are eaten. Therefore the eggs cut off from the males condemned to be females, are eaten. From such a conclusion the child turns away in horror, although in general he has little feeling for the woes of others. He thinks it senseless to mutilate people merely for the sake of eating the eggs, since the hens lay enough eggs for that. And so he searches for some other purpose, to make this amputation and eating reasonable. Then an early experience comes to the help of the reflective child; from eggs come chickens, the hen's children: and these eggs come out from the hen at the back, out of the hole in the hen's "popo"; and out of the woman's "popo," he knows already, children come. Now the matter is cleared up. The eggs that are cut away are eaten, not because they taste good, but because little children are going to come out of them. And slowly this circle of ideas

closes up, and then out of the misty darkness of thought a terrifying person steps forth: the father. The father cuts off the mother's sex parts and gives them to her to eat. And out of them come the children. This is what is going on during those panting, bed-shaking struggles between the parents at night, the groans and the sighs are for this, this accounts for the blood in the chamber. The father is terrible, a cruel man, a man who punishes. But what is it then that he is punishing? The rubbing and touching. Then was the mother also doing this? That can hardly be possible, but it is not necessary to think that, for an experience comes to take its place. Every day the mother's hand rubs the childish "eggs" of her son, every day she plays with his little tail. "Mother knows how to rub, father knows and punishes her for this; so he will punish me, too, for I also play. But let him punish me, for I want to have children. I will play, then he will punish me and I shall have children. Thank heaven, I've an excuse for playing. But what shall I have to play with when my father has cut my tail off? It would be better to hide my enjoyment. Certainly it would be better."

And so anxiety and longing change and change about, and slowly the child grows into a man, forever wavering between instinct and morality, desire and fear.

Goodbye, dear one,
Your

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XXIV

How nice of you, my dear, not to take my writing tragically, but to laugh at it! I have been laughed at so often and have so much enjoyed joining in the laughter that I often do not know myself whether I mean what I am saying, or am simply poking fun.

But it is written, sitteth not in the seat of the scornful. I don't imagine that the mixture of fantasies that I recently set out for you as a childish sexual theory was ever really in the mind of a child, or at any rate, in any child's mind but my own. Fragments of it you will find everywhere, often changed almost beyond recognition, often incorporated in another series of fantasies. What I wanted to do was to make it quite clear to you, to impress it on your innermost soul, that the child is continually occupied with the mysteries of sex, of Eros, of the Es, is much more deeply concerned with these than is any psychiatrist or psychoanalyst, that his development is essentially bound up with the attempt to solve these mysteries; in other words, that our childhood may very well be regarded as a school in which we are instructed by Eros. And now if you imagine

the wildest fantasies that child may have over birth, conception, sex differences, you will still not be able to imagine a millionth part of what the child, every child, actually dreams; indeed, on any given topic you will only be able to imagine what you yourself, as a child, once really thought. For this is the remarkable thing about the Es—and I beg you to remember this—that it does not distinguish as does the lofty intellect between reality and fantasy; for it everything is real. And if you have not yet grown quite stupid, you will understand that the Es is right.

Yes, I can tell you something more, not much, but something, about the fate of that little tail that you must have imagined was eaten by your mother. From this little tail, the child hazards, there comes the sausage. Not all of the eggs that are swallowed give rise to pregnancies; most of them are changed in the stomach into a brown chocolate-like mass, like other kinds of food and because this mass contains the eaten-up, sausage-shaped tail, it takes on the shape of a long sausage. Is it not strange that the three-year-old's brain already holds the theory of form, and the theory of fermentation too? You cannot attribute enough importance to this, for the associations: defecation, birth, castration, conception, and sausage, penis, power, money, is daily and hourly repeated in the world of our unconscious ideas; it makes us rich or poor, amorous or drowsy, busy or lazy, potent or impotent, happy or sad; it gives us a skin which sweats; it makes and unmakes marriages, builds factories, contrives whatever happens, and plays a part in everything, even in diseases. Or rather, it is in the diseases that this association allows itself to be most easily discovered; only one must not be frightened at the jeers of the wise.

For your amusement I will tell you of another idea hatched in the brain of the child, which seems not infrequently to survive in the adult. It is the idea that the tail when swallowed is sometimes transformed into a stick corresponding to an erection, that the little eggs are fixed on this, and so an ovary is made. I know of an impotent man—that is, he became so at the very moment when the member had to be inserted—who had the idea that in a woman's body there were sticks bearing rows of eggs. "And since I have a particularly big member," thought his vanity, "I shall break all these eggs with my thrusting." His is now potent. The noteworthy point in his story was, that as a boy he had a large collection of eggs, and in blowing out the eggs which he took out of the nest away from the mother-birds, he now and then found one which already contained a young bird. His theory about the egg-sticks (ovaries) went back

to that. To the great logicians this is nonsense, but you do not consider it too trivial to ponder over!

I return to my associations with the situation in which I recently found myself in writing to you,—you remember, when I was speaking about the watch chain. I still owe you an account of the itching on my right shin bone and the spot near my upper lip. In some curious fashion the word shin-bone (“*schienbein*”) at once turned itself around into leg-pads (“*beinscheine*”), and then there rose up before me the picture of Achilles, as I remember it from my childhood,—perhaps from my eighth or ninth year. It is an illustration in Schwab’s “*Stories of the Greek Heroes*.” And the words “unapproachable hands” occur to me. Where am I to begin? Where to end? My childhood wakes up and something within me is weeping.

Do you know Schiller’s poem, “*Hector’s Farewell to Andromache*”? My second brother, Hans,—I mentioned him recently in speaking of Hans am Ende,—yes, verily, he had a wound on his right shin. In tobogganning he had hit a tree. I must have been five or six years old at the time. In the evening—the lamp was already lighted—my brother was carried in, and I saw the wound, a deep wound a couple of inches long, all bleeding. It made a terrible impression on me; I know why, now. The picture of this wound is indissolubly united with another: black leeches are hanging on the edge of this wound, and one or two have fallen down from it; the Creation of Eve, castration, leeches, the penis cut off, wound, and womanhood. And my father put the leeches on.

Tobogganning—why do people toboggan? Did you know that rapid motion gave sexual pleasure? Since the nose-dive was invented, every aviator has known it. It sometimes leads to erection and ejaculation; life itself tells you why, for thousands and millions of years man dreamed he could and would fly, whence came the legend of Icarus, why angels and cupids have wings, why every father lifts his child up and lets him fly through the air, and why the child exults in it. Sledding and tobogganing were for the boy Patrik a symbol of masturbation, and the wound and the leeches, its punishment.

To come back to Hector’s farewell, and the “unapproachable hands.” My second brother Hans, and the third, Wolf,—a fateful name as you already know,—used to give a dramatic rendering of this poem, at which the family and any visitors we might have would form the audience. And then a riding cloak of my mother’s with a red lining, and trimmed with fur, was used to adorn Andromache; purple and ermine, that is the great wound of the woman, and the

skin; the bleeding and the binder. What an impression it all made on me! Right at the beginning the words "To him brings Patroclus, a dreadful sacrifice." "Patroclus—Patrik," and the sacrifice, Abraham's offering and the circumcision, and the weeping for the desolation now of Achilles' revenge, now of the castration. The little one, the penis, he shall no more "cast the spear," because dark Orcus has devoured Hector. Hector is the boy, and Orcus, the mother's womb and the grave; it has to do with incest, the everlasting wish of man and of little Patrik. Oedipus! What shudders went down my back at the words, "Hark, the enemy is thundering at the walls." I recognized this thundering, the fearful wrath of the father, Achilles. And Lethe's stream got mixed with the meadow-brook from *Strupelpeter's Paulinchen*, with the maiden's masturbation-song, and with the bed-wetting stream of urine when I was deep in sleep.

Certainly, dear, I did not know this at the time, and did not know it with my intellect. But my Es knew it, understood it all better, more thoroughly, than I understand it now, after all my efforts to know my own and others' souls.

Let me rather speak about that book, Schwab's *Greek Stories*. It was given to me as a Christmas present. My parents by that time had become poor, and so the three volumes were not new, but only newly bound. They had previously belonged to my eldest brother, a fact which distinctly increased their value for me. And concerning this brother many things come into my mind, but first I must finish this business with Schwab. One volume—it deals with the Trojan War—had the corners crushed. I had struck my brother Wolf with it, the brother five years older than myself, when he teased me into a rage and then laughingly held me with one hand. How I hated him, and yet how I must have loved him; how I admired him, the strong one, the wild one, the wolf!

I must tell you something. Whenever I am miserable in any way, perhaps my head or my throat is aching, the word Wolf comes up in the analysis. My brother Wolf is inextricably knit up with my inner life, with my Es. There seems to be nothing more important for me than this Wolf-complex. And yet years pass by without my thinking of him, and, too, he is long since dead. But he forces himself into my anxiety states, he comes into whatever I am doing. Whenever the castration-complex comes to the surface, Wolf is always there, and something dark and terrible is threatening me. I remember only one single sexual experience which I can connect with him. Even yet I can picture the scene; it was out in the open

and a school friend of Wolf's was holding a playing card up to the light. Something peculiar could be seen when the light shone through it, something forbidden, for I still remember their frightened manner due to their sense of guilt. What was on the card, I do not know. But with this memory a second is unseparably connected, how my brother Wolf pretended to this same friend that his name was derived from the giant Wolfgrambär, and this had a dreadful effect upon me. And now I know that the giant is the personified phallus.

Suddenly there comes to my mind one of Kaulbach's illustrations to Reineke Fuchs, how the wolf Isegrim has broken into the farmhouse, is discovered, has thrown the farmer over and stands with his head under the man's shirt. I have not looked at this picture for at least forty years, but I can still visualize it clearly. And I now know that the wolf is biting off the farmer's sex-organ. It is one of the few pictures that have remained in my memory. But Isegrim—Grim was the name of the boy from whom I learned to masturbate—significantly enough, meant to warn me, and told me what was deeply repressed.

How did the Fuchs epic come to choose the wolf as a castrating animal, and how did Kaulbach come to make a picture of this incident? What is the meaning of the story of Red Ridinghood, and of the Seven Kids? Do you know that one? The old goat goes out and warns her seven little ones beforehand to keep the door locked, and not to let the wolf into the house. But the wolf forces his way in and devours all the kids except the youngest, who hides in the grandfather clock. There the mother finds him on her return. The kid tells her of the wolf's wickedness and the two of them search for the robber, find him lying in deep slumber after his too heavy meal, and as there seems to be something moving about inside his belly, they rip it open, and all the six kids he has swallowed come to light again. Now the mother fills the wicked animal's body with great stones, and sews him up. The wolf wakes up thirsty and, as he leans over the brook to drink, he is overbalanced by the heavy stones and falls into the water.

I do not pretend to be able to explain the story so as to clear up all the secrets which the folk-mind has put into its composition. But I can say a few things without being too daring. First the cutting open the belly, out of which comes forth the young life, is an easily intelligible birth symbol, since it links up with the idea commonly accepted by children that the body is cut open at childbirth and sewn up again. And along with that we have the explanation of the children being devoured without being killed: It is the conception. And

in the mother's warning that the door must be kept locked, one can read the reminder that there is only one virginity to lose, and that the maiden should never allow entrance until "the ring is on her finger." But it remains a puzzle what the safe hiding of the seventh kid in the clock-case means. You know what a rôle the number seven plays in human life; one meets it everywhere, sometimes as a good number, sometimes an evil one. In that connection it is surprising that the expression "bad seven" is only used of the woman. It may be assumed then, that "the good seven" denotes the man. That seems to be right, for while the woman, with head, body, and four limbs, has the character of "six," the man has also a fifth member, the sign of his lordship. According to this the seventh little goat is the male member, which is not swallowed up, but hides itself in the clock-case and then jumps out again. And it is open to you to decide whether the clock-case is the foreskin or the vagina, which the seventh leaves again after the ejaculation. That the wolf falls into the brook at the end I cannot rightly get clear to myself; at the most, I could say that, as so often happens, it is a reduplication of the main theme of birth, as the hiding in the clock-case might also be interpreted as pregnancy and birth. We know from dreams that falling into water is a pregnancy symbol.

So far the story, brought out of its beautiful legendary form, is given more or less the aspect of plain everyday experience. There remains only the wolf, and you know that my personal complexes begin there. But still I will try to make something out of it. I should like to go back to the seven. The seventh is the boy. The six together are the "bad seven," the girl, with whom the "seventh" gets ill and is eaten up, and is bad because she masturbated and acted badly. Then the wolf would be the power which makes out of the seven "the six," which changes the boy into a girl, castrates him, cuts away his member. He would be identified with the father. If this is so, the opening of the door acquires another meaning, it is then the childish masturbation of the "seven," of the boy, who by his rubbing makes his "seven" sore, bad, so the wolf eats it up, that he may be restored to the world as a girl, with a wound instead of the member. The seventh little goat, to avoid masturbating, or at least the discovery of masturbation, awaits the time when he shall be sexually mature and therefore keeps his boy's nature. The word "bad" added to "seven" to denote the woman, in its further meaning of "sore" and "suppurating," supplies the association with syphilis and cancer, and helps us to understand why every woman dreads being visited by these two diseases. The eating of the kids

leads on to the childish theory of conception through swallowing the seed, an association which reappears in the tale of "Hop o' My Thumb," in the person of the man-eating giant. In the story of the "Seven-leagued Boots," the connection between wolf and man or father is shown; for one would certainly not be mistaken in seeing a symbol of erection in these wonderful boots.

Now I must go back to something that I mentioned earlier, namely that the child does not like to have anyone look in his mouth. He is afraid of the uvula being cut off. In the name "Wolfsrachen" (wolf's jaws = cleft palate), you have the association between wolf and masturbation. With a cleft palate the uvula is missing which represents the male member, it is castrated. It symbolizes the punishment for masturbation. And if you have ever seen anyone with a cleft palate, you will know how dreadful the punishment is.

With that I come to an end. I do not know whether the interpretation pleases you, but it has helped me over the many difficulties of my "Wolf-Isegrim-brother complex."

Affectionately,
PATRIK.

LETTER XXV

According to you, then, "the bad Seven" is the mouth, and there I entirely agree with you. There are men also, of course, who "jaw" terribly, but in the end it comes down to this: the seventh opening of the face is just as much a woman-symbol as the great wound in the abdomen.

Since we are on the subject of numbers, let us go on playing with them. To begin, I must point out that the Es, which has a marvellous memory for numbers, masters the simple rules of arithmetic in a way otherwise met with only in a certain type of idiocy, and that it finds just the same sort of pleasure as the idiot does, in solving arithmetical exercises in an instant. You will be able to convince yourself of this by means of a simple experiment. Talk to anyone you please on a subject that stirs the Es; there are all kinds of signs by which you may determine that he is so moved. When you observe these signs, ask for a date, and immediately, with absolute certainty, one will be named which stands in intimate relationship with the complex which has been brought to the surface. Often enough the connection is obvious, so that the speaker himself is astonished at the capacity of his unconscious. Often all such connection is denied. Do not be misled by that. The man's conscious mind likes to deny—I had almost said to lie. Do not listen to his "No," but hold fast to the knowledge that the Es never lies and never denies. After some

time the correctness of the association will be proved, and at the same time a mass of psychic material will come up, which, repressed in the man's unconscious, has brought about in him all sorts of evil and good.

I will describe to you a little number-trick carried out by my own Es, which when I discovered it amused me very much. For many years when I wished to express my impatience and displeasure, I used to say, "I've already told you 26,783 times." You must remember that when we were last together, you teased me about it. That vexed me and I puzzled over the mystery of this number. It occurred to me that the cross sum of the figures in this long number is 26, exactly the same number which is separated from the other figures when they are taken away. With 26 I think of my mother. I was 26 years old when my mother died. Twenty-six was the age of both my parents when they married; in the year 1826 my father was born. If you take the cross sum of the other figures, 783, you hit upon 18. Isolate the first three figures as $2 \times (6 + 7)$ and you have the 26. Add the 2 to the last two figures 8×3 and again there is 26. I was born 10/13/'66. These figures can be added to make 26.

I have analyzed the number 26,783 in yet another way. The 2 seemed to me to stand by itself, since I had unwittingly applied it to the two operations, with $6 + 7$ and 8×3 . The other numbers group themselves, under the influence of the isolated 2, as 67, 78, 83. Sixty-seven was the age of my mother at the time of her death. Seventy-eight is the date I had to leave home to enter a boarding school. In '83 my old home was lost to me forever, for in that year my parents left the town where I was born, to settle in Berlin. In that same year an experience befell me, the effect of which lasted over a long period of my life. At recess between two periods one of my schoolmates said to me: "If you go on masturbating like this any longer, you will soon go crazy; as it is you are half-mad." These words became portentous to me not merely because my masturbation-anxiety was thereby intensified, but because I did not reply, and accepted in silence the disgrace of the public accusation of masturbating as if it had left me unmoved. I felt it profoundly, but suppressed it immediately, with the help of the word "crazy." At this time my Es took possession of the word, and has never since let go. Thenceforward all my freak thoughts seemed to be permissible. For me, half-mad means, "You are straddling between two possibilities; it is up to you whether you incline towards one side or to the other; you can look upon the world and upon life as a sane and ordinary human being, or as a madman, an exceptional individual

who has foresaken ordinary standards." This indeed I have done with great thoroughness, and still do, as you know only too well. The two mothers—the wet-nurse and my mother—found a new and necessary support, and my position between the two was made bearable to me through half-madness; it led me from the compulsion of doubting, to a patient scepticism and irony, to the world of Thomas Weltlein's thought.* It is possible that I am mistaken in the value I put upon this phrase, "half-mad", but it explains for me the curious qualities of my nature, which usually avoids two alternatives, but which nevertheless is able to follow two opposing, even contradictory, trains of thought at the same time, undisturbed by contempt, every advice, every example, and despite my own inner disinclination. In a careful examination of the history of my life, I have found that this half-madness has given me just that amount of ascendancy which my Es required for the mastery of its problems. In this connection my medical career—for me at least—is significant. Twice I have adopted new methods in medicine, and have so absorbed and refashioned them that they have become my own personal possessions; once as the apprentice of Schweninger, the second time as the disciple of Freud. For me, each one of these men represents something mighty and inescapable. I succeeded in reconciling their influence in the year 1911, and 11 is the cross sum of the figures in 83, and the cross sum of 11 is 2.

The year '83 has crept in as especially important in its influence upon my external existence. This corresponds to its prominent position as the end figures in the mystery number 26,783. Soon after that remark about masturbation, I fell ill with scarlet fever, as a result of which I contracted nephritis. Later, as you know, I went through another illness of the same character. I mention this because this kidney disease—it holds true for me and for all people with kidney trouble—is characteristic of a double attitude toward life, of standing between two things. The kidney person—if I may use this expression—is facing two ways. His Es is able, with more than customary ease to be both childlike or grown-up; a property both useful and dangerous; it takes its place between the 1—the symbol of the erect phallus of the grown-up, of the father,—and the 3,—the symbol of the child. I leave it to you to go on with the endless chain of fantastic possibilities open to such a hybrid, and will merely observe that my own condition was revealed not only in the attacks of nephritis, but also in the fact that up to my fifteenth year I was a

* Thomas Weltlein, the hero of "*Der Seelensucher*."

bed wetter. And as a final word I would add: the hermaphrodite is neither man nor woman, but both, and that is my case.

And now we will play with numbers, and, as far as that is possible, we will be like children. But you must not get cross if grown-up stuff pushes its way in. That cannot be helped. A child always wants to look big, and so he puts on his father's hat and takes his cane. What would happen if this wish to be big, this wish for an erection, were not present in the child? We should remain small, and never grow. Or do you think I am deceived in thinking that there is a certain connection between people's remaining little and their wanting to be little, their acting as if they did not know about erections, as if they were as innocent as little children; that the not-growing-tall arises from the wish to have an excuse to still be a child? We have this wish expressed in the rhyme, "*Ich bin klein, mein Herz ist rein*" (I am little, my heart is pure).

Sit down with me in front of the blackboard; we will both act as though we were learning to write numbers again. What goes on in a child's brain when he is made to write half a slateful of ones or eights? You can apply this also to the letters of the alphabet, to the a's and the p's and all the hooks and loops that tantalize a child's fancy. What does 1 stand for to you? For me it is a stick. And now the leap into grown-upness, the father's stick, the penis, the man, the father himself, his sternness and power. Number 1 in the family; 2, that is the swan of Spekter's fable. Ah, how pretty it was! My sister had a long thin neck and was often teased about it. And she really was an ugly duckling that became a swan, only to die too soon. And suddenly I see the swan lake of my birthplace. I am eight years old, and am sitting with Wolf, Lina and a little girl friend, named Anna Speck, in a boat, and Anna falls into the water on which the swan is swimming. "My swan, my silent one, with tender plumage." Is that why I have occupied myself so much with Ibsen, because he composed this poem and I, in that trying time when I thought I was dying, used to hear it sung? Or is it Agnes in "Brand"? Agnes was my childish playmate and I loved her dearly. She had a crooked mouth, and the story was that she had put an icicle into her mouth. And the icicle is symbolic. With her I jumped the rope and with her is connected my family romance of kidnapped children and my fantasies of beating. Agnes and Ernest,—that was the name of her brother who was my inseparable companion, but whom I later abandoned with contempt. And Ernest Schweninger. Ah, my dear, it is too much, too much!

Back to Anna Speck. Speck, Spekter's fables. "What kind of

beggarman is that? He wears a coat as black as coal." The raven. And Raven was the name of my first teacher, whom I looked upon as a model of strength, and who once burst his breeches in jumping, an incident that came up again later in "*Der Seelensucher*." And the word raven has been coming up for weeks in a patient's treatment which I want to bring to a successful issue, for it would be such a triumph as I have seldom enjoyed.

Spekter's fable of the swan. Did you ever see a swan swallow a large piece of bread? How it twists its neck down? Anna Speck had big, very big glands in her neck. And a thick neck signifies that something has got stuck there,—the seed of a child. Yes, the seed of a child. I ought to know, for I myself for more than ten years had a goiter which as good as disappeared when I discovered the mystery of the half-swallowed child. How was I to think that this Anna would play such a part in my life? How should I ever have recognized her importance if it had not been for my faith in studying the Es? And Anna was the name of the heroine of my first romance, and her husband was called Wolf. Wolf and Anna, they were both in that boat. And there, too, Alma appears again, whom you know is the friend of Lina's who interrupted my sadistic playing. Wolf had made a house with mattresses, in which he lived with Anna. But we little ones might not go with them into this mattress-house. Alma, however, who was a knowing child, ran into the garden with Lina and me, when Wolf sent her away, and called out, "I know what the two of them are doing in there." I did not understand what Alma meant at the time, but the words remained in my memory, and the place where they were uttered, and I feel even now the shudder that ran through me then.

Anna, that is without beginning or end, alpha and omega, Anna and Otto, spelt backwards and forwards alike, the being, the never-ending, eternity, the ring and the circle, the void, the mother, Anna.

It comes to my mind now that Anna's fall into the water must have meant a great deal in my life, since for years I had the masturbation-fantasy of Anna jumping from a high bank into my boat, and slipping so that her clothes flew up and I could see her drawers. How strange are the ways of the unconscious! For you must not forget that in the fall into the water there is a pregnancy symbol and a birth symbol, and Anna had a thick neck—like me.

That then is the 2, and the 2 is the woman, the mother, and the maiden with only two legs, while the boy has three. Three feet, tripod, and the Pythian oracle only speaks when she is seated on the tripod. But Oedipus guesses the riddle of the Sphinx about the

animal which at first has four legs, then two, and finally is three-legged. Sophocles holds that Oedipus solved the riddle. But is the word "man" an answer to a question?

Two, thou fateful number that signifieth marriage, art thou also the mother? Or is 3 the mother? This 3 reminds me of the bird that my mother used to draw for us. *Vogel* (bird) and *Vogeln* (sex act) go together. But when I see the 3 now lying down, it is for me the symbol of the breasts, my nurse, and all the many breasts that I have loved, and still love. Three is the sacred number, the child, Christ the Son: the triune godhead, whose eye is shining within the triangle. Art thou truly only Eros' child, thou pattern of science, mathematics? And does even faith in a divinity spring from thee, Eros? Is it so, that the 2 is a pair, a married pair, and also the pair of testicles and of ovaries, of vulvae and of eyes? Is it so that the 1 and the 2 make 3, the all-powerful child in the mother's womb? For who is mighty, if not the unborn child, whose every desire is fulfilled before it is even felt? Who in truth is God and King and dwells in Heaven? But the child is a boy, for only the boy is the 3, two testicles and the penis. We're getting a little mixed up, are we not? Who could find his way aright through the labyrinth of the Es? One is amazed and grows despondent, and yet casts oneself with shuddering pleasure into the ocean of dreams. 1 and 2, that is 12. Man and woman, justifiably a sacred number, from which comes the 3, when it flows together into the unit, the child, the God. Twelve months are there, and the year is made up of them; twelve disciples are there, and in their midst is raised the Christ, the Anointed One, the Son of Man. Is it not wonderful, this phrase "Son of Man"? And my Es says to me, loudly and distinctly, "Explain, explain!"

Farewell, dear,

PATRIK.

LETTER XXVI

So the playing with numbers interests you, my dear? I am glad to hear that! You have so often given me a severe scolding that I need the appreciation. And I am deeply grateful that you mention my name in the same breath as that of Pythagoras. Quite apart from the pleasure you bestow upon my vanity in so doing, it proves to me that you have the first requirement of a critic, the ability to compare, without hesitation, a Smith, a Jones, a Brown or a Troll with Goethe, Beethoven, Leonardo or Pythagoras. It makes your statements doubly worth while to me.

That you even quote further examples, pointing out that 13 is the number who partook of the Last Supper, and connecting the

fear that the thirteenth guest at the table must die, with the death of Christ upon the Cross, gives me the hope that your opposition to my Es-talk will gradually disappear. But why must it necessarily be the Christ? Judas was also one of thirteen, and he, too, was destined to die.

Has it never surprised you how closely the two conceptions, Christ and Judas, are interwoven? I spoke to you once before about the ambivalence in the unconscious, about the human characteristic of showing hatred in love, treachery in fidelity. This profound and insurmountable inward duality of human nature has enforced the story of the kiss of Judas, in which are reflected the everyday affairs and experiences of mankind. I should like you to be quite convinced yourself of this fact, for it is of great importance. So long as you are not cognizant of it, are not permeated through and through with its realization, you understand nothing of the Es. But it is not easy to arrive at such a realization. Think of the greatest moment of your life and then search until you have found the Judas intention and the Judas betrayal. When you kissed your beloved, up went your hand to smooth your hair that might have become disarranged. When your father died—you were still a youngster—it delighted you to wear a black frock for the first time. You counted proudly the letters of condolence, and with secret satisfaction you put the lines of sympathy from a reigning Duke on the top. And when your mother was ill you felt ashamed of the sudden thought that came into your head of the string of pearls you would soon inherit; on the day of her funeral you thought the hat you were wearing made you look eight years older, and in that thought you were not concerned with your husband, but with the judgment of the crowd before whose eyes you wanted to play the part of the beautiful mourner, just like a real actress. And how often have you betrayed, as grossly as Judas, your dearest friends, your husband and your children, for the thirty pieces of silver? Think over these things a little. You will find that man's existence, from beginning to end, is filled with what our rash judgment brands as the worst and most contemptible of sins, treachery. But you also see at once that hardly ever is this treachery felt as guilt by the conscious mind. Scratch where you will the thin conscious layer with which the Es covers itself, however, and you will see how the unconscious is continually sifting the treacheries of the last few hours; one it casts out, a second it puts ready for use the next day, a third it represses into the unconscious, so that it may brew from it the poison of future illnesses or the magic potion of coming achievements. Look atten-

tively into this strange darkness, dearest. Here is a chink through which you can dimly, almost despairingly, see masses driven like clouds by one of the active forces of the Es, by the consciousness of guilt. This is one of the tools with which the Es works on mankind, surely, and without fail. The Es uses this consciousness of guilt, but it takes care that its sources are never fathomed by man, for it knows that in that same moment when anyone discovers the secret of his guilt, the world will tremble to its foundations. For that reason it heaps horror and dread round about the profundities of life, makes ghosts out of the trivialities of the day, invents the word "betrayal" and the man Judas, and the Ten Commandments, and confounds the vision of the "I" with a thousand things which seem to the conscious mind to be shameful, in order that man may never believe the consoling words: "Fear not, for I am with thee."

And there you have the Christ. Just as treachery enters into every noble deed of man, taking part therein, so in all that we call evil, is there always the nature of the Christ—or however you may name this nature—the loving, the benevolent. To recognize that, you do not need first to tread the long road, which carries the murderer's thrust back to man's primitive instinct, to try to press into the innermost parts of a fellow creature, out of love, to give happiness and to receive it—for in the last resort murder is only the symbol of the suppressed love-rage. You do not need first to analyze a theft, in which you would again come upon the same all-transforming Eros, who in taking, gives. You do not need to consider the words of Jesus to the adulteress, "Thy sins are forgiven thee, for thou hast loved much." In your everyday life you will find everywhere sacrifice and simplicity enough to teach you what I was saying: Christ is, wherever man is.

But I go on talking and talking, and what I wanted to do was to make you understand that there are no contradictions, that everything is reconciled in the Es; that according to its own pleasure this Es can employ one and the same action as grounds for remorse or for the exaltation that follows a noble deed. The Es is crafty, and it does not trouble itself to make the stupid consciousness confident that black and white are opposites, and a chair is really a chair, whereas every child knows that it is also a cab, a house and a mountain. The consciousness sweats and sweats in the effort to invent a system, and to put life into pigeon-holes, but the Es gaily and inexhaustibly creates what it wants, with its own power, and sometimes I think it laughs at the conscious mind.

Why do I tell you all this? Perhaps I too am making merry.

Perhaps I only want to show you that one can start out from any point and roam over the whole of life—a little truth worth thinking about. And with that I make a bold jump back again to my story, for I still have something to say about the spot near my mouth—perhaps the most important thing of all, in any case something strange, which will reveal more about your correspondent's repression than he himself knew for some years.

The spot near the mouth—I told you this once before—means that I should like to kiss someone, but I have some sort of feeling against doing so which is sufficiently powerful to raise up the top layer of the skin and fill up the hole thus made with fluid. That is not much to start with, for, as you know, I like kissing, and if I were to consider all those persons who seem to me to merit a kiss, and who I am not sure would kiss me in return, my mouth would always be sore. But the spot is on the right side, and I tell myself that this is the side of righteousness, of authority, of family connections. Authority? Of my relatives; my eldest brother comes into my thoughts; and indeed it is he against whom this spot was aimed. On that day my mind was occupied constantly with the thoughts of a particular patient. That surprised me, for it is customary for me to think no more about my patients once I have closed the door behind them; but soon I knew the reason for it. This patient resembled my brother. The desire to kiss is thereby explained, for it had to do with this patient, to whom I had transferred the feeling I had for my brother. This was made easier by the fact that my brother's birthday fell around that date, and that shortly before I had seen this patient unconscious. As a child I witnessed several times my brother's prolonged swoons; I can picture the shape of his head even now, and I have reason to think that my attitude to this patient was due to his resemblance. The likeness between the two became obvious to me in the immobility of their faces.

But the existence of the spot; one has to consider not only the wish to kiss, but also the opposite. That is quite explicable. In our family such demonstrativeness among the children was strictly forbidden. It is still unthinkable to me that we could ever have kissed one another. But the aversion to kiss is not merely a matter of family traditions, it concerns also the question of homosexuality, and I must dwell a few moments on that.

I was, as you know, brought up in a boy's boarding school from the time I was twelve. There we lived in our monastery, quite shut off from the outer world, and all our capacity and need for love was directed towards our schoolfellows. If I look back upon the six years spent there, immediately there comes to me the image of my

friend. I see us both, with arms tightly locked, as we walk through the cloisters; from time to time our furious discussion about God and the world breaks off, and we kiss each other. It is not possible, I think, to imagine to oneself the force of a vanished emotion, but judging from the many scenes of jealousy, which were accompanied, on my side at least, by fantasies of suicide, my affection must have been extreme. I know, too, that at that time my masturbation fantasies were almost exclusively concerned with boys' love. After I left school my affection for this friend endured until, a year later, I transferred it to a comrade at the University, from whom it made a sudden jump to his sister. With that my homosexuality, my affection for members of my own sex, was apparently extinguished. Thenceforward I loved only women.

I loved them very constantly, and very inconstantly, for I remember that for hours at a time I would stroll about the streets in Berlin for the sake of seeing some bit of femininity whom I had met by chance and never came to know, but who occupied my fantasies for days and weeks. The list of such dream loves is unending, and up to a few years ago was added to nearly every day. My actual erotic experiences had nothing in the world to do with these loves of my soul. For my masturbatory enjoyments I have never once, so far as I know, chosen any woman whom I really loved. Always strangers, persons unknown. Do you know what that means? No? It signifies that my deepest love belonged to one whom I was not allowed to know, in other words, to my sister, and before that, to my mother. But do not forget that my knowledge of this is only recent, and that until a short time ago I never believed that I could desire my sister or my brother. One goes through life without knowing the tiniest thing about oneself.

To complete the story of this love life with strangers, with unknown people whose acquaintance I never sought, I must add something else, although it is only distantly connected with what I wanted to speak about, namely, homosexuality. It concerns my attitude to the women to whom I am really bound by this tie of love. Not merely one of them, no, from every one, I have heard the same astonishing judgment: "When I am with you, I seem to be nearer to you than anyone else in the world, but so soon as you have said good-bye, it is as though you built up a wall between us and I were a total stranger to you; as if we had never met." I have not been aware of this myself, probably because I have never felt that anyone was not a stranger to me, but now I understand it. In order to be able to love I had to keep real people at a distance, and artfully draw close to the "images" of my mother and sister. At times that must have been

really difficult, but it was the only way to keep my passion alive. Believe me, images are powerful things.

And that brings me now once more to my homosexual experiences. For with men it has been much the same thing. Thirty years long have I kept them at a distance; by what method I do not know, but that it was highly successful is proved by the list of my patients, which only in the last three years has once again included the names of men. They are reappearing now, because I am no longer fleeing from my homosexuality. For when all is said and done, it was my wish to escape from men, and that was the reason I was seldom consulted by them. Throughout those years I had eyes only for women, looked searchingly at every woman I met and loved her more or less, and during all that time, in society, in the street, in travelling, yes, even in meetings of men, I have never really observed a single man. I looked at them without seeing them, even if they were for hours before my eyes; they did not reach my consciousness.

All that has changed. I now look at men in the same way as I do women; they have become human beings to me, and I am equally pleased to deal with both; there is no longer any difference. Above all, with a man I am no longer embarrassed. I no longer need to keep people at a distance. The deeply repressed incest wish, which had so mysterious and powerful an influence, has now become conscious and disturbs me no more. At least that is how I account for the change.

To a certain degree the same sort of thing has occurred in connection with children, with animals, with mathematics and philosophy. But that is another story, although it, too, is bound up with the repression of mother, sister, father and brother.

However true it may seem to me now to account for my nature by this flight from Trolls, who are for me a special sort of people—for there are good people, and wicked people and Trolls—however enlightening it may be for me that I had to make a perverted use of the opera glasses through which I looked at my companions, put them artificially at a distance and make them into strangers so that they might resemble my images, it is still not sufficient to explain everything. It is not possible to explain everything. But one thing I can add: I need this subtle type of loving, this remoteness, because I am centered upon myself, because I love myself immeasurably, because I am what the learned call a narcissist. Narcissism plays a great rôle in men's lives. If I had not possessed it to so high a degree I should never have become what I am, and also I should never have

understood why Christ said: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." As thyself, not more than thyself.

Among us Troll folk there was a phrase which ran: "I come first of all, and then I come again, then nothing comes for ever so long, and then come other people."

And just think, how amusing! As a little boy of perhaps eight years old, I had an album in which my best friends wrote verses and their names. On the outside cover is written in my handwriting a modification of an old proverb:

Whoever loves me more than myself,
Let him write below myself
Thyself.

That is how I felt at the time and I fear I have not greatly changed.

Ever your own,
PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XXVII

Thanks for your letter, my dear, I will at any rate make the attempt this time to comply with your request that I should be objective. The phenomenon of homosexuality is sufficiently important to be methodically examined.

Yes, I hold the view that all people are homosexual, hold it so firmly that it is difficult for me to realize how anyone can think differently. Man loves himself first and foremost, with every sort of passionate emotion, and seeks to procure for himself every conceivable pleasure, and, since he himself must be either male or female, is subject from the beginning to a passion for his own sex. It cannot be otherwise, and unprejudiced examination of anyone who will consent to it, gives proof. The question, therefore, is not whether homosexuality is exceptional, perverse—that does not come under discussion;—what we have to ask is, why it is so difficult to consider this phenomenon of passion between people of the same sex, to judge it and discuss it, without prejudice, and then we have also to ask how it comes about that, in spite of his homosexual nature, man is also able to feel affection for the opposite sex.

The first question is easily answered. Pederasty is threatened with penal servitude, is branded as a crime, has been looked upon for centuries as a shameful vice. That the majority of people do not observe it is explained by this prohibition. It is not more astonishing than the fact that so many children never observe their mother's pregnant condition, that almost all mothers are unable to observe expressions of sexuality in their little children, that no one observed

the boy's incestuous desire for his mother until Freud described it. But to be able to recognize the universality of homosexuality is a long step from being able to judge it without prejudice, and the people who are able to do this prefer to remain silent rather than to enter into an argument with ignorance.

One might think that an age that is proud of its civilization, that learns geography and history by heart because it does not think for itself, that such an age must know that on the other side of the Aegean Sea, in Asia, open pederasty is the rule, and that such a highly-developed civilization as that of Greece is not to be thought of without its homosexuality. It must at least be surprised at that curious phrase in the Gospel concerning Christ's disciple "whom Jesus loved," and who lay upon the Lord's breast. We make nothing of it all. To all this evidence we are blind. We are not to see what is there to be seen.

In the first place, the Church forbids it. Obviously she derives this prohibition from the Old Testament, the whole spirit of which was directed towards bringing all sexual activity into direct association with the begetting of children, and, as a result of priestly ambition, she purposely made this inherited human instinct into a sin in order to lord it over the stricken conscience. This was particularly opportune for the Christian Church, since it was able to deal with the root of Hellenic culture in its execration of male love. You know that there is an increasing feeling against penalizing pederasty, because it is felt that in this matter an evil has long been made out of what is an hereditary right.

In spite of this increasing insight we cannot expect a speedy reversal of our judgment of homosexuality—and that for a very simple reason. We all spend at least fifteen or sixteen years, most of us spend our whole lives, with the conscious or at any rate half-conscious realization of being homosexual, of having behaved as such more or less often, and of still behaving so. It happens with everyone that at some time or other in their lives they make a superhuman effort to throttle this homosexuality, which in words is so despised. And the repression is not even successful, so, in order to carry through this lasting, daily self-deception, they support the public denunciation of homosexuality and thus relieve their inner conflict. With every reflection upon experience we come upon the same discovery: because we feel ourselves to be thieves, murderers, adulterers, pederasts, liars, we are bitter against robbery, murder and lying, in order that no one, ourselves least of all, shall come to the knowledge of our wickedness. Believe me, whatever man hates, despises, condemns, is in his own original nature. And if you want to make

something really serious out of life and love, out of the nobility that is in your temperament, you must hold by the old proverb:

Blame not me!
Blame yourself alone!
And if I am at fault,
Then make yourself a better man.

I know of yet another reason why we are afraid to be honest in considering homosexual problems, and that is our attitude towards masturbation. The source of homosexuality is in narcissism, self-love and self-gratification. The being has yet to be born who is not prejudiced against the phenomenon of self-gratification.

It will surprise you that so far I have spoken only of homosexual love between men. That is easily understood since I was born at a time when people behaved—or did they really believe it?—as though, except in the case of outcast prostitutes, women had no sensuality in their nature. In the support it gave to this view, one might say the last century was almost ridiculous, but unfortunately the results of this absurdity are serious. It seems to me as though the existence of the breasts, the vagina, and the clitoris, has only recently been re-discovered, and the idea become permissible that there is a female bottom, having to do with feces, fecal gas, and voluptuous sensations. But that is at present a secret known only to women and to a few men. For the great mass of the public the word homosexual appears to be derived from homo—male. That the love of one woman for another is an every-day affair, and is openly exhibited before everyone's eyes, is hardly noticed. Nevertheless it is a fact that any woman may kiss and hug any other female person of any age, without fear. Things of this kind are not "homosexual," any more than feminine onanism is "onanism." Nothing of the sort.

May I remind you of a little adventure we had together? It must have been about 1912. The dispute concerning the moral turpitude of homosexuality was at that time particularly keen, because the German penalizing laws were under review; a proposal had been made to include the female sex under paragraph 175. I was with you, and because we had been a little out of temper with each other, but quickly wanted to be friends again, I had taken up a journal and was turning over its pages. It was the *Kunstwart*, and it contained an article in which one of the most highly respected women in Germany gave her views on feminine homosexuality. She took up a strong position against the proposal to penalize love between women, saying that it would shake the whole structure of society to its foundations, and that in any case, if people wished to extend

the penalties to women, they would have to multiply the supply of prisons a thousand-fold. Hoping I had found a harmless topic of conversation by means of which we could chatter ourselves out of our mutual ill-humor, I handed the paper over to you, but with a curt "I've read it already," you refused my olive branch. We made up then in another fashion, and that very evening you told me a story of your girlhood, how your cousin Lola had kissed your breast. I inferred from that, that you held the same views as that woman champion of the freedom of sapphic love.

For me the problem of homosexuality was cleared up then and there; this assault upon your breast showed me at once that nature itself insists upon erotic emotions between women, since little girls, after all, are fed by their mothers, and not by their fathers, and the fact that suckling at the breast is a voluptuous act, is known to every woman—and every man too. That the lips which call forth this voluptuous pleasure are those of a baby and not of a grown-up, at the most only makes this difference, that the baby caresses the breast more sweetly and tenderly than ever a grown-up can. The writer of that article seems to me to have been right on the further point, that the foundations of human life would be shaken by the punishment of homosexuality, for it is on the sexual ties between mother and daughter, between father and son, that the whole world rests.

Now one may boldly assert—it is in fact being asserted—that up to the time of puberty, during childhood that is, people are one and all bisexual, and then most of them renounce love for their own sex in favor of love for the opposite sex. But that is not true. Man is bisexual all his life long, and keeps his bisexuality: at the most he consents at one or another period of his life, as a concession to the moral code in fashion, to repress a portion—and it is a very small portion—of his homosexuality, and in so doing he does not destroy it, but merely narrows its range. And just as no one is purely heterosexual, so no one is purely homosexual. Not even the most passionate Urning has escaped the destiny of staying for nine months in the body of a woman.

The expressions "homosexual" and "heterosexual" are nothing more than words, headings under which anyone can write what he will. They have no fixed meaning whatever, but are just something to talk about.

A much more important question for me than the love for one's own sex, which necessarily follows upon self-love, is the development of love for the opposite sex.

The matter seems simple in the case of the boy. The life within the mother's body, the years of dependence on woman's care, all

the tenderness, joys, delights and wish fulfilments which only the mother gives or can give him, these are so mighty a counterbalance to his narcissism that one need seek no further. But how does the girl come to turn to the opposite sex? I fear the answer I give to that will satisfy you as little as it does me. Or, to speak more plainly, I know of no sufficient grounds to give you. And since I have a not unreasonable objection to playing with the word "inherited" for I know nothing more about inherited qualities than that they exist, and indeed exist in quite other ways than is generally supposed, I am obliged to hold my tongue about them. I should merely like to offer a few suggestions. And firstly, there is no doubt that the preference of the little girl for her father arises very early. Admiration for the superior size and strength of the man, if that is one of the sources of feminine heterosexuality, must be regarded as a proof of the child's innate power of judgment. But who is to establish whether this admiration is there to begin with, or only comes about in course of time? Exactly the same uncertainty disturbs me in regard to a second factor, which later on has a strong influence on the relation of the woman to the man, the castration complex. At some time or other the little girl discovers her natural lack, and at some time or other—certainly very early—she is conscious of a wish at least to borrow the manly weapon in the act of love, if she is never to grow one of her own. If one may derive feminine heterosexuality from the years of infancy, it is easy to find sufficient grounds for it. But the signs of the preference for the man, of sexual preference, appear at such an early stage that one cannot get much out of arguments of that kind.

I notice that I am beginning to babble, and so instead of giving you any more learned talk I would prefer to tell you something else about myself and the number 83. In the year '83 came that ominous remark about masturbation of which I spoke to you; soon afterwards I was taken ill with scarlet fever, and when I got well from that there came upon me a great passion for the boy with whom I walked in the cloisters and whom I kissed. I have cause to preserve the year '83 in my unconscious.

One other trifle I have still to record. I spoke about my eldest brother's fits, which I consider specially significant in the development of my homosexuality. One of these fits, which remains the clearest in my memory, took place in the toilet. The door must have been broken open, and I remember the figure of my father, axe in hand, just as well as I do that of my brother, sunk down behind, sitting there unconscious with his body exposed. If you remember that the breaking open of a door contains the symbolism

for a sexual attack upon the human body, that here, therefore, to my symbolic feeling, the homosexual act was carried out; that, further, the axe revived my castration complex, then you have a connecting point for all sorts of trains of thought. Finally, I offer also for your consideration the fact that the parallel between giving birth and defecation here comes into force, and that the toilet is the place in which the child is best able to observe the sexual organs of his parents and family, and in particular, of his father or elder brother. The child is accustomed to being taken there by grown-ups, and it happens often enough that his escort takes advantage of the opportunity thus offered, to relieve himself. In this way the child's unconscious gets used to identifying the bathroom with his examination of the sexual organs, just as later it puts this room and masturbation into the same pigeon-hole of repression. You will certainly know, too, that the homosexual is specially fond of using public lavatories. All sexual complexes have some close connection with the evacuation of feces and urine.

It comes to my mind that I broke off my consideration of the sources of heterosexuality to give you memories of my brothers and a "bottom complex." The reason for that lies in to-day's date. It is August 18th. For about four weeks, that patient who reminds me of my brother has been telling me that, from August 18th onwards, my treatment will have no further effect on his progress. As a matter of fact, his condition to-day has even become worse. Unfortunately he cannot supply the unconscious ideas which make this date critical for him, and I, on my side, feel uneasy because I do not know the reasons for his resistance, and foresee all sorts of future difficulties.

The question how the little girl's preference for the man arises, is to me, for the time being, unanswerable, and I leave it open for you to reply. For my part I hazard the question that the woman's erotism is much freer than the man's in relation to the two sexes: it seems to me as if she had a fairly equal capacity of love for either sex, which can at need be transferred from one to the other without any great difficulty. In other words, it appears that, in her, neither homosexuality nor heterosexuality is very deeply repressed, that such repression as there is, is pretty superficial.

It is always dangerous to assign opposite qualities to men and women; one ought not to forget in that connection that in reality there is neither man nor woman, that everyone is rather a mixture of man and woman. With this reservation I am inclined to think that the problem of homosexuality or heterosexuality has little significance in women's lives.

I hazard yet one more guess; that the bond between women is stronger than that between men, which seems to me obvious and to be explained by the fact that self-love and love for the mother are directed towards one of the same sex. Opposed to that, so far as I can see, there is only one important factor which attracts her to the man, the castration complex, the disappointment at being a girl, and the resultant hatred of the mother, and the wish to be a man, or at least to give birth to a boy.

The case is different with the man. He is concerned, I think, not only with the question of homosexuality and heterosexuality, but with another that is inextricably interwoven with this, that of incest with the mother. The impulse, which is repressed, is towards a passionate relationship with the mother, and its repression, under certain conditions, drags all inclinations towards women along with it into the unconscious. Perhaps you would like to hear more about that later? Unfortunately it is all pure conjecture.

PATRIK.

LETTER XXVIII

It's not a bad idea of yours, that these letters should be published. Many thanks, my dear, for firing my ambition. To be sure, you've taken away half the pleasure I derived from writing them, and if you really think that I should revise and brush them up, I'll have nothing at all to do with it. My profession gives me quite enough to do. I've scribbled these letters to please myself, and work is no pleasure for me.

But I hope you do not mean this seriously. I can quite well imagine you were perfectly serious in what you wrote about my errors and exaggerations, my contradictions and superfluous witticisms, which you think are well enough in a correspondence between friends, but not suitable for publication. That attitude harks back to the time when you passed your examinations as a teacher. I have always liked you when you suddenly became solemn: I could imagine you in school raising an admonitory finger, and in mocking fancy I put your right hand behind your back, made you hold a cane in it, and stuck a pair of spectacles on your nose. And then this figure, transformed into a lovable woman, seemed to me so irresistible that I intentionally encouraged you to go on preaching for quite a time, simply in order to reveal in the contrast between what you are and what you were pretending to be. However, to-day, I will treat your serious intentions in like manner.

Why should I interfere with the pleasure my fellow men will find in discovering the erroneous statements contained in these

letters? I know what a dreadful effect even quite perfect people produce,—we Trolls would call them oppressive angels,—and I know how much I enjoyed exposing any sort of stupidity myself, hence I am not so uncharitable as to grudge this enjoyment to others. Besides, I count on giving so much that is useful that no one will bother about the rubbish. I want, or rather I am obliged, to believe that; otherwise my own self-esteem would desert me, and I really could not live without that. My behavior is much the same sort of thing as I was trying to describe to you in talking of spots on the face, or the evil-smelling breath. One is not quite sure whether one's affection is returned, one would very much like to find out, and one creates for oneself something or other that is calculated to put people off. "If I am still pleasing to the object of my adoration when I have a cold in my nose, or sweating feet, then there is no doubt of her love," thinks the Es. The bride thinks so when she becomes peevish; the bridegroom thinks so when he starts drinking before going to his beloved; the child thinks it when it behaves badly, and so does my Es, when it puts mistakes into my work. I shall let the mistakes remain as they are, just as they stood in my earlier publications, in spite of all advice, friendly and hostile.

Some years ago I sent a manuscript to a good friend in whose judgment I had much faith. He wrote back a charming letter with many encouraging words of praise, but he thought the thing was much too long and much too blunt. It resembled an embryo, with its sex-organs disproportionately developed; I must make it shorter, then it would be a fine child. And in order to discover what to strike out, I must follow the example of the man who was on the lookout for a wife. When he noticed that he was beginning to fall in love, he contrived to go to the toilet immediately after the presumptive queen of his heart. "If it smells as nice to me as fresh-baked cakes, then I do love her. But if the smell is horrid, then she's not for me. I followed my friend's recipe, but all that I had written smelt to me like new cakes and I crossed nothing out!

I'm going to make a proposal to you. We will let the stupid bits alone, but you shall write and tell me whenever you find a mistake, and then, a few letters later, I will correct it. In this way the conscientious reader, with his pedantic attitude, will get his fun, and then a few pages further he'll be annoyed by reading the correction, and we'll have our fun. Agreed?

Now as to the faults that I'm to get rid of altogether. First, there is the story of the creation of Eve. That has always offended you, and now you suddenly open fire with the heavy artillery of science,

and prove to me that this legend did not spring from the soul of the race, but owes its existence to the tendentious work of the priests, in the Old Testament. Very likely you are right: at least I once read that, too, but it left me cold, like a good deal else. For me the Bible is a wise and entertaining book, with beautiful stories in it, which are doubly remarkable because people believed in them for thousands of years, and because they have been of immeasurable significance in the development of Europe, and for all of us were a part of our childhood. As to who invented them, that is of interest to me as a matter of historical importance, but it does not stir my human emotions.

I grant you the stories were invented by the priests. There you are right. But you argue from that, that these Creation legends cannot be used for the purpose I tried to make them serve, as evidence for the childish theory that the woman comes into being through the castration of man. There you are wrong. I am not bold enough to maintain that the child has the idea of the castration-creation from the beginning, but think it much more probable that, originally at least, he knows about the birth mechanism just what he may have learnt of it through self-experience. And then on top of his original knowledge, just as it happened in the Old Testament, the priests of childhood, parents and others, laid the castration-idea, and just as the Jews and Christians have believed the fairy-tales of the priests for thousands of years, so the child believes in the fairy-tales made up from his own observations and by the lying lips of his preceptors. And as the belief in the creation of Eve from Adam's rib helped to bring about the thousand-year-old contempt for women, with all its consequences, good and evil, and still does so, in the same way the castration-belief works continuously on and on in our own souls right up to the end. In other words, it matters little whether an idea grows up of its own accord or is forced on us from without. What does matter is whether it penetrates to the depths of the unconscious.

I am going to take this opportunity of making a Trollish remark about the creation of Adam. He was given a soul, as you know, by Jehovah's blowing the breath of life into his nostrils. That particular way, through the nose, has always struck my attention. Judging from that, I said to myself, it must be something with a smell that gave life to Adam. What sort of a smell it was became clear to me when I read Freud's story of little Hans. It became clear to me, but you need not, of course, accept my explanation. The little Hans, in his childish fashion, holds the view that the "lump," the sausage in

the toilet, is more or less the same thing as a child. Your obedient Troll has the idea that the ancient Divinity also created man out of his own "lump," that the word "dust" is substituted for feces only out of regard for decency. The breath of life would then be blown, mingled with his living fragrance, out of the self-same opening as the feces. Certainly the race of man has proved itself worthy of such an origin!

Well now, most honored lady, in telling Adam's story have I rightly explained the childish theory of birth from the bowels, or has that grown out of the extraordinary relief which even the poets of the Bible felt after an evacuation?

The second error you have pointed out to me has made me thoughtful. It could easily be omitted, but I am going to leave that in, too. Let me explain why. In speaking of the castration-complex I recounted an episode from Reineke Fuchs, and in this I have ascribed to Isegrim the Wolf, a rôle that is actually played by Hinz the Cat. The causes of this confusion, I think, are involved, and I doubt whether I can unravel them.

One thing is clearly obvious; the wolf-complex in me is so powerful that it claws at things which do not really belong to it. To complete what I have already said about it, I will tell you of an incident of my childhood. Lina and I, when we were about ten and eleven years old, respectively, once acted Red-Ridinghood with other little friends. I was cast for the wolf's part, and I acted it with tremendous verve. Among the audience was a little girl of five called Paula. I hated this Paula, who was a pet of my sister's, and felt wicked satisfaction when she set up a howl of terror at the wolf while the performance was going on. We had to stop. I went up to her and took off my wolf's mask and quieted her. It was the first time that anyone had been terrified by me, and so far as I know, the first time also that I felt a malicious pleasure. And it was the wolf that produced the terror. That experience has remained in my memory, partly, too, because there were among my fellow-players in addition to my sister, the oft-mentioned Alma and a namesake of mine, Patrik, in whom I first saw an erection.

This Patrik was really a friend of my brother Wolf's, and therefore some years older than I. He was, however, for some reason or other left behind in the lower classes, which I attended, when Wolf was transferred to the Gymnasium. We younger ones used to bathe a good deal at that time in summer, and we shared a common dressing room. Here my namesake produced an erection for us, and also made some sort of masturbatory movements; at any rate he pointed

to a bright, sticky secretion hanging in a drop from the urine-tube, and this he claimed to be the forerunner of an emission, for which he would soon be man enough. This experience has remained only dimly in my memory; I have a feeling as though I had not understood all that was going on, had only looked at it calmly, as something new.

On the other hand, another display remains in my memory. This same boy tucked his penis and scrotum to the back, nipped them between his legs, and then pretended to be a girl. I often repeated this performance before the looking glass, and every time it gave me a curious voluptuous sensation. I consider this experience particularly important because it shows the pure castration-desire, free from any admixture of anxiety. For my part, I personally have never been able to doubt the existence of this desire, as evidence of which I occasionally had fantasies in which I tried to imagine the sensations of a woman during intercourse; how the member is guided into the narrow opening and moved to and fro inside, and what sort of feelings are then set free. But since the day my namesake showed me how to become a girl, I have also observed other men, and have been able to make sure that the anxiety-free wish to be a girl is common to them all. One does not need to undertake a wearisome investigation in order to establish that. One only needs to know a little about the love-play between man and woman, and then one sees that the variation in which the man lies under the woman appears on occasion everywhere, and that no human couple has ever stuck to the so-called normal sex-act, out of regard for which all others are called perverse. If one thought it worth the trouble to go further into the matter—and a doctor ought to at least have that much scientific curiosity—one would easily discover among one's friends and acquaintances, conscious fantasies similar to those I have told you of, and if for once it really appears that these desires are entirely driven out of consciousness, all one needs to do is to bring such sexually normal people to an analysis of their modes of eating, still more of drinking, of brushing their teeth or cleansing their ears. Their associations then soon jump over to all sorts of other habits, to smoking, to riding, to boring in the nose and other things. And if all this is denied through the successful resistance of the will-to-be-male, there are familiar types of illnesses, of constipation, with their pleasure-yielding obstruction of the feces by means of the anus, hemorrhoids, which transfer the desire to this entrance of the body, the swelling of the abdomen, with its pregnancy symbolism, the enema, the morphine injections, and the manifold use of inoculations,

so fashionable in our repressed age; headaches, with their relationship to labor pains, work and the creation of work, of the child of man's spirit. Put my opinion to the test, rouse up here or there a man's resistance, and one day, usually very soon—there comes up the memory; what was repressed becomes conscious, and then it is as with us less normal people: "Yes, I have sucked a woman's breast, and if I have not actually done it, yet I have imagined doing it; yes, I have put my finger into the anus, and it was not merely that I wished to allay an itching; yes, I know that the wish to be a woman can be aroused in me."

But I go on chattering and say nothing about why I made the wolf the castrator, instead of the cat, and why I put a peasant instead of the priest who was deprived of his sexual organ in that illustration from Reineke Fuchs. It is easy to see the reason for the second muddle. From Pfarrer (priest) to Pater, Vater (father), the one who is to be castrated, is only a step, and the sound of Pater suggests the name Patrik. The threat to my own person in the animal's bite sufficiently accounts for the repression and falsification of the memory. The singular humor of the Es is manifest in this. It lets me get rid of the anxiety connected with Pater-Patrik, but at the same time it makes me substitute a peasant, and George—Hodge—is, as you know, my second Christian name. So do we mock ourselves.

But why have I changed the harmless, domestic cat into the dangerous wolf? Pater and Kater (male cat), they rhyme, and whoever is given to rhyming, goes on to Vater (father), and the unconscious often likes to rhyme. The father therefore was repressed: he truly was more terrible than the wolf. He had knives enough, for he was a doctor, while my brother Wolf at the most had a penknife, and on Sundays there was placed next to papa's plate a whole set of carving knives, some of which had a wicked likeness to the knife of that giant who ate men's flesh. It might easily have occurred to him to test the sharpness of this knife on my little penis; after he had been grinding it for a time, it looked quite dangerous. It occurs to me now, too, why he seemed to me like a cat. One of his adorers had praised his fine legs, and to please her he used to swagger round in high boots. "Puss in Boots," that was who he was, and I was reading this story at the time unusual delight, and had secured a cut-out puzzle of little picture-scrapes giving gaily colored scenes from this fairy tale.

Now the case is clear. For anyone who suffers from castration-anxiety, the father is worse than the brother: The cat he sees daily is worse than the wolf whom he knows only by hearsay in fairy tales.

And then the wolf only eats sheep, and I no more thought of myself then as a stupid sheep than I do now; but the cat eats mice—as is shown by women's fear of mice; the mouse runs up under their clothes, it wants to get to the hole that is hidden there.

Behind this dread that the father-in-boots might eat up my little mouse, something else still is hidden, something dreadful, something devilish. Puss-in-Boots overcomes a sorcerer who transforms himself into an elephant and then into a tiny mouse. The symbolism of erection and relaxation is obvious, and since I certainly did not know of these phenomena from my own physical experience at the age when I read the fairy tale and saw the Kaulsbach illustrations, I incline to the conclusion that the sorcerer who changed into an elephant and a mouse was my father, his castle and kingdom my mother, and I myself the puss-in-boots, as well as his owner, the miller's youngest son. As I realized that I could not destroy the whole of this man-elephant, it seemed reasonable at least to devour the symbol of paternity, the mouse, the father's member. And actually there seems to come before my eyes the picture of myself at that time, wearing my very first pair of Hessian boots. In the fairy tale, as in the picture, I saw my own castration, and, more horrible still, the criminal wish to devour the father's mouse in order to succeed in getting possession of the mother: both were repressed, and what remained was the dangerous rivalry with brother Wolf. And in this way we get a new light on the substitution of Hodge-George for Pfarrer-Vater. The wish to castrate the father will surely be punished with my own castration. My Es, it appears, has a more or less sensitive conscience, so it repressed the crime but insisted on the expiation, and in this way made it as though the wish had never existed.

Let me draw your attention now for one moment more to the boots: they appear also in the story of Hop-o'-my-Thumb, and may be looked on as an erection-symbol. Now you ought to try to find what meaning they have for you. First the boots might stand for the mother; indeed, according to my idea they are the mother, and also the woman, for she has two openings, the anus and the vagina, which are the boot-legs. Since they make a pair, they may also be the testicles, the eyes, the ears, perhaps also the hands, which in their preparatory play lead on in seven-leagued strides to erection and masturbation.

Here I reach the third reason for the repression, masturbation, an entirely personal reason which finds no support in the fairy tale but only in my own experience. At that time I learned that now and

then the male cat ate up his own children. If I am to be the cat, then my penis was my own child, which as the mouse is weakened to the point of destruction by the boot-play of both hands in masturbating. Evil habit!

You see, if I take the trouble, I can invent fairly satisfactory reasons for my error, but it goes against the grain to do it. I claim the right to make mistakes, since I consider truth and reality to be doubtful blessings.

With every good wish to you and yours,

PATRIK.

LETTER XXIX

You do not reply, my dear, and I am all in the dark as to whether you are cross, or whether, as it is so prettily put, you "haven't time." I will take a chance and go on with my theories regarding the symbolic significance of animals although I don't know whether or not you approve of the letters being published with their mistakes left in.

I spoke about your sensations at the sight of a mouse, but I finished only half of what there was to say. If the mouse merely signified running up under the skirt, women's fear would not be so disproportionately great. The mouse, as a thieving animal, is the natural symbol of masturbation and, in consequence, of castration. In other words, the girl has the vague idea, "My penis is running about there on four legs: as a punishment it was taken away from me, as a punishment it was given a life of its own."

There you have something of a belief in ghosts, of superstition: if ever one goes into the origin of ghost stories, one very soon arrives at the problem of erotism and guilt.

This peculiar symbolization of the mouse as a member, slipping about freely, brings me to its relative, the rat, which appears with the wolf and the cat, as a castrator symbol. Rather strangely, it seems to be the most dreaded and the most horrifying symbol of the three. In and of itself, the rat is less dangerous than the wolf or even the cat. But it combines within itself both the castration threats, that against the father and that against the child. Because it nibbles off anything that juts out, it is dangerous to the child's own nose and penis, but in nature and form it is the personification of the father's amputated member, the spectre of that impious wish to destroy the father's masculinity. And because it gets into everything and forces its way into every dark place, it is at the same time the symbolic guilt and the parents' insistent curiosity. It lives in the cellar, in the drain-pipe, in the woman. Hateful, hateful!

In the dark cellar there lives also the toad, moist to the touch,

and flabby. And popular belief takes it to be poisonous. "Little toad, pretty toad," that is something which is not for the daylight, the little pet belonging to the girl who is just growing up; it has not yet the steady warmth of love, but is only moist from hidden desire. The contrasting symbol is the thieving little mouse with its soft fur, the precocious girl, who makes for the larder. And at once one thinks of the word "kitten" used in every language to denote the soft curling hair of the woman's pubis, or as a name for the sexual parts, and for the sleek woman, *chat noir*, the cat which catches the mouse, plays with it, and eats it up, just as the woman devours the man's mouse with her hungry organ.

Did you ever see the childish drawing of the woman's organ which hobbledehoy will make on walls and benches, in their foolish longing? There you have before your eyes the source of the expression "beetle" for a loving girl, but it also makes clear why the spider is used as a term of insult for a woman; the spider, which spins its web and sucks out the blood of the fly. The familiar spider proverb, "*matin chagrin, soir espoir*," expresses the woman's attitude towards her sexuality; the more ardent the bliss of her night of love, the more despondently will she, on waking, look upon the man to see what he is thinking of her abandonment. For more and more insistently life forces upon women a morality which seems to condemn all sensuality.

Symbols have a dual significance: the tree, if you are considering its trunk, is a phallus symbol, one that is quite respectable and sanctioned by custom, for even the primmest miss is not too shy to contemplate her family tree upon the wall, although she must know that the hundred organs of procreation of all her ancestors are leaping out at her from the picture, all swelling with power. But as soon as you think of the fruit, the tree becomes a woman symbol, becomes "the oak" or "the beech." Before I forget it, I must tell you that for some weeks I have derived much amusement by asking everyone what kind of trees are growing near the entrance to my sanitarium. Up to the present I have not once been given the right answer. They are birches; their shoots are made into canes, which we feared and still more desired, for in all the many naughtinesses of children, and of grown-ups, there lives the yearning for the burning sting of blows. And at the entrance gate, so that everyone strides over it, there stands a cornerstone, projecting and round like a phallus. That, too, nobody has noticed. It is the stone of stumbling and offense.

Pardon the interruption. Other symbols, too, have a double meaning. Thus the eye both receives and emits rays, and the sun,

in its fertility, is the mother, but in its golden radiance is the man and the hero. So it is, too, with the animals, and most of all with the horse, which is sometimes equivalent to the woman, on whom one rides, who carries about during pregnancy the fruit of her body, and sometimes the man who bears the burden of the family upon him, and will give to a crowing youngster a trot on his knee or his shoulders.

This double application of animal symbols is supported by a curious proceeding on the part of my unconscious, originating from the castration complex. If I pass by a wagon drawn by cattle and glance at it, I do not know whether the draught animals are cows or oxen. I have to look for quite a time before I find the distinctive signs. And it is not only I, who am like this, but many, many other people, while those who can distinguish a cock from a hen canary are just as rare. I go rather far in this respect. If I am looking at a fowl run, I can tell the large cock from his hens, but if young cockerels are there too, I find it difficult to distinguish them, and if I meet a single fowl by itself, I am puzzled. I do not remember ever consciously noticing a stallion, a bull or a ram; for me a horse is just a horse, an ox is an ox, and a sheep is a sheep, and if in theory I know what a mare is, or a gelding, and which is a sheep or a wether, still I cannot make use of this knowledge in practice without an effort, nor can I make sure when or how I got hold of the information. Obviously this is the effect of some early prohibition connected with an unconscious anxiety as to my own castration. At the ripe age of fifty-four, I became the owner of a fine Tom cat. What a shame that you could not witness the amazement that befell me when I came to notice his testicles!

This brings me back again to the subject of castration, and I must say a few more words about animals, which, in symbolic form, have a strange life in the dim regions of the human soul. Do you remember how we went to Kleist's grave in Wannsee together? It was long since, we were both still young and enthusiastic, and had hoped to get I know not what lofty emotions, from this visit of ours to the dead poet whom we loved. And while you were gazing, full of devout reverence, at the holy mound from which I was plucking an ivy leaf, a wretched caterpillar fell on the back of your neck. You shrieked, turned pale, and trembled, and Kleist and all else were forgotten. I laughed and nonchalantly took away the caterpillar, but if you had not been so taken with your own terror, you would certainly have noticed that I removed it with the ivy leaf, because it would have made me creep to touch it. Of what avail are courage

and strength against the might of the symbol? If at the sight of such a little, many-legged, crawling penis, there falls upon us the whole weight of mother incest, masturbation, and the castration of one's father and oneself, we turn into four-year-old children and nothing we can do can change it.

Yesterday I walked across the park. There is always a great assemblage of baby carriages, of youngsters playing, and nursemaids. A fat-cheeked little girl of three or so was radiant as she carried a long earthworm to her mother. The creature was winding about between her little fingers, and the mother shrieked out, struck at the child's hand, exclaiming "Ugh! ugh!" and knocked the horrid worm far down the slope with the tip of her umbrella. Growing paler, she kept on scolding while busily wiping the infant's hands. I should like to have become angry with the mother, only I understood her too well. A red worm, that crawls into holes; what is the use of Darwin teaching about the beneficent labor of the worm, in the face of that?

"Ugh! ugh!" That is all the mother's knowledge of training children amounts to. Everything the child likes is to be made disgusting to him. And one may not remonstrate against it. The joy in passing water and in defecating must not be suffered; otherwise, people think—I don't know with what truth—the child will never learn to be clean. But I will venture to ask you in the name of research, to pour some urine just once over your legs and arms; otherwise you will never believe that the child enjoys anything of this sort, and furthermore you will think those grown-up people who now and again indulge in it are perverse, unnatural, vicious, ill. Illness only comes in this way through anxiety. Try it. The difficulty is to manage it without embarrassment. That is disproportionately great. People have spoken to me now and again about this experiment—for you are not the first to whom I've recommended it—and if I am to believe them, they first got everybody out of the house, then locked themselves in the bathroom, and sitting naked in the bath so that they might clean themselves immediately afterwards, they have been able to carry out my suggestion. And yet we always keep inside the body this fluid which is thought to be so filthy on the skin, and never think twice about it. Are not men strange? Yet in spite of all these precautions the dread of doing the forbidden thing remained, only the pleasure came, too. Not one among the people who tried it has dared to deny that it was enjoyable. What an enormous amount of repressive power has been operative here to load with so much dread an act that every child can perform without

embarrassment! And now for the attempt to let feces remain underneath the body and to lie in them. Even to make the arrangements costs a terrible lot of thinking, and scarcely three or four of those who wanted, under my direction, to explore the development of the unconscious, have had the courage to carry it out. But what I maintained, these people have confirmed. Ah, my dear, whenever you read philosophy, and even when you read these letters of mine, you must read them in the same way as you would read a schoolboy's scribble. Nonsense should never be taken seriously! Only the Es understand the psychology of life, and the only literary interpreters it makes use of are the few great poets.

However, I do not want to speak of these, but to consider the effects of the "Ugh! ugh!" of the earthworm incident; you can apply what I say about people's ideas about other outlawed animals, plants, people, ideas, activities and objects. On these I leave you to your own reflection. And do not forget, as you reflect thus, to get a clear idea of the difficulty of all research into nature. Freud has written a book about the forbidden things in human life; he calls it "Taboo." Read it! Then let your fancy roam a little over all that is taboo. You will be horrified and yet astonished at what, in spite of this, the spirit of man has accomplished. And finally you will ask yourself what may be the reason that the Es plays such a curious game with itself, why it creates obstacles merely in order to surmount them with a great deal of trouble. And finally you will capture joy so great, you cannot imagine how great it is. I think this is what the feeling of reverence must be like.

You know, training gets rid of nothing; it only represses. Even that delight in the earthworm cannot be destroyed. There is one curious form in which it returns, the form of a body worm. The germs of this visitor, I imagine, are everywhere in our intestines, they come into everyone's body, often and often, but the Es cannot use them, and so it kills them. One day, however, the Es of this person or that becomes just as a child, has childish fantasies, and remembers its interest in the earthworm. Straightway it makes an image for itself out of the eggs of the body worm. It laughs at the mother's "Ugh! ugh!" and snaps its fingers at her, and at the same time it remembers that the worm is also a child, so it laughs still more and plays at being pregnant with the intestinal worm, and another day it will play at castration, or at having children. And then it makes the body worm—or it may be, the little white worms with whose assistance one secures permission to insert a finger in the anus, and so to get the greatest pleasure out of anal masturba-

tion—then it makes these worms leave the body through the bowel opening.

Now please, dear, read this passage aloud to your medical advisor. You'll have great fun in seeing the sort of reception he'll give to this seriously-intended theory of a serious-minded colleague, concerning the disposition to disease.

I still have to tell you a story about the snail. It concerns someone we both know, but I shall not tell you her name, or you would probably begin to tease her. I was going for a walk with her when she suddenly began to tremble, all the blood went out of her cheeks, and her heart began beating so hard that one saw the veins pulsating in her neck. The sweat of fear broke out on her forehead. What was it all about? A slug was crawling in our path. We had been speaking of fidelity, and she had complained of her husband, whom she suspected of dalliance. She had long had the idea, she said, of tearing off his member and trampling on it. So the slug was this torn off member. That seemed enough to account for everything, but for some unknown reason I was dissatisfied and stuck to it, in spite of everything, that there must be some other hidden motive. One must have been unfaithful oneself to feel such raging jealousy. Then it shortly became clear how no one feels jealousy unless one has been themselves untrue: this friend had not been thinking of her husband's organ, but of mine. We both laughed over that, but as I could not help going on being the schoolmaster, I gave her a little lecture. "You are between Scylla and Charybdis," said I. "If you love me, you'll be unfaithful to your husband, and if you stick to him, you'll deny me and your great love for me. Small wonder that you cannot go on, since you see that you will soon be forced to trample on the slug, either his member or mine." Such incidents are not rare. There are people who fall in love in their youth and hug this first love to their bosoms as an ideal vision, but marry someone else. If now they become dissatisfied with their bargain and have injured their partner in any way, they bring forth this ideal, make comparisons with the reality, bewail the fact that they married the wrong one, and presently find all sorts of grounds for proving how wicked the person is whom they have married and grieved. That is clever, but unfortunately, too clever! For the reflection follows that they were unfaithful to their first love in marrying another, and unfaithful to the second in holding fast to the first. Thou shalt not commit adultery!

Such behavior, which is of some importance, is difficult to understand. I have long searched for a reason why people like this—

they are anything but rare—get themselves into this situation of perpetual infidelity. My friend solved the riddle for me, and it was on this account particularly that I told you the story of the slug. She had on the inner side of the upper thigh, right under the bend of the leg, a small penis-like outgrowth as long as my finger. This worried her terribly. From time to time it got sore. Some strange chance determined it that this soreness came on several times during my treatment, and disappeared every time when repressed homosexual trends had come to the surface. She had long been advised to have the growth removed, but had not had it done. I pressed her until the fact came out, broken into a thousand splinters, that she wore this little tail out of love for her mother. All her life long she had insisted that she hated this mother, but I had never believed her, although she never tired of telling me stories to prove her hate. The reason for my disbelief was, that her undeniably strong affection for me, bore all the signs of a mother transference. It went on for a long time, but finally there emerged a sort of mosaic picture, partly damaged, of course, in which everything was portrayed, the ardent love for the breast, for the mother, for her arms, the repression in favor of the father, associated with a pregnancy, the springing up of hatred with its homosexual remnants. I cannot give you all the details, but the result was that this woman, whom I saw again the following year, was operated upon and felt no further dread of infidelity or of slugs. You can believe what you like, but for my part I am convinced that she brought about the growth out of love for her mother. And now I have still to add that the slug is a dual symbol, the phallus, by reason of its shape and its feelers, the female organ, by reason of its slimy secretion. Scientifically speaking also, it is double sexed.

I must tell you a little story about the Axolotl too. You have seen this creature in the Berlin Aquarium, and know how much it resembles an embryo. In front of the axolotl's tank in that aquarium once, a woman standing near me nearly fainted. She, too, pretended she hated her mother, as is always the case. She was very fond of children, but she had come to hate her mother while the latter was pregnant, and in spite of all her longing she had had no children. Look carefully at childless women, if they really love children. There is one of life's commonest tragedies. For all these women—I venture to say, all—bear hatred towards their mothers in their hearts, but crushed into a corner there mournfully sits the repressed love. If you can help it to escape from its repression, that woman will seek and find a man to give her a child.

I could go on talking in this fashion, but my attention is captured by a spectacle of which I will tell you. The best comes at the end. As I write I am sitting on that terrace crowded with baby carriages, which I mentioned before. In front of me two children are playing with a dog, a boy and a girl. The dog lies on his back and they are tickling his belly, and every time, in response to the tickling, the dog's little red penis shows itself, and the children laugh. Finally they have carried their play to such a point that the dog ejaculates his semen. That makes the children thoughtful. They run to their mother and pay no more attention to the dog.

Have you noticed how often grown-ups will tickle a dog with the toe of their boot? Memories of childhood! And since the dogs cannot talk, one must watch them and see what they do. Many of them react to the smell of menstruation, and many masturbate by rubbing against people's legs. And if dogs say nothing, question people. You must ask with confidence or you will get no answer. Intercourse with animals, too, is considered perverse and experiences with dogs are deeply repressed. For the dog is not merely an animal, but a symbol of the father, of the penis.

Would you like to know still more about animals? Good. Station yourself for a few hours in front of the monkey cage at the Zoo, and watch the children: you may even spare some of your glances for the grown-ups. If in those few hours you have not learned more of men's souls than you will find in hundreds of books, then your eyes are not worth carrying in your head.

Every good wish from your trusty

TROLL.

LETTER XXX

So that was the reason for your long silence! You have again considered the question of publication, and you approve of my side of the correspondence appearing in print, but refuse to allow your own letters to be included. So be it, and may the Lord have mercy upon us!

You are quite right. It is time I gave some serious explanation of the Es. But words are fixed and rigid, and so I must ask you every now and then to go right around one of the words I've written and consider it from every point of view. You will then find some meaning in it, and that is what counts, not whether this meaning is right or wrong. I will make an effort to remain objective.

I must first impart to you the sad tidings that, in my own opinion, there is no such Es as I have been presenting to you, that it is a fiction of my own imagination. Because I concern myself alone and entirely

with the man, with the individual man, and shall continue to do so for the rest of my life, I must act in such a way as if there were, apart from the Universal Nature of God, individual beings called men. I must behave as though such an individual being were somehow divided by an empty space from the rest of the world, as if it stood alone and independent of everything outside its own imaginary boundaries. I know that this is not so, but nevertheless I shall continue to suppose that every man is his own Es, with definite boundaries and a beginning and an end. I emphasize that because, most excellent lady, you have made several attempts to seduce me into talking of the World-soul, Pantheism, the Divine Nature. For that I have no inclination, and I hereby solemnly declare that I am concerned only with what I call the Es of the man. And exercising my authority as letter-writer, I make this Es start at fertilization—at which point of this extraordinarily complicated business is immaterial to me, and I will leave it to you to pick out some one moment in the whole process of dying, and to take this as the end of the Es.

Since at the start I grant you an admitted error in my hypothesis, it is open to you, of course, to find as many conscious and unconscious errors as you like in my explanations, but do not forget that this original mistake of separating individuals, living or non-living, from the Universal, is a part of all human thought, and that our every utterance is burdened with it.

And now a difficulty arises. This hypothetical Es-unit, whose origin we have placed at fertilization, contains within itself, as a matter of fact, two Es-units, a male and a female. And then I look beyond this perplexing fact and see that these two units, which proceed from the ovule and the spermatozoön, are again no units at all, but multiplicities, coming down from the time of Adam and the animal world, in which male and female lie in inextricable confusion; though never mingled, it would seem they are always side by side. I must ask you to remember this, that these two principles never merge, for it follows therefrom that every human Es includes within itself at least two Es-beings, which, bound as they are into some sort of unity, are yet in certain ways independent of each other.

I do not know whether I need to display to you, as I have done to other women—and men, too, of course—the full extent of our ignorance concerning the further development of the fertilized ovule. For my purpose it is enough to say that after fertilization this egg divides into two parts, into two cells, as science prefers to call these beings. These two then divide again into four, into eight, into sixteen cells, and so on, until finally there comes to be what we commonly

designate a human being. Into the details of this process, thank heaven, I need not enter, but shall content myself with pointing out something which seems to be important, however incomprehensible it remains to me. In this tiny little being, the fertilized ovule, there is something or other, an Es, which is able to take charge of all this dividing into multitudes of cells, is able to give them distinctive forms and functions, and to induce them to group themselves as skin, bones, eyes, ears, brain, etc. What in the world becomes of this Es at the moment of division? Obviously it divides itself, also, for we know that every individual cell is able to exist and to divide independently. But at the same time there remains as well a something that is general, an Es, which binds the two cells together, which in some way or other influences their destiny and is itself influenced by them. Considerations of this kind have forced me to accept the hypothesis that, in addition to the individual Es of any man, there must also be an innumerable number of Es-beings belonging to the individual cells. And kindly remember in this connection that, just like the individual Es of the whole man, the Es of every cell conceals within itself a male and a female Es, as well as all the tiny Es-beings of the ancestral chain.

Please don't become impatient. It is not my fault if I show things in a tangle that are taken as simple in our daily thought and speech. Some divine being will lead us, I hope, out of the thicket which threatens to choke us.

In the meantime I will further confuse you. It seems to me as if there were yet other Es-beings. In the course of their development the cells join together to form tissues, epithelium, connective tissue, nerve substance and so forth, and each of these separate structures appears again to be its own Es, which is able to affect the general Es, and the Es-units of the cells and of other tissues, and is in turn influenced by them in its vital activities. And even that is not all. New Es-forms appear in the various organs, the spleen, liver, heart, kidneys, bones, muscles, brain and spine, and beyond these again we meet other Es-powers of the organic systems, for it seems these form artificial Es-unities as it were, which have their own strange nature, although one might suppose they were merely names and show pieces. And so I must believe, for example, that there is an Es of the upper and of the lower half of the body, of the right and of the left, one of the neck and one of the hand, one of man's interior and one of the surface. They are beings which we could almost believe originated in our speaking, thinking or acting, which we could almost take to be the creation of the much esteemed intellect. But do not

believe that. Such a view only springs from the hopeless, hesitating endeavor to try to understand anything in the world. So soon as we attempt to do that there is some assuredly malicious Es sitting in hiding which will play tricks on us, and laugh itself to death over our pretensions, over the desire of our nature to be great.

Never forget, dear, that our brain, and therefore our intellect, is itself the creation of the Es. Certainly it is one which can work creatively on its own account, but nevertheless it begins to function comparatively late, and its sphere of action is definitely limited. Long before the brain comes into existence, the Es of any man is already thinking, thinking without the brain, since it itself has first to construct the brain. That is something fundamental, something we ought never to forget and yet always do forget. In the assumption that one thinks by means of the brain, an assumption undoubtedly false, is to be found the origin of a thousand and one absurdities, the origin also, it is true, of valuable discoveries and inventions, the origin of everything that adorns life and everything that renders it ugly.

Have you had enough of the tangle we have got ourselves into, or shall I tell you something more still? That new Es-beings continually reveal themselves in never-ending variety, almost as if they were newly born? That there are Es-beings of the bodily functions, of eating, drinking, sleeping, breathing, walking? That an Es of pneumonia or of pregnancy will reveal itself, that these strange beings fashion themselves from one's profession, from one's age, from the place one visits, from the toilet and the bed chamber, from the school, from confirmation and marriage, from art and from habit? Confusion, endless confusion! Nothing is clear, all is dark, inescapable entanglement.

And yet, and yet! We master all this, we step into the middle of these foaming waters and dam them up. We seize hold of these powers somehow or other, and pull them hither and thither, for we are men, and our grasp can at least achieve something. It arranges, organizes, collects and completes. Over against the Es stands the "I" and however else it may be and whatever else one may say, for men there remains always the verdict, I am I.

We cannot do otherwise, we are forced to imagine that we are masters of the Es, of the many Es-units and of the one common Es, yes, masters even of the character and the actions of a fellow creature, that we control his life, his health, his death. Assuredly this is not so, but it is a necessity of our organism, of our human existence, that we should believe it. We live, and because we live we have to

believe that we can train our children, that there are causes and effects, that we are able to be useful or harmful in accordance with our thoughts. As a matter of fact we know nothing whatever about the connection of things, we cannot determine for twenty-four hours ahead what we shall do, and we have not the power to do anything of our own design.

But we are compelled by the Es to take its doings, its thoughts, and its feelings for affairs of the conscious mind, of our own design, of our "I." Only because we are immersed in error, are blind, and ignorant of every little thing, can we be physicians and treat the sick.

I don't know exactly why I write you all this. Perhaps to excuse the fact that in spite of my firm belief in the all-powerfulness of the Es, I am still a physician, that in spite of my conviction of the determination of all my thoughts and deeds by forces lying outside consciousness, I nevertheless always continue to treat the sick, and act before myself and others as if I were responsible for the success or failure of my treatment. The essential quality of man is conceit and overestimation of self. I cannot rid myself of this quality; I am obliged to believe in myself and my doings.

Fundamentally, everything that goes on in a man is done by the Es. And it is good that it is so. And it is also good, at least once in a lifetime, to stand quietly by, and as far as possible to give oneself up to the consideration of how things happen outside our knowledge or our power. For us physicians in particular, that is essential. Not in order to teach us modesty—what should we be doing with such an unnatural, inhuman virtue? It is purely pharisaical. No, but because otherwise we run the danger of being one-sided, of deceiving ourselves and our patients, by saying that just this or that mode of treatment is the only right one. It sounds absurd, but it is nevertheless true, that every kind of treatment is the right one for the sick man, that he is always and in all circumstances rightly treated, whether according to the methods of science or the methods of the old wife. The success of the treatment is not determined by what we prescribe, according to our lights, but by what the Es of the sick man makes of our prescriptions. If this were not so, every broken limb that was correctly set and bandaged would have to heal. But that does not always take place. If there were really so great a difference between the doings of a surgeon and those of an internist, a neurologist or a quack, one would rightly boast of one's successes and be ashamed of one's failures. But one has no such right. We do it, but we have no right to do it.

This letter, it seems to me, is written in an unusual vein, and if I

go on with it any longer, in all probability I shall either make you miserable or reduce you to laughter. And neither the one nor the other is what I am aiming at. I prefer to tell you how I came to take up psychoanalysis. Then you will understand more quickly what I am driving at, and will get an inkling of what sort of thoughts I entertain about my profession and its mode of existence.

I must first make known to you my state of mind at the time, which can best be summed up by saying that I had become mentally bankrupt. I felt old, I had tired of everything I used to hold dear, and above all, my work as a physician had become distasteful to me. I pursued it merely for the sake of an income. I was ill, of that I myself had no doubt, only I did not know what ailed me. It was not until some years afterwards that one of my medical critics told me what my trouble was: I was hysterical. The accuracy of this diagnosis I accept with all the more certainty, because it was made without any personal knowledge of me, simply from the impression given by my writings. The symptoms therefore must have been very clear. During this time I undertook the treatment of a lady who was seriously ill, and it was she who compelled me to become an analyst.

You will forgive me if I do not go into a long account of this lady's troubles. I should not enjoy doing that, because unfortunately I have not succeeded in fully restoring her, although in the course of the fourteen years during which I have known her and she has consulted me, she has become better than she herself ever expected. But in order to assure you that in her case it truly was a solid, organic, and therefore a real illness, not simply an imaginary one, an hysteria, that I was treating, I will mention the fact that in the years immediately preceding our acquaintance, she had undergone two severe operations and was handed over to me by her latest scientific adviser as a candidate for death, with a plentiful stock of digitalis, and other truck.

That she responded to my somewhat over-strenuous examination with abundant hemorrhages from the bowels and womb did not surprise me; I had too often experienced things like that with other patients. But what did surprise me was, that in spite of her considerable intelligence, she had an absurdly poor vocabulary. She would employ circumlocutions for nearly all useful objects, so that, perhaps, for a wardrobe she would say "the thing for the clothes," or for the stovepipe, "the arrangement for the smoke." Moreover, there were certain movements she could not tolerate, such as plucking at the lip, or playing with the tassel on a chair. Various things that

seem to us necessary for everyday life were banished from her sick room.

When I now look back upon the whole picture of the illness as it then presented itself, it is difficult for me to believe that there ever was a time when I understood nothing about all these things—and yet it is so. I felt that in this patient I had to deal with a difficult combination of so-called physical and mental symptoms, but how she had got into this state or how one was to help her out of it, I could not tell. Only one thing was clear to me from the start, that there was some mysterious bond between me and the patient, which enabled her to place confidence in me. I did not then know of the idea of “transference,” but was merely glad of the apparent suggestibility of my charge, and blindly continued my usual treatment. Even at the first consultation I achieved a great improvement. Up till then she had always refused to be alone with the physician during treatment; she wanted her elder sister to be with her, and in consequence, all inquiries were pursued through the intermediacy of the sister. For some strange reason she at once concurred with my suggestion that on my next visit she should see me alone. Only later did it become clear to me that this was due to the nature of the transference. It was her mother whom Fraülein G. saw in me.

Here I must interpolate something about the Es of the physician. It was at that time my habit to insist with great emphasis, without any fear of consequences, upon my smallest orders being obeyed. “You had rather die than fail to carry out my instructions to the slightest degree,” I used to say, and I meant it quite seriously. Stomach patients who suffered from vomiting or body-pains after eating certain dishes, I fed exclusively on these dishes until they had learned to tolerate them; I compelled others who lay in bed unable to move, owing to some inflammation of the veins or the joints, to get up and walk about; I treated apoplectics by making them bend over every day, and people I knew must die in a few hours, I dressed and took out for a walk; it happened once in my experience that one of these crumpled up, dead, in front of my door. This method of enforcing an infallible, authoritative suggestion, in the manner of the kindly, all-powerful father, I had seen in my own father, had learned from that great master of the art of the father-doctor, Schweninger, and had had something of it in me from birth. In Fraülein G.’s case everything went on quite differently from the start. Her childlike attitude towards me—indeed, as I understood later, it was that of a child of three—compelled me to assume the mother’s rôle. Certain slumbering mother-virtues were awakened in me by the patient, and

these directed my procedure. Later on, when I came to look into my own medical activities more searchingly, I discovered that often before I had been forced by mysterious influences of this kind to adopt some other attitude than the paternal one towards my patients, although consciously and theoretically I held the firm conviction that the doctor must be friend and father, must control his patients.

And now I was confronted with the strange fact that I was not treating the patient, but that the patient was treating me; or, to translate it into my own language, the Es of this fellow-being tried so to transform my Es, did in fact so transform it, that it came to be useful for its purpose.

Even to get this amount of insight was difficult, for you will understand that it absolutely reversed my position in regard to a patient. It was no longer important to give him instructions, to prescribe for him what I considered right, but to change in such a way that he could use me. But it is a long step from understanding this principle, to fulfilling the conclusions to be drawn from it. You yourself have observed me as I took this step, have seen for yourself how I changed from an active, exploring physician into a passive instrument, have often blamed me for it, and still do so, impetuously urging me again and ever again to advise here, to explore there, to help by command or direction. If you would only stop it!

So far as helpful activities go, I am hopelessly lost; I avoid giving advice, I take pains to free myself as quickly as possible from any unconscious opposition to the Es of the patient and its wishes; in so doing I feel happy. I see results, and have myself become healthy. If I have anything to regret, it is because the road I tread is all too broad and easy, so that out of pure curiosity and foolish wantonness I turn aside to lose myself in bogs and caverns, and thus bring trouble and injury to myself and those confided to my care. It seems to me that the hardest thing in life is to let oneself go, to wait for the voice of the Es in oneself or another, and to follow that. But it is worth while. One gradually becomes a child again, and you know, "Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven." At five and twenty one should give up trying to be big; up till then one really needs it, if one is to grow, but after that it is only required occasionally for the sake of the erection. To allow oneself to relax, and to conceal this relaxation, this ease, this freedom from erection, neither from oneself nor from other people, that should be the important thing. But we are just like those soldiers with the wooden phallus of whom I told you.

Enough for today. I have long been wanting to have your opinion as to my progress in growing childlike, in getting rid of the "I." I myself have the feeling that I am still at the beginning of the process generally called "growing old," which seems to me to be like "growing childlike." But I may be mistaken, though I am somewhat reassured by the angry words of a patient who revisited my office after two year's absence: "You have put on mental fat!" Please make known your verdict to your faithful

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XXXI

I would never have believed, most honorable lady, that you could be such a scold! It's clarity you want, that is all! Clarity! If I could get clear about the Es, I should think I was no less than God. Permit me, please, to bear myself more modestly!

Let me go back to what I was telling you in regard to how I came to be one of Freud's disciples. After Fräulein G. had recognized in me her "mother-doctor," she grew more trustful. She made no fuss about anything in the treatment that my work as masseur entailed, but there remained the difficulties in speech. Gradually I accustomed myself—for my own amusement, it seemed—to her roundabout expression, and behold! To my great astonishment, after some time I noticed that I was seeing things I had never seen before. I learned to recognize the symbol. It must have come about very gradually, for I do not remember on what occasion I first grasped that a chair is not only a chair, but a whole world; that the thumb is the father, that it can wear seven-leagued boots, that the outstretched forefinger becomes an erection-symbol, that the heated stove is an ardent woman, the stove-pipe a man, and that the black color of the pipe gives rise to unspeakable horror, because death is in the black, and so this harmless stove signifies the sexual union of a living woman with a corpse.

What am I to say further? I was seized with intoxication such as I have never experienced before or since. The symbol was the very first thing I learned in the whole field of analytical knowledge, and it has never since lost its importance to me. A long, long road of fourteen years now lies behind me, and if I try to look back upon it, it is full of strange discoveries of symbolism, richly varied and shot through with changing colors. The shock of the change which this insight into symbolism brought in me must have been immense, for in the first few weeks of my tutelage I was driven to seek the symbol in the organic modification of human expression, in what we call physical, organic disease. That mental life is one continuous

symbolization was to me so obvious that I impatiently pushed aside the masses of new thoughts and feelings—new to me, at least—that arose in me, and in mad haste pursued the working of symbolization in organic disease. And this working was, to me magical.

Think now, I had behind me my twenty-year-old medical practice, dealing only—an inheritance from Schweninger—with chronic cases that had been given up. I knew exactly what could be done on my former lines, and without hesitation ascribed the increased success which now attended me to by understanding of the symbol, which I brought to my patients like a raging wind.

As well as the symbol, I acquired, by means of this patient, a practical knowledge of another peculiarity of human thought, the force of association. Perhaps in this, other influences were also at work, journals and communications, gossip, but the essential part came from Fraülein G. I immediately conferred this blessing, too, upon my patients; enough of my medical habits remained to lead me occasionally into error, but at that time, to me, everything seemed very good.

And so for a time it went on, but soon I began to meet with rebuffs. Some sort of mysterious forces suddenly barred my way, forces which later, under Freud's influence, I learned to designate "resistances." For a time I went back to the method of command, was punished for that by unfortunate results, and finally learned more or less to find my way. Taking it all in all, my success went beyond expectation, and when the war broke out I had elaborated a technique which eventually met the requirements of my practice. When I was working for a few months in a hospital for the wounded, I tested my amateur, "wild" analysis—which I still stand by—and saw that wounds and broken bones responded to the analysis of the Es in just the same way as nephritis or heart-failure or a neurosis.

So far this has all been very nice and pleasant to write about, and it sounds quite plausible, but in the middle of this stage of development comes something puzzling: an open attack on Freud and on psychoanalysis. You can still see it in black and white in my book on the healthy and the sick man. I always imagined, and do still, that I learned analysis through Fraülein G., but it cannot be true, or how should I, at a time when apparently I knew nothing at all about Freud, have been familiar with his name? That I knew nothing that was true about him is evident from the words I used in making this attack. I cannot think of anything more stupid than those words. But where in the world could I have heard of him? It was only a short time ago that it came to my mind. My first ideas

I got many years before I knew Fraülein G., from an article I had read, and a second occasion was when I heard the name of Freud coupled with the term "Psychoanalysis," in the gossip of a patient who had picked up her knowledge somewhere or other.

My vanity prevented me from interesting myself in scientific psychoanalysis for a long time. Later on I tried to repair my fault, with a fair amount of success, I venture to hope, although there yet remains a weed here and there which I have not uprooted from my analytical theory and procedure. But my wilful refusal to learn has also held a certain advantage. In that blind struggle, unimpeded by previous knowledge, I came by chance upon the idea that in addition to the unconscious of the thinking brain, there is an analogous unconscious of other organs, cells, tissues, etc., and that through the intimate connection of these separate unconscious-units with the organism as a whole, a beneficial influence may be directed upon the individual units by means of the analysis of the brain-unconscious.

You must not think that I feel quite easy in my mind as I write down these views. I have the uncomfortable feeling that they will not survive your kindly criticism, let alone the serious examination of an expert. But since it has become easier for me to give an opinion than to give proof, I will take refuge in opinion here too, and say: "Every sickness of the organism, whether it is physical or psychic, is to be influenced by analysis. Whether in a given case one should have recourse to analytical methods, or surgical, or mechanical, whether one should prescribe medicine or a special dietary, depends upon what one is aiming at. Of itself, there is no department of medicine in which Freud's discovery cannot prove its worth.

Your reference to the fact that I am a practicing physician and claim the title of doctor is so very trenchant, my dear, that I feel myself obliged to brag a little more about how I imagine I understand and cure disease. But first we must come to some agreement over what we shall call "disease." I think we won't worry about what other people understand by the term, but will make sure of what we mean ourselves, and I therefore propose to enunciate quite definitely. "Disease" is a vital expression of the human organism. Take a little time to think whether you agree with this formula or not, and meanwhile I will continue as if you approved it.

Perhaps you do not consider the question particularly important, but if you had been trying for thirty years, as I have, to get a certain number of people every day to grasp this simple statement, and day by day for thirty years had found that it could by no means be driven into people's heads, then you would consent at least, when I emphasized its value, to understand it.

Whoever, like me, sees in illness a vital expression of the organism, will no longer see it as an enemy. It will no longer be his purpose to fight the illness, he no longer tries to cure it, he does not treat it at all. It would be just as absurd for me to treat disease as it would be to try to answer your teasing by pointing out the little naughtinesses in your letters very nicely and delicately, without telling anything about it.

In the moment that I realize that the disease is a creation of the patient, it becomes for me the same sort of thing as his manner of walking his mode of speech, his facial expression, the movements of his hands, the drawing he has made, the house he has built, the business he has settled, or the way his thoughts go: a significant symbol of the powers that rule him and that I try to influence when I deem it right. Disease is then no longer anything abnormal but something conditioned by the nature of this one man who is ill and wishes to be treated by me. One difference exists in the case of disease, namely that the creations of the Es to which we are accustomed to give that name, are under certain conditions inconvenient for the creator himself, or for those surrounding him. But after all, a shrill voice or illegible handwriting can also be intolerable to one's fellow men, and an unsuitably built house needs just as much rebuilding as a lung that is inflamed, so in the end there is no essential difference to be found between disease and speaking, or writing, or building. In other words I can no longer make up my mind to proceed with a sick man otherwise than with someone who wrote or spoke or built badly. I should try to make out why, and to what end, his Es made use of the bad writing, speaking, building, of his sick state, what it was it wanted to express in this way. I should inquire from the Es itself what grounds it had for acting in a way that was disagreeable, for me as well as for itself—I would discuss these and then view the result. And if one discussion was not enough I should repeat it again ten times, twenty times, a hundred times, until at last the Es found this talking tedious, and either changed its behavior or compelled its creature, the patient, to depart from me, whether by breaking off the treatment or by dying.

Now I grant you it may be necessary, is so in most cases, to reconstruct or to pull down a badly built house as quickly as possible, to put a man to bed with pneumonia and nurse him, to get rid of the edema in a nephritic patient perhaps with digitalis, to set and immobilize a broken bone, and to amputate a gangrenous limb. Yes, and I have the same well-founded hope that the architect whose new building is reconstructed or pulled down immediately after he has

handed it over to the owner, will examine himself, see his mistake and avoid it in future or give up his calling altogether, as that an Es, when it has damaged its own work, lungs or bones, and thereby suffered pain and trouble, will be reasonable, and will have learned its lesson for the future. In other words the Es can convince itself, by its own experiences, that it is foolish to spend its strength in producing disease instead of using it to compose a song, to carry on a business, to empty the bladder or to achieve the sexual act. But all this does not relieve me, whom my Es has made into a physician, from the necessity of listening, when time permits, to the reasons of the disease-seeking Es of a fellow man, of weighing them, and when it is possible and desirable, to refute them.

The matter is sufficiently important, looked at again from another point of view. We are usually accustomed to search for the causes of our experiences, according to whether they are pleasing or not, in the world outside, or within ourselves. If we slip in the street we look for and find some orange peel, or a stone, the external cause of our fall. On the other hand, if we take a pistol and put a bullet through our heads, we are of the opinion that we are acting from inward reasons, with intention. If someone gets pneumonia, we attribute this to infection, but if we rise from our chair, walk across the room and take some morphia from a cupboard in order to drink it, then we think we are being moved by causes within. I, as you know, have always believed I knew better than other people, and if someone has held forth to me about the well known piece of orange peel that suddenly appeared on the path, despite all the police warning, and caused Frau Lange's broken arm, I have gone down to her and asked, "What was your purpose in breaking your arm?" And if anyone told me Herr Treiner had taken morphia the night before because he couldn't sleep, I have asked, "How and by what means did the idea of morphia become so overpowering in you yesterday, that you made yourself sleepless in order to have the excuse for taking it?" So far an answer to such questions has always been forthcoming, which after all is not so very wonderful. Since everything has two sides, we can always consider it from two points of view, and shall find, if we take the trouble, that for every event in life there is both an external and an internal cause.

This amusement of the would-be wiseacre has had some strange results. In its exercise I have been led more and more to seek out the internal cause, partly because I was born into a time which prated of the bacillus and only of the bacillus, even if it did not still bow down before the words "chill" and "disorder of the stomach,"

partly because the wish awoke in me very early—probably owing to Troll arrogance—to find within myself an Es, a God, whom I could make responsible for everything. Since I had not been so badly trained as to claim omnipotence for myself alone, I attributed it to other people also, invented for them also this, to you, so offensive Es, and was now able to maintain, “Illness does not come from without”; man creates it for himself, uses the outer world merely as the instrument with which to make himself ill, selects from that inexhaustible supply to be found in the wide world, now the spirochaete of syphilis, to-day a piece of orange peel, to-morrow the bullet of a revolver, the day after a chill, so that he may pile on his woes. And always for the sake of getting pleasure out of it, because as a human being he finds a natural pleasure in suffering: because as a human being he has by nature a feeling of guilt, and wants to remove it by self-punishment; because he wants to escape from something or other that is uncomfortable. For the most part these strange causes are all unknown to him, indeed they are all removed from the conscious mind, locked up in the depths of the Es, into which we never look. Between the bottomless depths of the Es and our sane human intellect, however, there are layers of the unconscious which are attainable by the conscious mind, layers which Freud called capable of becoming conscious, and in which all sorts of nice things are to be found. And the strangest thing of all is that if one rummages through this, it not infrequently happens that we suddenly come upon what we call healing, too—by chance it seems to be. “Not all our worth, nor all our pride.” I must be forever repeating that.

And now in conclusion, a story, according to custom, or perhaps two. The first is simple enough, and you will probably think me silly in attaching any value to it. Two officers in the trenches were talking of home, and one of them said how fine it would be to get a wound which would entail the necessary leave of a few weeks or months. The other was not content with that; he wanted an injury that would permanently incapacitate him so that he could stop at home, and he told of a brother officer who was shot through the elbow joint and thereby rendered unfit for service in the field. “That would just suit me!” Half an hour later he was shot through the elbow joint. The bullet got him at the moment when he raised his hand to salute. If he had not saluted, the shot would have gone past him, and there was no real need for him to salute, since the comrade whom he greeted had already met him three times in the previous two hours. You need not attribute any significance to this; it is enough if I make a little song for myself out of it. And since I

have the well considered intention to find an inner connection as often as possible between an incident of being wounded and the wish of the Es, it has not been hard for me to read this into people.

Another gentleman came to me for treatment long after the war. Among other things he suffered from slight epileptic seizures, and in describing them he told me the following story. He, too, was weary of fighting and was occupied in thinking how he might be lucky enough to get out of the mess without the consequences being too serious. It then occurred to him—and this thought too was not a mere chance, but was determined by impressions received shortly before—it occurred to him how as a student he had been compelled by his excessively strict father to wear skis, how uncomfortable these were for him, and how he had envied a school fellow who in skiing had broken his right knee cap and was consequently absent two months. Two days later he was at his observation post directing his battery. They were being shot at by three enemy batteries, a light one that aimed short, a medium one that shot a good distance to the left, and a heavy cannon whose shells fell at regular intervals of exactly five minutes, just between the battery and his post. If he left his post immediately after this gun had fired, he could get back to his battery in safety, and this he did twice. Then there came an order from an officer in a safe position behind, that his battery must be moved. He was very angry at this order, and longed once again for his “Blighty wound,” and—yes, I must accept what he told me, and I believe it too—he left his protected position exactly at that moment when the familiar interval between the heavy firing expired. The result was fortunate: two seconds later he lay on the ground with his right knee cap shattered, had a fit, and on returning to consciousness, was carried behind the lines. Of course this was pure coincidence. Who could doubt it? But the affair had a little sequel, which is the real reason for my telling you the story. You see, since that time, this man has had a stiff leg, not absolutely stiff, but enough so that on passive rotation of the joint, one could only get to about 20° . According to the verdict of the people who must have known, since they were learned surgeons and had mastered the Röntgen technique, and moreover they bore really honored names, this was due to the contraction of the scar on the knee cap. The day after he related this story, he could bring his knee round to 26° , on the day following still further round, and after eight days he was cycling. And yet nothing at all had happened with his knee, except that he had spoken about it, and had been told of the strange healing power of the Es. But he has not learned to kneel and that is a pity.

His mother is a pious lady and would rejoice in his learning to pray once more, an exercise he carried on as a child with great zeal. But, it seems, he is still too much at odds with his father, in whose likeness he created for himself God, to bow the knee before him.

I have still another story to tell you. A young man recently visited me who was under my charge a long time ago. He suffered from frightful anxiety, which pursued him day in and day out. When he came to me he already knew that it was a castration-anxiety, and right at the beginning he told me of a childish dream in which two robbers came into his father's barn and castrated the black horse which was his favorite. (In contrast to his two brothers, this gentleman had perfectly black hair.) As a growing child—I believe of nine years—he caught a heavy cold, and before that had lasted very long he'd had a piece of the septum removed. I know that: it is a trick of the Es to castrate the father symbolically. And ten years later he had had both little toes amputated, and so had symbolically castrated his two brothers. But it had not helped at all; the anxiety remained with him. He only got rid of it after a troublesome analysis that lasted years. The funny thing about this case is, that the man has the vivid fantasy of enjoying sexual pleasure as a woman, and yet wishes to be heterosexually potent to an extraordinary degree. He has preferred the wish to be castrated, to become a woman, as he expressed it in his dream, to turn against his father and brothers, and has paid for this evil wish by the operations on the nose and the toes, and by anxiety.

The Es plays marvellous tricks, makes ill, makes sound, compels the amputation of healthy limbs and makes a man run up against a bullet. In short, it is a capricious, unaccountable, entertaining jester.

Affectionately yours,

PATRIK.

LETTER XXXII

No, my dear, that man's toes have not grown again in spite of the Es and of analysis. That, however, does not preclude the possibility that some fine day a method will be discovered which, with the help of the Es, will make it possible to re-grow amputated limbs. The experiments in getting different organs to grow again after their removal from the organism, prove that many things can be accomplished which thirty years ago we believed to be impossible. But I am going to make demands upon your powers of belief with something much stranger still.

What do you think about the "I," for example? "I am I," that is the fundamental proposition of our life. My assertion that this

proposition in which mankind expresses its egoism is a mistake, will not shatter the world as it would do if people actually believed it. But they cannot and will not believe it. I don't believe it myself, and yet it is true.

I am by no means "I," but a continually changing form in which the Es displays itself, and the "I"-feeling is one of its tricks to lead man astray in his self-knowledge, to render his self-deception easier, to make of him life's pliant tool.

I! With the stupidity which grows with our growth, we so accustom ourselves to the self-importance inspired in us by the Es, that we quite forget the time when we naïvely held the opposite idea, when we used to speak of ourselves in the third person—"Emmy naughty girl! Smack Emmy!" "Patrik very good. Chocolate!" Which of us grown-ups could emulate a like objectivity?

I do not wish to maintain that the child's idea of the "I," the idea of his own individuality, first arises in the moment when he learns to use the pronoun "I," this symbol of mental impoverishment. But this much at least one can say, that the consciousness of the "I," the manner in which we grown-ups make use of the idea "I," is not inborn, but only gradually grows within man's mind, that he has to learn it.

You must make allowances for me if I skip over a good deal in writing of these matters. No one can find his way aright in the middle of the "I," neither will anyone ever be able to come to the end of it.

I am speaking intentionally of the "I" consciousness as we grown-ups feel it. It is not absolutely certain that the new-born child is entirely without the consciousness of being an individual; indeed, I am inclined to think that he is so conscious, only that he cannot express himself in speech. I go so far as to believe that there is an individual consciousness even in the embryo, yes, even in the fertilized ovule, and in the unfertilized one too, as well as in the spermatozoon. And from that I argue that every single separate cell has this consciousness of individuality, every tissue, every organic system. In other words, every Es-unit can deceive itself into thinking, if it likes, that it is an individuality, a person, an "I."

I know this sort of argument confuses all our ideas, and if you put aside this letter unread, I shall not be a bit surprised. But still I must express what I believe: the human hand has its "I" as well, it knows what it does, and it knows that it knows. And every kidney-cell and every nail-cell has its consciousness just the same, and its conscious activity, its "I"-consciousness. I cannot prove

it, but I believe it, and for this reason, that I am a doctor, and have seen that the stomach responds in a certain way to certain amounts of nourishment, that it makes a careful use of its secretion according to the nature and the amount of food supplied, that it thinks over what it will enjoy and to that end it uses the eye, the nose, ear, mouth and so on, as its own organs, so that it may determine what to do. I believe it also for this reason, that a lip which does not wish to be kissed, although the person's "I" desires the kiss, makes itself sore, puts a spot there, disfigures itself, and asserts its own opposing will in an unmistakable and highly successful manner. I believe it for this reason, that a penis will protect itself against a sexual connection desired by the general "I," by means of an herpetic eruption, or will avenge itself upon the overpowering might of the lustful sex-instinct, by getting infected with syphilis or gonorrhea; that a womb will obstinately refuse to become pregnant, although the conscious "I" of the woman so greatly desires it that she is willing to be treated or to have an operation; that a kidney will refuse to work if it finds that the man's "I" desires something unreasonable; and that when the consciousness of the lip, the stomach, the kidney, the penis, the womb, can be persuaded into obeying the will of the general "I," all their hostile manifestations, the symptoms of disease, disappear.

In order that you may not misunderstand my otherwise confusing statements altogether, I must expressly emphasize one thing: the "I" that I claim for the cells, the organs, etc., is not just the same thing as the Es. Rather is this "I" a mere product of the Es, just as the gestures, the voice, the movements, the thinking, building, walking upright, getting ill, dancing, are all products of the Es. The Es-unit at one time expresses its vitality in this manner, and another time in that, so that it transforms itself into a urine-cell or helps to make a nail, or becomes a blood-corpuscle, or a cancer-cell, or gets itself poisoned, or avoids a sharp stone, or becomes conscious of some other phenomenon. Health, disease, talent, action and thought, but above all, perception and will and self-consciousness are only achievements of the Es, expressions of life. About the Es itself we know nothing whatever.

This is all pretty complicated! For if you picture to yourself how the Es-units and the Es-wholes are working with and against each other, and how they now here, now there, one time in this way, another time in that way, come together and separate from each other; how at one moment they make use of the general "I" in order to bring something into consciousness, and at the same

time to repress this or that into the unconscious; how they bring one thing into the general consciousness, another again only into that of the part-"I," a third is shut up in a room from which it can be brought out into consciousness again with the help of memory or reflection, but by far the greatest part of life, of thought, feeling, perception, willing, acting, passes into the unsearchable depths. When you remember all this, you will find it easy to realize how vain it is to want to understand anything whatever. But heaven be praised, not only is it unnecessary to understand but the wish to understand is merely a handicap. The human organism is so strangely ordered that it will respond—if it wishes to do so, not otherwise,—to a gentle word, a kind smile, a pressure of the hand, the cut of a knife, or a spoonful of digitalis, with results which only fail to astound us because they are so common. I have followed methods of medical treatment of every kind, at one time so, another time so, and have found that all roads lead to Rome, those of science and those of charlatanry, and so I do not consider it is of special importance which of the roads one takes provided one has the time and is not ambitious. And so habits have established themselves in me in the face of which I am powerless, which I am obliged to follow because they seem to me to be valuable. And preëminent among these habits is that of psychoanalysis, *i.e.*, the attempt to bring into consciousness the unconscious. Others do differently. I am content with my results.

But I wanted to speak of the "I" and of its manifold nature. One usually understands by that term only what I have been calling the general "I," which I use as a starting point in my psycho-analytical experiments and alone can use. But even this general "I"—which we may as well now call the "I"—is not a being to be easily surveyed. Inside a few moments it will turn towards us the most diverse sides of its serried and scintillating surface. At one moment it is an "I" that comes out of our childhood, later it is twenty years old; now it is moral, now sexual, and again, it is the "I" of a murderer. Now it is pious, a moment later, impertinent. In the morning it is the professional "I," the officer or the civil servant, at midday perhaps the married "I," and in the evening a card-player or a sadist or a thinker. If you consider that all these "I's"—and one could quote untold numbers more—are simultaneously present in the man, you will be able to imagine how great is the power of the unconscious in the "I," how exciting it is to observe it, what inexpressible pleasure it is to influence this "I,"—whether it remains conscious or unconscious of us. Ah, my

dear, it is only since I began to occupy myself with analysis that I have realized how beautiful life is. And every day grows more so.

Shall I tell you something that always fills me with amazement? That man's thought—the thought of the Es, or at least of the unconscious "I" life—appears to be like a rolling ball. That is how it seems to me. I see nothing but beautiful round globes. If one writes down a number of words, just as they occur to one's mind, and examines them, one finds they have grouped themselves together into a spherical phantasy, into a poem in spherical form. And if one gets somebody else to try the same thing, again one sees the sphere. And these spheres are rolling about, turning fast or slow, and shimmering with a thousand colors, with colors as beautiful as those we see when we close our eyes. Magnificent sight! In other words the Es compels us to associate in geometrical forms, which rearrange their colored particles like those pretty optical instruments which, in turning, always make new figures out of their colored glass.

I ought now to tell you something about the onset of diseases, but on this subject I know nothing. And about their cure, I ought to speak, if I am to do what you wish. And of that, too, I know just nothing at all. I take both of them as given facts. At the utmost, I can say something about the treatment, and that I will now do.

The aim of the treatment, of all medical treatment, is to gain some influence over the Es. It is the usual custom for this purpose to give direct treatment to groups of the Es-units; we reach them with the knife, or with chemical substances, with light and air, heat or cold, electric currents, or some sort of rays. No one is able to try more than one method or another, the results of which nobody can foretell. What the Es will make of such a means can often be judged with some degree of precision; often again, we merely entertain some vague hope that the Es will be good, will call our action satisfactory, and for its part will set the healing forces in motion. But mostly it is a groping in the dark, to which not even the most indulgent of critics can attribute any intention. This has always been the usual practice, and the experience of thousands of years shows that it can achieve results, favorable results. Only one must not forget that recovery is brought about not by the physician, but by the sick man himself. He heals himself, by his own power, exactly as he walks by means of his own power, or eats, or thinks, breathes or sleeps.

Generally speaking, people have been content with this method

of treatment, called "symptomatic treatment" because it deals with the phenomena of disease, the symptoms. And nobody will assert that they were wrong. But we physicians, because we are compelled by our calling to play at being God Almighty, and consequently to entertain overwhelming desires, long to invent a treatment which will do away, not with the symptoms, but with the cause of the disease. We want to develop causal therapy, as we call it. In this attempt we have looked around for a cause, and first theoretically establish, under the disguise of many words, that there are apparently two essentially different causes, an inner one, *causa interna*, which the man contributes of himself, and an outer one, *causa externa*, which springs from his environment. And accepting this clear distinction, we have thrown ourselves with raging force upon the external causes, such as bacilli, chills, overeating, overdrinking, work, and anything else. And the *causa interna*, that we have forgotten. Why? Because it is not pleasant to look within ourselves—and it is only in oneself that one finds some tiny sparks which can lighten the darkness of the inner causes, the "disposition"—because there is something which Freudian analysis calls the resistance of the complexes, the Oedipus complex, the impotence and masturbation complexes, etc., and because these complexes are terrifying. Nevertheless, in every age there have always been physicians who raised their voices to declare that man himself produces his diseases, that in him are to be found the *causæ internæ*; he is the cause of the disease and one need seek none other. To this claim people have assented, they have repeated it, and then they have again attacked the outer causes with prophylaxis, disinfection, and so on. Then some people came along with very loud voices, and never ceased to cry "Immunize!" This only emphasized the truth that the sick man himself creates his disease. But when it came to the practical application of immunization, once again people applied themselves to the symptoms, and what was ostensibly a causal treatment grew into a symptomatic treatment unawares. The same thing has happened with suggestion, and, admit it at once, with psychoanalysis. Even this method uses the symptoms, and nothing but the symptoms, although its practitioners know that the man alone is the cause of the disease.

And there I have my jumping-off point. One cannot treat in any other way than causally. For both ideas are the same; no difference exists between them. Whoever is treating, is treating the *causa interna*, the man who has created the disease out of his own Es, and in order to treat him the physician must watch the symptoms, whether he works with stethoscope and Röntgen rays, or looks to

see if a tongue is furred, the urine is cloudy, or whether he judges by a dirty shirt or a few cut-off hairs. It is the same thing in essence, whether one goes carefully through all the signs of the disease, or contents oneself with reading a letter written by the sick man, or with looking at the lines of his hand, or with dealing with him while he is in a somnambulistic condition. Always it is a treatment of the man and therefore of his symptoms. For the man, as he appears, is a symptom of the Es, which is the object of the whole treatment; his ear is just as much a symptom as the rustling in his lungs; his eye a symptom, an expression of the Es, just as is the eruption of scarlet fever; his leg is a symptom, in the same sense as the grating of the bones which indicates the broken condition of this leg.

If then it's all the same thing, what sort of purpose is there in Patrik Troll's writing such a long book, full of statements sounding as if they claimed to be new thoughts? No, they make no such claim, they merely sound like that. In truth I am convinced that, in analyzing, I do no differently from what I did before, when I ordered hot baths, arranged dietaries, gave massage, and issued masterful commands, all of which I still do. The new thing is merely the point of attack in the treatment, the symptom which appears to me to be there in all circumstances, the "I." My treatment, in so far as it is different from what it used to be, consists of the attempt to make conscious the unconscious complexes of the "I," to do this systematically and with all the cunning and all the strength at my command. That is certainly something new, but it originated not with me, but with Freud; all that I have done in the matter is to apply this method to organic diseases also. Because I hold the view that the object of all medical treatment is the Es; because I hold the view that this Es, with its own masterly power, forms the nose, inflames the lungs, makes a man nervous, prescribes his breathing, his gait, his activities; because, furthermore, I believe that the Es can be just as much influenced by the making conscious of unconscious "I"-complexes, as by an abdominal operation; for these reasons I fail to understand—or rather, I no longer understand—how anybody at all can believe that psychoanalysis is applicable only to neurotics, and that organic diseases must be helped by other methods.

You must let me have my laugh over that!

Ever your

PATRIK TROLL.

LETTER XXXIII

Your words sound the note of release! "I have had enough of your letters," you say, to which I add, "And I enough of writing them!" Unfortunately you still express the wish—and your wishes are my commands—that I shall say quite concisely and conclusively what I understand by the term "Es." I can say it no better than I have done before: "The Es animates the man; it is the power which makes him act, think, grow, become sick or sound, the power, in brief, which animates him."

But you are not helped by such a definition. I shall therefore have recourse to my time-honored means of telling you stories, but you must remember, with these, that the events which I relate to you are selected from far-reaching associations, and are the occasional incidents which break the monotony of wearisome treatments; otherwise you will get the idea that I think myself a miracle-worker. Nothing of the sort! On the contrary, the more I have to do with people, the more firmly rooted is my conviction that the doctor can do almost nothing by way of curing a patient, that the patient himself heals himself, and that the doctor, even the analyst, has only this one question to decide, by what artifice at any moment the Es is contriving to remain sick.

It is therefore a mistake to suppose that the patient comes to the doctor in order to be helped. Only a portion of his Es is willing to be healthy; another part wants to remain sick, and watches the whole time for an opportunity to be injured by the doctor. The principle that the most important rule of treatment is to avoid injuring, has impressed itself upon me more deeply with every passing year: indeed, I am inclined to believe that every case of death during treatment, every set-back, is to be attributed to some mistake of the doctor, into which he has allowed himself to be led by the villainy of the sick Es. Alas, there is nothing God-like in our doings, and the wish to be as God, which is what really impels us to be doctors, takes its revenge upon us, as upon our first parents in Paradise. Punishment, curse, and death attend it.

Here is a recent example showing what hostility the deep-hidden Es of a patient felt against me, though his conscious "I" regarded me with admiration and gratitude: One night the patient had two dreams which contained much that was informative. To begin with, he said he no longer knew anything of the first dream. But since he pondered a long time over this forgotten dream, one might infer that the key to the riddle lay there. I waited patiently for awhile to see if any memory whatever would emerge, but nothing came,

so I finally challenged the patient to say a word haphazard. A little trick of this sort is often worth while. For instance, in such a situation, I once had the word "Amsterdam" named, and for about a year a successful, an astonishingly successful, treatment turned on this one word. Well, this patient named the word "house," and told me that on the previous day he had been looking at my sanatorium from outside, that it had a quite irrelevant tower, that a makeshift bridge had to be tacked on to it because the house was in a wrong position, and that the roof was ugly. I cannot dispute—nor will you, since you know the house—that he was wrong. And yet these reflections led on to quite other things, to things that were far more important, that turned out to be decisive for him and for my treatment. That was proved by the second dream. The patient said, "It was a thoroughly stupid dream," and with that he laughed. "I wanted to pay a visit at a house belonging to a shoemaker. In front of the house two boys were scuffling, and then one ran away howling. The shoemaker was called Akeley. No one was to be seen, but by and by some servants seemed to be about. The shoemaker, however, whom I wanted to visit, I did not see. Instead, after some time there appeared an old friend of my mother's, curiously enough with a head of black hair, although in reality he is completely bald." If the patient had not laughed in telling this, if he had not previously been criticising the outside of my sanatorium, perhaps I should have been weeks in getting to the meaning of it. As it was, it came out quickly. The word Akeley gave the first clue. It had been taken from a recently published work by Arno Holz, entitled "The Tin-smithy," an extremely witty and erotic bit of foolishness.

Contempt for my person is to be found here, since the patient had been reading, a short while before, a book I had given him, "*Der Seelensucher*," by our familiar friend Groddeck. This, then, was "*Die Blechschmiede*," the shoemaker Akeley was myself, the shoemaker's house, my sanatorium. It also came out from this, that, as a matter of fact, on arrival the patient had been kept standing in the corridor for quite a time before anyone showed him to his room. He did not see me until the following day. This sort of criticism of the doctor who is treating him is to be found in every patient, it is always there, and the consistent nature of the disapproval, which is merely repressed, is evidence that we deserve it. There would have been no special point in relating this dream if it had not also given the reason for the patient's contempt of me. Instead of the shoemaker, there appears in the dream an old friend of his dead mother, who for some curious reason had black

hair. This friend of his mother represents the father, who is given black hair because he is dead. The hate, then, is not for me, but for his mother's friend, and behind him, for his own father. It is an amalgamation of three people, which shows clearly what a heaped-up mass of opposition my patient had transferred to me. But the mother's friend is also the patient himself, who rejoiced in a head of luxurious black hair. His unconscious showed him in the dream how altogether different it would be, if he had been giving the treatment instead of the shoemaker Troll. He was not so far astray; the patient always knows better than the doctor. Only unfortunately his knowledge is not at the service of his thought, but can only be expressed in dreams, movements, clothing, nature, symptoms of disease, in short, in a language which he does not understand himself. And in truth, this identification of himself with the mother's friend, and with the father, revealed more than the patient guessed. Here was hidden the incest-wish, the wish of childhood, the wish of every child, to be the lover of his mother. And now comes a strange turn. With a merry laugh, not in the least scornful, the patient said, "My mother's friend was called Lameer, he was a Fleming, his name has nothing to do with 'la mère,' the mother."

No, truly? Yet I think it has. And that augurs well for the treatment, for if the patient identifies me not only with the friend and with the husband of the mother, but also with the mother herself, then he has transferred to me the feelings he has for her, too, a feeling that cannot have changed essentially since his sixth year, for the mother died at that time. Perhaps that is well, provided his attitude towards his mother was good, that he obtained help from her. But who is to know that? It may also be good that he hated her even more than he loved her.

Here I must go back to the beginning of the dream, to the two boys scuffling in front of the shoemaker's house. These are easily explained. They represent the same thing at two successive moments, one of them being the phallus in a state of erection, the other, who runs away crying, the member as it ejaculates. Behind the first interpretation is a second, according to which the one boy was the dreamer, the second his brother whom he had ousted from the favor of their parents. And the third, most deeply hidden of all, is that the first boy is the dreamer himself who masturbates his penis, the other boy. This act of self-gratification takes place in front of the shoemaker's house, but the erotic fantasies of the dreamer, as the further progress of the dream shows, are concerned

not only with the shoemaker, but with the mother's friend, that is, the father, and behind him, well concealed, with the mother herself, "Lameer."

I tell you this dream because, without knowing it himself, the dreamer gives in it the points for attack in the treatment. First he reveals to the attentive listener, long before he is clearly aware of it himself, that there exists a strong opposition to the doctor, that once again, therefore, we have reached the point which may be said to be the one and only feature of importance to the treatment. For it is in the conscious or unconscious recognition and removal of the resistance that the doctor's activity is essentially concerned, and this will be the more effective the more clearly he realizes the situation. Furthermore, the dream shows from whence this resistance comes. It derives from the hostile attitude towards the friend and husband of the beloved mother, and before that again, from the struggle of the two rival-brothers for entrance into the mother, who, behind several concealing veils, is yet clearly the owner of the house, of the sanatorium in which one gets well, of the mother's body, into which one enters. Finally, the patient also betrays the complexes which are affecting him, the Oedipus and the masturbation complex.

There you have a sample of the way in which the unconscious, the repressed material, attempts to make itself intelligible. But I am carrying coals to Newcastle—for you tell me you have been reading Freud's "Dream Interpretation." Read it over again, and then several times more; you will be repaid in a way you do not anticipate yourself. In any case it is superfluous for me to go over the ground which the master himself has presented, and after him thousands of his followers, in ever new descriptions, to everyone who wishes to traverse it. Even the little story that follows takes a course which is known, or ought to be known, to you.

It concerns a little girl of eight years, who for some time had been afraid of school, although previously she had gone there quite willingly. Arithmetic and knitting troubled her. I asked her what number was the most disagreeable to her, and she at once gave 2. She had to write down a 2, and then she said, "The little hook underneath isn't easy; if I write it quickly, I leave it out." I then asked her what this little hook made her think of, and, without reflection, she replied "A meat hook," and then added "for ham and sausage," and then, as though she must obliterate the impression of this strange answer, or else explain it, she quickly added "I let the stitches drop in knitting and then a hole comes." If you start out

from this last tag, "a hole comes," you will realize that the meat hook is a hook of flesh, that the child is therefore passing through a period in which she is trying to explain to herself the fundamental difference between the two sexes. And in a very compressed form, through her anxiety, and through the mistakes she makes in leaving out the hook in 2 and letting her stitches drop, she lets us know of her theory that the woman, the 2 in the family, has no hook of flesh, but has lost it through over-quick writing, masturbation; that through the quick movement of the needle, in and out, there has come the big hole out of which the precociously voluptuous girl makes her little pool, while the boy squirts his fountain out of the narrow opening of the penis. That is truly a difficult problem for a little girl's brain, and it is no wonder that arithmetic and knitting will not go right. On the next day the child showed more of her knowledge, which this time was of a reassuring nature. She complained that she had had dreadful pain in defecating, and so laid stress on the fact that, as a substitute for the abstracted penis, the girl can bear children, even if this means pain. And then, in her mysterious urge to explain herself more clearly, she began to relate, to the amazement of her mother who thought she knew nothing, how she had been present when a calf was delivered out of the body of a cow, and how three sweet little kittens had been born from the mother-cat. It is droll to hear this bubbling out of a child's soul, if there is a leak anywhere in the layer which covers what is repressed.

In symbolic actions or mistakes of this kind, the unconscious is quite often expressed. Recently, for instance, I found one of my patients—he belonged to the so-called homosexuals—in a bad temper because he had broken his eye-glasses, without which he could not enjoy life. They had fallen from his nose as he went to remove a vase from the table. When I asked him to name other objects on the table, he mentioned the photograph of his friend, which was still lying there. As a matter of fact it was found buried under a heap of cushions and covers, with the back uppermost, so that one couldn't see the picture. It came out from this that the friend had been unfaithful to him, with a girl. Since it was not in his power to keep the youth away from the girl, he wanted at any rate to separate them symbolically, and therefore took away the vase, which represented the girl. There followed automatically on this, the turning of the photograph over on its face, the covering it with cushions, and the breaking of the pince-nez. Translated into the language of the unconscious it means, "I will not see the faithless one any more.

His back shall always be kept towards me, for that part of him has no use for a girl. Let the photograph be turned over so. It is, however, safer to protect the back. Let us cover it over with cushions. That's good; now I shall see nothing more of him, especially if I put a cover on top. It isn't enough. I'm suffering too much. It is best to blind myself. Then I shall not have to observe his faithlessness any more, but can go on loving him." And with that, the poor dear broke his glasses.

The unconscious makes strange experiments with the eyes. It thrusts retinal impressions out of consciousness when they are unbearable. One day I asked one of my patients to look carefully at the objects on her writing desk and make a note of them. When I required her to tell me what was on the desk she enumerated everything until she came to the photographs of her two sons, which she failed to mention, notwithstanding my oft-repeated warnings that she had suppressed two things. When I asked her why she had omitted the two photographs she was astonished. "I did not see them," she said, "and that is all the more surprising since I dust them myself every day, and did it to-day. But there, you see, my poor boys are both in uniform. One has already been killed, the other is now at the front. When it is possible to suppress my grief, why should I arouse it afresh through my eyes?"

Another patient complained that he suddenly saw everything black before his eyes; that often occurs. I told him to go back in his recollections to the place where the black mist had descended upon him, and to tell me what he was seeing. "Stones," he replied, "I was going up steps, and it was stone steps I was looking at." That was little enough to start with. But as I kept obstinately to the point that the sight of the stones had caused his dizziness, he promised to look out for this. As a matter of fact, the next day he brought out that he had often been looking at stones on the occasion of another attack. The matter was perhaps not altogether to do with the present, for he now knew that he had first experienced an attack of a similar kind in Ostend, which had always seemed to him a comfortless collection of stones and of far too many cold-hearted people. When I asked him what such a collection of stones and cold-hearted people signified, he said "A churchyard." Since I knew that he had been brought up in Belgium I tried to refer him to the similarity of sound between pierre (= stone) and Pière (Peter). But he explained that neither a Peter nor a Pière had ever played any part in his life. The next day he brought up the matter himself and said possibly I was right. The home in which he lost his mother at the age of six,

and which was soon afterwards sold, when the father moved to Ostend, stood in the Rue St. Pière, and even though the mother was not buried in the churchyard of St. Pière, still his nursery window looked out on the gigantic stone masses of the church. He had been to the church of St. Pière with his mother quite often, and had always been confused by the stone masses of the interior and the crowd of worshippers. After the word Ostend, Russia came to his mind, the land of Russ (= soot) the black land, the land of death. Since that day when he became conscious of the repressed complexes, he has never again seen black before his eyes; on the other hand his Es has not abolished another measure of repression. The patient, who was trained by his mother to be a strict Catholic, had abandoned his faith under the influence of the desire to repress; in spite of the relief of the repression, however, he has not again returned to the church.

Do you remember Frau von Wessels? How fond she was of children, and how sad that she had no children of her own? One day I was sitting with her by the edge of the wood. For some time our talk had dragged, and finally it stopped altogether. Suddenly she said, "What's wrong with me? I can see nothing at all on my right, while everything to the left is clear and distinct." I asked her how long this condition had existed, and she replied, "I noticed it while we were still in the wood." So I told her to name any place where we had been during our walk, and she mentioned some cross-roads we had passed. "What was to your right there?" I asked.. "A lady walked past us with her little boy. And now I can see everything clearly." And then she remembered, laughing, how she had entertained me the whole way, before we reached the crossroads, with the fantasy that she had a cottage far away from everybody, with fowls and ducks and all sorts of animals, and there she was living with her little son, while the father only came for the day now and then, to visit them. "If I had not known for a long time that you were right in your opinion that all diseases were created for some discoverable reason by the Es," she said, "I should not have been convinced of it, for my one-sided blindness can only have been brought about by my not being able to endure the sight of that mother with her little boy."

Hysterical? Certainly, no doctor and no educated person will hesitate about the diagnosis. But we two, you and I, have learned to smile at the term hysteria, we both know Frau von Wessels, and the most we can admit, out of deference to spectacled wisdom, is that this lady became hysterical for half an hour. But why should

we bother ourselves further with such a thoroughly stupid and diabolical word as hysteria? Let me rather tell you of what happened some years later.

One evening I met Frau von Wessels after the theatre. She told me she had gone there on the chance of meeting an old acquaintance of hers, whose name she had seen some hours before in the visitors' list. I was surprised to see that the top of her left eyelid was much reddened and swollen. She had not previously noticed it, but she took out her pocket mirror, looked at the eye, and said, "I should not be surprised if the Es wanted to play the fool again with a one-sided blindness." Then she began again to talk of the unexpected arrival of this former friend, but suddenly interrupted herself with the words, "Now I know why I have this swollen eye. It came when I read the name of this admirer of mine in the visitors' list." And then she told me how she had flirted with this man during her first husband's long and fatal illness. She mentioned all sorts of details connected with this period, and grew more and more taken up with the idea that her eye had become swollen so that she need not see the name that shamed her, accepting my counter-suggestion, also that her Es was appropriately punishing her in the very organ with which she had sinned. The results seemed to prove that we were right, for when she went away, the swelling had vanished. The next day she had a fierce quarrel with her second husband about her step-daughter, who was sitting on her left, and her eyelid slowly became swollen again. I talked to her later, and first she said that she, being childless, had not been able to tolerate the sight of her step-daughter, and probably for this reason the eye had again swollen. This led to a new line of thought which she followed up for some time. Possibly the step-daughter was also the cause of the eyelid being swollen the day before. Soon, however, she came back to her old idea that it must have been the name of her old friend in the visitor's list. "In a few days," she said, "it will be the anniversary of my first husband's death. I have noticed for years that I always become ill and wretched at this time, and I believe that I brought about this quarrel with Karl"—that is her present husband's name—"in order to have some reason for crying over my first husband. That is all the more probable since it has just occurred to me that the day before yesterday, that is the day before the swelling came on, I was in the hospital, and saw a man with kidney trouble who had the characteristic uremic smell, scraping the sediment from his tongue with a spatula, just as my dead husband used to do. That same evening I was sick when I looked at the horseradish sauce, and this

went away as soon as I realized the similarity of the sauce to the secretion on the tongue. The sight of my step-daughter was intolerable to me, because her existence brought before my eyes the fact of my infidelity to my first husband. For you can imagine that in that sad time I made a thousand vows never to marry again." Once more the swelling disappeared while we talked.

This time the inflammation of the eyelid was finally disposed of. But the next day, instead of that, Frau von Wessels appeared with an upper lip half an inch thick. Just over the top of the lip, right at the edge, a fiery-red spot had formed, which made the red of the lip look double its width. Half laughing, half angry, she gave me a letter which an acquaintance had written to one of her friends, and which this friend, full of disgust, had sent on to her, as friends are wont to do. There was to be read in this letter, after all sorts of other amiabilities, that Frau von Wessels, with her conspicuous and vulgar sensuality, was a real witch. "Look at my mouth," she said jokingly, "Can there be a better proof of my vulgar and sensual nature than these swelling, bright red lips? Fraülein H. is quite right in calling me a witch, and I could not punish her for lying." The matter interested me for various reasons, one of which I will tell you about later, and I devoted a good deal of time for some days to a thorough analysis, the results of which I will briefly set forth.

The matter did not rest with the death of her husband, nor with the step-daughter, nor with the former admirer: the crucial point was with this very Fraülein H., whose letter had given her the swollen lip. This lady—let us call her Paula—an ancient enemy of Frau von Wessels, had been in the theatre the self-same evening—Friday, the 16th of August—that the left eyelid had become swollen for the first time, and indeed had sat to her left. Exactly a week before, also on Friday, August 9th Frau von Wessels had been to the theatre. As you know, such repeated visits are quite unheard of with her. Her second husband was with her, and to the left of her was sitting this same Paula, who, she knew, had fruitlessly endeavored to entangle Herr von Wessels. On that first Friday, August 9th, Frau von Wessels had encountered the malignant gaze of Paula's remarkable gray eyes, which in certain circumstances have a particularly hard and piercing look. Such gray eyes belong also to the wife of the nephritic hospital patient, with whose furry tongue she associated the sickness on Thursday evening, August 15th. On the occasion of her visit to this patient, whose uremic odor reminded her of her first husband, his gray eyed wife had been there too. This lady is called Anna, but Anna was also the name of Frau von Wessels'

eldest sister, under whom she had suffered inordinately as a child. And this sister Anna had the same hard, piercing eyes as Paula. And now comes the strange thing: this sister Anna had her birthday on August 21st. On the 15th, Frau von Wessels had looked at the calendar and determined to write; on the 16th she had wanted to write but had gone to the theatre instead, to see a ballet, *i.e.*, to see beautiful legs; on the 17th, she had again postponed her birthday letter, which she did not write until the 18th, the day she had the swollen lip. Finally, on the birthday itself, the swelling quickly disappeared, and the analysis, which up to that day made little progress, suddenly went on swimmingly, and all sorts of tangles were smoothed out.

Frau von Wessels told me, "At about fourteen years of age, when I first understood about pregnancy, I compared the dates of the birthday of my sister Anna, whom I thoroughly hated at that time, and the wedding day of my parents, and as a result it seemed to me that she must have been on the way before they were married. From this I drew two conclusions, first, that my sister was not really legitimate—and this appears again in my inexplicable dislike, on August 17th, for my step-daughter, for she is not my child, is therefore not legitimate, but was born before my marriage—and secondly, that my equally detested mother was a vulgar, sensual woman, an idea which I believed at that time to be all the more justified, because during the previous six months—in my fourteenth year therefore—she had yet another child. As an analyst, you will certainly know what envy is aroused in the heart of an elder daughter by so late a pregnancy. I have always considered this calculation of pregnancy dates in connection with my sister Anna, to be the most miserable thing I have ever done, and even now I find it hard to confess. As you have seen from my lip, I punish myself for the shameful deed against my mother, by expressing my own sensual nature to the whole world, once Fraulein Paula's accusation has been made. I know that my sister Anna expected me, in my birthday letter, to invite her here for October, but I don't want to have her here, although I feel wicked in hating the idea. The mouth, which will not utter, must be punished. But it must also be punished because about the same time as I reckoned up the dates of the wedding and the birth, I made it voice a wicked vow that I would never bear a child. This vow was made when I heard, by chance, the shrieks of a woman in the throes of childbirth. The association with the mouth is made clear through an acquaintance of mine, who after a long period of childlessness, has become pregnant, and whose lips, previously tightly pressed,

are now full and red. I met this lady on August 15th, and talked to her about the coming baby. That is all the explanation I can offer for the mouth. As regards the eye, that is a very simple matter. Of my mother's numerous periods of pregnancy I noticed nothing at all, not even the last, although I was thirteen years old at the time, and knew very well how children came into the world. The attempt to make myself blind to pregnancy is therefore very old, and that I now take the opportunity by approved means to block up my good left eye—the right is almost useless—when the pregnancy complex in regard to my mother comes into the foreground, is not surprising. But there are still other things besides. For instance, I now know that in my visit to the hospital patient, it was not the uremic smell that upset me, but the smell of feces: that is, behind the memory of my husband's death was hidden the profoundly shameful remembrance of a moment when my mother was stroking my cheek, and I, instead of rejoicing in her tenderness, accused this loving hand of having a fecal smell; in other words, I transferred to her the habits which I as a child must have myself indulged in. I leave it to your facile mind to say whether the horseradish had anything whatever to do with my mother." Of this permission I took advantage. (*Meer-rettich* = horseradish.) Meer seems to me to be associated with mère, and the radish is a recognized symbol for a man. The phrase, "to stick a radish in the bottom," ("To send him away with a flea in his ear") takes us on to the smell of the closet. "The smell impression now leads me back again to the wife of this patient, and to her gray eyes, and to the hard eyes of Paula and sister Anna. The dread which I certainly have of Paula, is due to these eyes so like Anna's, which frightened me. But when I say that I hated my sister Anna, I must make some reservation. Something in her I loved beyond measure, and that was her legs and her drawers. Even now I have in my possession a whole collection of Anna-legs in lace drawers, which I drew in the margin of my book during school time. In any case her legs have much to do with my love for the ballet, and you know that on the 16th I went to the theater to see beautiful legs. And now at once there comes an association which takes me back to my earliest childhood, beyond which I can only reach by the road of fantasy. The fear of hard eyes, namely, goes back to my grandmother of whom I had a terrible dread. The first thing she did when we went to her, was to lift up our frocks to see if we had on clean drawers. I understood, even then, that this practice was directed, not against me, but against my mother, and because of her enmity to my mother, the old woman was revolting

to my soul. None the less, I think it possible that this inspection of my drawers gave me voluptuous feelings. But notice, the charge of my dirtiness which I took so hard from the old woman, I myself afterwards made against my mother when she stroked my cheek. That is bad. And something else still. One of my aunts—I heard the story in very early childhood—was repudiated by my grandparents because she became pregnant through her fiancé before their wedding. Again, the same accusation as I brought against my mother. My grandmother was an absolute witch, to me. And with this word ‘witch’ we come back to Paula and the events of the last few days. I knew that Paula, whose brain plays with all sorts of occult fantasies, ascribed telepathic powers to me and called me a witch. I have often applied the same term to my step-daughter’s own mother, whom I knew only by sight, or rather by sight and hearing. When I heard her voice for the first time, an icy fear seized me; I felt that there was something horrifying emanating from my childhood, in this voice. And when I saw the lady, it immediately came to my mind that she had my sister Anna’s hard eyes, and then I knew also that her voice was like that of my grandmother, the witch. The remarkable revulsion I had against looking at my step-daughter on the 17th, is connected with the fact that I was identifying her mother with my grandmother and my sister and my enemy, Paula, so that she called up the worst, most deeply repressed memories. So far as I understand the matter, I must therefore seek for the causes of the mishaps to the eye and lip in conflicts with my grandmother, my mother, and my eldest sister, which were aroused from their sleep under repression through the coming of the birthday and the meeting with Paula, while the yearly-repeated grief for my first husband is an attempt to cover up these complexes. The difficulty in seeing brought about by the swelling of the eyelid is the same attempt at repression in another form, in a symptom of disease; I do not wish to see and consequently when, owing to the accumulation of phenomena, I can no longer be prevented from seeing the complexes, there comes the wish not to speak to them at least, and this is expressed in the swelling of the lip, and the resultant discomfort in speaking. The two things are at the same time the punishment for looking at beautiful legs, and for abjuring all pregnancy.”

I leave it undecided, my dear, whether Frau von Wessels was right in her conclusions. Certainly she has even now suppressed a lot of material, and has scarcely interpreted a half of what she did give. I tell you the story, because here you have a not unintelligent woman describing, in her own vivid fashion, what I think about the

mode of expression of the Es through the symptoms of disease. But, as I have already indicated, I have still another reason for going into detail in these things. At the time when Frau von Wessels had this experience with her eye and lip, and spoke about the uremic smell, there was in my sanatorium a patient with kidney trouble, who had this characteristic odor. I received him in the last stages of the disease and undertook the case in order to observe and make easy his dying, because the shape of his mouth with its tightly-pressed, thin lips, seemed to me to be a confirmation of my belief that the Es, in keeping back the urine, is saying the same as in the pinching together of the lips. For me, the uremia signifies the deadly struggle between the repressive will and the repressed material forever trying to force its way up, the important urine-secretion complex, which originates in earliest childhood and lies in the deepest levels of the constitution. The case did nothing essential in forwarding my fantastic, unscientific researches—in which I have a personal interest owing to my own disease. I had then to decide to bring some strange incidents in the progress of this tragedy into connection with my attempt to interpret the Es. And here I must mention that already, after the first few days of analysis, the constipation from which he had suffered for years before was converted into diarrhoea, the stench of which was indescribably horrible. One could, if sufficiently foolish, read into this the mocking cry of the Es: "I will indeed give forth the bodily dirt which I used to hold back, but I am not going to surrender the filth of the soul." One could attribute a similar meaning to vomiting, which is certainly just as usual in uremia as diarrhoea; while on the other hand, with a little courage, one might say that the uremic cramp attacks, and finally the dying, are the means of compulsion adopted by the repressing Es to prevent the complexes from reaching consciousness. Lastly, a remarkable edemic thickening of the lips, which I have never observed in any other case, and through which the mouth lost all its tight pressure, may be interpreted as the mockery of the Es, which appears to restore freedom to the mouth, while in reality, by means of the edema, it prevents it from speaking. But all this is mere thought-play, which I allow myself to indulge in, but for which I have not the least warranty in fact. During this time, however, I had a comical experience which I am able to interpret with a certain amount of confidence, since I was the person concerned. In the days when I was busying myself over Frau von Wessels' analysis and her swollen lip, my patient had his first uremic cramps. I stayed over night in the sanatorium, and, as it was cold, I had a hot water bag in my bed. Before going off to sleep I was cutting a

number of Freud's Psychoanalytical *Zeitschrift* with a pointed paper knife, and turning over its pages. Among other things, I found therein a notice that Felix Deutsch had read a paper in Vienna on psychoanalysis and organic disease, a subject which, as you know, I have long been evolving in my mind, and which I have left to our mutual friend Groddeck to work up. Putting both paper and knife under my pillow, I began to fantasy a little on the subject, and in so doing soon got on to the uremic patient and my explanation of the withholding of the urine as a sign of repression. I went to sleep, at this point, to wake up the next morning with a strange sensation of dampness which made me think I had wet the bed. As a matter of fact, in my sleep I had stuck the paper knife into the rubber bag, and a small stream was issuing from it. Well, the following night I again slept at the sanatorium, and since I like to be munching something, I took some pieces of chocolate to bed with me, as I often do. What do you think happened? When I woke up the next morning, my bed-clothes and night shirt were smeared all over with chocolate. It looked horribly like feces, and I was so ashamed that I immediately took away the bed-linen myself to avoid the charge of having relieved myself there; that led me to analyze this incident a little. For it then occurred to me that previously I had thought, in connection with the accident to the hot water bag, that it meant bed-wetting, and since I had been so much occupied with thoughts of the uremic patient, I explained the matter to myself this way: "Your Es says to you that in spite of your kidney trouble you need not be anxious about ever getting uremia: for you see how easily you surrender urine and feces, you hold nothing back, you suppress nothing, you are like a suckling babe, innocent and open with heart and reins." If I did not know the cunning of the Es, I should have been content with this, but as it was, I did not allow it to satisfy me. All at once the name Felix shot through my mind; Felix, that is the name of the man who had spoken on psychoanalysis and organic diseases. But Felix Schwarz was also the name of a school friend and this friend had died of uremia, following scarlet fever. Schwarz (= black) that is death. The name Felix signifies happiness, and the union of Felix and Schwarz, happiness and death, can only be found in the moment of the utmost sexual delight, united, as it is, with dread of the death punishment; in other words, it is the masturbation complex, this early complex, which is forever taking possession of me when I think about my kidney trouble. And now it seemed to me that the explanation I had found for the two mishaps was sufficient. Two hours later I knew better, for when I went to the

bedside of my uremic patient, the thought suddenly came to me, "He looks like your brother Wolf." Up to then I had never noticed the likeness, yet now I saw it clearly. And darkly rose up before me the question, "What has your brother Wolf, or the word wolf, to do with your repressions? It is always coming up anew, however much you analyze yourself, and never do you find the answer. Even this one, that comes into your head at this minute, is not the last one, the ultimate."

Nevertheless I will not withhold it from you. When I was quite a tiny child—but old enough to remember—I often got a sore place in the cleft between the buttocks; *i.e.*, I had a wolf (= chafing). I then went to my mother and she would rub on some ointment. That certainly gave me an incentive towards masturbation, later, and was certainly itself a form of infantile masturbation, in which, in half-conscious, fox-sly cunning, I made use of my mother's hand for this wicked deed, no doubt remembering the voluptuous feeling which every infant gets during his nurse's cleansing. And when I had got so far in my analytic play, it occurred to me that earlier in the day I really had produced a wolf (chafing) between my legs, in cycling. "So that is the wolf you have so long been searching for," I exulted, and I was happy, and able to help the wife of my patient over a bad half hour. But when I went out of the door, I knew, "Even that is not the solution! You repress, and however much your Es and your friends may praise your candour, still you are just as other men are. And only he is honest, who says, as that publican, 'God be merciful to me.'" But do you not think that even this ultimate conclusion, precisely this conclusion, is pharisaical?

Adieu, dear one,

I am your

PATRIK.

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF RANK'S "TECHNIQUE OF
PSYCHOANALYSIS" AND "THE MAIN FEATURES
OF A GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY."

BY
L. PIERCE CLARK

The study of normal psychic life on the one hand and of disorders of psychic life on the other have been pursued by groups of workers who have had but little contact with one another. While the academic psychologists have concentrated their efforts upon the development and application of the experimental methods of the laboratory, the study of the disorders of mental life has remained in the hands of medical men who with few exceptions have had little sympathy with or knowledge of the results achieved by the academic psychologists.

An unbiased person cannot fail to note that the majority of the critics opposed to Professor Freud's psychoanalysis are foredoomed to failure. In the first place, they fail to recognize that Professor Freud is far more thoroughly grounded in racial culture, folkways, mythology and anthropology than many of the trained physiologists and experts in the wide field of anthropology. Before the advent of psychoanalysis his contributions to internal medicine, and neurology in particular, marked him as a man of outstanding ability, and his work on infantile cerebral palsy in Nothnagel's *System* is still authoritative. The foregoing explanation may seem unnecessary, but to those who are not so fully informed the matter is succinctly stated to show how Professor Freud's own works carry a signal refutation of his opponents' criticisms.

If one would take time to read Professor Freud in the original, there is hardly a single critic who could not find an answer to the very points to which he objects. Freud has a faculty of visualizing in advance the possible objections to his views, and he invariably meets all criticism as he proceeds to unfold his theories. Again, though the views of Freud may seem new to us, they have been maturing in his own mind for a number of years. In this respect one may recall the long ripening of Darwin's theories, mentioned in the preface to his work, *On the Origin of the Species*. Pupils of Freud might profit from his example.

Freud's contributions show a loftiness and dignity of scien-

tific spirit which are rarely attained in any other field of medicine. Assertiveness and dogmatism are signally lacking in marked contrast to those of his critics, and even those formerly accredited as his pupils who, though often classed as his colleagues, are really outside his principles. There are not a few still ranked as friends of psychoanalysis who are unskilled in Freudian principles and do much harm to the movement as a whole. The desire to keep the psychoanalytic movement free from narrow and pedantic methods makes one hesitate to sharply define what is and what is not psychoanalysis. Perhaps Professor Freud's own statement, "That is psychoanalysis which enables the patient to overcome his unconscious fixations and resistances," is certainly a broad designation of the art. However, one cannot stress the fact too thoroughly that there is but *one* system of psychoanalysis, and that system is due solely to Professor Freud's individual effort.

When one considers how the specialty came into being, its foundations resting firmly upon accumulated investigative research, no other branch of medicine has a better *raison d'être*. Fundamentally psychoanalysis is so opposed to all sorts of intolerance that the majority of workers in this field feel loath to withdraw from those who are obviously opposed to Freud's teachings until they come out clearly in opposition. The hope is that further research will show such aberrants where their theories and hypotheses are wrong that they may correct them accordingly. In the meantime much harm is inflicted on psychoanalysis, but we must be patient, for psychoanalysis as a system is still to be formulated. It is still in an experimental stage in theory if not in therapeutic practice. It is a poor test of the validity of a theory in mental science that it meets with therapeutic success.

Several years passed before many realized that Jung no longer believed in psychoanalysis. Even now many of his adherents speak of themselves as analysts of the Jung, Adler, Stekel and Freud schools—as though it were possible to be in accord with all at the same time. Fortunately the dissenters, either voluntarily or otherwise, have stated their exact position so that there is no doubt as to just where they stand.

For instance, Jung's revolt really began in 1911, as pointed out by Jones, when many felt Jung was but a Cassandra, but events have fully justified his early awareness of Jung's defection. In time, of course, Jung indicated his complete separation from Freud's psychoanalysis and has given data to show what to him justified his revolt. Academic psychologists still profess to believe that all these

one-time psychoanalysts are to be more or less closely grouped together. We may cite the writings of McDougall, Pillsbury and Woodworth in this respect. Perhaps such expositors of psychology have only a recondite or academic interest in psychoanalysis—hence they are not to be held so strictly to account—but this should not be our position as trained workers in this field.

In a nutshell we may state that Janet's and Prince's systems of philosophic thought are built upon an intellectualized scheme of ideas; that Stekel is a brilliant but unsound analyst; that Adler was never able to read the symbols of abstract thinking or to pass beyond a biologic concept of emotional living; that at best Jung never did practice real instinctual psychoanalysis and his work was sadly marred by static or mystical thinking, and, moreover, as early as 1913 he served rather definite notice that he had resistance to the so-called infantile unconscious (pregenital stage); and finally, that Bleuler himself was not willing to follow fully into the realm of metapsychology, where dynamic psychology is now winning important data for our understanding the motivation of the unconscious. However, while he has remained outside as an objective and descriptive psychiatrist, he still employs the feeling tone of his Freudian concepts in his objective psychiatry. While Bleuler is one of the most advanced of our descriptive psychiatrists, he falls far short of an instinctual recognition of the more basic concepts of the primary emotions of man in which his conceptions of autism and symbolic and schizoid reactions are by no means as final as the terms of the anal, oral and urethral erotisms enable us to make them. These are facts which a sound contemplation of the modern trends of dynamic psychology would, and indeed must, have revealed to the thoughtful and discriminative scholar.

It is not insinuated that there shall not be continued alterations in the technic and theory of psychoanalysis either from within or outside the rank of Freud's followers, but from what we and others have already so definitely pointed out, these deviations or modifications should be made with that same liberality and caution which Freud himself has recently so excellently exemplified.* It is not only conceivable but humanly probable that the whole of the present-day psychoanalysis will be so radically changed with the advance in knowledge of genetic development that the present Freudian psychoanalysis will not be recognizable. With the advance in biology, anthropology, embryology, biophysics and chemistry, this may be brought about, but until this time, perhaps phylogenesis—the col-

* S. Freud, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1926.

lective unconscious of Jung—which now and then looms large and transcendent, should be considered a speculative myth.

It may seem unfair to group Rank's recent works with the simpler and more obvious defections of Jung, Stekel and Adler, but in some of the more important principles his present attitude is the more unpardonable and incomprehensible. When one grasps fully the wide departure in practice as well as technic which Rank now sponsors, knowing his almost incomparable brilliance and acumen in psychoanalysis as well as his knowledge of the very essence of Freud's views, we believe his present position of partial analysis would seem to merit more definite reflection. Rank's position is not really dissimilar to the earlier dissenters although it is overlaid with specious casuistry and seemingly good rationalizations. His principles can be laid partly to the lack of a biologic and medical training; singularly, these sciences are the ones stressed by Rank in his physiologic traumas of the individual's evolution. They are carried over bodily into metapsychology, a transition approached by Freud himself with the greatest caution.

One may judge of the degree to which Jung's denunciation of the infantile sexual unconscious has operated upon fairly stable minds but in whom the resistances are reawakened in that McDougall in his recent work on *Abnormal Psychology* is moved to state that in Jung's hands the unconscious ceases to be a mere fermenting dung-heap made up of odds and ends of nasty and forbidden desires. While Adler historiographically reaches an objective and descriptive level of organ inferiority, or, as in more recent extensions of his conception where no organ inferiority as such is found to exist, he seeks to prove the whole organism to be an inferior mechanism. The latter concept is much more basic and dynamic than the former which when present in the single case renders a facile explanation to simple minds. But the whole organ inferiority mechanism is only a partial recognition of the fundamental biologic fault and although it was generally accepted some two decades ago, it has now been definitely superseded by the hypothesis of the antecedent conflicts of infancy, *i.e.*, the infant in developing from a state of intrauterine wish-free existence, at birth passes to a state of all-powerfulness which is operated by magic signals; these magic signals later become ineffectual and in consequence the infant has a sense of frustration and deprivation (castration complex); he feels inferior and more or less rapidly recognizes that reality must be compromised with, and although in many respects he learns to subdue reality he continues to have a sense of universal inferiority which endures throughout

life. This simple yet brilliant theory is the work of Ferenczi and has been one of the essential foundation-stones of psychoanalysis since its advent in 1909. Thus the earlier valuable work of Adler is superseded by Ferenczi's development of the sense of reality, which has at last given us an adequate metapsychology for the universal sense of varying degrees of inferiority in all human beings. Singularly enough, Adler fails to incorporate this conception of Ferenczi, which would at once do away with all the repressive educational measures which Adler so strenuously advocates today and which at first glance seem so convincing to the lay mind. By accepting Ferenczi's and Freud's incorporation of the universality of the sense of inferiority, the whole problem becomes a matter of the infantile unconscious and one truly psychoanalytic. It more or less plays a rôle in every neurosis.

It is more difficult to encompass fully the defection of Stekel, but perhaps it may be said to be less of a revolt than an incomplete conception of Freud's view of the essential basic unity of the libido theory; Stekel attempts to evade this unity by endowing the partial impulses of ambition, religious feelings and the instinct of self-preservation and similar impulses or strivings of the individual as separate and even opposing the all embracing libido of Freud which so far seems to be an adequate and sufficient basic concept of the human strivings as we know them to-day. According to Freud, the libido in totality embraces the ego libido, the partial objective libido (sexual), and the death impulse or tendency to regress to the life before birth.

It is not our purpose to undertake a point-by-point analysis of Rank's views which when they confirm and reëmphasize Freud's views are less convincing than Freud states them, and when they oppose them or extend to more definiteness fail of conviction through lack of an expository attitude of his subject, that is, his text carries a certain tone of finality which Freud has never employed and which the latter even warns anyone to assume with the present unclear theoretical and therapeutic position of psychoanalysis. Rank's attempt to geneticize psychoanalysis is too ambitious and instead of employing an argument of his views he assumes an *ipse dixit* attitude quite different from anyone in the field of psychoanalysis to-day. For instance, one exclaims with Reich, Can the normal sexual act really be only a substitute and a sadistic oral revenge for the failure of oral gratification at the maternal breast, and is it only a masochistic experience for the woman? Rank fails time and again to give attention to the amount, intensity and form of impulsive life, the

variations of which make all the difference imaginable between normal and neurotic genitality. Thus identity is confused with mere analogy. For instance, it is unwarrantable to say that normal intercourse is a regression to the maternal body when it but *symbolizes* a regression.

Rank has attributed the inspiration of his time limited analysis to Freud. In his *Technique der Psychoanalyse*, page 15, he states: "Many years ago Freud stated that in the analysis of compulsives there is a quite definite stage in which, on the way to transference, the analysis itself becomes a compulsion. The latter, according to Freud, can be solved only when one applies himself to the task of setting for the analysis a definite limit which must be strictly observed. In following this precept I came gradually on a series of finely nuanced criteria which permitted me to introduce the entry to the stage in question prematurely, and I was able to make use of this experience in other cases. This boundary fixing not only essentially shortened the treatment but also served to loosen the transference and adapt the patient to his own ego. Thus, that which at first was only a by-product, developed great theoretic and practical significance." Both before and since Freud made such a statement he has indicated that the analyst may not set time boundaries for any analysis. Indeed, in his recent Socratic dialogue on *The Question of Lay Analysis (Section V)* he specifically states the following reasons for avoiding such a procedure:

"You must determine to comprehend the material which the analyzed person delivers to you in obedience toward the rule in a very particular way; somewhat as in the case of an ore from which the content of valuable metal is to be won by a definite process. You are then in a position to work over many tons of ore which perhaps contain but little of the valuable material sought. This is the foundation for the duration of the treatment. . . . You commit a grave error if in your efforts to shorten an analysis you throw your interpretations at the head of the patient as soon as you have found them. You thus obtain expressions of resistance, refusal, indignation and do not succeed in having his Ego master the repressions. The precept is to wait until he has approached so closely to them that under the direction of your proposed interpretations he needs to go but a few steps further. It is determined that you now make a discovery for which you are not prepared—that you have deceived yourself in your patient, that you cannot at all count on his assistance and pliancy, that he is ready to throw all possible difficulties in the way of the common effort—in a word he will not be cured. The patient does

wish to recover, but he also does not wish it. His Ego has lost its unity and hence he cannot bring a unit will to bear. If he were any different he would not be a neurotic. . . . We encounter during the treatment still other resistances. When in the early period the Ego has through fear accomplished a repression, this fear continues and expresses itself as resistance when the Ego approaches the repressed content. Finally one may imagine to himself that it does not depart without difficulties when an impulse process which has gone a particular way for decennia is suddenly to take a new path which has been made for it, and this, too, may be called resistance of the It. The struggle against all of these resistances is our chief labor during the analytic cure, while on the other hand the task of interpretation vanishes. Through this struggle to overcome the resistance, the Ego of the patient becomes altered and strengthened, so that we may look toward its future behavior after completion of the cure with calmness. On the other hand we now understand why the long duration of treatment was necessary. The length of the path of development and the abundance of material are not decisive for it is rather a question whether the way is clear. At one stretch which a man may cover in times of peace in a few railway hours, an army can be held up for weeks if it has to encounter the resistance of the enemy. Such conflicts likewise require time in the psychic life. Unfortunately I have found that all efforts to hasten the analytic treatment notably have thus far been in vain. The best way to curtail an analysis is to carry it out correctly."

In Rank's genetic psychology one catches an almost rueful note that he has over-biologized psychoanalysis, a position which he frequently wrongly accuses Freud of doing. It is this very position taken by Rank that Freud so frequently states cannot be taken by anyone as yet, if ever. No doubt Rank's work will have a great vogue with many psychoanalysts who are not willing to labor without a prescribed goal and with a not always clear aim in the therapeutic procedure itself. One must look upon Rank's attempts not only as being premature but not really psychoanalytically sound. Where he restates the Freudian historical method, such work is unnecessary, and where he formulates new principles in the absence of an expositive attitude the so-called new systematization is defective and perhaps actually harmful.

ABSTRACTS
TECHNIC OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

I. THE ANALYTICAL SITUATION. ILLUSTRATED IN THE TECHNIC
OF DREAM INTERPRETATION *

BY
OTTO RANK

Theoretical Part

This volume is intended as the first of a series to be devoted to the technic of psychoanalysis. No work on this subject has ever been published, and although Freud, during the period 1904–1918, issued certain basic articles on this technic, his pupils have added nothing, with the exception of Ferenczi's "active therapy" (and even this has recently been essentially cut down), and the author's own conception, which is presented in schematic form. Failure to systematize this technic is to be explained through the development of psychoanalysis. At first Freud had to elaborate his method of exploration and the therapeutic application gradually followed step by step and is not complete even at present. The author must reply in the negative to that most important question: May the method of investigation be forthwith used for treatment? Freud himself has said no less. But how shall it be so modified as to make possible therapeutic results? The problem of transference seems to constitute the nucleus of analytic treatment, although transference is often the greatest obstacle to treatment and to end results. In such cases the patient utilizes transference as resistance and will not give up his infantile fixations. In the neurotic, transference usually takes place early in the treatment, and the aim of the analyst must be to get rid of the transference without losing the benefits obtained by treatment. This result should be obtained in a satisfactory manner as soon as the patient realizes that the analyst's relation to him has been that of his parents—essentially of his father. But this conception of Freud neglects the chief significance of the analytic situation, which from an obviously sexual relation goes over into a psychic situation which is free from sex. It is thus that the analyst finally masters the

* Abstracted from the German, published by Franz Deuticke, 1926.

resistance which otherwise would be impregnable. If the analyst refers the transference in a female patient to his representation of her father the heterosexual fixation is underscored and this is also true of the homosexual fixation in the case of the male patient; in both cases resistance develops which can be overcome only in the deeper strata.

Freud's therapeutic conception, in accord with his theoretic achievement, referred the analytic transference to the Oedipus situation, which the patient after his own fashion strives to reproduce. The author has sought in the past to carry the analytic situation back of the Oedipus complex to the earliest biologic fixation to the mother and made the surprising discovery that the patient regularly represented separation from the analyst as the act of birth. This he found to be true of patients of both sexes. To realize the therapeutic possibilities of this discovery it is necessary to introduce it early in the analysis and not to wait until the close of the treatment. In this way it was possible to break up the deep fixation to the analyst and at the same time to loosen the early infantile fixation to the mother. This made possible the mastery of the preliminary stage of the Oedipus complex in which there is rivalry with the other children for the maternal love. Then only as a third stage does the Oedipus complex come into consideration, as the analyst comes into his own as father representative, in the case of the woman as the paternal love ideal and in that of the man as the super-ego ideal. This cannot take place, however, until after the analyst has played his rôle out in the analysis, as has already been outlined. Nor does the analytic curative rôle stop with the Oedipus situation adaptation but proceeds to a further mastery of the father relation, whether of identification or choice of object. Hence the introduction into analytic treatment of the pre-Oedipus situation has given analysis something it did not before possess—something definite and final. Ferenczi and other analysts have regarded this as an advance but do not regard the mother rôle of the analyst as of vital importance; although this is clearly because they have not penetrated into the essence of the author's conception. The technic of fixing a boundary rests on the fact of the reproduction of the earliest mother fixation in the analytic situation. The evaluation of the latter consists not only of a gradual difference in the analysis of transference but above all in dealing with the deepest strata of the mother fixation, for the libido of the patient is essentially a mother situation and the analyst must lead him back by analysis to a father adaptation and finally to his own ego. The patient is conducted analytically through the deepest

mother fixation through birth, weaning, his relationships with other children of the family, castration, up to the Oedipus situation, which therapeutically represents the first adaptation situation, and then after the conquest of Oedipus dependence into the development of the personal ego.

The translation of the author's technical viewpoints into therapeutic values may perhaps be designated as "active therapy" in the Ferenczi sense, although he has never systematically made use of commands and prohibitions to patients and has sought only to make use of such knowledge as is inaccessible to the latter. However, he believes that our present day knowledge is sufficiently ample and certain to permit its transmutation into therapeutic activity. One need not fear in this connection that he "suggests" something to the patient, for without our technic we should be as helpless toward the ailment of the latter as is the patient himself.

As the author has shown elsewhere, the cure is wrought not through intellectual knowledge but through the immediately affective experience of the analytic situation. By emphasizing this fact he eliminates an essential element which deterred Freud from publishing his technic. The latter thought that the resistance had an intellectual origin; but if the affective element of the analytical process had been recognized as essential the latter would have been of no greater significance than a guidebook is to a tourist who likes to wander through strange surroundings. In his experience it does no harm and for certain types of mankind it is even useful to have some idea of what lies ahead. Most of the patients who come for analysis are informed in advance, although often in inadequate fashion—for they believe they must "fall in love" with the analyst.

This anxiety concerning the information of the patient makes the analyst timid in his interpretation, which would not ordinarily be so bad but under the circumstances is protracted into a game of mental hide and seek for the patient. It is much more efficacious to give the patient unconscious hints as to what he may expect and then to demonstrate the material and experiences by his reactions.

The analyst must not only control the knowledge necessary but must know when and how to apply it. Experience often makes it possible to understand a case in advance, but then one must have the courage to turn this knowledge into therapy. The author does not mean that one is to explain to the patient the genesis of his neurosis but that one must treat the case in accordance with this foreknowledge without any fear of employing suggestion. The analyst is more prone to fear the action of autosuggestion upon himself, and in every case

must first convince himself that his presuppositions concerning psychoanalysis are correct. In general, he limits his explanations to a minimum, avoiding theory, but allows the patient to experience things on the affective side and to understand these experiences. The entire treatment is therefore based on the emotional transference relationship, as it is presented in the analytic situation by repetition of the biologic and infantile. Fixing the terminus, this most important intervention comes about only from the development of this transference situation and not from any theoretic considerations. The course of analytic investigation is somewhat different from the course of therapeutic action. We should seek no historical material, recall no memories, but merely set free the old affects, after which the memories will return of themselves.

We may point out here that the original reacting off of affects remains a therapeutic agent, but with the advance that we no longer leave its course to the repetition compulsion. The libidinous gratification with which is associated the reacting off on the analyst presents an essential curative factor. The difference between reacting off in catharsis and in the psychoanalytic experience is that in the latter the pathogenic affect is allowed to escape from the analytic situation, to be brought into recollection later of itself. In the first we seek recollections to come upon the affects, and in the second to utilize affects reproduced in the analytic situation to unmask the unconscious. In the latter a path is made to lead off the affects while the entire psychic existence is raised to a higher level, that of adaptation to reality.

The analytic situation is not to be confused with a conflict but corresponds rather to a reproduction of early infantile situations upon which the real conflict is imposed, while the analytic situation is a libidinous counterpart to it. The repetition tendency is to be changed therapeutically into adaptation, which can only succeed partially and then only when one gets beyond the Oedipus situation. It then appears that the affects are permitted to pass from the actual conflict into the much more satisfactory infantile situation which Freud has aptly termed the "flight into disease." There is likewise a flight in the analysis from the conflict; this can be made into a therapeutic resource if both the regression into infancy and the actual conflict situation (neurosis) are decomposed at the focal point at which they have coalesced. In analysis the infantile is often favored and the conflict itself can only appear of superior significance up to a certain point, and remains insoluble until the anchored affects and inhibited impulses have streamed back into the infantile situation and become

manifest, and there is always affect enough anchored in the actual conflict to present analytical solution. Finally the neurosis, no matter how far it may reach back into the infantile and familial, is still a conflict which sooner or later breaks out and our entire therapeutic endeavor rests on this supposition. The intellectual insight into its history is not the essential agent but the affective displacement (transference) of the inhibited impulses upon the primitive infantile conflict and its representation in the analytic situation. The affects are something actual, indeed the only actuality in the analytic situation. Analytic insight into the determining coherences of childhood can translate itself as a result of cathartic displacement into conviction and acceptance, and the mechanism is that of deprecation.

This comprehension of the analytic situation is composed of three strata, and by simultaneous consideration of all layers and of both progressive and regressive tendencies on both the libido and ego sides, a sort of qualitative analysis can be carried out. This does not aim at the historical evolution of the patient's libido nor bring into consciousness all of the unconscious memories.

Quantitative analysis may have a theoretic value and be desirable for purposes of study, but is rather a hindrance than help in treatment, for all material of the three strata must be kept in mind at the same time.

In regard to the resistance of the patient, which is of course unavoidable, the analyst should not be worried. It makes little difference at what stage it appears and it is well if it appear gradually. But the most important thing is that through comprehension of the analytic situation the problem of resistance takes on a new significance. As long as the analyst interprets at the father level, every negative expression of the patient is resistance which leads back to castration fear. The analytic situation, however, does not rest on the manifestly sexual rôle of the analyst but, as the term applies, on the situation itself; and if the patient expects nourishment from the analyst there is a mother situation and not a homosexual one. In the unconscious the penis may represent the maternal breast but this is not necessarily homosexual. If one holds fast that in its deepest layers the mother fixation is present in the situation, resistance in the sense of separation from the mother must be interpreted as an advance, and will be of more service than in always driving more deeply into infantile fear of the father, from which there may be no therapeutic escape. The problem of resistance and of negative transference the author regards as a constructive element of treatment to be taken up later in detail.

In this first volume, on the analytic situation, the technic will be presented from the libido side as a continuation of the theory and treatment of Freud.

Time Limit and Mother Fixation. Many years ago Freud stated that in the analysis of compulsives there is a quite definite stage in which, on the way to transference, the analysis itself becomes a compulsion. The latter, according to Freud, can be solved only when one applies himself to the task of setting for the analysis a definite limit which must be strictly observed. In following this precept the author came gradually on a series of finely nuanced criteria which permitted him to introduce the entry to the stage in question prematurely and he was able to make use of this experience in other cases. This boundary fixing not only essentially shortened the treatment but also served to loosen the transference and adapt the patient to his own ego. Thus that which at first was only a by-product developed great theoretic and practical significance. Under the pressure of this boundary fixation the patient showed reactions which could mean only one thing—the relation of transference, which replaced the infantile libido fixation in the neurosis, plays itself out in forms which can be grasped only as reproductions of the solution of the original libido object, the mother, since the patient appears to reproduce the act of birth.

One may, of course, object that despite the therapeutic value of boundary fixation it is a mere artifice as far as the production of the patient's reactions are concerned, but the author recalls cases in which there was no boundary fixation, yet the analysis concluded with the reproduction of the act of birth although at the time he did not understand why. In 1918 Freud, in his "History of an Infantile Neurosis," visualized the end of the treatment as a rebirth experience. This can, of course, be produced artificially by fixation of the boundary. As the author went ahead with the comprehension of this end stage he noted in both sexes that the same result came about naturally from the analytical situation itself.

Under these viewpoints psychoanalytic treatment presents itself as a process in which the original libidinous fixation on the mother, as given in the biologic relationship and the original solution of this union by birth or weaning, is lived through again in the shortest course. In the present connection the author intends to consider the "birth trauma" only from its therapeutic side. The aim of treatment as in other traumas is to prevent as far as possible the unconscious reproduction of the same during the analysis. In every case and in both sexes he now proceeds with this end in view. One can-

not wholly prevent the reactions of the patient, but they become much milder and the problem is less difficult for the analyst if from the first the mother fixation is elaborated and the way prepared for the boundary fixation without allowing this to come about suddenly. Along with this enormous practical advantage there is also the analytic advantage that in the terminal stage the actual conflict of the patient is relatively free from early infantile fixations. The author believes that in this way he has given to therapeutic psychoanalysis a definite and circumscribed character and content which is susceptible of a wide extension.

The author applied Freud's idea of boundary fixation in the compulsive neurotic to all kinds of neuroses and in every analysis he arrived regularly at the end stage of the treatment with the same typical reactions. The libido was invariably set free from its original object, the mother, not only in the symbolic phantasy of the maternal body but in affective reproduction of birth. Mother fixation and mother separation, biologically indicating intrauterine life and labor, were compulsively repeated in the deepest strata of the analysis and must be vanquished by affective devaluation as well as intellectual understanding.

In the author's method the analysis decomposes itself into two tasks. In the first place the separation of the actual libidinous mother fixation and the application of the libido are thus set free to new ego ideal formation and to normal adaptation to a sex object. In the second part of the analysis the rôle of the analyst as a substitute for the father in his quality as educator and as love object comes to the fore but with the distinction that this follows undisturbed from the already mastered regression to the mother. It means that every child must separate from the mother (pleasure principle) with partial transference to the father as reality principle.

Anything which will bring about the separation from the libidinous fixation to the mother makes up the essence of analytic therapy. The rest is mostly constructive and educational and here we invoke the entire analytic psychology as supplied by the doctrine of complexes, the comprehension of dream life and the sexual theory. The analyst profits both from his experience in analysis and from his increased knowledge of the psychology of the destiny of impulses. To obtain the result a definite course is required comprising a short observation period and an approximate interval for the process to develop. The analyst must be influenced neither by the more passive methods nor by intellectual technic in his investigation and interpretation lest he be led up a therapeutic blind alley and supply the patient

with any amount of resistance. He must say to himself that in order to restore the patient to usefulness he has to undertake a definite procedure with him which will last on the average about six months. The analytic treatment will not only be definite and circumscribed but will require a definite though variable interval of time.

But how is it possible, one will ask, in anything so complicated as a neurosis with its constantly changing and manifold statements of the patient, to make use of so simple a therapeutical formula? The latter, which can hardly be called simple, has crystallized itself gradually from the material of the analyses. Nor must we forget that the patient has in the analysis unfolded his entire soul and impulse life. Further, the analytical situation truly reproduces the mother situation and the neurosis itself, so that the analytical separation of the mother fixation is at the same time the separation of the neurotic libido fixation. Finally, the essential advantage of the author's method is that the therapeutic intervention of the analyst is given a definite direction and content and thus may be compared with a surgical intervention.

When the author states that the formula is not so simple as it seems he means by this that one should not visualize it as a simple explanation of mother fixation. The latter has hitherto been too little regarded as a chief source of resistance. The analytic situation in all of its phases corresponds to a situation of mother fixation and the analyst will restore the association between the two, now in one and now in another respect, so that he will be able to comprehend the relationship which exists between the typical traumas—birth, weaning, Oedipus, castration and, last but not least, the ante-Oedipus brother and sister trauma which in practice is too little valued in the anchoring of neurotic symptoms.

It may be objected that the time allowance is much too brief to go so deeply into the unconscious of the patient and get permanent results, but for that matter it is often possible even in the first few weeks to penetrate into the deepest strata of the unconscious. From the very first hour of the analysis the presence of the mother fixation may be recognized, as the patient from the first hour identifies the analyst with the mother and the analytical situation with the earliest libidinous mother situation. The most primitive impulse ego cannot, of course, be changed, and what we do accomplish is the formation of a new ego and of the choice of objects. Mere length of time in an analysis often means an unsolved transference, and the author's method from its relative brevity and general clean-cut character may be likened to a surgical intervention. But one who has been using

the older methods should not suddenly seek to complete the analysis by introducing the author's method of fixing the boundary nor should he make the mother libido the foreground of the analysis. Attempts thus to graft a new method on to an old one will come to naught.

The most important intervention is fixing the time limit, and experience will soon teach one how to go about this. As a pattern one may follow Freud in his article on compulsion neuroses. When analysis becomes a compulsion—that is, when the totality of the libido of the patient is directed against the analyst—we have the indication to fix the terminus. The patient is now striving to attach himself to the analyst in the same infantile fashion as he attached himself to the mother. This moment should be divined as soon as possible and he must be warned by the analyst and made conscious of his attitude before he comes to realize fully the neurotic fixation in the analysis. The indications as to the time of setting the boundary differ with the individual case but they are always unconscious signs. In regard to the fine criteria mentioned, we may distinguish between two types. In a patient with strongly positive transference (inclining to the hysterical type) the full establishment of the mother situation in the analysis will soon be brought about, but a long time may be required for breaking off.

The result is that after fixing the terminus the greater part of the analysis will be devoted to detaching the patient from the fixation. But if the patient is more on the narcissistic type and originally negative, a long time may be required for the first part of the analysis, while the second will be relatively brief. According to the type of case the patient will react to the fixing of the time limit with the mechanism of separation which plays the greatest rôle in the infantile structure of his personality, as weaning or learning to walk. The birth separation is always present, however, because it is the first of the traumas and the most serious in consequences. In the second or narcissistic type there may be great resistance to fixing the terminus. The situation may be overcome with ordinary analysis but the patient has no comprehension of his defense mechanism with which he protects himself from the analyst as with a coat of mail.

Outlet of the Libido and Resistance of the Ego. Beginning with the psychic facts of transference and resistance, one may reach a general formulation of psychoanalysis which presents it as an individually restricted and time-limited process within the libido- and ego-development of the patient. As in the case of physical injuries, time is necessary for recovery, and the analyst interferes with the aim of correction as the flow of the libido meets with resistance, an

artificial libido process being inaugurated. There is in man a sort of mania for transference which is especially seen in the neurotic. Since in real life the expansion of the libido is inhibited in many ways, analysis under certain conditions permits its escape and even promotes it. In his rôle the analyst is chiefly passive and only occasionally actively intervenes. At first he has nothing to do but make an analytical diagnosis and his only therapeutic efforts are those of the internist before his diagnosis is completed.

The chief difference between the internist and the analyst has been pointed out by Freud, who states that the latter not only employs the latent transference to facilitate the escape of the libido but also shows the patient step by step how he can finally free himself. The internist in addition to other means applies suggestion as unconscious transference while the analyst makes but little use of suggestion.

From the comprehension of analysis as an artificially conducted leading off of the libido in the interest of correcting neurotic deviations the often asked question is automatically answered as to the rôle of the analyst. He remains mostly passive in the presence of the escape of the libido but when correction is necessary he intervenes actively or as a sort of catalyst.

Before the author answers the question as to how the analysis of libido resistance is perfected and wherein the neurotic requires correction, he would answer that in the following description the analytic phases in practice are not presented so schematically. The chief subjects are phases of resistance and transference. In the resistance which the ego itself opposes to the reproduction of the unconscious and still more to the analysis itself, along with preconscious memories of the patient, there come into consideration certain manifest characters of the ego and the ideal. These resistances of the ego differ greatly in value and in the beginning of the analysis are removed one by one and the resistance of narcissism and ideal construction often makes great difficulties to be overcome, for the entire personality of the patient fights to oppose the automatic escape of the libido. In order to succeed, it is sometimes necessary to wound the narcissism or suspend the ideals. From the situation of transference which presents a wax impression of the old infantile libido development of the patient, it is possible to reproduce in the analytic situation the disturbed infantile developments and translate them into the speech of consciousness.

In contrast to the preconscious memories which the patient in the resistance phase hastily assembles from his varied spheres of interest and centers of fixation, the making conscious of the libido tendencies

in the transference involves the reproduction of situations which for the most part were never conscious, dating from infantile development and originating in impulses which have been repressed or inhibited. In the transference one succeeds in making the patient live through wish incitations which were at the time cut short. The chief resistance to overcome is the infantile fear or its association with the libidinous parent conflict as sense of guilt. In the struggle between the ego and ideal and the libidinous tendencies and wish incitations which correspond to them we have material for conflicts. The neurotic suffers in the classic compulsion neurosis but also in every form of psychic anomaly as perversion, psychosis, criminality, and from the sense of guilt which is unconsciously present and in excess. If by analysis the patient may be made to react off the fear or reduce it to normal limits these may come into consciousness and be elaborated by the actual ego. We know that they can in this way become sublimated or rejected outright.

If the shaping of the analytic situation indicates permission of libido gratifications formerly forbidden by the ego, the analysis must not only reconstruct the fixations of the patient's infantile libido but likewise free the patient from the sense of guilt and thereby give an outlet to the repressed and inhibited libido tendencies. Here we see in every case a reproduction and not a mere recollection of the pre-conscious and the patient will strive, through actual reproduction, to withdraw certain multivalent libidinous situations of the analytic reproduction, but this must be prevented, if necessary, by command. The conscious explanation by the patient shows itself often only as an auxiliary to the reproduction of repressed situations which cannot be recalled. It is otherwise with analytic reproduction which is not only not forbidden but the patient is encouraged to reproduce, understand, and master the repressions. The renunciation of the libido is also an auxiliary in bringing about reproductions.

If in this manner the infantile libido of the patient is freed from the repressions of fear and sense of guilt, and if he has also with our active assistance found the courage to confess his libido tendencies, this entire infantile libido should be set free from the analytic situation and the patient should be made amenable to new application. This task falls into the period of disaccustoming, which analytically denotes the correct solution of the transference. In this connection Freud has termed analysis an "artificial neurosis" in which the actual replaces the infantile fixation, or it may be spoken of as a symptom. This artificial transference neurosis with its new fixation tendencies must now itself be treated, which is accomplished by the gradual breaking down of the transference.

At this point of the analysis the analyst enters actively into the lapse of time and reels off the last piece of analysis from the analytic spool. In this last phase of analysis in which it must be shown that the patient tolerates the weaning process new resistance appears on the part of the ego, for the unconscious of the patient does not wish to pay the price of perpetual separation from his libido gratification. This is a test of the patience of the patient who strives to show in the direction of neurotic renunciation that weaning endangers the cure because it is the only way in which the analytic task can be finally settled. After the formation of the transference neurosis the final period of analysis must be accurately observed and neither resistance nor the progress of the case must divert us into discharging him prematurely, for this last phase is the one to which all that went before is but the preparation.

We may now formulate the essentials of the analytic intervention. There is a time-limited process of leading off the libido in the course of which all claims of the infantile libido find partial fulfilment in the transference. As we transpose the patient back to the old infantile situation we make it possible to transform his personality back step by step to the early infantile stages. These stages are realized not only in the expression of his libido but also in the inhibiting expressions of his ego resistance. The entire process stands under the enormous pressure of the infantile libido which sees the possibility of gratification and runs its course despite the protests of his entire actual personality. The greater the pressure the greater the ego resistance of inhibition, which stands in the way of the libido fulfilment. But the genuine resistance, far removed from disturbing the analytic work, may be likened to the mainspring of a watch which regulates and measures. We should not think of this inhibition as a function and nothing more, for the content is also important, as it is almost always a sign that the patient reproduces in place of recollecting.

If in the analysis the adaptation has succeeded and the analyst has taken the place of the libidinous object—mother or father—then the artificial neurosis is carried back to the infantile situation artificially on this mother foundation and the transference established in purely unconscious fashion, which can now be utilized to transpose the old infantile neurosis to one of the forms clinically known to us into a new analytic transference neurosis. This comes about under the consequent translation of the unconscious material in each of its expressions and its interpretation, as well in the sense of the analytic situation as also parallel with the infantile. In this way of experiencing the infantile libido strivings with perpetual discharge in the

sense of becoming conscious under renunciation, the patient learns at last to give up the unsuitable adaptation and pathologic gratification of the infantile libido, now critically rejected by his new ideal ego. This is that subsequent education which comes to the neurotic through his ego.

The most important technical problems of psychoanalysis lie in the correct prosecution of this task. For the particular form in which the normal infant libido is elaborated by the ego expresses itself in the phenomenon of transference and resistance which have to be understood and solved.

A reaction which repeats itself quite regularly in the analytic reproduction of the Oedipus situation is the castration complex. In man this means that the mother ceases to be an object of libido and that the son identifies himself with her which in turn motivates many forms of unconscious sense of guilt. In the woman it means diversion from the father and identification with him in the sense of the persistence of the infantile penis wish.

As we proceed from the already disfigured neurosis to place the patient in the transference neurosis we make possible to him the "primitive neurosis" which he goes through in the analysis in all of its stages so that his own neurosis will be feeble and superfluous.

The two stages of analysis represent the activation of the primitive neurosis and its solution seems to correspond to the two stages of infantile and actual neurosis. The neurosis of the adult goes back to the primitive biologic conflict, and the possibility of sexual gratification is assumed as a substitute for giving up the mother. In the neurotic the unconscious stands at the stage of the primitive biologic conflict which makes intelligible the infantile character of the neurosis. Behind every neurosis lies a child neurosis which appears in the analysis only through reproduction which is experienced chiefly in transference.

Psychoanalysis therefore permits the patient to live again the infantile primitive libidinous situation with partial gratification under the condition of conscious renunciation to the unsuitable adaptation. Under the pressure of analysis the adult ego can master this situation. In analysis infantile love impulses inhibited in their development force themselves into repetition. Not the entire development of the individual is repeated but only certain phases of the libido.

Is analysis an education of the ego or only of the love impulses? It is in part an education of the ego to the extent that certain expressions of the libido are confessedly repugnant to it. After transference has occurred the libido development inhibited in infancy is fully

unfolded. These properties of the ego are not to be regarded as incorporated with the precepts preached into us from without but without their aid the last stage of the analysis could not succeed. It would be impossible, after the patient has been cured through his affection for the analyst, for him to renounce that affection, but the patient realizes that the objects of infantile striving are unattainable in reality, so that his desires undergo a sublimation.

Through the creation and solution of the analytic situation one exposes the patient again to his own infantile trauma and to the ungratified infantile libido, which in neurotic fashion is displaced on inadequate objects, and is offered the old object. This affective refixation presents to the ego of the patient a gratification in association with the situation. We give to the patient his mother love sought from the earliest period. As the patient identifies us with the mother he indicates distinctly that what he seeks is the ideal parental image although we cannot offer it in the wished for form. But if nevertheless we do it we apparently cure the patient in that he obtains libidinous gratification while the analysis must make it plain that he must renounce this infantile libido through realization that it is unrealizable.

Through identification with the analyst there follows a new provisional ideal which comes in conflict with the ego ideal of the patient in the form of resistance. This resistance can be removed by the substitution of the analyst for the mother. A common difficulty, however, is a precocious identification with the father as representative of the infantile fear of giving up the mother fixation. Only after the analyst has given up the rôle of the mother can this identification with the father be employed therapeutically, although it may also be grasped as resistance against giving up the mother.

The Curative Process. The psychoanalytic treatment of every neurosis brings a bit of freedom to the repressed or infantile-fixed libido which serves in part to elevate the atrophic sexual life of the patient to the stage of actual genital primacy; otherwise the freed libido may be elaborated by the ego for social adaptation.

The author has been able to follow the first process most distinctly in psychic or rather neurotic impotence, for here the setting free of the libido attains at the same time the therapeutic goal. In other neuroses the symptom formation of the libido is not limited to the genitals, but in every psychoneurosis there is probably a certain psychic impotence, *i.e.*, a persistence of the libido in an infantile stage of development which may be expressed in many different ways. He has therefore used the term psychic impotence in a general way.

There is in the development of infantile libido as manifested in the

Oedipus complex that which leads to normal heterosexual life in place of such disorders as antisocialism, perversity, and homosexuality. In the analysis there results a correction of these deviations through the reëvolution of the originally lost developmental process. The psychic costs of this revision are borne by the libido of the patient in the sense that he must learn to renounce the old forms of gratification. He atones by vanquishing the fear of the father (castration complex, homosexuality, birth fancies) and gains the ability to identify himself with the father, which is necessary in order that he play the rôle of a male. A similar course is seen in women.

From the finer study of ego psychology and especially of primary identification we may then seek to understand and influence the choice of object. The original object of both sexes is the mother. The man will later seek a substitute while his ego formation requires identification with the father. The woman gives up the mother object in a certain identification with the father which pathologically becomes the masculinity complex. From this development of the female libido fixation it is evident that the later choice of object is not a direct substitution but part of the formation of an ideal.

In the choice of object the normal adult is able to renounce not only the original object but the substitute and apply it to satisfactory objects in a narcissistic sense. The woman gives up the mother object for man but retains a good bit of narcissism, which explains her more passive rôle in the choice of object. An ideal factor also plays a considerable rôle, and she usually has a male ideal in part identified with the father or brother in childhood. At the same time she can be thrown back to the mother identification which enters into the Oedipus situation, as identification with the father is attended with sense of guilt. In becoming a mother she identifies herself with her mother and later the child is a new object which is identified in part with herself, leading also to narcissistic ideal formation.

It is clear that this complicated process of development is exposed to disturbances in its most varied stages which vary in degree and in localization expressed in the sexual life and neuroses. Man is also confronted with similar difficulties. In analysis in both sexes by means of transference the primitive libido directed on the mother is set free to serve in part for the erection of a new ideal through which a normal choice of a spouse is made.

The mechanism of cure culminates essentially in identification with the analyst who frees the patient from the sense of guilt, which is made possible through the solution of fear displaced originally from the mother to the father. This conquest of fear is produced by correction of the affective gratification from an improper object.

Here it is essentially a matter of partial freedom from sadistic impulse components, which in the neurosis regularly discharge themselves at a false object—the self (fear, sense of guilt, etc.). This revenge on the ego is changed in the analytic situation into libido revenge, which in the case of male neurotics indicates overcoming the father in the Oedipus situation and in the female a victorious battle with the rival—the mother. Neurotically the man has fixed vengeance on the mother, the woman (castration fear), and the woman shifts it on the man (castration wish). Hence as a rule the neurosis of the man is directed against the woman and *vice versa*.

Fixing the terminus in the analysis helps not a little in freeing and satisfying the sadistic impulse, the repression, inhibition or negation of which shows itself as the leading cause of the symptom-formation. This not only solves the fear reaction which is referred back to birth but also the sadistic impulses of rage and revenge which are diverted to the proper infantile object. This freed impulse is elaborated on the one hand into the normal sexual impulse and on the other into narcissistic fixation of the ego which is compensated by the neurotic inferiority sense. A transition phenomenon in the author's experience is the reanimation of the earliest infantile mechanism of masturbation.

The libidinous end situation in the analysis shows that the strengthened narcissistic reactions of the patient place the identification tendency in the service of the ideal ego formation through the introjection of the analyst as father.

In order to understand these processes in the ego which are so important for recovery we had best begin with the mechanism of identification with the analyst.

From this viewpoint we may describe the analytic process as a repetition of the old infantile choice of object (in the transference) which as a result of denial threatens to go off again into a neurotic identification but is dissolved by the aid of narcissistic ego strivings of a new and appropriate ideal formation and the resulting choice of object. To this end the neurotic must renounce all of his idealizations which are either of too high tension or are inadequate, and must regress again to the primitive object choice in order to attain new possibilities of gratification. Here one may study the solution of old ideals side by side with formation of new ones and the process of ideal formation and sublimation in its essential relation to object choice and identification.

The actual mechanism of ideal formation which goes out from the ego consists in this, that in place of giving up an object fixation there enters a corresponding piece of ego fixation, and by way of identi-

cation the narcissistic ideal places itself in part as substitute for the object given up. The ideal formation makes this just to the ego. The analysis has to carry over the infantile choice of object and identification reproduced in the transference into a new narcissistic ideal formation, which is able to find gratification from the libido set free from repressions in replacement objects which are satisfactory to the ego. The choice of object, by reason of the new narcissistic ideal formation, is the piece of constructive therapy which must adjoin itself to the now free libido formerly repressed or displaced.

In the solution of the infantile conflict with especial regard to the pre-Oedipus situation one must bear in mind that almost invariably there is a displacement of the libido and fear fixation from the mother to another and infantile object, about which the neurosis is centered, and which therefore plays a decisive rôle in the analysis. There are definite types of this pre-Oedipus displacement, the most common being that of the younger brother or sister. A general condition, probably, is that of separation from the object with trauma which holds good especially for the dead. The course and termination of the analysis hinges on the solution of conflict in relation to the "traumatic object." The analyst may even have to identify himself with this object before the solution can be completed. In one definite phase he becomes a substitute figure for the mother and the solution consists in having the patient identify himself neurotically with this figure regardless of sex in order to obtain the love of the mother and finally discharge upon this figure his repressed hatred.

The analyst, then, is not always the father, for he may be the young brother or sister, step-mother, deceased relative, etc. In the Oedipus situation the father is often only secondary to the primary disturber, and a step-parent or brother may precede the father as a disturber of the mother, and finally, in the case of the disturbing analyst. And as the patient must identify himself with the analyst, he himself becomes a disturber. The moment of the trauma plays the leading rôle in the pre-Oedipus situation (weaning, birth of younger brother, etc.), and the mechanism of cure consists of identification with the disturbing object which touches mother fixation and mother separation (birth trauma).

The curative process is in the end an ego process—that is, libidinous identification with the analyst at the mother stage and the libido situation of the patient is the constant (the mother) and the ego relation (variable—fear, suppression, sadism, narcissism). The patient will retain the analyst as mother and the analyst must bring him to acceptance and then identification through demonstration and denial

of this striving with the inhibiting object (normally the father). From this identification with the originally inhibiting father there then results, through overcoming fear, the new structure of the ego, which therapeutically is the most important task. This building up of the ego takes place chiefly by means of the mechanism of identification, which the patient is obliged to set in motion through separation from the analyst (time limit); again, with the distinction that he separate himself from the analyst as from the mother. The analyst must bring the patient to identify himself with him as the inhibiting father which leads to therapeutically efficacious building up of the higher ego instances. The content of the identification mechanism must be changed and he must identify himself first with the father before proceeding to that with the mother. The father rôle first gradually asserts itself in the course of the analysis as the mother fixation is loosened and overcome and the analyst becomes the father through analysis of the mother and pre-Oedipus situations and, therapeutically, identification with the father replaces fear and is applied to prevent regression to the mother.

The transference-love is the motive to become well and may thus be applied as a mechanism of recovery; the mechanism of identification with the analyst as an actual person. This transference-love indicates that the patient does not believe in the treatment but in the power of the analyst to heal him. The libido set free is diverted from the analyst to other objects and the only technical performance is the explanation and rejection of the mother libido in the analytic situation. The patient loses his symptoms through love of the analyst and identifying himself with him.

This process is theoretically justifiable for the patient must learn to love and to "court" in place of being loved, and this he learns through transference. The entire curative procedure should end by a strengthening of the ego, and this is possible only through analysis and elaboration of the fear which first becomes free of its symptomatic associations. It is not a matter of analysis of the libido or of giving up the libido but in carrying the fear over to narcissistic ego and ideal formation. This is the least constructive part of the therapy, which has as the consequence the setting free of the libido. This is possible at the different points—birth, weaning, brothers, Oedipus, castration—only when in addition to the content we bear in mind the tendencies which motivate the patient in the neurosis and cause him to repeat. Such a motive analysis is often a most excellent way to penetrate into the nucleus of the neurotic impulse conflict.

With this analysis of motives in accord, there is analysis only of

tendencies and not of material—that is, we do not discuss generalities at all but only the particular instance, as it affects the patient alone. In this way we are able to isolate, localize, and individualize.

Practical Part

Analytical Dream Interpretation Technic. The dream analysis which we employ in practical work differs widely from the classical technic, chiefly because we have different objectives. We are interested not in dream types, symbols, and the products of human phantasy, but in the distortions of regular types by the neurotic psyche. For the most part we do not have to translate the individual dream elements into typical situations, transparent symbolism, or known complexes. The significance of the dreams is concerned rather with the progress of the analysis, overcoming of resistance and transference, and therefore we deal with the recent material. The unconscious infantile wish is the symptom-former in the neurotic and this should be known to us. The dream may be compared with an experiment and our interest lies chiefly in reactions or how reactions occur. The analyst is even able to influence the dreams arbitrarily. After we have explained to the patient some of his reactions, it is not surprising if his dreams do not in a way become conscious. The analyst uses a sort of “stimulus” to provide expectant ideation. In other words, dream analysis is a part of the curative process. The association of ideas is invoked and certain bits will be found intensively repressed; the kind and degree of resistance is estimated and the resistance is visualized as a sort of libido thermometer. The dream is useful only when it adds some yet unknown factor to the analytical situation.

There is a distinction between the ordinary and analytical dream. The analytical material belongs to the preconscious thoughts to which belong the transference relationship to the analyst, the interpretations and expectant ideas and events of the day. In the course of the analysis the unconscious becomes accessible to the analyst.

The latter should be able to foresee many things about the character of the dreams and can predetermine almost with certainty in which new phase the patient must enter by reason of the repetitive compulsion or the natural course of the transference. From another angle the analyst soon becomes conversant with the special psychic content of the patient—his complexes, his symbolism.

The initial and final dreams suggest the opening and terminal moves in the game of chess. In the course of an analysis we sooner or later come upon paradox, in comparison with the dreams of normal sub-

jects, in which the deepest subconscious matter which remains always hidden in the normal mind becomes preconscious and in general the dream becomes more valuable than the symptoms themselves.

In analytical dream technic stratification and the tendency thereto play an important rôle which is indispensable for the interpretation. In general the author believes that the clinical history of a neurotic patient is best given by serial dreams—not so much in the interest of interpretation but to show the relationship between the changes in the dreams and the progress of the case toward recovery. The series given in the book show what is to be understood by typical analytic dreams and what they mean for the theory of dreams and the structure of a neurosis.

In addition the author has for the first time sought to illustrate in typical dream examples a few important reactions to the analytical situation, and believes the insight gained by the knowledge of these dreams makes it possible to penetrate into the heart of a neurosis much more rapidly than ordinary interpretation permits.

The Analytic Situation. In several analyses of female patients the author found that the younger brother played the leading rôle in the suppressions and that the conflict yielded only upon the elaboration of the younger brother complex. Most of these women were frigid and in fact came for analysis for this reason. Many did not wish for children, causing the assumption that in mother identification the first child represented the younger brother.

One of these patients whom the author calls G did not become frigid until after the birth of her first child, a boy; and the analysis of this case allowed the infantile family constellation to appear. She did not come so much for frigidity as for anxiety concerning the baby. This was hysterical in type, the kind we are wont to ascribe to the unconscious death wish. Analysis of the latter revealed the fact that the woman had married as a sort of substitute for the death of her own mother, whom she had tended during a long illness. She had long known the husband. The patient's brother, two years younger, and whom she held responsible for the loss of the mother, was the original object of the death wish, and this had been transferred to her own child. Two or three weeks after its birth she dreamed that it had bitten off her nipple, and as the breast symbolizes the mother, this went back to the agency of the brother in depriving her of her mother. At one time she had identified herself with this brother although not through penis envy. After the recovery of the patient she was willing to bear another child, or in other words to accept a younger brother as a child.

A dream before this second pregnancy had for its content that as she was washing the baby's toy rabbit the skin came away and revealed a rabbit like the first. The child, however, wanted her first rabbit back.

The associations of this dream went back to the younger brother, who, at the age of eight, owned and bred rabbits and knew that they bred every six weeks. This dream appeared in the sixth week of the analysis. Her husband, who was analyzed at the same time, was accepted by her as the brother because they had the same mother (analyst).

The frigidity was toward the husband and any more children. The historical motivation of the frigidity went back further, to an experience in her twentieth year. Riding on a train with her mother, she saw a man masturbating. Since then the sight of an erect penis repelled her. An intensive attempt was made to connect this with the infantile trauma of beholding the father's penis, as the patient's dreams seemed to point in this direction. At the age of four or five she recalled finally that she had seen the penis of a big dog as he was engaged in defecation. She had developed a nausea at the sight of male organs, and had once dreamed of a child being born from the rectum. There were four pieces of excrement and in her family, beside herself, there were four children. She was at the time of her dream four months pregnant (first child). Penis envy was shown by her identification as a child with the brother at the breast. A wish fancy of castration of her husband, implied in her frigidity, went back to her attitude to the father in regard to other children and she was enraged at the brother for usurping the mother's affection.

She had, as stated, married her husband as mother substitute and hence refused him as a father by reason of the latter's procreation of other children; hence the frigidity. She had shifted the death wish (castration wish) from the father to the husband.

The following dream is from the end phase of this analysis:

A servant girl came up the front stair and into the main door of the dreamer's house, saying that the back door had been fastened while the front one stood open. She was vexed over this and taking the child herself went to the agent to complain. He was sorry and asked what floor to which she replied "fifth." He said a lock would have to be put on the main door whereupon she said she would attend to it, in order to make sure. She then picked up the child as she was about to go but let it drop although no harm resulted and she picked it up for the second time and left. This child was smaller than her own real child.

In a second fragment she was riding along with her youngest brother who also seemed at times to be her husband, on the way to her home. Once she passed some yellow flowers.

In a third fragment she was in a room and about to put on a cloak which was full of spots and quarreled with an old woman who was responsible but who only said that she should get a new one, but she excitedly said that she wanted the old one.

In a fourth her husband came into bed with her. She embraced him and waked sexually excited.

In this dream there was an identification of the husband with the youngest brother but the purpose was not apparent. The fifth story of the building agreed with the fact that at the time she was five months pregnant; also with the number of the analyst's house. The house superintendent was also the analyst. The arguments with the servant and old woman, showed that she had ceased to accept her husband as mother and now accepted him as husband (here identification of brother and husband). The new cloak referred to pregnancy and the need of new clothing. She had quarreled once with the husband for planting yellow flowers which to her symbolized pregnancy. The final fragment showed acceptance of the husband as sex object.

In succeeding dreams the patient appeared to have reacted off the anger against her brother, represented now by her husband and for the first time had a dream of her father. This is the final adaptation to the Oedipus situation. She had discarded her mother, whom consciously she had loved fondly and for whom she had an unconscious sense of guilt in order to be alone with the father (analyst).

In a later dream there was the death of the mother without special grief.

She also dreamed of intercourse with her husband with full orgasm. The analyst was present but she paid no attention to him. This indicated transference from the father (analyst) to the husband and giving up the male rôle. As a matter of fact she now had intercourse with her husband with orgasm.

The Pedigree Dream

This is illustrated by the following dream, in which Professor Freud himself figured. She (the dreamer) had returned to her home after a trip, but was to stay there only a short time. She did not know why she had returned. She talked a great deal about Vienna which she said was now inhabited mostly by foreigners. Her sister thought this strange and she replied that no one could visualize it unless one

had actually been there. Next the dreamer was in Vienna. She had sheltered Freud. Her mother seemed to be with her at times. She dreamed of a great park or rather waste space. Professor Freud was present with three pupils, and she felt she must entertain him lest he be bored. Her sister and her husband (the dreamer's brother-in-law) seemed to be present, the former pushing a baby carriage. Someone gave it a tremendous push which sent it flying but when it capsized it was found to contain only a doll. This she felt would make a bad impression on Professor Freud.

There was another dream about being in Vienna with her mother and the latter complaining of a Sunday headache, and in this dream she was having a pair of shoes repaired.

There was also a notable dream about the origin of man in which Freud figured. He was present with his pupils. A picture hung on the wall, painted on both sides. It seemed to be alive like motion pictures. On one side was a family tree, a pedigree which showed the origin of mankind. A daughter, very beautiful, was given off from the trunk, but the sex seemed in doubt, aside from the fact that it was the highest type of beauty. Another figure, a son, came down from the tree, and showed a remarkable aptitude for music. The tree and the figures also suggested the Garden of Eden and the first man and woman. Both these were nude. Other figures then appeared, including three or four men, who had children. The dreamer awakened abruptly in the midst of the dream.

On the wall of the analyst's office is an etching of Freud with four photographs of his pupils, all hanging above a sofa where the patient habitually saw them at the time of the analyses. This was the motive for introducing Freud into her dreams in which the sofa also figured. The patient had introduced the "analytical family" into her own kindred. Her grandfather had been in the habit of showing her the family trees. Her father had three brothers (or sisters) making four in the generation and the grandfather had three brothers. The whole was also sublimed into a paradise fancy. The musical genius was a young man of her own town. The baby carriage, the accident, and the doll, referred to her sister who was then pregnant and to a phase of the analysis in which this sister, who had never borne a child, was made to have one in an imaginary analysis by Freud.

Subsequent experience has taught the author that this kind of dream originates in the analytical situation and from the wish of the patient who knows that the end of the analysis is definitely set. It is this tendency to belong to the same family with the analyst which is responsible for fancies of the remote past and the phylogenetic and prehistoric elements of the dream.

Another patient had at the beginning of the analysis a dream of being in a strange city with paved streets. At a turn of the road he saw a bare tree which a man was cutting down, chopping a ring around the base of the tree close to the ground. The tree already tottered as if about to fall. At this point the dreamer saw that there were three or four negroes in the tree and told them that they would be injured but one negro laughed him to scorn, saying that was their lookout. The tree then fell, very slowly. One only of the negroes seemed to be hurt and a crowd of curious people gathered. The emotion of the dreamer was curiosity rather than anxiety.

This patient had run away as a youth and traveled extensively. He had often marveled at the skill of tree fellers and had tried to get the knack but unsuccessfully. He had been laughed at for his awkwardness. Of the four negroes two were definite, an old and young man (the latter had laughed at him), while the others had their backs to him. Negroes he knew to be dirty, syphilitic, living promiscuously, and were strongly sexual and even homosexual, but were strong and good workers. His house superintendent, although himself a former Jew, is antisemitic. The patient had once acted over his head, dealing directly with the house owner.

In this dream the two negroes were really Jews, the author and Freud being symbolized. The dream of the tree is clearly a castration fancy, the tree being separated from its mother earth.

This patient like the preceding one saw the author's gallery of ancestors; in the center was Freud, the elder, flanked by four pupils, Rank being the one who had laughed. This patient had also learned by chance that Rank had at the time four patients. The fear of the dreamer that the young negro would be injured by the fall of the tree was the patient's own fear, but at the same time it expressed a typically hostile wish directed against the sister, the father and the analyst himself. The sister played a prominent rôle in the patient's unconscious, as may be seen later, which did not become clear until the end of the analysis. The reason that the tree in the dream was bare is first the wish that there may be no more members in the family; it represents sterility and a biological castration. On account of its sterility it is to be cut down. The patient's father had been a gynecologist and had himself delivered him at his birth. His mother's breasts went dry early so that he was brought up partly on the bottle. The fact that the father himself had cut the cord had at the same time robbed him of his nourishment; and he himself wished to become a gynecologist like his father and thereby get even with him. The skilled tree feller symbolized the father. The patient had the wish

for sole ownership of the analyst, as representative of the mother, as experienced in utero, at the breast, etc. He was jealous of the other patients as he would have been of his own brothers and sisters.

A dream narrative published by Freud from his own practice was found by the author to possess so many resemblances to his own that Freud's text is reproduced in full, illustrated by a sketch of five wolves in a tree.

In the course of the analytic cure this dream of Professor Freud's patient appeared, and in one form or another tended to recur innumerable times. When the patient was a boy, he dreamed that it was night and that he lay in his own bed with its foot against the window, outside of which were many old walnut trees. All at once the dreamer was startled to see this window open spontaneously whereupon he noted in the tree nearest the window six or seven white wolves, who also resembled in some ways sheep, dogs and foxes (tails of foxes, ears of the dogs). His age at this time must have been four or five and it was probably his first fear dream. He waked with a cry and his nurse rushed in to investigate. It was some time before he could be persuaded that this was a dream, it seemed so vivid and realistic. The sole action in the dream was the raising of the window, for the animals did not stir although their gaze was directed upon him with whole attention. He did not get over the fear of repeating a fear dream until the age of eleven or twelve.

He explained the dream by the fact that he had read much about wolves in his story books and had acquired a fear of them from one particular picture which illustrated Red Ridinghood. Here the wolf was represented as walking. Why were the wolves white? There were many sheep in the vicinity and the patient had witnessed an attempt to inoculate them against some disease which, however, failed to protect them. Other parts of the dream seem to have been inspired by tales of the patient's grandfather in which wolves entered windows and chased men up trees; also a wolf lost its tail by amputation (compare the compensatory foxes' tails on the wolves), the last being a castration fancy. Why there were six or seven wolves is hard to explain—probably the idea came from fusion with some other fable, as the story of the wolf and seven kids of which the wolf ate six.

This interpretation is, of course, not analytic, but simply takes account of the original child dream. Two elements in the latter were of great significance for the analytic dreams—the immobility and tense expectation of the wolves and the intense sense of reality on the part of the dreamer, which means that something had actually taken place beyond mere fancy. This reality is in direct contrast

with the unreality of the fables on which it was founded. As for the alleged age of the dreamer—not less than three or more than five years—this probably means that the dream at that period was a recollection of something still further back. This the analysis should bring out. The sheep remembered by the boy had almost been exterminated by the pestilence. The first analysis apparently brought out that the wolf was the father substitute. The object feared was therefore the father. The self-opening window may have symbolized the eyes which opened and saw the sight. The staring of the motionless wolf was simply the boy's own staring and immobility, these inversions being of common occurrence. The tree probably symbolized the Christmas tree and this boy happened to be born on that day. Even in the dream it was winter. The patient recalled later that this dream must have happened not long before Christmas when he was looking forward to it. He was anticipating both holiday and birthday gifts. The wolves on the tree must then have symbolized presents. The fear was, as stated, of the father—castration fear, which caused the affective state. Back of all this was some experience which the analyst fixes at the age of one and a half years at which the patient chanced to witness coitus between his parents. This was fixed in part by a history of a malarial attack in the summer when the parents went about with scanty attire and took an afternoon nap. Coitus was evidently practiced from behind, so that the child could not see anything but he had been able to see the genitals of both parties. It was thought by Freud that this act had been repeated several times but the steps by which this conclusion was arrived at are not specified. The child in some manner finally interrupted the practice.

The author sees in this case of Freud's a strong analogy with the pedigree dream of his own patient. The fear which Freud imputes to the father as object may have concerned the mother but the important point seems to have been the position of the bed and tree to the window. The author recalls that in Freud's office the patients lay on a sofa, the foot of which was against the window and that trees—chestnut he thinks—were outside the window. The patient looks toward a wall to the left of this window on which there were at the time of the analysis a number of photographs, which varied—five to seven—which appeared to stare at the patient, being of course motionless. This could have been responsible for the number of wolves. The subjects, Freud and his sons, constituted a family tree. This would also explain the sense of actuality.

The material of the dream appeared to agree with the dream of

the author's patient in the early spectacle of parental coitus (at the age of one and a half years), which was elaborated into a dream at about the fourth birthday; in the dream of Rank's patient the fancy of paradise may have symbolized the coitus of the first parents from whom all are said to spring. The paradise fancy also symbolizes the antenatal state. Numerous other parallelisms may be found between the dreams of the author's patients (the last two) and Freud's patient in respect to the family tree fancy.

Another patient, male, termed H, with the same mother fixation and infantile trauma of disillusionment in connection with dry breast, the only child and hence the heir of the race, unmarried, whose stepfather represents the rival brother, was unable to transfer his libido to another object. One of his early dreams under analysis was that he was in the upper berth of a sleeper while in the lower was a woman. He seems to fall and at the same time felt her breasts. The same night he dreamed of a storm from which he sought to protect himself but held in each hand a tart (belonging to the stepfather). Mostly in his dreams he was up high, on a roof, a stair, etc., from which he fell, sprang or glided down. In the third month of analysis the tree appeared in his dreams, although it appeared that there were personal reasons for this. The patient had ridden into the jungle apparently without saddle or bridle when his horse suddenly shied at what apparently was a tree trunk or root but which proved to be a giant snake which had been hewn in pieces. Later he rode beneath a tree, the branches of which hung low and he feared the presence of another snake, but the wilderness changed suddenly to a sort of space, with two walls only, a sort of improvised studio. It contained a piano and another coffin-like instrument on high legs, like the finger board of a pianola. A friend was in this studio and warned him of the snake; in fright—for he had no weapon—he climbed up on the coffin-like box which swung back and forth, so that he wished to change to the piano but thought the snake might get him from above. He asked the friend if he had killed many snakes and the answer was "yes."

The dreamer knew that the analyst was about to take a trip which apparently motivated the sleeping car dream. The horse symbolized the mother and the analyst. The shying of the horse had reference to this journey. The studio was the analyst's office.

As the patient lay on the analyst's couch he could see but two walls. Fear that a snake could get him from above had reference to the fact that the analyst was above him. The friend in the studio was also the analyst and the snake which he would kill was the analyst as representative of the mother. The thick snake on the ground

was a stout woman with whom he had danced the evening before after a young girl had refused. He was vexed with both of them and before falling asleep had a fancy of two skeletons which stood for the two women. The skeleton denoted the contrast to stoutness and also stood for dryness (dry breast). The snake symbolized the penis but also woman (myth of the fall of man); and the mutilation of the snake castration and separation from the mother. The whole dream was a reaction of rage against the two women.

Hate for the stout woman was unconscious; she was associated with the mother who had married again and who had no milk for him. The mother also was identified with the analyst who as mother representative denied him much. He wished to be above the mother and hence projected the fancies of horses, trees, the box on high legs, etc.

A later dream was of a bare tree (nothing had been said of family trees by the analyst). This did not come into the dream until late when he noted the bare tree on a hill and climbed it. There were no branches, only the trunk. He was able to look down from this height on a spectacle which he had been watching from the ground. There were crowds and a race was being run, with horses—a sort of steeplechase.

The dream and its explanation are given in unusual length and detail but the content is that of the analysis itself and the analytic family, the family tree, etc., as in the previous dreams. The tree was bare and only the dreamer occupied it until another, who symbolized the analyst, joined him in it.

Two weeks before the close of the analysis of another patient—D, male—the dreamer saw from a great distance the fall of a tree of great size. Children had been playing about it and some woman called on him for help. The tree lay in the middle of a large city. This tree probably was identified with a church in Vienna, near the patient's residence. On the day of the dream the analyst had dismissed another patient of the same age, who had gone away. He and the other patient had become friendly. This second patient had grown children, while the other although from a prolific family had none. The tree then symbolized the analyst and the two patients as constituting a family.

The tree also stood for the mother as shown by the children who played about it. The dreamer heard the cry of the woman but the falling tree had made no sound. There was, however, an extra-analytic explanation for recently an elderly relative—woman—had been in distress and had called on him for aid.

The Infantile Prototype. The author goes back to the family tree

dream of patient F, and would show that sitting on the same, which corresponds to the analytic situation, indicates in the infantile sense the sojourn with the mother. It is noteworthy that after the family tree dream the patient began to recall infantile happenings, as when once he climbed across his mother to get to his father in bed. In his numerous dreams he is high up on roofs, high buildings, ships, mountains or floating about and in danger of falling. He thinks this happened when he was between three and four years old for before then he had slept in a trundle bed. The patient thought that this explained certain homosexual inclinations. He recalled events in the first year of his life, as drinking milk from a blue glass which was molded externally to resemble a bunch of grapes.

The convex surfaces on the glass which the infant recalls feeling may have suggested the maternal breast. Another recollection of this early period is the father's finger which was used to tease him and from which he shrank back. The dream life of the patient was of the father, never of the mother as such. However she was symbolized by high buildings, ships and similar high objects over which as a child the patient loved to climb. The attachment to the father went back to the second year of life and up to that time the latter had taken but little notice of him. One morning the father took him from his bed and showed him a burning building. He was wrapped in a gray shawl and raised to his father's shoulder. This garment had been long in the family, was worn and ragged and often in dreams symbolized the mother, as a protective instrument. The recollection of the father's taking him from bed and of crawling over the mother to reach him constituted a sort of weaning trauma. He learned that when he was born his father was the first to touch him and take him. This was evidently the patient whose father was the gynecologist and had delivered the child. In the analysis this scene was reproduced with the reaction of rage against the father (analyst also). This primitive scene accounts fully for the homosexual tendencies of the patient for he had abandoned the mother for the father. The dream of the barren tree, the dry and brittle branch, was typical with the patient and indicated that the nourishment of Mother Earth had been cut off. Toward the end of the analysis the elder sister of the patient appeared almost for the first time. In the earlier dreams he once showed his sister his pocketbook which was well filled. As two men seemed to be watching he slipped the pocketbook to her and she fled down the stairs. He then slid under the men who came toward him and got away. Dreams of criminals were typical with him.

This sister dream related to money conflicts with his father from whom he would accept nothing. He had many dreams of ships long before he had ever been on one. Before the war he had battle dreams, of shell explosions and of being hit in the face with the fragments. His dreams were usually on a large scale, spatial, and sometimes large objects would descend on him and crush him. The ship evidently symbolized the mother. The high places and the descent from heights could be interpreted from the family tree angle and the constant recurrence of slipping down, sometimes slowly, also symbolized the separations from the mother, as in birth and weaning. In one dream the father gave him pills to take and told him he must not ask questions but trust him. This was in general the paternal attitude. There were eight to ten of these pills which pointed to the number of the months of gestation. The favorite number of the patient was five which often recurred. Dream numbers usually refer to simple things like the number of children in the family, the month of pregnancy at a given period, etc. The fifth year was a critical one in the life of the patient for they moved into a new house and the father (gynecologist) shaved off his beard so that the son did not know him. In his recurrent dreams of criminals the latter were always bearded.

In the 10th analytical session the patient related a fear dream from which he awakened with a cry. He was driving through a wood with his wife and baby and it was necessary for the wife to push away hanging branches in order that headway be made. Finally they reached the carriage house when the horse and carriage seemed to vanish. The dreamer wished to close this building for the winter but found no lock on the door. He stood at one end of the building with his wife at the other when he noted that the trap door in the ceiling was open and that some one was in the loft. Fearing violence he warned his wife.

Later the same night he had a dream of the analyst. A man whom he encountered said he was the analyst although he was not. The dreamer had apparently gone to the wrong street door. The false analyst gave him two tablets and although he believed the man was not a physician he took them.

These dreams showed fear of the father in respect to the mother and the last one showed plainly the identification of the father with the analyst (episode of the pills repeated). The disappearance of the wife in the barn was analogous to that of the sister in the pocketbook episode, both having been threatened by criminals representing the father. The entrance into the barn and the disappearance

of the woman symbolized the return to the mother. At the 21st hour three dreams were related which showed infantile regression—playing, creeping about, infantile sex curiosity (he saw his mother in bed), and identification with both father and mother at different times.

At the 33rd hour he told an examination dream of sitting on a school bench and studying an examination paper. However he seemed to be testing himself and had put five questions to himself. Three of these disappeared and when they turned up were in a strange handwriting. He asked the woman who wrote them the reason, and she said she wanted to help him. He had had many of these examination dreams and usually was able to read the words of the questions but they made no sense. In this dream he thought the questions were about psychoanalysis. The patient had evidently identified himself with his father but the woman who helped represented the mother. This double identification represented a conflict, the five questions being divided up into the first two and the other three which had at first been lost or forgotten. The patient's wife also figured as a rival in scholarship.

In the 35th hour some one wished a letter sent off in a hurry and the dreamer offered to deliver it as he was going that way. He took an automatic elevator to the fifth floor but did not know how to bring it to a stop but finally succeeded. As he went to leave the car he looked down the shaft and the car seemed to sway as if the shaft were much wider than at first. He had no anxiety at the time but in telling the dream there was some affective reaction.

This dream was a few days before his mother's birthday and his wife had already written to congratulate her but the dreamer had at first known nothing of this. He wrote on large male stationery, while the dream letter was in a small feminine envelope, and posted the letter himself.

The dream showed the wish to give the mother the letter in place of mailing it and showed a certain rivalry between the dreamer and his wife over the mother. The situation of separation from the mother was represented and the swaying in the elevator—he had seemed to lie on his side to glance down the shaft with his feet in the car—was associated with the act of labor, the feet being still unborn. The pendulum-like vibration of the elevator also suggested the swaying of a tree.

The dream of the 89th hour was hard to relate. The dreamer was on a holiday and saw something between a cathedral and a hill which he partly ascended and stopped at a balcony from which he could

look down and see the wing of the church. He then climbed higher and looked down on another roof which was said to have been the place where Oedipus killed his father. The information came from a young man present but the dreamer disagreed with him and insisted that it was a rock and not a building and the starting point of Xenophon's march (anabasis).

The rock then seemed to change back to a church and someone again spoke of Oedipus. The dreamer then proposed that they go down and investigate the place. Going down a stair he awakened. The association of the Oedipus situation with the analyst is, of course, obvious in conjunction with school reminiscences. The word anabasis could mean literally the "climb down" although in its usual significance the idea of a descent is not involved. All of these dreams of watching from high places denote the infantile situation. The church recurs constantly as a mother symbol and the effort to visit the site of the murder betokened the return to the maternal body.

The dream of the 105th hour was experienced early in the morning. For the first time he dreamed of his old house and his former room. With his sister he was awaiting the father's return, to accompany him. Finally he heard the sound of the carriage and called his sister to get him some food before he left. In this dream the sister replaces the dreamer's wife. When no longer nourished by the mother the patient's libido went over to the father. The return of the father who was to take him away is associated with separation from the mother.

The task of the analysis had been to overcome the patient's fear of the father, which represented a displacement of the maternal fear of labor, and adapt him to the Oedipus situation. This succeeded by forming an ideal of a better father, who not only permitted but promoted this situation. Return to the old paternal house, to his old bed where he had been born, the reappearance of the sister in the dreams, longing for the father to come to take him away, etc., all pointed to the new adaptation of the patient to the Oedipus situation.

Historical Projection. Projection of an actual situation into the remote past shows the original relationship to the mother. This abounds in popular myth as well. The person analyzed not only goes back to his own birth but to his family descent and even to the childhood of the race, to paradise fancies and prehistory. In popular myth men may originate from trees and the tree of life is a biblical landmark. The fruit of the tree may symbolize the breast, both being universal nourishment and the fall of man may symbolize weaning from a particular kind of nourishment. Plucking the

forbidden fruit may symbolize the separation of the child from its mother, in other words birth itself, while the sojourn in Paradise would be the antenatal period in the womb—Paradise, where one can return only through death. The Christmas tree is associated in the mind with the Tree of Life and the Cross of the Christians is the Tree of Death. The relationship of these two trees has been noted by Zöckler in his History of the Cross. According to an Oriental legend some one who was allowed to look into Paradise after the Fall of Man saw that the Tree of Life was withered, while a little child lay in its branches.

Freud has claimed that wood is feminine in symbolism, bearing as it does fruits and leaves, although the trunk is masculine. To give a tree bisexual significance, however, is to make interpretation difficult and uncertain. The author thinks the maternal significance of tree comes from its protective quality—it is a kind of sanctuary. In addition the tree must have often served as home—the original dwelling place of man.

From the numerous analyses given it is made clear that there is a libidinous wish for the sole possession of the mother, which is at the bottom of the neurosis. Rivals for the mother are the father and the other children.

Return to the mother with elimination of the father allows the supposition of a historical motive which plays an analogous rôle in the fancies of childhood. Hence in projection into the past the doctrine of the primeval horde and the primeval father may be supplanted by that of the primeval mother. The young infant at the breast knows only of its mother. The father idea is secondary, the father having been forced into the family tree, or having been insinuated into it, as it were, artificially. The idea of the totem and the totem pole is to keep alive the descent from the father.

The ascendancy of the mother is libidinous and that of the father juristic. Totem poles which repeat endlessly the maternal descent, show a defense against the father right. There is here perhaps a castration element.

In regard to phylogenetic symbolism it is of no value in analysis. The formula is "analyze the analytic situation" and this has been shown to be *not* equivalent to analysis of the transference. This is not spared but torn out with its root, the infantile mother fixation. If the situation is now analyzed further we come very soon upon the patient's Ego, which is recognized as the middle point of this situation. For understanding the narcissistic character of the same the cultural and historical material may give us hints. The wish for

the sole possession of the mother is narcissistic and not only is present throughout life but after death as shown by certain funeral ceremonies—exposure in ships which symbolizes return to the mother. Whosoever goes back to his mother must go alone. The opposite, of mass burial, is peculiarly repulsive. The ordinary solitary interment in the earth is the return to the antenatal state. Attempts to eliminate the brothers and father, however, react with sense of guilt.

Analytic and Historical Significance. During the analysis material is encountered which does not come from the past of the analyzed but are of present origin and an outgrowth of the analytic situation. If the nature of this material is not recognized the treatment may be vitiated. One may seek in the past of the patient the prototype of an unintelligible reaction without finding it or he may try to build up actual material into a reconstruction of the past and in both cases come to naught. The sources of error which spring from neglect of the analytic situation may be recognized by Freud's historical method, the phylogenetic method of Jung or the more practical "actual conflict" of Stekel. The author prefers Jung to Freud in this respect for phylogenesis projects the present into the past better than historical explanation. If we try to place the "actual conflict" in the middle of the analysis there is danger of confusing it with the analytic situation.

There is, however, a way to aid in the solution of this problem and that is the employment of the extra-analytic dream. Unfortunately we never know the significance of these dreams even when the dreamers are familiar with psychoanalysis and interpret them themselves. In telling the dream or allowing another to interpret it something analogous to the analytic situation is produced and its influence on dream formation, the associations and interpretation, is shown beyond doubt. Even the typical dreams as described by Freud do not help us out, for in the typical form and content we see these dreams in the act of formation in the analytic situation. Old dreams which correspond to the latter may also be seen in adapted form which make it possible to recognize the progress of the patient and his attitude at the moment.

In this sense one may comprehend the content of the unconscious as a depiction of what is taking place between the patient and the analyst projected into the historical past of the patient. Hence it would be nonsense to deny either the fact or the importance of the historical. There remains only to investigate how far the historical element is concerned in the pathology and what else beside the analytic situation is projected back. One may say at the outset that

Freud himself has never denied that in this reconstruction of the past from the actual situation sources of error may be yielded which analysis must at once investigate. In his latest presentations Freud has emphasized how difficult it is to unmask the scenes of seduction as representations of the Oedipus complex which most patients recall from their childhood.

Under the "artificial" character of the analytic situation the author understands not only the external medium which the patient applies as material for his productions but the affective relationship to the person of the analyst and finally the peculiar situation itself from which come spontaneously certain typical reactions. Thus the position on the sofa with the analyst behind causes the wish to see the analyst, even when he does not predominate in the instinctive life of the patient and the narcissistic desire to show himself. The wish to see is motivated in part by the anxiety of the patient at having someone behind him whom he knows nothing about nor what he might do. Often enough one gets the impression that this arrangement sets the patient in an anxious condition and adds to his already present fears—just as the operating table of the surgeon is believed to do. If the analyst remains passive this influence on the patient is not marked, but trivial things such as changes in the seating arrangement, the clothing, etc., may exert an influence on the patient. It is known and recognized that the analytic situation does influence the behavior of the patient during the analysis and a typical wish of the latter is to become an analyst himself, not so much from father identification as to understand the "analytic family" and especially the family tree dream, although the most distinct wish is to make of the analyst a permanent mother.

These examples may show how important it is to understand the affective expressions and reactions of the patient from the analytic situation, which itself is not to be explained historically, for it does not find any prototype in the life history of the patient. He does indeed bring from his past matter which is adaptable to the situation, but this is adapted to the situation, in other words disfigured and its reconstruction is possible only when one regards the influence of the analytic situation instead of undervaluing that which is produced therein as phantasy. The author does not deny that interpretation by the infantile is of therapeutic value in as far as it makes his asocial incitations acceptable to the patient's ego from a higher standpoint but in theory the question is still open as to how far it is really infantile and how far only therapeutic auxiliary construction which permits the patient to play a rôle in the analysis.

It is not so much a matter of giving criteria for the objectivity of psychoanalytic statements as of emphasizing the attitude of the analyst which is so important for therapy. Whether transference can be explained as a mere wax impression of the historical may be doubted. Of especial importance in this connection is the family history of the patient which forms the leading symptom in the analysis of married people with marital difficulties. If the transference is neglected in these cases, the patient will begin to think of getting a divorce when the close of the analysis approaches. He would rather be free from the marriage than the analysis. The striking fact that in the analyses of the married the spouse plays a very small rôle is only apparent, for he or she is often disguised in some way. One can naturally arrange the transference but cannot do this straightway for he must take heed of what alterations in the affective relations have already been experienced before the transference is made from mother to wife and then again to the analyst. These are not equivalents, for beneath this apparent equality lies the essential conflict in the analytical task.

Another serious fault is the belief that all which is unconscious and repressed must be infantile. This may be the case, but it is experimentally demonstrable that as a rule neither analyst nor patient sees the influence of the analytic situation. That it often becomes manifest and is forced into consideration when it becomes resistance is no proof that it was latent. On the contrary this may be demonstrated as it is one of the special tasks of the analyst to show not only his theoretical knowledge but the influence of the analytic situation as far as it is not yet manifest—and mostly it is never spontaneous—and to recognize it at the right moment.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF A GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY *

(ON A BASIS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE EGO STRUCTURE)

BY
OTTO RANK

PART I

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Psychoanalytic Problems

1. *Methods*

I would like to discuss certain fundamental problems of psychoanalytic investigation; that is, to clear up certain of the principal questions which have already come up in psychoanalysis, but which take on new importance as a result of new experience. Incidentally I will seek to delimit the field of psychoanalysis more sharply than formerly, while at the same time the manner of contemplation shall be made more fruitful for the understanding of phenomena. I am convinced that much honest effort has been squandered because the limits of psychoanalysis have not been grasped. The causes for this I cannot indeed remove, although I can indicate the first step to be taken for their removal. This is a systematic presentation of psychoanalysis which will automatically lay bare its discrepancies, uncertainties and obscurities. Thus far no one has attempted such a presentation and Freud himself has always warned against overhasty systematization. To continue as before with the empirical method has advantages but also disadvantages. The former comprise, as before stated, the avoidance of premature systematization, while the disadvantages include the inability to explain an entire series of findings. The method of Freud heretofore in vogue has been recognized as the empirical or historical, in contrast to the systematic or speculative method which is about to be considered.

In following the historical method there is danger of taking up the new to the detriment of older finds and discoveries; and conversely of adhering too zealously to the old and ignoring the new. In an ideal method the new must be incorporated and the old and tried not too hastily condemned, just as the new must not be over-

* Abstracted from the German, published by Franz Deuticke, 1927. Part II will appear at the close of 1927.

valued. The systematic standpoint protects against such dangers and matters are viewed evenly without historical distortion. But I have no intention of making an entire change of front from the historical to the systematic method because thus far it is still premature to systematize fully our knowledge of psychoanalysis. What is attempted is the systematic elaboration of what is thus far known of psychoanalysis—an effort which shall be synthetic and methodical and applied to psychoanalysis within certain limits of its territory.

2. *Nomenclature*

Psychoanalysis from the first has been a combination of certain elements such as “free association,” “interpretation,” “psychoanalytic therapy,” etc. It also implies the psychology which is based on these elements. This construction has led to errors and confusion, so that with many the term psychoanalysis is reserved for Freud’s classic method of investigation. To the psychology which is founded on psychoanalysis I have applied the name “genetic psychology.” The fact that our knowledge of it has been obtained from patients does not interfere with building up therefrom a normal psychology. But too much stress should never be laid on names in the developmental stage of a new science because such words may prove a stumbling block to progress and we must expect to revise them from time to time as new discoveries are made.

Terms are still used which have long been outgrown and will continue to be used until a systematic treatment makes them superfluous, although much time is required for new ones to come into common usage. It would be a service if the new terms could precede the systematization of our knowledge.

Some of the terms which are retained go back to preanalytic days, as “conscious,” “unconscious,” “homosexuality,” etc. Others like “repression” and “castration” have come into use with psychoanalysis. The older terms are chiefly descriptive while the analytic words are phenomenologic or dynamic. Some of the older terms have largely changed their significance as a result of analysis, while others have automatically been superseded by new ones and still others are retained out of sentiment for Freud.

The conception of the “complex” originally showed itself very useful but later became superfluous and then disturbing; nevertheless it is still current. We may term it to-day the precipitate of a trauma. Trauma itself, which plays so great an historical rôle in analysis, was originally a chance injurious experience but I now employ the term to indicate a biologically necessary forward thrust

of development, which per se is not traumatic. "Unconscious" has indicated a purely negative conception and is now not only superfluous but disturbing. It may be replaced by the "inhibited" or "repressed" instinctive impulse, which terms I have adhered to since 1907 in visualizing psychoanalysis as the "doctrine of instincts." Another expression, "amplified sexuality," was a mistake from the first. "Libido" expresses the same idea but even to-day there is no unanimity among analysts as to the significance of these terms. In regard to "repression" as a type of psychic defense or reaction the author since 1911 has made use of another term, "denial" to indicate a psychic reaction.

We now come to the two most important conceptions of psychoanalysis, the "Oedipus" and "castration" complexes, derived from primitive mythology. The former originally referred to a single fact but in time was expanded by Freud for the erection of the super-ego and central nucleus of the neurosis. This can be decomposed into the "pre-Oedipus situation," which involves the relation of the children to the mother, and the "Oedipus situation" in which the relation is to the father. The "castration" complex comes from the same myth, belonging to the Oedipus stratum, and embraces in addition to castration other separations as weaning and birth itself. Freud associates it intimately with fear. It concerns only the masculine half of society although the "wish for maleness" which replaces it among women is termed by some the castration complex. "Castration fear" is regarded as synonymous with danger to the ego and equivalent to fear of annihilation. My view, as is well known, is that all later fear is a reproduction of birth fear.

In recent years Freud has admitted but one new conception, that of the It of Groddeck, a biologic unconscious, but there seems no warrant for such mythical personations and depersonations, as long as much simpler conceptions are available.

The same objections inhere in the word "transference," which originally was well chosen and useful and meant simply that in the course of analysis the analyst came to replace the mother and at the same time represented social requirements. A part at least of this conception is better summed up as the "analytic situation." The term "resistance" sums up almost all that is not comprised under "transference." I make a distinction between "ego" resistance and "libido" resistance, although this is only a temporary distinction.

Both Freud and myself have sought to distinguish between a psychoanalytic technic of investigation and one of treatment. The latter, like treatment in general, must be "active" provided there

is no associated element of investigation. To remove a causal factor is active intervention. If moral precepts carried out could cure neuroses there would be no occasion for further investigation, but Freud in seeking for a remedy learned the existence of psychic inhibitions which must be removed to cure the patient. The transference or analytic situation invoked for this purpose represented unheard-of activity, comparable with protracted serum treatment. The patient may be said to receive daily doses of "libido" which cause the inhibitions to dissolve automatically and which are likened by Ferenczi to the action of a catalyst. The last phase of treatment is weaning the patient from this opiate and is likewise an active resource, for the time is fixed for the treatment to end.

In the province of therapy we encounter an entire series of psycho-analytic problems. The principle which is possible in the historical method is not utilizable in therapy. If the original task of investigation is to isolate the general and typical from a chaotic material, the task of treatment is to seize upon the individual problem and to work constructively rather than historically. If the task of investigation be to collect all the data and sift them historically in order to find the typical it is the task of treatment to bring about the psychic adjustment of the individual conflict of the patient through mastery of the analytic situation.

Therewith we come to the important problem of interpretation which is not only a technical problem but a methodological one and every explanation which we give the patient is an interpretation in so far as it is a mediation to a theory which rests on the interpretation of the observation. In this sense all analytical interpretations are final and not causal. Causal interpretation can only impart to us the genetic mode of consideration in which there is no room for final interpretation because it operates with instinct incitations. Jealousy or sense of guilt as we find them in the Oedipus situation do not originate in the latter, are not derived from there but these reactions express themselves in this situation with especial distinctness. If we follow jealousy further back we shall find that it expressed itself in the earliest nursling stage in connection with the mother.

It is especially in the application of symbolism that the essential errors of all analytic interpretation occur. Not all authoritative persons or figures (as in dreams) have father significance. For one patient it may be the mother who was the first figure of authority; in fact she is such with the majority of mankind. Further it should be explained why in the same person now one and now the other

symbol represents authority. The snake is not always a phallus symbol for it may represent a woman; but where it does have phallic significance there is not necessarily a masked representation for it may indicate fear, or a special fear of being bitten. But not merely within the sexual sphere must the symbol be explained in its specific conditionality for other possibilities must not be neglected. Thus "house" must not be rendered as woman only, for there is the special interpretation of protection or possession. Always it should be explained why woman is in one connection an object of protection, of possession, or an object of fear. In interpretation there must be a relationship elicited between content and form, not merely of content alone.

3. *Special*

We come now to the crux of the totality of psychoanalysis, the doctrine of neuroses. Despite the relative antiquity of the relationship there is still much obscurity, for we have always striven for some new viewpoint concerning the etiological root of the neuroses. At first it seemed to be a matter of trauma of childhood until it appeared that these were partly fantastic and partly to be found in normal man. Then came Jung's "complexes" but it was learned that these are present also in dementia precox and may also occur in normal subjects without damage. For some time the nucleus of neurosis was attributed to the Oedipus complex and later the castration complex was made an etiological factor of the first rank. Freud adopted this as a partial symptom of the great fear problem, which is, however, a general one and not specific of neuroses. I have resisted the temptation to make the "birth trauma" the special etiological factor in the formation of the same. This is seductive but again we are only confronted with a bit of normal psychology.

We seek for a cause because a cause always simplifies therapeutics. but search for a specific cause for neuroses corresponds to the purely medical attitude. Psychoanalysis, however, has shown that it is not a matter of disease but of defective adaptation, so that in the medical sense psychoanalysis is not a causal form of therapy. A causal therapy of neuroses would involve a revolution in society. In analysis we do not seek to cure a disease which is due to failure of adaptation but after analysis we strive through education for a better adaptation. The patient becomes partly rid of his sense of guilt which has come about from false ideals and sees that others cope with the same problem and can adapt themselves after a fashion without striving for a hopeless ideal which is responsible for the sense of inferiority. In place of the medical term *normality* one

should rather speak of *average adaptability*. From these considerations it appears that it should be better to abandon the idea of *neurosis* in favor of something else (Stekel has suggested *parapathy*).

This viewpoint leads up past the narrower problem of the neuroses to the proper theme of our study, the building up of a genetic psychology which comprises the relations of the ego to its environment in its biologic, psychologic, and social relations. The stepwise development of the libido in its individual thrusts would be a practicable scheme for a first orientation but has been given up by Freud himself when he made two great groups of instincts: life and death. But if the organization of the libido is given up the etiology of the stations of fixation must also be forfeited. Compulsion neurosis no longer regresses to the sadistic stage but the entire human being is built up on this sadistic stage. This again goes back to a constitutional sadistic anlage with its correspondingly strong inhibitions and is also again a qualitative problem. As there is no longer a specific etiology there can hardly be a specific symptomatology but only mechanisms.

If neuroses are to be conceived as defective adaptations the problem for practical psychology is one of phantasy and reality, internal and external, ego and the world. If in the trauma theory reality has been overvalued the most essential phase of analytic development represents an overvaluation of phantasy life, of so-called "psychic reality." While analysis has been of great value in this direction it makes things too easy in its flight into phylogenesis. My conception of birth trauma makes the primitive phantasy a personal and not a racial one.

4. *The Fear Problem*

Closely bound up with the neurosis problem is the fear problem, with which it is almost identical. After Freud had conceived neurotic fear as equivalent to repression of the libido and had thus arrived at the castration theory, I went a step further and derived the fear from the birth trauma, regarding the separation from the mother as a trauma of eminent psychological significance. I would now like to show that this view is historically as well as systematically correct and at the same time pave the way for a genetic psychology.

How is the relation of the libido to fear to be explained? I took the stand that libido is not transformed to fear but simply masks it, so that when the libido is suppressed fear comes again into view. In such cases libido gratification is attended by fear. In Freud's recently published work on "*Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety*," he accepts my idea in part but is unable to renounce his original conception of castration fear, while admitting that it may not be the

sole motive. As long as he adheres to castration as the principal source of fear he must deprive the separation from the mother at birth of its traumatic character. He insists that the fetus has no subjective sense of detachment from the mother because of its eminently narcissistic nature. He concedes that we know all too little of the sensory life of the newborn. Too much of adult analysis has been projected back into the fetus.

There can be no doubt that the newborn has lost something through birth and even before birth which may be spoken of as loss of the object or loss of environment. Birth represents a transition phenomenon. We know that when the infant misses the mother in after life it reacts with anxiety, or fear.

This fear from the birth trauma is biological, as is the longing to return into the womb. Freud by means of his castration fear has sought to sexualize a simple biologic fact. Freud himself once made birth fear a physiologic reaction, and it was this conception that was responsible for my birth trauma theory of fear. I have explained in my book on the birth trauma that this physiologic fear becomes anchored as a psychic fear but Freud does not allude to this possibility although he does state that later fear from loss of the object is psychic. We find nothing in his writings to oppose the view that this psychic fear does not originate in the fact of birth, although, as stated, he will not concede that the mother is an object to the child at that time. Having given up the view of libido renunciation, he cannot regard the mother as a libido object. I have made the physiologic fear due to danger to life in the main but only by accident associated with loss of object.

Freud, perhaps for the first time in his career, abandoned analytic experience in accepting some of my views theoretically and critically, but comes to no positive result save that fear is reproduced as a reaction to any danger situation, as a sort of signal. This being the case, he must concede that the original fear situation is a danger situation. Analysis has shown us that neurotic fear is an instinctive fear, and when we allow the danger to the ego to become conscious we obliterate the distinction between real and neurotic fear (Freud). Elsewhere he speaks of castration fear as a danger from without and also says that the sole difference between the two fear types is that in neurotic fear the subject remains unconscious of the content of the fear save in a disguised form.

This takes us to the important problem of quantity and the therapeutic idea bound therewith of reacting off. Freud does not accept my idea of a quantitative factor in birth trauma in his general critique

of the subject, although elsewhere he seems to concede its possibility even if it cannot be directly demonstrated. On this as on other debatable subjects his book is filled with contradictions, for example, that of reacting off a trauma. In one place he makes fear a combination of anticipation of danger and reproduction in a mild form of a primitive fear state.

Freud's inconsistencies appear to be due to his resistance to the legitimate consequences of the problem of fear as stated by me. But the chief support of his libido theory is forfeited, namely, the enigmatical transformation of libido into fear. At the same time his most important mechanism of repression becomes greatly restricted. He now recognizes it only in connection with the genital organization of the libido and in all other relations speaks only of defense. This, however, is again too general in scope, so that he has been obliged to introduce a special mechanism which he terms "unhappening," where I myself have long relied on "refusal." Freud's regrets that so many difficulties are to be found in the conception of the most fundamental things is due largely, as said before, to his own resistance to outside ideas, which objection can also be brought against his collaborators as well. In place of accepting ideas from outside he is inclined to go back to some of his own sidetracked viewpoints. His only concession to me, as already stated, is the validity of the birth trauma as a cause of fear, although he will not accept the association of this affective manifestation with separation from the mother.

In making the birth trauma, like the Oedipus complex, a universal phenomenon, I have been accused of reducing psychoanalysis to an absurdity in so far as it is concerned with a specific cause of neuroses. Freud has stated that the birth trauma can be studied objectively and statistically, but this is only partly true, and such study would not yield results worth the effort. We know in advance that plenty of people are born without the later development of neuroses, but it is none the less true that extreme cases of birth have exerted a decided influence in the building up of a subsequent neurosis. There are, moreover, innumerable transitions based on the quantitative character of this factor which are as little subject to measurement as the Oedipus complex. I have shown that not only the intensity of the fear at birth but the psychic fear anchored at the time in the mother object comprise the etiological factor of the neurosis.

Freud in his conception of fear has gone from one extreme to psychic fear (repressed libido) to the other extreme of biologic fear in that he makes the later fear affect a signal of danger, which does not help any in the neurosis problem. In regard to psychic repre-

sentatives of fear, I introduced as long ago as 1911 the sense of guilt, which was originally derived likewise from repressed libido.

If my birth trauma doctrine has a defect it is certainly not that of being too radical in replacing old conceptions by new, for according to Freud I have become too conservative in that he has been able to deduce more radical consequences from my doctrines than I myself. I am still trying to adapt my own experiences to his libido theory in the interest of the salvage in the latter.

This attempt to salvage the libido theory has rightly been recognized by Freud as the weak point in my own doctrines, but although he has been forced to abandon his doctrine of the libido I myself am not yet fully trustful of so radical a change of front.

In regard to the repression doctrine, Freud holds that the essence of repression is the affect transformation which manifests itself so frequently in the presentation of the opposite. If my interpretation of child fear by the birth trauma is methodically unjustifiable, then the whole superstructure of the repression doctrine must collapse along with its technic of interpretation.

Another and still more important point which is of decisive importance for the entire libido theory and therapy of neuroses is hardly touched on by Freud. I have looked on all positive and negative emotional relations of the child as directed originally toward the mother but displaced later toward the father and other children of the family. Freud holds that all libidinous object besetments proceed from the ego and again return to it. If this be true, then the entire doctrine of transference must collapse.

It has been alleged that the birth trauma and regression to the womb count only as a flight tendency; but the same kind of statement could be made as well of the Oedipus and castration complexes. The entire problem can be regarded from still another standpoint, the genetic. If all the conceptions of libido, fear, object, and ego coalesce in birth as a psychophysical nodal point, this does not mean that all of the problems are therein to be solved. We must still depend on adult analysis for knowledge of the psychic life of the child, and the problems can never be solved by the most intensive study of the newborn.

But I hope to be able to show how a genetic study of the object choice of the adult will throw light on the very earliest beginnings of object relationship in the newborn, which is the problem of the ego and its first relation to the mother. This problem of the relation of the ego to the object and to reality presents the essential theme of genetic psychology, which is built up from the results of analytic

investigation. This ego relation decides not only the kind and degree of adaptation but also the health and morbidity of the individual, that is, the difficulties and impossibility of adaptation.

B. FOUNDATION OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

1. *The Biologic Substratum*

Psychoanalysis, as its name implies, is a method of investigating psychic phenomena. The human ego is so complicated a structure that hitherto there has not been sufficient distinction made between the biologic, psychologic, and social factors. It was a great advantage that psychoanalysis concerned itself first with the pathological, the chief disadvantage being that the analyst must hold fast to the medico-therapeutic attitude. The difficulty lies in the fact that in the pathological aspect of the psyche we can only speak of quantity, not of quality, in contrast with pathology of the organic. Psychic life forms a connecting link between the biologic and the social, the former dealing with the instincts and the latter with the environment, between which there must be adaptation. Thus conceived, the problems fall into two great groups, the sexual (biological) and the social. Human love life shows sexuality at the social stage.

Above all, the starting point for study of object relation (Oedipus situation) is laid in the ego, the structure and development of which have always stood under the influence of object relation. The original object relation is not a two-sided one, as in the Oedipus situation, but refers solely to the mother, who is not only an object for the gratification of biologic needs but at the same time is a representative of the restrictions of the external world, or of the social world in a primitive fashion. If we go back further into prenatal life the mother is less an object than part of the self. With progressive adaptation to reality the mother is projected outside the ego. Transition from mother object to father object is termed in my conception the pre-Oedipus situation. Naturally the character and behavior of the parents and other children play a decisive rôle in development, while premature deaths, divorce, etc., cause trauma and defective adaptation. Freud has overvalued the influence of the father as representative of the social order, for the mother plays an enormous rôle in the formation of the child ego and its higher functions.

We have now left the analytic for the genetic field. Psychoanalysis regarded all from the standpoint of libidinous object relation. It is true that the ego develops under the compulsion of libido requirements but the development begins long before the Oedipus situation and independently of it. This last comprises the relation

of the mother and child to the father, but ego formation begins in the pre-Oedipus phase under the influence of the mother. What we call the psychologic ego is only a precipitate of the original relation to the mother. The Oedipus situation appears as a premature interruption of ego development by the father in which the biologic is interfered with by the social element. The father is the carrier of all the social inhibitions of the biologic instincts, but at the same time represents all the adult privileges.

The child identifies itself with the father, and sexual possession is but one form of such identification and rivalry. Freud overemphasizes the sexual rivalry, and for him the Oedipus situation is always reproducing itself in later life, as when a man falls in love with a married woman. But this is something more than a mere reproduction, for it is also an ego reaction due to the structure of the ego. The same reactions can be seen in child life whether from wounded vanity, jealousy aroused or desire for battle or possession. If we interpret a hatred in later life as hatred of a brother or father, this can have no other meaning than that such a hatred gave the first occasion to react with jealous and sadistic incitations. The chief accent of the entire analytic mode of contemplation is the overvaluation of these infantile experiences.

2. *Social Adaption*

A second source of error is the overvaluation of sexuality as a cause of neuroses. Historical backward projection, however, is more at fault here than the overvaluation. Without actually denying the existence of biological sexual impulses in children, two methodical scruples must be expressed as to the possibility of such projection and the relation of sexuality to infantile fear. From the genetic standpoint sexuality is not pathogenic as such, but the super-ego is that which is responsible for the conflict. Sexual manifestations may be symptoms of disturbed ego conditions. Further, in the neuroses the sexual is symptomatic and not etiologic, and the sexual is not anti-social, as analysis has it, for the antisocial is made up of jealousy, desire of possession, combative instinct, etc. Rivalry for a woman is more than sexual and aims at conquest and victory and other narcissistic and egoistic gratifications.

In regard to the castration phantasy there can be no doubt that originally it represented a sadistic revenge impulse, the genetic development of which can be followed up later. Analytic contemplation falls into the error of false projection. Thus suppression of the sadistic wish to castrate out of fear of the analyst is regarded as the

source of castration fear, and every sado-masochistic impulse incitation is interpreted as castration fear or castration wish. The castration theory of Freud seems to be untenable, for a further genetic following up of the development of the fear affect shows that it serves for the inhibition of sadistic-aggressive impulses. On the other hand the tendency to castrate the father in the myth and in the life of the child has not only the significance of separating him from the mother but also of preventing the birth of more children. In this sense the castration idea is the expression of an egoistic and jealous incitation directed toward sole possession of the mother.

What we call sadism seems to be a mixture of cruel, selfish, and sexual impulse incitations, and the entire social organization is for the purpose of moderating, damming up, and distributing the same. The inhibitions which obtain in childhood break down at the time of puberty and there then appear cruelty, pugnacity, malice, and in general sadistic-antisocial impulses. In infancy such impulses are in the interest of sole possession of the mother, and the rebellion at puberty is directed against society as father representative.

When this point of view is applied to the sexual life we see that sadistic incitations find therein their greatest gratification, but by reason of external and internal inhibitions such gratification is antagonized and is replaced by various substitutes—socially permissible sports and contests, criminal activities, and neuroses. To a certain degree the psychic conflicts which take place within us and which we call neuroses, replace the biological struggle of the external world. The tendency to self-torture and self-destruction may belong here in the enigmatic masochistic tendencies. In manic-depressive insanity the depressive phase may represent a protection of the ego from the egoistic and sadistic impulses of the manic phase.

Aside from this domestication of our impulses there is a particularly severe element which hinders sadistic and egoistic impulses as far as sexuality is concerned. Woman's ego is not at all different from that of man and she has the same self-centered, narcissistic, and sadistic impulses, is equally proud, jealous, envious, and vindictive. She wishes to dominate the opposite sex. The libidinous object relation of woman is originally the same as that of man, and like the latter is directed toward the mother. But there are really two sexual objects, and while the psyche is the same in both sexes the biologic object differs. We can only speak of a sexual object in the biologic sense. Here psychoanalysis has been at fault in assuming a psychologic sexual object. From the biologic standpoint the woman must play a passive rôle both from anatomical reasons and because of

motherhood. With the birth of the child she has an entirely new object relation at the expense of the husband. The child in turn is responsible for a psychic differentiation between its parents, who are forced to new adaptations—those of family life.

3. *Development of the Ego*

One cannot fully understand and estimate these ego problems and conflicts unless one combines the genetic with another dynamic viewpoint which flows from it, to wit, the evolutionary, in the sense of biologic development and psychic alteration. If the problems are viewed from this angle we obtain new perspective for the comprehension of normal development and of pathologic maldevelopment. Tendency of the libido to become fixed combats the tendency of the ego to develop. We can thereby explain why all of the developmental periods can act traumatically on ego development—birth, weaning, puberty, climacteric.

This evolutionary viewpoint is alone able to explain both the disease and the recovery. What happens to make a person psychically ill? Energies may have been unfavorably displaced, protective mechanisms may have failed, an auxiliary apparatus becomes a burden because of progressive development, a substitute becomes superfluous, etc. We see that some factor, which is essentially traumatic, does not behave thus until after the further development of the ego. Analysis itself may act in this manner, for it is an intense psychic experience. In such cases we should not invoke the activity of an alleged compulsion to repetition without taking into account the ego development. In this sense there are no infantile fixations or repressions which persist throughout life. The patient is not fixed at the Oedipus stage but only reacts in the analytic situation with the same impulses—of jealousy, for example—as in similar antecedent situations. Why he reacts in this manner is a problem of great theoretic and practical significance which we will take up later in connection with the mechanism of denial. Repetition compulsion is derived from the phenomenon of transference and signifies therapeutic helplessness. However, repetition does not actually occur because no two analytical situations are the same. There is an instinct for reproduction in the organic world just as psychologically there is a wish for perpetual return of experiences which can never be realized because of the alteration in the situation and in our own selves. The wish for repetition is a reaction against our steady development and alteration which demands new orientations and new adaptations.

The evolutionary mode of contemplation has another methodically

important consequence which will be taken up more fully when we try to formulate the position of psychology within science. It recommends itself to mention here certain principles which shall indicate the paths which will serve us in addition to psychoanalytic investigation.

The psychological sense of the urge to search for natural laws is the avoidance of fear and the acquisition of certainty. This is possible only if we neglect the evolutionary principle which has to do with the interplay of unforeseen factors. In other words, all theory formation deals with that which is past, from which we can determine future lines of development. Theory sets up laws, fixes boundaries, remains always statistical and descriptive, but phenomena are dynamic and only these allow us to understand the principle of development. This holds good especially in the psychic life in which we deal with function and not phenomena. Therefore we are unpsychologic when we introduce dynamic and evolutionary elements. With the genetic mode of consideration I would like to restore the lore of the soul, free from the slag of foreign admixture. In the midpoint there are two basic concepts, those of sadism and fear. Neither is a simple concept and each should be viewed from the biologic, psychologic, and social significance. In this way we arrive at a point of view brought to us by psychoanalysis, to wit, that the inner or external inhibition of sadism causes fear. It is undecided whether an actual transformation is involved but it is certain that fear can sometimes act like sadism and can originate from external or internal inhibition.

It is probably better to speak of tendencies rather than instincts, leaving this latter term to biology. The term *tendency* is also preferable to Freud's "*wish*," as used in the psychological sense. Tendencies and reaction formations may be more impulsive in their expression than instincts themselves. According to the psychic situation first one and then another tendency may have a causal action.

The most constant tendency which we can discover is that to gratification and protection of the ego. Fear is the strongest protector of the ego when the gratification is too dangerous or is prevented altogether. Psychologically fear is applied to rationalization of the inhibition.

We readily find the transition from fear to instinctive life as we direct our attention to the tendencies through which fear is inhibited. These tendencies which are directed to ego gratification are hunger and libido, the latter comprising not only the sexual instinct but general regressive instincts such as the tendency to return to the mother as manifested in the phenomenon of falling in love. In the animal

kingdom another tendency is that to migrate which may be stronger than the tendency to self-preservation.

That which in biology is an instinct becomes in psychology a tendency or reaction, and in biology the inhibition of instinct which is fear presents psychologically a projection phenomenon. Psychologically only the tendencies are important. Freud has carried biology too far into psychology, has overvalued biology, and Adler has overvalued psychological tendencies. Jung introduced too much psychology into biology. But all of these theories supplement rather than antagonize one another.

What I attempt in outlining a genetic psychology is, first, a conceptual orientation and systematic presentation of psychological results and consequences of analytic investigation and second, from the biologic, psychologic and social material to build up a pure psychology of which the ego is the vertebral column. Instead of biologic we speak of genitality, while sense of guilt conforms to the psychological, and object love to the sociological.

Considered in chronological stages there are three of these in the individual as well as phylogenetic, as follows: I. Genital gratification. II. Sense of guilt (from external or internal inhibition). III. Object love for the social justification of ego gratification. Genitality is built up on the biological procreative function, sense of guilt on biological fear, and object love on biologic sexuality. Gratification tendencies are either purely egoistic or sexual and the combination of both is represented by sadism which may be characterized psychologically and sociologically as follows, the social inhibitions having the following results: I. Moderation of sadism in the direction of genitality. II. Inhibition of sadism in the direction of sense of guilt. III. Sublimation of sadism in the direction of love (tenderness). Each of these subdivisions will now be taken up individually.

II. GENETIC SECTION

1. *Genesis of Genitality*

The conception of a genesis of genitality is one peculiarly psycho-analytic although the genetic viewpoint was at first applied to the sexual instinct as such. In the narrow sense the genesis of genitality comprises Freud's discovery of infantile or pregenital sexuality and primacy of the genital zone which is comprehended therein. On this foundation Ferenczi undertook the attempt to describe certain additional mechanisms of this development from pregenital to genital stage—the so-called “amphimixis” which includes the displacement of anal and urethral mechanisms and energies. More recently

Helene Deutsch has analytically inferred the displacement of oral libido to the vagina as a condition for fully developed sexuality in woman.

The genetic question now, however, is when and how this process of development to normal fully developed genitality in the adult perfects and prepares itself in the child—what libidinous energies become displaced, what mechanisms this displacement follows, what obstacles of development have to be overcome and what we have to regard as the particular result of this psychobiologic adaptation. We shall study here not only the energy problem of libido displacement from one erogenous zone to another, but must also turn our attention equally to the traumatic renunciations, which are obviously necessary, in order to set in motion the phylogenetically outlined displacement in the individual, in order to guarantee the biologic continuity of development. The study of the mechanisms which therewith come into play will probably allow us to understand better the obstacles which make for developmental defects, that is, fixations and regressions to earlier stages.

Let us first take up the well known object of this infantile development which Freud has circumscribed as the Oedipus complex in the narrower sense. We may state that we have to follow the development from its original wholly biologic libido relation to the mother up to the sexual and social adaptation effort. Freud first described the complex as the nucleus of the neuroses but later was obliged to expand this conception by claiming that it is actually the nucleus of the total psychical superstructure which is erected on the biologic basis. After analysis had followed up the further fate of the complex in life and neuroses it interested itself in the manner in which the child brings about this adaptation and why failure may result.

Let us first consider the girl, for with her as with the boy the mother is the first and for a time sole libido object. How does she effect the complete libido transformation to the father object? Biologically there is of course a strong attraction to the opposite sex but in the psychic world there is strong resistance to this biologic tendency. This will be taken up in due course but at present a weightier problem comes up for solution of how the ego comes to the object, and especially in the case of the Oedipus complex. There is in the case of the boy a similar adaptation which has been underrated.

The task of the boy in the genitality development is genital mastery of the mother as a replacement of the original oral mastery. This never succeeds fully and a considerable share of oral libido persists

in the sexual act and must be active and obtain gratification, partly with a sadistic element in the oral stage (biting, kissing). This oral-sadistic element in the nursling persists either as normal or perverse sexuality, having been shifted to the genital stage. What now are the mechanisms which make this retention possible and cause it to come newly to light in later life?

As a result of analytical investigations I believe that the biologic mechanism of this displacement is nursling masturbation. The route traversed is as follows: sucking the finger, rhythmic application of the finger to the genitals which later may become true masturbation with pleasure gain and sense of guilt, representing an early conflict. Oral sadistic libido has been shifted by means of masturbation to the genital zone. True masturbation appears to be thoroughly sadistic. The act is completed on the self and not as is the case in nursing on another—the mother. In masturbatory phantasies in the male the sadistic element is dominant while in the female the dominant factor is masochistic.

To return to the female, the conditions here seem at first sight simpler than in the male but the displacement is much more complicated. The young female child knows nothing of the vagina as a libidinous organ and in phantasy she thinks of the mother as having a penis. The father organ of penis seems to be accepted as similar to the breast from the analogy of the nipple and flaccid male organ. Later the clitoris is recognized as the true analogue of the latter. After the female child has practiced clitoris masturbation the parallel between the sexes is obvious, the oral-sadistic libido having been shifted to the genitals. However some of the libido of the female infant seems directed to the father and to the opposite sex in general.

In masturbation in boys the hollow of the palm succeeds the mere contact of the fingers and in phantasy replaces the cavity of the mouth, so that masturbation becomes the analogue of nursing. In this way the narcissistic stage of genitality is reached. In the boy we see complete phantastic analogies—penis and nipple, mouth and hollow of the hand—but in the girl there is only a common resemblance between nipple, clitoris, finger and penis.

The mechanism of intermediation by which displacement occurs from above downward is assisted by the mastery instinct of the hand. In the finer study of this complicated mechanism of displacement by which sadistic libido from the mouth is conducted, displaced and converted to the genitals an astonishing light is shed on sexual symbolism which has a general biologic background.

The replacement of the mouth by the vagina explains the folk-

lore idea of the dentate vagina while the idea of the penetration of the vagina or hollow of the hand by the penis also possesses a dental significance.

I can suggest only in a cursory fashion, concerning certain psychological conditions which make it possible, that oral sadism in the genital stage is distributed in the biologic sexual rôle in contrary fashion. The biologic problem of activity and passivity is one of the deepest for while the vagina plays a passive rôle essentially it nevertheless takes over the active erogenicity of the mouth and only after conquest by the male does it adopt the passive rôle which at the same time is extended to the entire somatic ego. Conversely in phantasy the penis is at first a passive organ, equivalent to the breast and only later is its active rôle assumed which likewise is shifted to the entire somatic ego. Sexual gratification (orgasm) is active alike in both sexes. The penis and vagina are stimulating to the opposite sex more than gratifying. This distribution of activity and passivity in the two sexes agrees well with the supposition of bisexualism. We may speak of an active vagina and a passive penis as well as the reverse.

There are deviations in the development of sexuality which are not necessarily abnormalities which may be sharply distinguished. The phantasies of dentate vagina and of the penis as a tooth, of male and female origin respectively, give rise to the fear of having the genitals bitten, which may appear in the infant at an earlier period than the castration fear of having the genitals mutilated by cutting tools. The specific neurotic disturbances of fully developed genitality are impotence in the man which betrays the original fear of the dentate vagina and vaginismus or frigidity in the woman; while ejaculatory disturbances bear traces of the oral stage and if the penis is regarded in phantasy as a substitute for the breast there may result phantasies of oral impregnation and actual sexual perversion in both sexes. Buccal erotism seems to be retained more in man than woman as shown by the greater enjoyment of smoking and drinking and also of active kissing.

The final step in the shifting of the libido from the mouth is seen in weaning which may be traumatic although usually sustained without injury. These developmental traumas, as has been stated elsewhere, are not manifested at the time but at a later stage. In the trauma of weaning the decisive shift to the genitals occurs and a miscarriage in the mechanism has as a consequence neurotic disturbances in the genital stage. The sexual act with its incidental kissing constantly repeats this process of displacement.

We have already shown that portions of oral sadism are used to nourish the mastery of the hand for the purpose of awakening genital activity and to strengthen the hunger libido with biting and devouring energy. Another portion is used for the mastery of the external world and for the building up of regulating and inhibitory ego factors in the aim of adaptation to the external world and reality, such as the sense of guilt. There can be no doubt that the inhibitory as well as aggressive factors are derived from the oral-sadistic libido.

Freud has spoken of the super-ego as sadistic, harking back to the earliest efforts of the mother to keep the infant clean and to punish for infractions of discipline. The little child checks its impulses alike from love and fear. The sadistic element is seen also in the refusal of the breast at weaning time. This means a strong denial of libido which is followed up by the educational prohibition of masturbation, of sucking the fingers, etc. The stasis of sadism in the ego which is present for a considerable period is apparently due in part to the undeveloped state of the genitals, but also to identification with the strict mother. As stated elsewhere, sadism breaks out energetically at the time of puberty.

The attitude of the child toward the mother has, however, an ambivalent quality, for the child while loving the mother at the same time hates her for interfering with the gratification of its libido, this representing a negative sadism. This ambivalent attitude may extend as far back as the birth trauma.

The so-called anal character which is not discussed in this connection has a sadistic makeup in its two most prominent qualities of cleanliness and order. Ferenczi makes use of a concept known as the "sphincter ego," and Freud speaks of stagnant oral sadism which regresses to the anal and urethral with formation of a negative or obstinate character. The inhibitory elements in the super-ego are summed up under the term "sphincter morality."

Sadism brought to the genital stage is then applied to the libido object as the inhibited form of tenderness. That is, in return for the libido gratification withdrawn from the child it receives tenderness, or in other words, the original tender attitude to the child returns.

Both sexes seek to return to the genital stage of the sadistic-oral pleasure experienced at the maternal breast but this results in a small fraction only because of inadequate facilities for discharge. The normal sexual act would then be not only a substitute but at the same time sadistic revenge for denied oral gratification at the breast and

according as one or the other tendency predominated there would result the well known disturbances of love life, which in both sexes may be reduced to this formula: too far-reaching substitution for oral gratification at the breast or too far-reaching revenge for the withdrawal of such gratification.

This entire process of development and displacement of oral-sadistic gratification at the breast up to partial restoration of gratification at the genitals of the opposite sex leads to an important stage of narcissistic substitution at the subject's genitals—masturbation. The question as to how the child comes to find its own body as a substitute for the lost maternal breast cannot be fully answered, for we do not yet understand the structure of the narcissistic libido organization. We may infer that the breast is part of the infantile ego and that there arises the impulse to rediscover it.

It is certain that at first the finger and later the genitals as substitutes for the breast are firmly bound to the ego while the loss of the breast is not recognized and is denied. The libido is turned inward narcissistically to the genitals with which the child identifies itself. With regard to this astonishing identification Ferenczi suggests that the discovery of the ego is closely related to the discovery of the genitals. To which I may add "discovery of the genitals as substitute for the breast." If this were the case a part of the oral libido displaced on the genitals streams narcissistically over the entire ego, narcissistically investing the sphincter ego which functions only in dependence on the object.

To this first narcissistic ideal formation the boy regresses to the Oedipus situation, taking the father as prototype. In his phantasy the father has overpowered the mother in coitus. His castration fear is overcome by sadistic besetment of the penis and he overcomes the fear of the female genitals by accepting the biological castration. There has been gradual preparation for this, for the mother image, inhibiting, denying and punishing, is for the most part displaced by the inhibiting father. In contrast to the mother the father has always been an object of the outside world and to be identified with him it is necessary first to have been identified with the mother, who originally was part of the child's own ego. The boy, however, sees in the father for the most part, the inhibiting, punishing and "bad" mother, while the girl sees the kind and tolerant mother. As long as the boy regards the penis as a passive substitute for the breast he will have castration fear, because the breast is something one can lose. Hence to overcome castration fear he must normally revert to the sadistic mechanism of the active mouth and tooth symbolism

which enables him to invest the penis narcissistically with a permanent portion of his ego. The girl is only in a position to give up the penis as substitute for the breast after the maturing of her own body when she invests the breasts narcissistically.

On account of these biological differences the super-ego of the woman is built up in a radically different manner from that of the man. The mother identification of the woman is a direct continuation of the primitive maternal sphincter ego which inhibits her sexual aggressiveness.

2. *Genesis of the Sense of Guilt*

We do not begin with the Oedipus situation but with the castration complex which in itself is a symptom of sense of guilt. Freud's super-ego, for him a derivative of the Oedipus complex, is built up before this in inhibited sadism. The so-called sphincter ego is the physiological nucleus of the purely psychologic super-ego.

Aside from the first great renunciation of the birth trauma the leading one is loss of the libidinous pleasure of nursing which is quite independent of hunger and satiety and is expressed by evidences of anger, rage and hatred of the mother as one part of the ambivalent attitude toward the latter. In seeking a substitute the genital zone is finally reached. Other renunciations are connected with cleanliness and order, etc., as the beginning of educational influence.

In identifying itself with the mother as an external source of inhibitions the child may be said to borrow a sense of guilt, in the opinion of Freud, but I do not regard this view as tenable, either from the genetic or the clinical standpoint. As stated, this source is the inhibited sadism, the latter being directed against the self. The child has identified itself with the strict mother. There is an inner tendency to unburdening oneself which is largely satisfied by punishment from without and which in addition tends to self-punishment and masochism. Identification with the strict mother not only is responsible for this tendency but at the same time the sadistic tendencies are discharged off. The strict mother is therefore the true nucleus of the super-ego, at least in its earliest stages.

This genetic conception throws a decisive light not only on the psychic development of the child but also on a series of pathological expressions and reactions of human beings as well as on the possibility of being influenced by treatment. It is noteworthy that we often find a particularly pronounced sense of guilt in those—especially women—whose mothers were not strict in the usual sense of the word. This confirms our view of the augmentation of internal

self-inhibition where there has been unsatisfactory external rigidity. Anal, urethral and sexual badness or symptom formation, in child or adult, is to be understood as a disburdening effort of the ego which seeks to provoke punishment by the mother.

In the treatment of such cases one must avoid all that can antagonize this tendency of the patient to unburden himself. While the quite necessarily strict education of the child spares it an excess of internal inhibition, which would cause him to react with a neurosis, the analysis should promote the setting up of an internal edifice of such factors (super-ego). The opposite course can only promote the masochism of the patient. Alcoholism and certain perversions which cause social contempt can never be settled by active intervention.

While we will take up the subject of sado-masochism later we will in this connection follow up the connection of this subject with analytical study. The sado-masochistic mechanism, as we have shown, is set in motion at the oral stage, speaking biologically, but the later content of this complex dates essentially from the following period of education in cleanliness. We see again that a biologic process cannot work pathogenically until the next stage of development has been attained. When the infant is weaned the denial is passive in character and later, in the next stage, the anal (and urethral), threats and actual punishment occur. From the genetic standpoint Freud's "sadistic-anal" phase is decomposable into a biologic sadistic oral component and a masochistic-anal one which is already under the moral influence of the mother. In the third, genital, stage we see sadistic inhibition as fear and masochistic subjection as sense of guilt. Fear in part corresponds to an unburdening of internal inhibitions.

Widely diffused anal perversions like coprophilia represent not only a stasis in the autoerotic stage of infantile development but also precipitates of the former object relation to the mother, combining obstinacy against the maternal regulations with longing for an ideal mother who permits all. Anal prohibitions are activated or replaced by sexual ones by way of the urinary functions which combine both systems, excretory (anal) and sexual.

If we follow up the effects of the maternal denials from the pre-genital to the genital stage we find that it is often the mother and not the father who especially antagonizes sexual pleasure gain. Children who have been analytically educated, which means that no prohibitions of any kind are inculcated, may show a greater sense of guilt than the average child, and this seems to show that some external demands are beneficial in dealing with this sense.

Analysis of patients has shown the following picture of genetic development: autosadism which inhibits in the oral stage becomes masochism in the anal stage; by the urethral route the genital guilt sense becomes manifest and hence is not primary but only a counterpart of sadistic investment of the genitals, which is partly given up through maternal restrictions at the anal and urethral stages.

Men with poorly inhibited sadistic sexual impulses (Don Juan type) often show oral and urethral guilt sense fully retained, while in women the pregenital guilt sense leads to frigidity through displacement to the genital stage. The peculiar sexual enjoyment known as the orgasm may be invested at the first experience with so strong a guilt sense that impotence and frigidity result. Most frigid women are extremely masochistic, and to attain an orgasm it must be under masochistic circumstances. The threat or actual blow on the buttocks from the husband's hand has been successful here. This apparently reproduces the punishment by the hand of the mother in childhood. The passive, masochistic rôle of the wife does not harmonize with an active, sadistic sexual gratification under ordinary conditions.

The anal origin of the sexual sense of guilt from the maternal education in cleanliness is betrayed by the tendency to repeat obscene words of the child language. Under the influence of fear these are reproduced in a blasphemous sense in the course of an analysis in which the analyst has come to stand for the mother who awakens sadistic phantasies of revenge.

In lightening the burden of internal inhibitions it is not so much the mere imparting of the mental experience to others as the confessional or cathartic action which exerts the favorable action. On the other hand, stuttering is only a general symptom of strong internal inhibitions at the pregenital maternal stage—a protest, if one will, against the mother. Speech as such doubtless represents an oral sadistic gratification.

At the sexual stage this protest against the denying mother is expressed in an attitude affected by culture to sexuality in which the conception of "purity" is carried over to the entire sexual life. If this occurs at the transition of the anal to the genital stage there results a horror of the female genitals, which are felt to be unclean, filthy. But the mother who so values purity cannot herself be clean, as is often sensibly manifested to the child itself, in menstruation, etc. Beauty of face and figure may itself come under the ban. The idea that women must urinate and defecate becomes repulsive. This element is present in male homosexuality. In this elimination of the mother there is a fragment of revenge.

In order to follow up the genetic development of these inhibitory tendencies at the genital stage it is best to separate the sexes, who up to this time have shown more similarities than differences. Originally fear and guilt sense are referred to the mother, but a new orientation results in the Oedipus situation. The girl changes her libido object and it is apparent that the guilt sense toward the mother does not derive from this situation. The mother does not become the source of hatred and guilt from mere rivalry with the father, but because of her earlier restrictions, and the same is true in the case of the boy. In the latter this rôle of the mother produces a strong inhibition regarding her as a sex object, without respect to the position of the father. In the early history of many men who become homosexual the father does not figure. The sadistic overpowering of the mother by the father, in view of the supposed strictness of the former, works strongly as an inhibitant at the sexual stage against her, but this does not intensify the Oedipus situation and does make it possible for the child to project some of its inhibitions on the father. Possession of the mother by the father, in other words, assists him in changing the identification with the mother to the same with the father.

In the Oedipus situation each sex shows a change in viewpoint. The woman retains the mother identification as the primary moral super-ego but changes the libido object, while the man retains the libido object while shifting his super-ego from the primary maternal to the social father identification. The father inhibits the sadistic aggression, thus generating fear, sense of guilt and tendency to self-punishment, expressed in the sado-masochistic phantasies which Freud has named the castration complex, which, however, is not the result of external threats by the father but the inwardly inhibited sadism.

In woman the situation is essentially dissimilar. Even simple observation teaches that she shows less fear than man, or better, a different type of fear. Her super-ego consists chiefly of inhibitions and sense of guilt, while that of man is dominated by fear. In place of a castration complex the woman has a sexual fear, her ego shrinking from the passive biological rôle, while the fear of man is predominantly social fear.

As has been insisted, the castration complex is pre-Oedipal in origin and determined by biological factors (anatomical differences), but it manifests itself pathogenically in the following or Oedipus stage. Before the latter came the anal stage in which the natural filth of the genitals was taught by the mother and the Oedipus complex serves to nullify in part the anal stage, for the boy again turns to the mother as a sex object. Both boy and girl become disillusioned

as to the opposite parent. When the boy turns again to the mother he encounters the father as a disturbing factor. The main difference in the Oedipus complex may be summed up as follows: on psychobiologic grounds the parent of the opposite sex is made responsible.

As a result of this complex the child regresses to its original narcissism. Biologically its sadism is dammed up, in the sexual phase its narcissism is inhibited, and socially its egotism is forbidden. The sense of guilt goes back beyond all recollection and even back of psychology itself—we cannot speak of psychologic causes of it. The sexual sphere plays the major rôle and in all stages there are equally strong restrictions. Perverse acts, venereal diseases, sadistic actions are all socially prohibited.

Just as closely bound together as are sexuality and sense of guilt are sense of guilt and fear. Much that goes by the name of guilt sense is really fear, the internal inhibitions being projected outward and both fear and libido can be applied to justify guilt consciousness by such projection. In its finality guilt consciousness is merely a product of the tendency to denial, as if it said, "I am not so bad as I feel myself to be." In this sense the so-called inferiority feeling of Adler is a form of acknowledgment of guilt and at the same time the bearer of a mass of other guilty feelings. Guilt is felt most typically in repentance, a purely internal process which is not projected outward.

From this general human tendency to displace internal inhibitions outwards it comes about that what we call sense of guilt is essentially a product of displacement and projection. It is a sort of interpretation. In reference to its genesis we may speak of it as a kind of "negative narcissism," for Sadger has shown in analysis that the ego loves itself because it is so loved by the "good" mother, while at the same time it identifies itself with the "bad" or disciplining mother.

3. *Genesis of the Object Relation*

The maternal breast was originally part of the child's ego, and after it was obliged to renounce this idea it sought a substitute in its own body, whence narcissistic investment with its libido. When afterwards an object has to be renounced the child again tries to find an equivalent in itself. A double relationship with the object thus results with identifications. The "bad" mother who denies and is feared is gradually identified with the father, who is also seen to be the possessor of the mother.

The Oedipus situation makes it necessary for the child to project itself on both sexes, which represents an unburdening and not a

special performance, for the maternal inhibitions can be gotten rid of, projected on the father. This tendency of the child to unburden internal tension by object relation causes it to apply any available means for this purpose. Transference is less a reproduction of the original Oedipus situation than a new projection of the old maternal and paternal imagos from within. Transference represents an enamoration, corresponds to an attempt to solve the ego problem in the object.

The genetic development of object relation gives an average picture as follows: Both sexes will form a picture of the parents, beginning with the attitude to the "good" and "bad" mother in accordance with their requirement for object investment and ego unburdening. In general, the boy finds the father in the "bad" mother; whether he is really strict or not he must be "bad," and in this way he preserves the object of the "good" mother. Complications must arise from the actual behavior of the parents. The boy becomes undeceived because he cannot uphold this distinction between the parents.

The term "negative object relation" may be applied when hate, fear, and sense of guilt prevail in the relationship. These negative emotional relations which play so marked a rôle in love life are intelligible as attempts to resolve conflicts in the ego which will free itself from internal tensions and inhibitions. This freedom effort may entail a renewed sense of guilt, for the moral ego does not allow itself to be used thus. Sensual enjoyment seems to entail this result in many men, as seen typically in the sense of guilt attached to the orgasm as the culmination of something forbidden. It begins with the denial of narcissistic pleasure which attains its height in the masturbatory conflict.

Every relation to an object, especially in the projection of ego strivings and conflicts, consists in the bare repetition of a situation. The first mother refusals force the child back within itself, and thus create narcissism, which in later object relations is decomposed into its elements. The degree of narcissism is decisive in all later object relations. In every object choice and love relation both components function. Two masculine types may be isolated, in one of which narcissism abounds with sexual life, a protest against the strict mother and constant but vain search for the permitting mother. In the other type there is more maleness, activity, and heterosexuality, the subject having identified himself with the father, as the first has with the mother.

Disillusionment in regard to the mother is due to the birth of later brothers or sisters, to the discovery that she has no penis, possibly to

the phantasy that children are expelled from the anus, the fact that the mother is devoid of the cleanliness which she inculcates, etc., etc.

The Oedipus situation has a progressive aspect in the course of which the father is recognized as the possessor of the mother. The castration wish of the boy at this stage is due not only to fear of the father but to the desire to maintain the original identification with the mother, even after recognition of the difference in sex (absence of penis). At this stage the boy completes his adaptation effort, giving up the mother as an object or part of his ego, although in view of his future sexual rôle he accepts her as an object of libido. In this adaptation the rôle of the father is limited, the boy projecting upon him responsibility for the disillusioning in regard to the mother.

Woman, however, cannot constitute a pure object, for enamoration is an ego process. Sadger in analysis of homosexuals found that the same ego problem was involved (narcistic). In general, the love object is always chosen from a narcissistic standpoint, the man looking for an ideal based on his mother or his super-ego. In all object relation there is an attempt to solve an ego conflict. There is an attempt here to be rid of a former idealized ego by depositing it in an object, which is seen in both hetero- and homosexual object choice.

The girl projects an ideal in her male object which she can also identify with herself. Should she herself wish to be male, a conflict would arise. The boy gives up the mother as an ego object and, as stated, accepts her as sexual object, provided he can give up his narcissistic identification with her. The natural biological attraction which the woman exerts on him may be opposed by his ego and its development. For the acceptance of woman as a love object there are the same two possibilities as are mentioned in the case of man.

But while in the case of woman in general the more favorable possibility results that she accepts the man as an ideal, the man seems more inclined or necessitated to objectivize the woman as a "sub-ego." This is due to his phantasy of her as castrated, which objectivizes his own castration fear, this being one of an entire series of disillusionings in regard to her.

In this entire process of ego finding, ego projection and ego deposit there are therefore two possibilities, and within these again three different mechanisms exist. From the narcissistic ego investment in which the mother is united with the child or object respectively and the ego relation, either the ego of the subject is projected and objectivized or, instead, the original mother object. In either case it is a true likeness or idealized or depreciated image of the same. In the development of this relation of ego to object the choice of

object represents only a symptom of its ego development. The libidinous object relations from the first in every form and stage are collateral phenomena or sediments of ego development, which explains the change in object relations as well as the difficulties within the same. In the more favorable cases the ego grows and develops in biologic harmony with the children in whom much of the parental ego development is deposited.

III. THE PSYCHIC MECHANISMS AND THEIR EFFECTS

In the next three sections we will seek to consider the psychic mechanism of relation to object and to reality from the standpoint of the ego, and at the same time present the social effects of this relation with reference to individual mechanism and their various forms of expression. The actual choice of object leads from the positive investment of the good mother over the narcissistic transition phase of genitality to love. Its essential mechanism is projection, which may also be styled ego-unburdening. The second fundamental process is the upbuilding of the ego, which leads from the primary narcissism over the strict mother to the super-ego with the mechanism of identification. In the dynamic sense it rests on the internal stasis of the aggressive-sadistic impulse which is objectivized in the picture of the strict mother and may also be termed instinct-inhibition. The third stage leads over the narrow object relation to adaptation to reality which indicates the furthest removal from egoism and narcissism but is made possible by repression or denial.

If in the erection of the ego the instinct-inhibitions are too strong, excessive fear and guilt sense result with the symptoms of the psychoneuroses (or better, affective disorders). If too much of the ego is displaced in the object there result disorders of love and the sexual life, otherwise actual, or better sexual, neuroses and perversions. If adaptation to reality becomes too burdensome there develop disorders in the reality relation which are known in psychiatry as psychotic, which we comprehend as failure of the ego function in adaptation to sexuality and reality. The psychoses therefore correspond to too strong fixation on the object.

1. Projection and Object Relation

Psychologically speaking, every progress in ego development has its precipitate in an object relation. Hence if an object is given up or lost the ego returns to itself, although not necessarily in a regressive sense, to a more primitive stage, but only to that phase which the lost object represents. The whole developmental thrust fails then

unless the lost object can be replaced. Identification in object loss is genetically the finish of an attempt at recovery with the aim of restoring the original unity of ego and object.

Normally the process of ego deposit and retrograde identification with the object occurs only in so-called love, which points out that a strong biological tendency exists to conserve rather than to develop the ego. In love, aside from the narcissistic wish to be loved, there is chiefly a redemption of the ego from the infantile objects incorporated within it. With children of one's own and with their growth and development one's own ego development is deposited and no further object relations will be necessary. Should this fail there is a crisis in ego development and possibly regression to an earlier stage with severe neurotic or psychotic conflicts.

It is at puberty that a biological object choice is first made, with frequent insuccess. Biology not only forms the basis of ego development, through growth and change, but also guarantees a normal outcome through object relation. The opposite sex may even represent an abandoned stage of development of one's own ego development.

The mechanism of the projection or deposition of the renounced or idealized ego-fraction in the object is best studied in the dream, in the interpretation of which we are accustomed to regard all figures as representatives of the ego or as personifications of fragments of the same. The same mechanisms, however, are seen in reality. They are encountered with some difficulty in enamoration and in pathologic states like perversions, such as homosexuality and masochism. The masochist unburdens the entire strength of his sadistic super-ego, derived from identification with the strict mother, into the object and the homosexual object relation is narcissistic, seeking its own ego and disburdening it through projection. This is positive narcissism while in the masochist the narcissism is negative.

One obtains the impression from the study of such cases that the mechanism of projection and identification is determined by the sado-masochistic relation as a psychic superstructure raised upon the biologic instinct anlage. Normally the projection of the mother at the genital stage should be without guilt sense while too strong inhibition of sadism leads to fear and guilt sense; as a result of which either the strict mother is sought as object (masochism) or one plays the "good" mother and loves another in himself.

On the other hand masochism shows distinctly that which we see elsewhere in human love conflicts; that it is normally the sense of guilt which makes possible the full sacrifice of the woman to the man to whom she is subject. Hence the sense of guilt has a most important

social function of inhibiting our sadistic and egoistic impulses and of adapting individuals to the sexual rôle. Falling in love is often an indication of guilt sense.

The sense of guilt which makes possible the subjection of the self in love is at the same time a symptom of a new awakening of the ego conflict which remains unsolved through the object relation; the object is no longer invested with libido but with fear or guilt. Social fear (the father) may also appear as guilt sense in the service of libidinous tendencies. Identification with an abandoned object is added as a renounced fraction of the ego, through which one sympathizes with himself as the abandoned object in another.

2. *Identification and the Uplifting of the Ego*

In projection by means of the mechanism of ego-unburdening of the narcissistic mother to object relation in its varied forms, the mechanism of identification does not lead to object choice but to building up the ego. The way is not the objectivizing of the mother but the further development of the strict mother and the erection of the paternal super-ego on the basis of the original mother inhibitions in one's ego.

Identification, speaking psychologically, is in reality always secondary—a retrograde identification with a fragment of the ego which was or is a fragment of the mother. Every object relation is in the end narcissistic and maternal. If we study identification intimately we must not lose sight of the fact that this conception is the result of mechanisms which we have yet to study. Two forms come chiefly into consideration, viz: love and hate identification, which may also be termed positive and negative types. The original identification seems to have been associated with love; it is not due to renunciation although it appears distinctly in connection with it. The object was originally a part of the ego and loved narcissistically, connected with the play of sado-masochistic forces. The love identification is more masochistic.

The positive identification seeks and finds the admired or idealized ego in another while the negative seeks and finds the hated and despised portion of the ego. On the former are built the emotions of love and enamoration, on the latter the hate feelings which spring from sadistic and egoistic stirrings. Both identifications go back to the attitude of the infantile ego to the "good" and "bad" mother.

The positive identification corresponds to dependence on the object and creates the love fixation, while the negative aims at the destruction of the object. Enamoration is, so to speak, a symptom of an

ego alteration, of the conquest of a phase of ego development in the object. The conflict does not arise until the ego phase has been overcome from within. That is, the object is no longer loved but is felt as an obstacle.

These relations become more complicated because in the love relation there is a reciprocal identification which results in a fixation of the ego from love or admiration, and in the case of hate, from hatred, jealousy or revenge. Negative identification leads from the picture of the "bad" mother to that of the "bad" father and so on to the super-ego formation. In a libidinous (narcistic) identification this formation is essentially a fear process or negatively narcissistic. Fear does not come from without but is a product of ego development projected on the father.

Negative identification is analytically an introjection which leads finally to super-ego formation and is negatively narcissistic. If when the mother is given up there is a fear component in the motive a negative ego development results in the form of guilt consciousness, inferiority sense and all the neurotic inhibitions and disorders of narcissistic libido gratification.

In the Oedipus situation there are various possibilities and tendencies to identification, the choice of which is determined by the pre-Oedipus situation which also decisively influences the further development. One of the best known is the identification of the son with the father in order to possess the mother. This is a negative identification for it has the presupposition of removal of the father.

As stated, pre-Oedipal influences can make themselves count in the Oedipus situation and after the same has been overcome, for example in connection with the brothers and sisters.

In regard to the group of fear disturbances we will here allude to the pathological mechanisms of fear defense. The nucleus of the ego, the so-called primitive ego, is doubtless entirely narcissistic. This nucleus is fear itself which later becomes sense of guilt, shame, etc. The relation between the ego and It (Freud) represents the relation between libido and fear; so that the super-ego is a mixture of both with dominance of the inhibitory factor. Fear as in the birth trauma prevents regression into narcissism and in general protects the super-ego against regressions. In the neurotic, of course, the super-ego is underdeveloped and reacts by fear on slight as well as great occasions and whether from external or internal causes.

In Freud's teachings fear is the nucleus symptom of all neurotic manifestations which comprise various somatic symptoms. But Freud has drawn a wrong conclusion based on results of treatment

that fear results from repressed or ungratified libido. These symptoms, however, are the result of unsuccessful attempts of the defense against fear at various stages of ego development which serve normally to bind and inhibit fear.

In its most primitive form the anxiety neurosis seems to be the reaction to an external trauma, corresponding to the birth trauma, or to some internal conflict which as phobia has been projected outward. The compulsion has an active, sadistic character which seeks to overcome fear through sadistic gratification but the hypertrophied super-ego prevents this. The different forms and mechanisms of the psychoses show these essays at fear defense in an extreme degree, for they either externalize the entire conflict or displace it wholly in the interior. Clinically there may result either paranoia or schizophrenia and in the former fear is ejected from the ego with compensation of narcissistic expansion of the ego. In schizophrenia the victim plays mother and child in one person while in paranoia the persecutor with the punishing and scolding voice is the mother. In both cases, however, the narcissistic investment of the ego serves for defense against fear.

In all of the pathologic reactions, but especially in psychoses, the original rôle of the object becomes part of the beloved ego and the means to ego expansion or ego unburdening. The psychotic would solve the object conflict in the ego while the neurotic would solve the ego conflict in the object, although the distinction between psychosis and neurosis is not abrupt but gradual. Normal man has the same ego conflicts as the neurotic but in the psychotic these conflicts appear undisguised. The disturbances of reality are also relative, for the neurotic not only thinks crazily but may act in a crazy manner (compulsive acts). The essential difference seems to lie in the relation to the love object—I say “seems,” for essentially everything is done for the ego and its interests.

3. Denial and Adaption to Reality

In the study of the first beginnings of psychologic ego development in giving up the maternal breast I have mentioned the mechanism of denial, to which seems to be assigned the most important function in the adaptation to reality. If narcissistic identification leads to upbuilding of the ego and the projective unburdening to finding the ego in the object, then the mechanism of denial decides the relation of the ego to other egos and to the entire external world. The conception of denial is substituted for the too descriptive conception

of repression as understood by Freud and makes possible displacement which in turn is involved in the production of substitutes.

Denial of an object as a presumptive portion of the ego leads to actual substitution, as in the case of the nipple, finger and genitals, and is therefore an ego mechanism like projection and identification, although it has stronger relations to reality and is therefore decisive for adaptation to reality. While from the first denial relates to a piece of reality, repression is a psychic counterpart of it but repression in the Freudian sense is only a specialized example of denial,—a denial of instinct. Repression has to do with an alteration in the ego but denial aims at a forcible alteration of the external world. Repression has to do with character and is static but the denial tendency determines our actions, which may be quite antagonistic to our character, even up to the extreme of the ego-foreign psychotic manifestations. Instead therefore of a breaking out of the unconscious which implies an insufficiency of the super-ego, we are dealing in denial with the functions of the ego.

There is a point at which one may speak of repression, namely, when there is a painful idea in the mind it may be forced out of consciousness; but this is only the ordinary mechanism of denial exerted at a high intellectual level. Here we have to do with a memory and not with that which is actually experienced. In denial we understand that the ego denies that a process exists, or ever has existed or ever will exist again. If the thing then comes into the mind its denial may also be called repression.

Before we give typical examples of the action of denial mechanisms in the life of the child it should be made clear as to what takes place and what the reaction of the ego is to the same. Denial is at first a rupture of the causal nexus of cause and effect. Since the ego denies the existence of that which has become unattainable in the intention to make the best of a loss, it seeks and finds a substitute for the lost pleasure in its own ego, lest the latter be held responsible for the unavoidable pain. The result is a consolation that the pleasure does not depend on the loss while secondarily the internal pain is thrown upon the object as hate.

Along with this projection of pain on the object there is another kind of defense which plays a great rôle in denial, namely, the tendency to justification. We see often that psychic pain which originates as a by-product of denial is not projected on the hated object but is justified in the ego, so that an organic pain (disease) is produced. This is simply a continuation of the mechanism of denial—not the object, not the ego, causes pain but this is the result

of disease. But we always have to show the patient that it is really his ego which causes the pain.

This mechanism of justification just mentioned leads us to describe the consequences of denial and one might designate it as the antithesis of denial—the positive antithesis. The ego cannot be satisfied with denial because this can never succeed for the reason that simultaneously with the intention of eliminating the objective source of pleasure the undesired pain affect arises. The ego then strives to justify the denial, that is, to prove that what was done was well done. This effort often fails and we then see the attempt to show, in a kind of secondary denial, that the justification was successful. The pain component is often manifest as a masochistic self-depreciation. It is the counterpart of hate projection on the object.

A third and perhaps the most sane reaction of the ego to denial is the narcissistic investment or strengthening of the ego. The special strength of the denial mechanism in the narcissistic is due to the special strength of the ego which cannot admit its dependence on the object. The more narcissistic the ego is or becomes, the less it can tolerate dependencies.

Perhaps the most important psychic consequence of the denial of reality is the reaction of the ego which we designate as an action and which ultimately determines our fate. The normal way in which the denial mechanism influences our actions which contains the middle way between overestimation of reality or idealization and under-valuation (hallucination) seems to me to be as follows: the primary mechanism of denial on giving up the maternal breast shows that the denied piece of reality is actually rediscovered in one's own body, which allows us to suppose that the denied reality is drawn into the ego, a process which has been described as identification or introjection, which we already know to be a consequence of ego projection. It is hard to follow this up in the primitive stage.

But in the higher stage of repression we see distinctly the same process played off and may draw conclusions. In the conscious repression of some recollected event this experience is always kept as a secret and thus forms an isolated portion of the personality. It also has a direct connection with denial. If we follow up this conception we may say that all actions, particularly with affective component, are really reactions, not repetitions.

Infantile denials seem to be necessitated in the service of self-preservation, self-maintenance and self-development, especially in so far as biological advances are concerned. There is an effort at defense by denial before one can adapt himself to them. In steady denial one holds fast to them, giving the impression of a fixation or

regression. Then comes the secondary denial within the ego which we call repression. But the realities are merely denied, not extinguished and can be accepted only when brought into positive relation to the ego, that is, regarded as part of the ego. As little as reality can be denied away, can the recollection be repressed, and both processes lead to reactions and substitute formations. The mechanisms of denial call for substitutions in one's own body. Complete denial means "it does not exist thus but it does exist elsewhere, better and independent of my ego."

This creative aspect of denial finds its expression in phantasy life, which luxuriates so richly in childhood. The child comes constantly in touch with new fragments of reality which it continually seeks to deny and which are compensated by phantasy. It is possible that the entire wish-fulfilment theory may be explained on a basis of a denial of unwished for realities with compensatory formation of substitutes.

This mechanism I have found in analysis, in dreams and phantasies and have obtained an astonishing glimpse into the relation between the two. From comparative studies of these phenomena as well as of the speculations of compulsive neurotics, which stand midway between phantasy and logical thinking, one may arrive at the conclusion that thought itself is not merely a substitute for realities but may be understood as a denial of the latter. This appears from a study of the phantasies and thought processes in psychoses. The paranoiac denies the kind of affectivity and the schizophrenic denies all affectivity.

While the reactions of these two types of psychotics represent the mechanism of denial carried to the extreme, the mechanism of denial may also be seen in the manic-depressive in its daily fluctuations of affectivity up to the most pronounced psychotic melancholia. Here the real source of unpleasure and pain is denied. This type of psychotic is extremely egoistic and narcissistic, usually endowed with excellent memory which enables them to remember all painful events with no tendency to repression. In denying the real source of pain they project it on the object. They also keep up a continuous denial in which they deny the denial and they give the impression of an external trauma which is not real.

In adaptation they strive to alter the external world to suit their own ego. They may execute great deeds but must then deny what they have done, thereby destroying their own creations. In the depressive phase they can do nothing at all, so that the personality is split between reality and the ego—in other words they shift the

denial from reality to the ego. In the melancholic depression they also turn the external hate towards themselves.

If one would understand these reactions in full he must follow up the sadistic component in these individuals. The manic-depressive with his strong denial tendency is not only egoistic but originally strongly sadistic. The egoistic and sadistic probably go hand in hand, narcissism being a later development. Sadism antagonizes the other tendency in some respects. A sort of balance or equilibrium between the opposed tendencies is readily upset and one or the other dominates. Sadism represents the strength of the instinct impulses and egoism (narcissism) the sensitiveness of the ego.

This double anlage has a special bearing on the super-ego formation. The sadistic component simulates the super-ego and may be termed a pseudo-super-ego. The melancholia of this affection may be termed a crystallization of the depressive phase in which all action is inhibited although the patient dreams of doing deeds which are chiefly sadistic and egoistic. The depression in this psychosis appears to be an attempt at spontaneous cure, as Freud similarly regarded projection in paranoia. Through the melancholic inhibition of the sadistic impulses the latter are pent up for the time but strive to break through.

If by changing the reality in melancholia the patient may be made to confess instead of deny, a relative cure may be effected for the next attacks may be mild. The cyclic character of the psychosis can also be understood on this basis of inhibitions and breaking through. There is a relation between the impulsive character and mania for in the former impulses are translated into actions instead of phantasies, which last is normal behavior although present in excess in the neurotic. The phantasy life and the emotional life are meagre in the impulsive character and sexually we see sensuality and not tenderness.

In the impulsive character there may be denial of pain and denial that the object can give pleasure—in other words denial of all emotional relation to the object. His sensual enjoyment is sadistic revenge on the “bad” mother while in actual mania he is the guaranteeing mother. Freud’s formula that in mania ego and super-ego coincide may be modified by saying the same of the two maternal egos (good and bad mother). Mania would then be the coincidence of the ego and object in the original narcissistic sense. Identification is with the good mother while in depression and melancholia it is with the bad mother. In these identifications the bad mother is in the object in mania, the good mother in melancholia; whence in the first case the sadistic revenge on the object and in the second case the extreme tenderness with exclusion of sensuality.

The entire process is then brought back to the ego, the good and bad mothers being projections from ego attitudes. Projection of one's own narcissism to the object makes the good mother and of one's own sadism the bad mother. The so-called coincidence of ego and super-ego in mania is really an abolition of the internal inhibitions of a sadistic-egoistic character. Biologically something of the manic-depressive cycle is seen in coitus for the act itself may be termed maniacal and depression follows with sexual passivity.

The sadistic impulse component is the most powerful in direct action, the sole driving force to master the external world and gain pleasure; while in the strictly psychic world the dynamic instance is denial. Psychodynamics in the last result have to do with denial. Uninhibited sadism is destructive and the defense against this denial, due to the psychobiologic tendency to self-preservation.

Sense of guilt has fundamentally no other significance than the denial of those tendencies within us. Its existence is the result of unsuccessful denial of sadistic-egoistic impulses and therefore is independent of all special experience. There is a criminal type "from guilt consciousness" described by both Nietzsche and Freud, where the criminal does forbidden things in order to feel guilty. There is no infantile source of guilt sense for the latter is only the expression of the denial of egoistic inclinations and sadistic impulses.

Other psychic mechanisms also derive their dynamics from denial, especially displacement and projection which so often concern the guilt sense. The feeling of guilt itself is the strongest expression of denial, seeking to make others responsible. "Not I, but some one else." Denial (not repression) is the psychic correlative of flight, the art of escaping from one's self with the sense of "out of sight, out of mind."

Denial, as stated, leads to positive reactions in thought and action, and above all to compensatory performances in the ego which we comprise under the terms phantasy and narcissism. What we call reality is not something to which we can adapt ourselves—something like a closed chapter—but something to be used for the development of the ego and for psychic unloading. When adaptation fails psychoses and neuroses result (too little or too much adaptation). Between the two lies normal object relation which we call love, in which we use the object for the enrichment and development of the ego, but also at the same time give as much to enrich the object as can happen without guilt consciousness.

THE FUNCTION OF THE ORGASM

(Psychopathology and Sociology of Sex Life)

BY

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I

THE NEUROTIC CONFLICT

Freud's psychological discovery, which placed the entire psychopathology on a new foundation and revealed new paths through fruitful interrogation, was, first, that every neurotic and psychotic symptom, no matter how senseless it seems, has a rational content, which on close investigation may be fitted completely into the total experience of the patient; and second, that the neurotic symptoms originate through a conflict between primitive claims of the instincts and moral requirements which prohibit the gratification of the same. The "internal denial" of this gratification, which we invariably encounter in the patient, is derived from the external restraint which the patient as a child has experienced from his parents and their representatives. The conflict between the impulse ego and the moral ego was therefore originally a conflict between the former and the external world, and in many psychoses it has retained this character permanently (Freud), as it has also in many impulsive psychopaths. In the neurosis, on the other hand, an important part of the personality has been brought into adaptation with reality, while another part has experienced an arrest of development at an early stage of psychic evolution: so that a conflict must arise between contrary endeavors. It is characteristic of the neurotic personality that the moral ego has neither the courage to permit impulse gratification in tolerant fashion, nor the strength to condemn the claims of the instincts, nor can it settle them in any suitable form; because the first requirement thereto—the consciousness of the impulse incitations—is either incomplete or absent altogether. The ego startles at the slightest suggestion of an "unmoral" incitation and disposes of it through the act of repression, which can take several forms—from a simple denial of existence or overlooking to a compensatory

emphasis of the opposite of the prohibited impulse, and finally through a total shutting out of the idea from consciousness (hysterical amnesia) and a constriction of every motor discharge of the corresponding affective total. The repressed impulse claim does not, however, forfeit any of its propulsive power. On the contrary it is fortified by the "stasis" of the as yet undischarged impulse energy, and the danger now consists in that it is no longer exposed to the control of conscious deliberation. It breaks through, on occasions offered by suitable situations, the "counter-besetments" or "resistance," respectively, of the ego. This breaking through of the repression which presents the second act of the neurotic process, can, however, succeed only through compromise, because the ego in its defense supports itself by powerful psychic factors which may be included in the popular conception of "moral." The result is a disguised impulse gratification, which as such is not recognized by consciousness; or in so far as it appears less veiled and as not belonging to the ego, is felt as a compulsion and rejected.

Thus far there is nothing to object to the psychoanalytic yield of Freud. The most violent opposition to Freud's doctrines was raised through the claim that sexual wishes are a regular constituent of the repressed impulse incitations. It is of no avail that Freud has replied to those who have raised the reproach of "pansexualism" against psychoanalysis, that first even the sex-repellent morality of mankind participates in the neurosis; yes, that without this opposition of the ego against its own impulses the latter could not come about; and second, that along with sexual desires egoistic, cruel and other wishes take part in the genesis of the neurosis, only not with the same regularity and without the same urgent power. Part of the world of science neglects to examine critically into what they really mean by the catchword "pansexualism."

Others cautiously and slowly follow up the psychoanalytic yield which originally was regarded as a chimera, and accept it in part as a strange (new) discovery; and to some extent in a diluted or distorted form. The fewest make use of the technic of psychoanalysis as stated by Freud in order to convince themselves of its correctness.

We have adduced the attitude of the opponents of psychoanalysis anew, not without an object. As we proceed to show the dominant rôle of impotence in man and frigidity in woman which is played in the neurosis, we come back to the attempt of Freud to mitigate the affective refusal of his doctrine of neuroses by stressing repeatedly and fervently that his conception of sexuality is broader than that commonly accepted. "Genital" and "sexual" need not mean the

same, otherwise perversions like coprophagy and fetichism could not be termed sexual affections. He shows that alongside of genital sexuality tendencies exist which have nothing to do with the genital zone (pregenital partial impulses), the aim of which is to obtain gratification through irritation of certain "erogenous zones" (mouth, anus, skin, etc.), and which may be designated as sexual because they play an important rôle as "preliminary acts" in normal sexual intercourse, (as long as they do not interfere with genital primacy and as perversions raise a claim to exclusive sexual gratification). In Freud's writings, the stressing of the distinction between sexual and genital often sounds like a reassurance over the consequences of its own discovery; but it remains without effect, for its doctrine of nursling sexuality and anal erotism encounters not less affective resistance.

By reason of the broadening of the conception of sexuality, Freud came to the conclusion that no neurosis can arise without a sexual conflict; that is, that we do not always find plain genital impulses as symptoms, for pregenital partial impulses may also figure. By this he only meant that the individual neurotic symptoms originate immediately through repression of some partial impulse, and serve its masked gratification; thus, for example, repressed anality acts immediately through nervous constipation, oral erotism by hysterical vomiting, genitality by *arc de cercle*, sadism by many compulsive actions and compulsive-neurotic measures of penalizing. An actual conflict can elicit a neurosis with a suitable disposition in any region one pleases. We will now demonstrate that sexual conflicts—in the narrower sense inhibitions, repressions, fragmentations of the genital tendency—can cause the nervous symptom and the neurotic conflict; not immediately, indeed, but they can play regularly an important dynamic rôle in the production of a neurotic basis for reactions, upon which a neurosis can be built up; further, that its removal as a result of its relations to the continuous neurotic process, plays a decisive rôle in the psychoanalytic therapy of the neurosis, under which we understand in the first rank influencing the neurotic reaction basis.

As the first proof for the correctness of this view, we adduce the fact that there is no neurosis without disturbance of the genital function. The two following statistics show that these disorders in the great majority of cases are not of a subtle nature, such as occur also in relatively healthy men, but concern the elementary functions of coitus and the psychogenital attitude in general. Most frequently we find sexual aversion and neurotic abstinence foster all the forms

of erectile impotence found in sex literature (complete, partial and facultative insufficiency of erection), disturbance of ejaculation (precocious, extravaginal, impotence of ejaculation) and of frigidity (total sexual coldness, vaginal anesthesia or hypoesthesia, vaginismus, etc). Here it appears that the severity of the potency disturbance is analogous to the severity of the neurosis and that even monosymptomatic neuroses begin with severe disturbance of the genital functions. The same holds good for the symptomless character neuroses. It is characteristic that among patients who suffer severely from the phenomena of the climacteric one finds none who can report an ordered sexual life in the preclimacteric period. At the close of this survey are mentioned cases of addiction and all other kinds of impulsivity in which the genitality is invariably greatly disturbed.

The first statistics embrace 338 patients who had visited the Vienna Psychoanalytic Dispensary in the course of the year November 1923 to November 1924. There were 166 male and 91 female patients in whom the following finds were obtained by simple anamnesis. There were 36 men and 45 women who gave no history of genital anomalies.

Of 166 male patients the following histories were given:

Apparently potent	17
Apparent simple impotence.....	18
Neurotic and abstinent.....	69
Neurotic with erectile impotence.....	27
Neurotic with precocious ejaculation.....	14
Perverse and erectile impotence.....	9
Climacteric	5
Actual neurosis, coitus interruptus.....	7

Of 91 female patients

All had anesthesia or hypoesthesia vaginae	
Apparent simple frigidity.....	6
Neurotic and abstinent.....	27
Neurotic and frigid.....	57
Neurotic from actual marriage conflict with frigidity.....	12
Climacteric	9

As already stated, there were 81 patients of both sexes who gave no history of any genital disorder but for the most part there was such aversion to interrogation at the outset that it was not pushed. Of the 17 men who claimed to be potent such patients for the most part show on analysis that more or less erectile impotence exists. Actual erectile potency is usually recruited from the erythrophobes, compulsive characters and other narcissistic-sadistics.

Of 41 male patients actually treated by analysis there were:	
Hysteric and abstinent but with erective potency.....	4
Compulsive neurotics with idealistic asceticism and abstinence..	6
Hysteric with greatly lowered erective potency.....	1
Hysteric with precocious ejaculation.....	2
Hypochondric-neurasthenic with genital anesthesia (precocious ejaculation extravaginally without erective potency).....	4
Erythrophobic, abstinent from fear of impotence.....	5
Morally insane (swindler and addict) with precocious ejacu- lation	2
Kleptomaniac with erective impotence.....	1
Neurasthenic with ejaculatory impotence.....	4
Neurotic character with simple impotence.....	4
Erective impotence (after encephalitis and influenza).....	1
Homosexual and perverse; erective impotence with women....	5
Impulsive character with erective impotence.....	1
Normal; no disturbance of potency.....	1
Erectively potent, narcissistic and homosexual, no gratification in act	1
Erectively potent, compulsive character, no gratification in act..	4
Erectively potent, satyriasis, no gratification in act.....	1
Of 31 female patients treated by analysis there were:	
Hysteric and abstinent from sex fear.....	7
Compulsive neurotic, sex repugnance and abstinence.....	4
Hysteric with vaginal anesthesia.....	9
Compulsive neurotic, frigid.....	5
Cyclothymic; chronic hypochondric neurasthenia, sex aversion..	1
Impulsive character, frigid or vaginally anesthetic.....	3
Nymphomania, masochistic perversion, vaginal anesthesia in act	1
Late epilepsy and frigid.....	1
Hysteroepilepsy and vaginal anesthesia.....	1
Paranoia, frigid	1

These returns speak for themselves.

Stekel's statement that he found among his female patients fifty per cent. of frigidity must refer only to complete sexual coldness. From the economic standpoint—and what other aspect of impotence has any practical value?—it is immaterial whether a woman has more or less feeling or a man more or less erective potency. It is only important to know whether the orgasm is affected.

Freud's doctrine of the phantasy activity of the neurotic human being allows the regular coincidence of neurosis and impotence to appear selfevidently. The interest in the world of phantasy which

the neurotic individual has created for himself does injure the function of reality, the ability to function from the erotic and social angles. The fanciful world is built up and is beset with permanent interest because the actual world cannot satisfy the claims of the pleasure principle; and certain erotic and egoistic claims collide against the invincible restriction of cultural and social norms, which can neither be vanquished nor accepted. In phantasy, on the other hand, all wishes can be represented as fulfilled. Working regressively, the preferred desires revert to the time in which the child originally applies its strongly erotic interest to the people of its closest environment—the parents, older children of the family, nurses, governesses, and so on. The sexual phantasy and the urge to motor discharge of the increased tension leads regularly to onanistic activity. Thus masturbation becomes the point of crystallization of all sexual strivings. Because every neurotic withdraws a large and even most important part of his libidinous interests from actual objects to be applied to the figures of his phantasy, this alone determines diminished potency in relation to the fitness of reality and in a narrower and broader sense. Slight potency or slight interest in the possibilities of gratification, which stand open in the reality of the sexual tendencies, do not yet indicate impotence. Can a neurosis be built up on sexual propelling power which lies outside the genital sphere without injury to the genital function? The patient would then be gratified in the genital libidinous fashion and at the same time would have ungratified pregenital wishes, which seek neurotic substitute gratification. Experience, however, teaches that ungratified and unsublimated libidinous claims which do not allow themselves to be fitted into the total endeavor can with time attract progressively more interest to themselves and thereby disturb the uniformity of sexual experience; otherwise nothing further could be fully experienced. This may at first injure a little the social performances because most of these stand far from personal experience. In the realm of sexual life, the high point of which, psychically and physically, is the orgasm, there is required, on the other hand, the capacity for unifying the sexual and cultural efforts. Upon this depends the economic expediency of the orgasm.

II

ORGASTIC POTENCY

Under orgasmic potency we will understand the capacity of a human being to arrive at a gratification which is adequate to the libido stasis of the moment; further, the capacity to be able to arrive

at this gratification far more frequently than to be subjected to disturbances of genitality, which occasionally disturb the orgasm in the relatively healthy. Orgastic potency comes about under certain conditions which one encounters only in individuals who are able to enjoy and perform; in the neurotic these conditions are absent or present only in a deficiency.

Can one describe a type of orgastic potency without regard to the differences in ordinary sexual requirements? The objection could be raised that we are describing an ideal which cannot be represented in reality even approximately. We dispute this; we mean, rather, a thorough reality. I thank a few colleagues warmly for having given me a phenomenological description of their sexual life which has made it possible for me to set up some criteria for orgastic potency; if these are absent one may diagnose with sufficient security orgastic impotence independently of the mostly misleading statements of patients, according to degree and quality.

From the clinical side the setting up of a type of orgastic potency is supported by the fact that after removal of the disturbance of potency the curve of orgastic pleasure experience approximates more or less in automatic fashion the curve of orgastic potency as described by us. We begin with the presentation of the progress made by a patient during analysis who among other symptoms suffered from precocious ejaculation and excessive masturbation. A few months after completion of the analysis he reported among other information that he felt himself fully potent and satisfied. The act lasted about five minutes, he did not indulge meanwhile in fancies and afterwards he did not feel dull.

On comparison of the curves we see that in the second the ascending shank is shorter than in the fourth. The great confidence which the patient felt in his sweetheart and the definite love conditions did indeed make possible the erective potency and a relatively great gratification although coitus fear caused the prolongation of the preliminary acts and a notable shortening of the friction time. With consciousness of coitus fear the act was prolonged about threefold. In precocious ejaculation the friction period was almost absent, the orgasm was poor and long drawn out. Slight sensations of pleasure were accompanied by intensive unpleasurable sensations which are not seen when the act is free from fear.

The intensity of the end pleasure in the orgasm is therefore (in a sexual act free from fear, pain and phantasy) directly proportional to the amount of sexual tension concentrated upon the genitals; that

is, it is the more intense the greater and steeper the descent of the excitement.

The following phenomenological description of a satisfactory sexual act concerns only the course of certain typical phases and forms of behavior. A description of the physiology of the sexual act may be spared by reason of the numerous and good descriptions which one finds in the literature. Nor do we take account of preliminary actions, which are determined by the various individual requirements and show no type. The processes of excitation involving the vaso-vegetative system, in so far as they may be comprehended phenomenologically, are considered in the Fourth Chapter.

I. Phase of Voluntary Control of Increased Stimulation.

(i) The erection is not painful but is in itself pleasurable; without this the genitals would be overexcited. The genitals of the woman become hyperemic and slippery through the abundant secretions of the genital glands. At the immission of the penis the clitoris may be the conducting zone, but in the orgasmically potent woman this is immediately transmitted after excitation to the mucosa of the vagina without any kind of rivalry. An important characteristic of orgasmic potency in the male is the psychomotor urge to penetration. Erections can come about from sensory irritation alone without the presence of this urge; this is the case with many narcissistic characters who are erectively potent.

(ii) The man is tenderly aggressive. As pathological deviations from this behavior may be seen exaggerated aggressiveness which originates in sadistic impulses, as in many compulsive neurotics with erective potency; the inactivity of the passive feminine characters as in onanistic coitus with an unloved object with absence of tenderness. The woman is more passive than the man, yet without complete inactivity (for example extreme inactivity as a result of masochistic fancies of violence).

(iii) The pleasure, which has held at about the same level during the preliminary acts, increases in like manner in both man and woman upon immission. The man has the feeling of being drawn in, corresponding to that of the woman of drawing in the penis.

(iv) The urge of the man to penetrate deeply increases without, however, assuming the form of a sadistic perforation as seen in compulsive neurotic characters. The excitement is concentrated through the reciprocal, spontaneous and not strained friction on the surface of the penis and glans and posterior portion of the vaginal mucosa respectively. The characteristic sensation which announces

the advance of the semen and accompanies it is still completely absent in contradistinction to precocious ejaculation. The body at large is still less excited than the genitals. Consciousness is concentrated fully on the perception of the pleasurable sensation and the ego is actively occupied to the extent that it attempts to exhaust all the possibilities of pleasure and attain a very high tension before the orgasm sets in. Obviously, this happens not from any fully conscious deliberations but automatically on a basis of previous experiences which differ with the individual, through change of posture, the kind of friction, the rhythm, etc. According to the unanimous testimony of potent men and women the pleasurable sensations are the stronger, the slower and milder the friction and the better it is shared between the two. This requires a high degree of ability to identify oneself with the partner. As pathological counterpart to this we find the urge to violent friction with partial penis anesthesia in sadistic compulsive neurotic characters who suffer from impotence of ejaculation, and in the nervous haste of those with precocious ejaculation. Inquiries reveal that orgasmically potent men never laugh during the sexual act and do not speak save for words of tenderness. Speech and laughter alike point to severe disorders of the power of devotion, presupposing the undivided concentration of the perception of pleasure.

(v) In this phase the interruption of friction is partly pleasurable in itself because of special sensations which set in on arrest of motion and are carried out without psychic outlay and partly are prolonged by coitus, for during rest the excitement sinks again a little, without, however, as in pathological cases, vanishing entirely. Even withdrawal of the member is not at all disagreeable provided there is first a period of rest. With resumption of the friction the excitement steadily increases above the level of that before interruption and gradually involves more and more the entire body, as the genitals themselves remain more or less uniformly excited. Finally there sets in as a result a new, usually sudden increase of genital excitation.

II. The Phase of Involuntary Muscular Contraction

(vi) It is now no longer possible to control voluntarily the course of the excitation which shows the following peculiarities:

(a) Increase in the excitation can no longer be regulated and it dominates the entire personality, causing pulse frequency and frequent respiration.

(b) The somatic excitation once more concentrates itself on the genitals although that of the body at large is not reduced. A sen-

sation sets in which may be best described as a flowing off of excitement into the genitals.

(c) This excitation first causes reflex contractions of the combined genital and pelvic floor musculature. The course is undulating and the peaks of the waves coincide with the complete penetration of the penis while the valleys of the same coincide with retraction of the member. As soon as the retraction has overstepped a certain limit convulsive contractions at once set in which accelerate the discharge of semen. In woman in addition the smooth muscle of the vagina contracts (suction activity of the vagina according to H. Deutsch).

(d) In this stage interruption of the act is absolutely painful for man and woman. The muscular contractions which bring about both orgasm and ejaculation in man, in place of being rhythmical pursue a convulsive course; this causes the most violent unpleasure and at times painful sensations in the pelvic floor and loins; moreover, ejaculation occurs earlier as a result of the spasms.

The voluntary prolongation of the first five stages (first phase) to a certain degree is not harmful and rather increases the pleasure; but the breaking off or voluntary alteration of the second phase or sixth stage is injurious because it comes about by reflex action and because it irritates the nervous system. This will be taken up again in the clinical section (neurasthenia, injury from coitus interruptus).

(vii) Through further strengthening of the involuntary muscular contractions and through increase of their frequency the excitation ascends rapidly and abruptly to the acme; this coincides normally with the contractions which first propel the semen. Now sets in

(viii) a more or less marked clouding of consciousness; the frictions spontaneously strengthen themselves after they have, at the moment of the acute acme, briefly intermitted and the urge to penetrate utterly becomes more intensive with each of the semen propelling contractions. In woman the muscle contractions pursue the same course as in the man, save that there is a psychic distinction that the healthy woman during and after the acme would "take up everything" (the mutual identification and further differences in regard to the behavior of the sexes will be taken up elsewhere). In the moment of the acme the breath is held and this is overcome by violent respirations which usually in woman dissolve in outcries.

(ix) The orgasmic excitation is imparted over the entire body and causes a lively movement of the entire musculature. Self observations by healthy subjects of both sexes as well as the analysis of certain disturbances of the orgasm show that what is called relaxation of tension, which is felt as a motor discharge (descending limb of

the orgasmic curve) is principally a result of flowing back of the excitation to the body at large. This backward flow is also felt as a sudden sinking of tension.

The acme represents the turning point of the genitopetal to the genitofugal course of the excitation (Ferenczi). Only the latter causes the gratification which means two things, transposition of the excitation and disburdening of the genitals.

(x) Before the zero point is reached the excitation dies away in a gentle curve and is immediately loosened by a pleasant somatic and psychic relaxation; mostly there sets in a strong tendency to sleep. The sensual relations are extinguished although there persists a satiated tender relation to the partner to which is sometimes added a feeling of gratitude.

In contrast with this the orgasmically impotent feel a leaden fatigue, nausea, aversion, satiety and at times hatred of the woman. In satyriasis and nymphomania the sexual excitability is still present. Women frequently react with insomnia which is an essential characteristic of lack of gratification. But if the patient report that the act was followed by falling asleep this does not at once imply that gratification was obtained. If we review once more the two phases of the sexual act we see that the first phase is chiefly sensory, the second phase chiefly motor.

The view is widespread that retardation of the orgasm in woman is physiological and attempts have been made to explain this fact biologically. For example, the delayed setting in of the female orgasm has the biological sense of attaining a second ejaculation by the male, which would make impregnation more certain (Urbach). It does indeed often happen that the woman reaches the orgasm with greater difficulty than the man but we must disregard the group in which delay in the female orgasm is merely the result of precocious ejaculation by the male. Fürbringer agrees with Lowenfeld's standard of ten minutes in making the limits five and fifteen minutes for the normal act and this is also our own estimation. But we cannot call it pathological if a man ejaculates in one to three minutes on an average, though we would not regard him as sufficiently potent because of the experience that precocious ejaculation may occur in men who although they seem quite healthy suffer from psychic inhibitions. We recall patients who before analysis arrived at a relatively satisfactory orgasm in half a minute but who when they became conscious of their coitus fear were able to more than double their friction period.

Aside from this there are enough other motives left to cause delay

in the orgasm of otherwise healthy women and which pertain to women only. There is the double sex morality which lays much greater obligation to sexual continence on her and the wish to be a man, which can exert a disturbing influence on the smooth course of the excitation. But if these inhibitions are absent the course in the woman does not differ from that in man.

The orgasm turns out more intense in both sexes if the acme in the two partners coincides. This happens in people who can concentrate the tender and sensual striving on a single object and at the same time find a corresponding echo. It is very commonly encountered and is the rule when the love relationship is disturbed neither from within nor without. In such cases conscious activity of the phantasy is eliminated without trace. The ego comprehends only the sensations of pleasure and the ability to concentrate on the genital experience for the time would be the phenomenologic definition of orgasmic potency.

Whether the unconscious phantasy activity rests or not cannot be straightway decided. Certain tokens speak for the affirmative. Phantasies which dare not become conscious could only be disturbing. Among those which accompany the sexual act one must distinguish between those which are in accord with the real sexual object and sexual experience, and those which contradict them. If the real sexual object were able to attract to itself, at least for the moment, all libidinous interests, unconscious phantasies would be superfluous. This is counter to actual experience, for man indulges in phantasy only when he can have nothing real. There is a genuine transference from the original object to the substitute object and the real object can replace the object of phantasy because it covers itself with it in the fundamentals. But if transference results in sexual interests, even if the real object is not so covered, merely by reason of neurotic search for the original object without the inner ability for genuine transference, no illusion can overshadow the mild sense of unreality in the relationship. There one is not deceived after the act, while here disillusionment is inevitable; here, as far as we can assume, the activity of the phantasy does not rest during the act but rather serves to keep up the illusion; there, the original object loses interest and also the power to engender phantasies but reappears in a new object. In genuine transference overestimation of the real object is absent and the qualities which contradict the original object are correctly estimated and tolerated; while in the unreal the idealization is excessive and the illusions dominate. The negative qualities are not perceived (repressed) and the activity of the phantasies cannot be intermitted else the illusions would be lost.

The more strained the labor of the phantasy in comparing the real with the original object, the greater the forfeiture of the sexual gratification in intensity and sexual economic value. It is wholly a matter of the discords which must come about between people in connection with long relationships, as to when and to what extent the intensity of sexual existence is reduced. This reduction becomes pathological the sooner the fixation becomes stronger on the primitive object and the inability for genuine transference; further, the greater the outlay of energy necessary to overcome the repugnance of the real object. Here we come naturally to neurotic disturbances of the orgasmic potency.

III

PSYCHIC DISTURBANCES OF THE ORGASM

In contrast with the disturbances of the erective and ejaculative potency the disorders of the end pleasure of Freud or the detumescence of Moll have received but little attention. In woman the less readily distinguished disturbances of the sexual function are comprised under the term "dyspareunia." Here also belong anesthesia and hypoaesthesia of the vagina. But we also find in woman isolated disturbances of function of the orgasm in the absence of disturbance of the preliminary physiological acts. Valuable contributions from the gynecological standpoint for the comprehension of the disturbances of the orgasm in woman and their significance for the origin of organic diseases of the sexual apparatus may be found in Kehrer's monograph on the causes and treatment of sterility (1922). Stekel's researches into the sexual frigidity of woman and impotence in man contribute an abundance of valuable material which is not suitably evaluated, for in the absence of a consideration and due estimation of infantile sexuality, which is only made possible by Freud's technic, no basic understanding of the situation can be attained. This also holds good for the otherwise very valuable contributions in the sexological literature. In the narrower confines of psychoanalytic literature we find no contributions to our problem. A certain shyness over the discussion of the high spot of human sexual life in interrogation or analysis of patients—without entering into details nothing can be accomplished—may be responsible for this silence. Patients themselves never furnish information. When I bestowed great attention on impotence and frigidity as regular accompaniments of neuroses this silence was the means of my escaping manifold disturbances of the orgasm. In addition very few patients know how to

give information on this subject nor do they understand why one asks about it.

In the course of the investigations it appeared necessary to give the conception of impotence an economic importance, which came about from setting up the conception of orgasmic potency. I may say that the economic problem of the neurosis has been made fruitful in a manner quite unexpected through this conception and analytic clarification. In this course I could support myself on the view first expressed and demonstrated by Freud that the neurotic complains of his defective gratification and that the somatic and psychic stasis constitutes the nucleus of the neurosis. I have to furnish the proof that sexual repression everywhere disturbs the end pleasure—when it does not interfere inhibitive in the search for a sex object (abstinence) or in the forepleasure mechanisms (erectile impotence, anesthesia), and thereby hinder the adjustment of the libidinous excitations. The psychic disturbances of the end pleasure may be comprehended jointly from the descriptive standpoint as deviations from the average types, already described, of orgasmic potency. By orgasmic impotence we understand the inner inability of arriving at adequate gratification of sex claims, even under the best external conditions and persisting to libido stasis. Since orgasmically impotent individuals mostly control a relatively slight ability in sublimation, there develops a persistent pathological stasis of the libido. In this respect they are worse than those who live abstinely or who are without genital excitability; because as a result of the immediate genital irritation they find themselves continuously in a condition of relatively high tension without being able to attain the so necessary adjustment.

One can, presupposing the integrity of the preliminary functions, distinguish between four basic forms of disorders of orgasmic potency: (a) Depression of the orgasmic potency. For internal reasons the orgasm does not answer to the libidinous claims, so that somatic and psychic libido stasis forms persist (onanism, onanistic coitus). (b) The wasting of the orgasm. The course of the excitation is directly disordered during the sexual act (acute neurasthenia). (c) The absolute inability to arrive at the orgasm (vaginal anesthesia, hypoaesthesia, genital anesthesia). (d) Nymphomaniac sexual excitation (nymphomania, satyriasis).

a. Depression of Orgasmic Potency

Persistent inadequate end gratification is found in the first place in individuals who from internal causes are unable to find the proper

sexual object; old masturbators, sexual cynics, masked homosexuals, old bachelors, schizoid introverts with defective object-relations; further, in those who exhibit a permanent cleavage of genital endeavor into tender and sensual components and in those who persistently have relations with prostitutes, in so far as the prostitute does not conform to a specific primitive object. Only that depression of orgasmic potency which sets in in time with masturbators is of clinical interest.

In masturbation the efforts to hold fast to phantasies, to vary them, to reproduce the sensations experienced in coitus, reduce the gratification so much that the tension is very incompletely relaxed. In this respect the onanistic coitus with an unloved object is fully the same (Ferenczi). The psychic endeavors remain always ungratified. To the psychic libido stasis (unquenched longing for love) is added a more or less intense somatic stasis, for the exertion in the formation of phantasies and the nongratification of the psychic endeavors also depress the somatic gratification. One cannot agree with the statement of Stekel that masturbation is the adequate form of gratification of many men, for analytic experience leaves no doubt that those who do not get beyond the physiological stage of puberty masturbation are fixed on objects of childhood and have coitus fear. After the tendency to masturbation has been thus established there develop ever stronger and more comprehensive regressions to infantile wishes and objects which require more intensive measures of defense. Thus it happens that so many neuroses break out soon after puberty and unfold themselves in the struggle against masturbation. If masturbation is fully suppressed so that even the somatic stasis becomes pathogenic, actual neurotic criteria become strongly prominent in the psychoneurosis—abundant reveries, irritability, moodiness, restlessness, disorder of work, pollutions, insomnia, etc., are usually the first tokens of the final disease. Suggestive removal of the guilt sense and fear of having injured oneself are able in many cases to mitigate these symptoms which result immediately from the masturbatory guilt sense and the strengthened somatic libido stasis. The psychic libido stasis cannot be attacked by suggestion and after cessation of the suggestive relationship causes a renewed increase in the guilt sense, inclination to complete abstinence and thereby further renewed growth of somatic stasis.

These facts, which present themselves in abundance to every unprejudiced observer since the researches of Freud and his school, require to-day no further detailed clinical proofs. On the other hand we will give an example in which the relative orgasmic impo-

tence is expressed in erectively potent neurotics. A man of thirty-two sought analysis for embarrassment and fear of blushing. He was living with a second wife whom he married for economic motives and still clung to the deceased first wife. The erective potency was good and at first he said he was satisfied sexually but during the analysis it appeared that he only copulated every six weeks or so from a sense of obligation and always at the time had fancies of his first wife. After the act he felt but little satisfied corporeally and was glad it was over.

This patient may be regarded as belonging to a large group of erythrophobics who battle unconsciously with homosexual fancies and who while potent heterosexually remain otherwise ungratified. It appears that the contractions of the genital muscles do not cause gratification during ejaculation save when the psychic stimulating apparatus is able to elaborate the sensations of pleasure without opposition. Psychic inhibition further prevents complete concentration and also the adjustment of the excitation concentrated on the genitals.

The same form of orgasmic impotence is found in erectively potent male compulsive neurotics with other psychic background.

These forms of relative orgasmic impotence, which have only slight relationship to neuroses and have to do chiefly with character, are discussed in full in the chapter on the social significance of genital endeavor.

b. *Wasting of the Orgasm*

This comes about as follows: inhibitions which set in during the sexual act not only lower the excitement and allow the gratification to peter out but even disturb the course of the physiological stimulation. Waste of the orgasm is encountered especially in patients who complain over acutely developing neurasthenic difficulties—irritability, disinclination to labor, states of exhaustion, diffuse somatic complaints as backache and drawing in the limbs. Freud says that "neurasthenia can always be referred to a condition of the nervous system originating spontaneously from excessive masturbation or cumulative pollutions." Stekel disputes the claim that neurasthenia differs etiologically from the psychoneuroses. In regard to the purity of neuroses Freud claims that while they may appear in pure form they are apt to complicate one another and also to be complicated by psychoneuroses. Stekel committed the same error in respect to actual neuroses as he did recently in connection with epilepsy; he derives from the mere presence of different impulse incitations a foundation for explanation without asking whether they prove that the various disease pictures are specific.

For the promotion of the problem of neurasthenia it is first indicated to distinguish between two great groups:

(i) Acute neurasthenia which appears as an acute affection—the type assumed by Freud to exist.

(ii) Chronic (hypochondriac) neurasthenia with an increase in the symptomatology over the acute form; for the most part this begins in childhood with constipation, meteorism, nausea, lack of appetite, persistent headache, etc. The male subjects exhibit precocious ejaculation, dribbling of urine or spermatorrhœa. This entire group is lacking in the acute form although some symptoms may appear individually. The question of the psychogenic origin of neurasthenia must be left to the individual case.

To take up acute neurasthenia, first, we find evidence both for and against Freud's masturbation theory. In some cases the symptoms do not set in until the habit has been given up. In some cases masturbation has been given up as a result of cumulative nocturnal or diurnal pollutions. Many masturbate compulsively, several times daily and with little pleasure. Two facts militate against Freud's masturbatory theory of neurasthenia; in many cases there is no history of excessive masturbation or pollutions and, again, excessive masturbation may not lead to neurasthenia. In certain cases it may be shown that the sense of guilt accompanying masturbation is responsible for the neurasthenia. Federn is entitled to the credit of pointing out that masturbation causes neurasthenia in proportion as sense of guilt accompanies it. This does not explain the somatic cases. Sense of guilt inhibits sexual gratification, which is frittered away and as a result the tension is not lowered. We know from reports of masturbators that many free themselves from this inhibition by a momentary unscrupulousness, as far as this is possible in an autoerotic act. In such a case the sense of guilt cannot injure the course of the pleasurable experience and the relaxation of the tension, because for the moment it is eliminated. But it is otherwise when the scruples and sense of guilt set in in the midst of the act, for here there is a psychic disturbance of a physiological process. Pleasure stumbles and there is no sudden sinking in the orgasm. The development of neurasthenia after cessation of the habit of masturbation must mean that large residues of unsettled excitation remain behind and that since they are of somatic origin must have somatic effects. The rôle of excessive loss of semen in the production of the neurasthenia will be taken up later.

We should look more closely into the phenomenon of irritation of the nervous system as a result of the reflex processes involved in the

excitation and the orgasm. This is the source of residues of somatic excitation, which with the activity of the phantasy play the chief rôle as motive for excessive masturbation. Those who masturbate without guilt sense at least lose the somatic tension and feel well afterward while for some time they no longer think of the practice.

Ferenczi speaks of the "one day neurasthenia" after masturbation. He thinks that the wave of sensual pleasure which normally dies down without residue is so divided in masturbation that part of the excitation remains behind unadjusted. It often happens that for some time masturbation is without ill effects until later these are called forth by luxuriant overgrowth of the phantasy or the perusal of trashy literature, which give rise to anxiety and sense of guilt and eventually neurasthenia.

As already stated, onanistic coitus may sometimes cause neurasthenia but only because a conflict disturbs the course of the stimulation. Tausk states that sense of guilt arises only when masturbation does not give complete gratification, but the author would invert this statement by stating that if full pleasure is obtained there is no subsequent sense of guilt.

To sum up, acute neurasthenia has a somatic etiological component which acts directly and a psychic one which has only an indirect action.

In regard to the frittering away of the orgasm in woman there is no essential difference in the case of those who with anesthesia of the vagina indulge in clitoris masturbation. The female sexual rôle is rejected and repressed but the physical femininity (lack of penis, menstruation) antagonizes the conscious or unconscious wish for masculinity; hence the greater the difficulty in gratifying the psychic libido, despite the occasional relatively high orgasmic relaxation of the somatic tension.

c. *Absolute Orgastic Impotence*

This occurs in men only in association with impotence of ejaculation and genital anesthesia; in neurotic women, on the other hand, it is always present. There are two types of the latter, viz., vaginal hypoaesthesia with orgasmic impotence and the disagreeable reaction of the frigid woman. In the former the vaginal excitability is intact but at the moment when the phase of involuntary muscular contraction sets in the excitation disappears or else it stagnates without orgasm. This anesthesia or hypoaesthesia is removable by analysis so soon as the patient becomes conscious of the coitus inhibitions. In the frigidity type the condition is much more difficult to deal with.

Orgastic potency in woman depends among other things on the erective potency of the male. Now it happens that women who have vaginal sensation and also organistic potency cannot come to end gratification if the man has already ejaculated. There is the disturbing idea that the penis will now lose its rigidity and that gratification will then be impossible. Often this idea sets in at the beginning of the act and the woman is dominated by the idea that she must hasten else it will be too late. In place of remaining passive she makes efforts which do not increase her excitement and this happens even when the penis remains rigid for a while after ejaculation. In typical fashion excitement ceases in such women at the moment of ejaculation. More careful analysis shows that at this moment a singular curiosity to observe the man overpowers her.

During coitus such women may identify themselves with the man with the phantasy that the penis is her own property. Relaxation of the rigid penis appears to symbolize castration and the woman may feel that she herself is castrated while at the same time she has also castrated the man. She is excited as long as nothing opposes her phantasy of being a man and she loses her excitement or, more accurately, she refuses the vaginal excitation when she must lose the penis which for the time she has borrowed. The disturbing idea that she is unable to attain gratification arises unconsciously from the fear that she is unable to keep the penis.

The most frequent cause of orgastic impotence in woman is fear of the orgasm. In certain cases it may have a superficial origin, as in the case of a man who laughed at his wife at the time of her first orgasm. The recollection of this episode inhibited her from any further orgasms. She had no further sexual desire and the act became repugnant while later she developed an anxiety hysteria.

In many cases there is a fear that during the orgasm she will defecate or urinate. In women of marked anality or urethral erotism there is an infantile anal idea of coitus. These accidents actually happen and in one case a woman passed both urine and gas. The orgastic relaxation of the tension is felt in all cases when fear disturbs the orgasm. This may be one of the reasons why falling dreams are so frequently dreams of impotence. Here castration fear quite replaces the orgasm. Many people have anxious and at the same time pleasurable sensations in the genitals when they look down a precipice or even imagine they do. Stair-climbing as a symbol of the sexual act represents not only the effort but also the ascent of the intensity of the pleasurable sensations during the act. Anxious and pleasurable sensations referable alike to the heart and genitals are

felt in swinging, in skiing, in going down hill in a motor, and descending in an elevator.

In the associative union of the conceptions of death (birth), castration and the orgasm, and in the symbolic presentation by the idea of falling, we perceive a confirmation of the hypothesis of Ferenczi that the expulsion of the semen is equivalent biologically (phylogenetically) to a castration and that the process of erection has beneath it a biological tendency to autotomy. However strange this hypothesis sounds, there is associated with the orgasm the feeling that a part of oneself is lost. One must assume that the sudden loss of libidinous tension which is associated in man with the expulsion of semen and in woman with profuse secretion of mucus, lies immediately beneath this sensation. The feeling of loss of something, however, should arise from the primitive castration fear. Those cases which tend to support that view fear the orgasm as a powerful sensation which comes over one, dominates, shatters and clouds the consciousness. One experiences it for the first time in masturbation, perhaps with fright and later forms the idea that loss of semen and the shock to the body shatter the nerves. There is added, therefore, to castration fear, which is increased by reading trashy literature, the somatic sensation of orgasm which is too powerful to be experienced without fear. Hence in cases in which it is not the manual friction of the genitals but merely the orgasm or ejaculation one must avoid the assumption that fear of castration has mastered the shocking experience of the first orgasm. The therapy of such cases must try to remove the fear which concerns masturbation; one should be able to masturbate without fear.

d. *Sexual Excitation in Nymphomania*

In this affection the women during one act of copulation reach the acme several times yet without relief from the tension, so that the excitement is continuous. The condition is therefore one of orgasmic impotence and is often accompanied by a ceaseless longing for copulation and quest for men.

The excitement is from the beginning notably higher than in the orgasmically potent individual and during the act increases much more rapidly. It disappears partially at the maximum of tension but the characteristic back current into the body at large does not set in. Hence the inhibition sets in only after concentration of the excitation upon the genitals.

Analysis of one case shows that ideas inhibit the gratification. What are these ideas? If we ask the patient what disturbs her

she can only declare over and over that she "must listen whether the satisfaction is coming." The sense of this turn of speech does not become clear until the patient states in addition that some person seemed to enter the room. In the course of months this unknown assumed different shapes. Finally it seemed to be her mother who was represented, occasionally with hallucinatory acuteness. It could not be learned whether the orgasm inhibition, when not due to the crude factors elicited, was dependent on unknown traumata. An idea of bursting was an expression of fear of being injured in the genitals, had been determined by actual experiences and was associated with the idea of a threatening and punishing mother. She did not fear castration by the mother but wished to become satisfied by her. She masturbated with a knife handle as in self-punishment, carried out castration on herself. She talked to herself during masturbation, presenting both the loving and punishing mother and the child which is excited and wishes satisfaction. The knife which alone seemed able to bring her to a high degree of excitement, she had purloined from a woman physician who had become to her almost a full value image of the mother; it had the significance of a maternal penis. The patient had the idea that during the sexual act the penis remained sticking in the vagina so that in this fashion the mother acquired possession of a penis. "I will be satisfied by mother" meant in the deeper strata, "I want mother to satisfy me with the penis which she has nipped off from my father." The coupling of this idea with the fear of having the genitals injured rests on a deepseated idea which was repressively activated: as in the course of the analysis the vaginal anesthesia in coitus was partly lost, she occupied herself ceaselessly with the idea of whether anything happened to the child in utero during coitus of the mother. She believed herself pregnant and on this account feared to have intercourse. The idea of coitus with the father while in the mother's womb was now and then fully conscious. As the mother had always been the dominant personality at home, the father being fully vanquished in the marital combat, it was natural that in her fancies the mother played the rôle of the man. We can now understand why the patient was vaginally anesthetic in coitus, could only be excited by masturbation with a knife. She obtained gratification when punished by her mother but in the presence of an actual man she was refractory for he could give her nothing, for the condition of excitement—the pain of punishment—was lacking. Only in the course of the analysis, when the female attitude to the father was reactivated by transference, was the infantile fixation on the mother partially

loosened and vaginal sensibility during coitus restored. Inability to obtain gratification was now the expression of a deep sense of guilt to the mother with pure castration fear. To become gratified meant to become castrated by the mother as punishment, and as the orgasm had once been a representative of punishment it was inhibited by the fear of punishment.

Another interpretation would be preferred by some analysts, that the patient did not grant herself gratification in self-punishment, but this leaves certain points obscure. Why did she develop fear when she reached the acme? Gratification was for her a punishable act. According to Alexander self-punishment is nothing but a license to do other deeds but in this case she avoided gratification from sense of guilt and from castration fear. This highly masochistic case shows that fear of punishment outweighed punishment requirement and we are justified in the assumption that self-punishment may have the aim of avoiding actual punishment from without.

Sense of guilt cannot be identical with demand for punishment, for one who feels himself guilty can both wish for punishment and fear it. The latter is the first and peculiar reaction of father hatred in the Oedipus complex. Special conditions must enter in to transform castration fear into the wish to be castrated. Clinically this case allows but one explanation for the orgasmic impotence—fear of castration by the mother.

If we seek for the manifold tendencies which here determined orgasmic impotence and present a conspectus of the stratification we have the following:

1. Overhearing parental coitus; genital excitement lived out in masturbatory acts; identification with the mother; wish for coitus with the father.

2. Sense of guilt towards the mother for death wish; trauma on the occasion of sexual play when the mother threw a knife at her and called her a "rank whore"; regression or oral fixation and activation of intrauterine fancy; incest wish condensed with these into the phantasy of coitus with the father in utero ("I can only be gratified in the womb"); the knife which the mother threw at her fused with the idea of the paternal member which was fancied as very long and adapted to penetration and later took over all the libidinous values of object love; the patient devoted herself masochistically to her mother because she was at once the punishing power and replaced the father as object of love. "I hear the gratification coming" means "I hear mother coming who alone can gratify me" and at the same time "I hear mother coming who will punish me for my

misdeeds." The high spot of the gratification, the orgasm, becomes also the high spot of the punishment—castration—which the patient evades.

IV

SOMATIC LIBIDO STASIS AND FEAR AFFECTS

a. *Generalities on the Sense, Tendency and Source of the Neurotic Symptoms.*

A study of the writings of Freud, Jones, Seif and others on fear shows the possibility of two different views on the subject. Fear can be the expression of repressed libido, the sign of its defense, or both at the same time. The problem is not a simple one and in order to get close to it many facts must be viewed and grouped from new standpoints. The methods of psychoanalysis do not yet allow us to draw conclusions as to the source from which the symptom draws its energy. A symptom *may* disappear when its secret sense and purpose become conscious, but cannot be forced to do so until the source of its energy is withdrawn. In every neurotic symptom we must consider:

(a) *The Psychic Sense.* Under this head we understand the repressed ideas, experiences, wishes, gratifications, self-punishment actions, etc., which arrive at a distorted presentation within. This psychic content, however, would not be able to produce the symptom unless it were affectively beset, that is, unless it stood in association with stagnated impulse energy. Most of the repressions found in analysis are secondary, after the symptom has been produced.

(b) *The Purpose.* Aside from leading off the libido and dis-burdening from the sense of guilt the purpose is to be understood as "secondary sickness benefits" which dominates more or less the picture of every neurosis. After the latter has arisen as a result of a pathological conflict the patient makes use of it to attain certain definite ends which always have intimate relations to the causation of the neurosis.

This tendency of the symptom is the consequence and never the primary cause of the neurosis; it does indeed complicate and render more acute the neurotic conflict and in many cases is wont to completely hide the primary causes of the conflict.

(c) If now we inquire into the nature of the essential causes we are necessitated to go into the experience in life which has become important through affective emphasis and into the secondarily added purpose of the neurosis as far as the boundary of the psychologically still comprehensible impulse event which is open to a biological

explanation and before all is anchored to physiological processes, which interplay themselves in the glands of internal secretion and the nervous system coupled therewith. As a psychology of the impulsive life, psychoanalysis has the closest relationship with biology and to the physiology of the neuroses.

As source of a symptom, biological instinctive energy comes into account, which kindles itself anew with somatic and probably biochemical processes, becoming manifest psychically as impulse urge or affect and associating itself as such with ideas and experiences. Of the four characteristics of impulse distinguished by Freud, the source and urge correspond to the biological and physiological while the purpose and object of the impulse represent the psychological side. The urge of an impulse when ungratified is perceived as unpleasure which is first expressed as somatic tension, and when this tension is liberated gratification follows. The direction of the sex impulse from unpleasure to pleasure is termed by Freud the "*Lust-Unlust Prinzip*." Nothing illustrates the correctness of this formula better than the fact that potency disturbance is a typical symptom of every neurosis.

What is the relationship between the disturbance of the genital function and the neurotic process? This is not hard to answer for the psychoneuroses. At whatever stage of psychic development the neurotic process may set in, the repression, whether primary or secondary, always lays hold of the genital endeavors, shuts them off more or less from the motility, or contents itself with the dissociation of the tender and the sensual or serves itself with various inhibitory mechanisms, as we see in individual neuroses. The inhibition of the genital functions brings about a somatic libido stasis to which is added a psychic libido stasis and thus the neurotic conflict is secondarily considerably exacerbated, consolidated and complicated. One is convinced that the psychic conflict which originally was not pathological becomes so only when somatic libido stasis has developed. That is, as soon as the source of energy for the symptom is supplied. Mere repression of an impulse prompting does not make a symptom which does not arise until after the impulse urge has succeeded in breaking through the repression on the side of the defending ego, which must be ascribed to the pent up energy of the impulse.

The somatic tension and sensations from the realm of neurasthenia, anxiety neurosis or hypochondria are never absent at the outset of a neurotic affection and are the immediate expression of somatic stasis. This agrees further with the fact that between the repression and symptom formation a longer or shorter interval—according to

the genital disturbance—is interpolated. This is seen with especial distinctness in erythrophobia, the patient struggling for months or years against masturbation before full suppression of the habit. Shyness in company first lessens and finally becomes aggravated after weeks and months, for banal reasons, with all the usual concomitants of the neurosis.

b. *Fear and the Vasovegetative System*

The symptomatology of the anxiety neurosis agrees in essentials with that of the vasomotor neurosis. The typical symptoms of both are cardiac disorders (as asystole, tachycardia, arrhythmia, extrasystoles, etc.); outbreaks of sweating, sensations of heat and cold, tremor, vertigo, diarrhoea and at times salivation. In one case the analysis of these symptoms may show a hidden psychic meaning while in another this element will be lacking in favor of an over-excitability which cannot be comprehended psychologically. When the psychic cause is at hand the symptoms follow the principles to which conversion hysteria is subjected. Thus the blushing in erythrophobia has the sense of social shame and unconsciously the exhibition of the erect penis, of which the head is the representative.

If we compare the two types of vasomotor neurosis, the psychogenic and the somatic, we find common to both the organs in which the pathological phenomena appear. Dismissing other elements from consideration we will simply hold to the fact that in the hysterical type the genital energies are conveyed to the vasovegetative nervous system. Blushing can represent an exhibitionistic act, tremor of the head masturbation or castration, the sense of heat may emerge in analysis as the expression of a somatic genital excitability which is not to become conscious; diarrhoea can express fear or sexual excitement. In many impotent subjects who cannot obtain an erection in attempting coitus there may be a copious secretion of sweat while the analysis of the phantasies and dreams shows the wish to return to the maternal body or an identification with the penis, the vasodilators functioning not in the penis but in the area of hyperhidrosis.

Has the psychic identification caused the outbreak of sweat? Has the unconscious wish to return to the womb caused the "erection of the skin"? This certainly cannot be the case. It is only conceivable that the somatic excitation which accompanies the coitus wish includes the vasodilators of the skin, which is not possible for the genital region because of psychic inhibition, or fear. The same mechanism may explain the sensations of heat.

The symptoms of the vasomotor neurosis may come about as an

expression of irritation of the vegetative nervous system. In Basedow's disease it is irritated by the dysfunction of the thyroid gland. In the moment of actual danger the same symptoms come to expression as fright; the precise relationship to fear is a complicated problem. To attack it one may begin with a simple manifestation, the action of nicotin. Self study shows that this is first expressed as tachycardia preceded by a brief asystolia. At the moment of intermission of the heart anxiety appears and later come vertigo, nausea and sweating. The fear which at first has no content later becomes fear of death. With the continuance of the tachycardia the fear of death is strengthened and this fear seems to intensify the heart symptoms.

To account for the mechanisms involved the association of simple "loose fear" with the tachycardia and intermittance is of interest. We may speak of "fear equivalents" like Freud, or we may assume that the irritation of the vasomotor system is in certain cases accompanied by fear. We may assume that stasis of the somatic libido can act on the vegetative system in the same manner and that the pent up libido is changed to fear. For the time being we have to assume that fear may in one state cause vasomotor phenomena and in another be caused by these.

That angina pectoris with its various symptoms of disturbed cardiac function is associated with fear has long been recognized and Brissaud states that all cardiac sensations are associated with fear of death. This cannot be due to the mere pain present else it would be found in other conditions which simulate it. This sensation of anxiety has been called specific and phylogenetic.

With the introduction of the notion of somatic libido stasis as one of the causes of disturbance of the vasovegetative system a gap in physiology has been filled which has defied explanation from the purely physiological side.

c. Sexual Excitement and the Autonomous Nervous System

Genital excitation and sexual desire give rise in the heart and vasomotor system to the same picture as fear. An individual sexually excited exhibits palpitation and feeling of heat within which are woven together the pleasure of expectation and the expectant fear. The specific cardiac sensation underlies both. Expectation of danger also accelerates the heart beat. It seems as if the lively anticipation of danger and of sexual pleasure must act on the imagination or the preliminary overaction may be of the nature of a tryout of the vagus and sympathetic. A close survey of the

tachycardia shows that a brief transitory cardiac dilatation precedes it. The metaphors which associate the heart with love are very numerous. In symptoms and dream life the heart may substitute for the genitals. One may assume that the burden on the heart is normally relieved so soon as the blood is diverted into the genitals. The acceleration of the heart during actual coitus is due largely, of course, to the great motor activity.

What is the further course of sexual excitement? In the beginning of the sexual act it concentrates itself always on the genital apparatus, is perceived as pleasurable sensation in the sensory apparatus and increases to the acme. In other words beginning in the vegetative system the excitement goes over to the sensory nerves and finally, at the moment of the acme, to the motor nerves and muscles. This transference indicates a disburdening of the vegetative nervous system and discharge of the sexual excitement into the sensorimotor system. Transference to the motor system and the ebbing of the excitement in the body at large is experienced as satisfaction.

The following phases may be enumerated.

- i. Tensionless storage of sexual energy in the vegetative nervous system.
- ii. Spontaneous or voluntary concentration of the libido on the genital apparatus.
- iii. Progressive transference to the sensory system (forepleasure).
- iv. Transference to the motor system.
- v. Retrograde current into the vegetative system.

The last two stages constitute the orgasm proper.

The sexual gratification is the greater or more complete:

- i. The more the libido is concentrated on the genitals;
- ii. The more complete or undisturbed is the ebbing of the excitement back into the vegetative system.

It is now possible to obtain a better idea of Freud's anxiety neurosis. If there is any inhibition of the conduction into the sensorimotor system and genitals the excitement remains pent up in the vegetative system and produces all of the phenomena of the vasomotor neurosis. This is most pronounced in total abstinence from psychic inhibitions if the genital sensibility does not function; also in frustrated excitement when the conduction does not reach the motor system.

In cases of coitus interruptus one may find neurasthenic cases much more common than anxiety neurotic ones. This is explained by the fact that in coitus interruptus the discharge takes place into the motor system but the course of stimulation is grossly disturbed

by interruption of the act, so that on one side the undischarged genital excitement generates typical neurasthenic symptoms and on the other side a more or less considerable amount of sexual excitement is left in the vegetative system and works itself out in the cardiac and autonomic systems. There are all transitions between neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. The further along the discharge in the motor paths at the time of interruption the greater the liability to acute neurasthenia, while the less the relief in the vegetative system the greater the element of anxiety neurosis.

Sexual gratification in the orgasm signifies not merely a transformation of nervous excitation but something which is more essential for the organism as a whole, a physicochemical freshening up of the other vegetative functions. Here physiological chemistry may expect a plethora of hopeful labor. I mention merely the physical bloom of the sexually satisfied woman and its opposite, the premature corporeal withering of the much mocked old maid who need be no older than her more fortunate contemporary. The same holds good for the men. The so-called greensickness of girls following puberty may also belong here. Most of the women who have complained of severe climacteric disturbances give histories of unhappy marriage, persistent frigidity, prolonged abstinence of widows and total abstinence of the unmarried. Women with happy marriage and no libido stasis go through the climacteric with little trouble.

d. *The Psychic Etiology of Actual Neurosis*

A prolonged analysis of a case in point has reference especially to the significance of somatic libido stasis for the prognosis of the neurosis. The capacity for relapse, once the patient has become free from symptoms depends chiefly on the quota of pent up libido—that is, from the yet unremoved inhibitions and external difficulties. In the case in question a conflict with the husband was utilized by the neurosis as a means of pushing neurotic intentions, as protection from the sexual act. The conflict itself, however, was the result of a misidentification determined by an infantile experience. She had been frigid for years but finally conceived; on account of poor economic circumstances the husband insisted on interrupting the pregnancy. This experience caused her to regress to an earlier libido position and early infantile sexual wishes brought about a state of vasomotor excitement and symptoms of vasomotor neurosis. The experiences of her early childhood had to do with overhearing coitus between her parents. Before intercourse her father was rough and brutal and she had fear of him conjoined with incest

wish. She had been sexually excited at these times and had masturbated. The fear she experienced now was complex—physical fear of the father, fear of coitus, fear of incest, all reanimated from childhood. Her coldness, however, was due in part to a masculine anlage as shown in her voice, gait, etc. Analysis, however, showed it to be due also to castration fear which was the chief cause of her genital anesthesia. The libido stasis produced the vasomotor symptoms of tremor, vertigo, etc.

Somatic libido stasis may originate in two ways. In the first a mild psychic inhibition disturbs the smooth winding off of the gratification without interference with the excitement. Stimulation without relaxation of the sexual tension (frustrated excitement) first causes restlessness, irritability and moodiness along with somatic disturbances. Genital sensations are unpleasurable and at times painful. Now the fear and vasomotor symptoms come to the fore. These disorders of the libido may bring to light the latent psychic conflict already present.

In the second type a strong characterological inhibition does not allow the somatic libido stasis to come to irritation. At first the somatic tension remains low until some special occasion appears, which, however, is always associated with an infantile conflict which is activated as sexual phantasies, becoming then pathogenic. The libido stasis, originally slight, becomes activated by these phantasies and the original psychic conflict is rendered acute, the stasis becoming the chief source of the symptoms.

In the advanced case the psychic and somatic components of the libido stasis are with difficulty kept separate. The difference between the actual neurosis and the psychoneurosis is a radical one at the outset of the process. In the former the somatic energy is first pent up and eventually leads to psychic stasis and regressions; in the latter by reason of actual occasions we see narcissistic affections, revival of ancient wishes and phantasies with secondary production of pathological stasis of somatic sexual energy.

An actual neurosis cannot come about without psychic inhibitions or disturbances of the genital functions and a psychoneurosis cannot come about without stasis of the somatic libido. The psychoneurotic component of a neurosis has to do with the historic etiology (Oedipus complex), the actual neurotic component with libido stasis.

e. From the Analysis of a Case of Hysteria with Hypochondric Fear

In this case fear was the last and severest symptom to appear, after a coitus dream in which she experienced pleasurable genital

sensations by reason of an incest phantasy. Long before this illness her psychic equilibrium had been labile; she had to battle with desires for masturbation. There was a high degree of vaginal hypoesthesia and orgasmic impotence. After some years of married life she had caught her husband making love to another woman and this exposure caused her to take refuge in phantasy and desire for masturbation (at puberty she had masturbated to excess). She had a deep fear that her child, a boy of 8, would die, which was partly justified as he looked ill and there was tuberculosis in her family. She caught her daughter, aged 13, in the act of masturbating, and also feared that the girl might teach it to the boy. Her fears for herself seem to have been projected on the boy. She may have ascribed the boy's ill health to her masturbation before marriage.

Analysis showed that in her unconscious ideation the boy symbolized the penis; she had transferred all her libido to him. This seems apparent from a wish she had when the boy was born that he might always remain small. The fear of loss of the boy symbolized in the deeper strata the loss of the penis as a form of castration fear. This all signifies an infantile identification with the father.

To sum up this case chronologically the revelation of the perfidy of the husband caused regression to the early infantile status hence the incest dream. The boy replaced the father and she both feared and wished to lose him (her father had died of tuberculosis). Other unconscious fancies were of seducing her son to masturbate but she fears this will kill him; of maiming him, cutting him up to get his penis. The boy symbolically is a penis, her penis, which she would use for masturbating but fears she might lose it as punishment.

A somatic symptom figured extensively in this case. Hives or itching blisters developed on her body at the time of puberty and were attributed to her excessive masturbation. Many years later they appeared in her married life when she was unable to obtain sexual gratification. This appeared to be the result of a shutting off of the genital area from the body at large. She still battled against the idea of masturbation and during analysis, when she strove against admitting this, her vulva broke out with itching wheals which she scratched freely yet without admitting to herself that this amounted to masturbation. It was striking to note that when the hives appeared the fear diminished and the hives returned whenever she repressed.

The question suggests itself as to wherein castration fear, which causes repression of genitality, is related to the actual fear that results from repression?

f. Apprehension and Fear Affect

Investigation of anxiety neurosis has shown that actual fear is not as was originally assumed the result of the immediate transformation of pent up libido but is one of the many symptoms of an irritation of the vasovegetative system. Qualitatively this fear is indistinguishable from other forms which affect this system, as the fear in angina pectoris and in nicotin poisoning. Nevertheless the pent up libido is the essential source of actual fear and the expression "libidinous fear" is justified. The discussion of the case with vasomotor symptoms has shown that the characterologic sexual denial as a result of castration fear has caused the libido stasis and therewith the actual fear. Castration fear is the prototype of neurotic fear as shown in the analysis of the hypochondric woman in whom the repressed wish to masturbate formed a constant internal danger, which was feared by the ego. Neurotic fear is fully analogous to actual fear and we have before us the complicated fact that fear may at one time be the cause and at another time the effect of the repression of a sexual impulse claim.

To attempt a revision of the explanation of actual fear it is possible to object that the fear which accompanies cardiac neuroses is actual only. We estimate correctly the importance of the heart for life and do not need to be hypochondriacs to fear for our lives. But there are reasons to oppose to this simple conception of heart fear. If this were sound then we should have fear in infectious endocarditis, in the dyspnoea of fatty heart, after severe bodily exertion, and we know that this is not the case. In other words, we experience heart fear only in a special group of cardiac affections. It is established on the physiological side that typical heart fear is sometimes seen before arrhythmia has reached the threshold of consciousness. Conscious fear of evil could not function under the circumstances. The action of nicotin in the production of fear has been stated in full so that we are thoroughly justified in speaking of a specific heart fear due to a form of irritation. Later, of course, actual fear may be conjoined with it.

The claim that fear during birth is the origin and prototype of all later fear and that neurotic fear is a reanimation of birth fear is open to various objections.

Birth is nothing more than the first occasion for a shock-like irritation of the vasomotor nervous system. We of course have no means of judging whether the new born experiences a fear affect. The common birth and uterine phantasies are not specific for the

fear affect, not more so than fear of castration, of burglars or of death. Birth fear could only be a special case of mobilization of organ narcissistic libido in the vasovegetative system and would then be actual fear.

How is actual fear related to fear of a real danger? While actual fear is the result of an irritation of the vegetative system real fear is itself such an irritation. One turns pale, his heart stands still, there is palpitation, tremor, cold sweats, goose skin on the back, he is paralyzed with fear. It is a reaction which, as Freud says, serves no useful purpose. More purposeful would be running away or fighting the danger.

The sudden appearance of a fearful situation hinders the transfer of energy of self-preservation from the vegetative to the motor system, but this vegetative reaction may be a survival of some protective action as the ink screen of the cuttle fish and the mimicry of many animals which are both vegetative and conservative. There is then a kind of regression to an early phylogenetic stage. Would this conception harmonize with the libido theory? It is necessary to go back here to the primary narcissistic libido, the source of all libidinous strivings. In any situation of danger narcissistic libido is mobilized in the service of self-preservation. Much depends on the kind of danger, whether external or internal.

In real external danger the intellectual system invokes the law, police, etc.; the motor system seeks safety in flight while, as we have seen, the vegetative system has a purposeless reaction of fright, regressing to the primary narcissistic stage.

In real danger from within, resulting from the crowding of prohibited impulse claims, the intellectual system makes use of compulsive neurotic measures such as ceremonies, prohibitions and commands, while the sensorimotor system employs all kinds of hysterical deviation of sexual excitation from the genitals to other organs (conversion).

The analogy of the forms of defense in external and internal danger within the intellectual and motor systems is illuminating. How are the vasovegetative phenomena as a result of shut off sexual excitement and the stasis fear likewise analogous to the biological fright reaction? Is actual fear perhaps a biological reaction to the threat of preservation of the species?

We know that fear is a reaction to danger, just as there are reactions to light waves and sound waves. But the optic nerve can be stimulated by other things besides light, as electrical and thermic stimulation. Hence may not the vegetative apparatus react by fear

even in the absence of danger and from the stimulus of pent up libido which can find no other way out?

If in fright situations narcissistic organ libido is mobilized in the vegetative system this might happen in sexual abstinence. Analysis appears to show that when sexual relations are given up without any other outlet certain patients develop castration fear. In patients with precocious ejaculation castration fear is especially well marked but there is no fear affect so long as the excitement can be led off along the motor paths. Fear affects in other cases disappear so soon as the patients under analysis develop genital sensations, which is possible long before castration fear develops, forcing the conclusion that castration fear attains the affective coloring of fear through somatic libido stasis.

Through the introduction of the fear affect into the discussion one difficulty is removed from the path which crept in with the verbal expression of fear. We do not mean the same affective fact when we say, "I am afraid to undertake a dangerous mountain journey." Fear before the event is something different from fear at the moment of actual danger although there are transitions between. Apprehension may be transformed into fear by thinking of the danger, but the most vivid idea will not be able to produce the fear affect of actual danger. Vivid thinking can elicit vasovegetative phenomena—palpitation, shuddering, vertigo, tremor may be called forth. Conversely the affect which transforms apprehension to fear may be the result of somatic irritation; we are accustomed to think of affects as dependent on somatic-biological processes.

To come closer to the comprehension of fear affects it is advantageous to study the more readily comprehensible sexual and anger affects, these being respectively regarded as manifestations of the sexual instinct and the destructive impulses. The mere idea of a sexual action in the state of nongratification is followed by vasomotor phenomena, genital sensations and sexual requirement. In the condition of gratification, as after an undisturbed sexual act, the same idea of a sexual action does not elicit vasomotor phenomena, pleasurable sensations nor sexual demands. A long period of rest is necessary before the affect is realized. One may think vividly of sexual acts but the affect does not appear, the phantasy is dull and without affective emphasis. The somatic source of the affect is extinguished, the tension is low, both somatic and psychic. Here the organ sensations precede the affect.

This holds good also for the anger affect which falls out the more strongly the more the motor action is suppressed. "Powerless"

rage is the most intense. If one allows his rage a free rein the affect soon loses itself. If it is suppressed the excitement persists, until it is built down through equivalent actions or fanciful deeds. In the long run anger affects are accustomed to being pent up and force themselves into motor discharges, often with inadequate cause. Unless the anger affect can be discharged off vasomotor symptoms appear, as palpitation, vasodilatation, respiratory disturbances, etc.

In sexual excitement, as in rage, the motor inhibition and the stagnation of the excitement in the vasovegetative system determine the affect, while the motor action abolishes it through unburdening the autonomous system. We come to the conclusion that the affect is a psychic manifestation of an excitation of the vasovegetative nervous system and that the psychic idea alone in the absence of somatic excitation can cause the affect.

It is difficult to visualize that an idea should be able to elicit a somatic excitation without the aid of the unconscious. Every idea which pops out in the realm of functions important to life sets libidinous or destructive impulse tendencies in readiness for motor discharge. These impulses cannot obviously become conscious as affects if the body does not vibrate with them. The vasovegetative system is therefore the mediator and this holds good alike in sexual excitement, rage and fear, the three most important of the affects.

What position now does fear take in this series of three as an affect? What advantage to us is the discussion of the love and hate affects for clarifying the problem of fear?

If one think vividly of a sexual act the body behaves as if the act were real and this is also true of rage and of acute hatred. In the woman patient whose case was related who had an anticipation of fear she behaved as if the situation had already been realized. This fear was the result of an infantile experience in which the father came home evenings in bad humor and she had identified herself with the mother for the moment. This apprehension became actual to the extent that the sexual excitement of the time reappeared in the neurosis (the father's ill humor ended with coitus which the patient overheard). The conclusion from a number of analyses is that the psychic affect of vegetative origin is per se not specific and appears as fear affect when neither the libidinous nor the destructive motility is free.

In considering these facts psychic fear appears as a complex formation made up of two principal elements of anticipation of danger and a somatic sensation. Fear of a danger presupposes a narcissistic besetment of the ego and the fear affect shuts off libidinous

and destructive motility. One must not fear, if he would be certain that he can allow his destructive impulses to rage at objects which bring danger. One would have no fear affect if the energy of the life drive sets the primitive life apparatus, the vasovegetative system, in action, as in primitive times. Fear as a biological phenomenon as a result of these relations to the basic instincts, as with sexual desire, lies beyond the possibility of our conception.

V

PSYCHONEUROTIC DESTINY OF THE GENITAL LIBIDO

In the anxiety neurosis and anxiety hysteria the genital excitation has no other fate than to undergo the defense and the blockade of the genital motility. The genital energy itself persists as such. Neither actual fear nor apprehension of castration, whether they come to light as catastrophe fear, hypochondric or incidental fear, are neurotic symptoms in the dynamic sense. Freud's definition of the neurotic symptom emphasizes the fact that it presents a new formation, which is a compromise of the conflict between repressed impulse and repressed moral influence, coming about therefore as a solution of a pathological conflict. This, however, does not square either with actual fear nor the apprehension of castration. As long as fear dominates a neurosis no kind of conflict solution is possible. This can happen only when circumscribed symptoms of conversion hysteria or compulsion neurosis set in, which are able to relieve or diminish the conflict—a binding of the neurotic fear (Freud). One can convince oneself of this in almost every analysis where the symptoms are removed. Compulsive neurotics develop fear when they suppress their compulsive actions. When hysterical vomiting vanishes as a result of transference, phobias and fear dreams appear, mostly with the content of violence. Fear appears also when impulsive characters suppress their sadistic impulses and when homosexuals cease masturbating. The fear set free has always both the character of impulse defense and actual neurotic fear affect.

Fear also appears in place of inhibited sexual excitation and can in turn be replaced by other symptoms. In every case there occurs a plus of psychic function which corresponds to a minus state somewhere else. One must distinguish between: (a) the plus functions which are dynamic in the sense of Freud; fear also belongs here. These disturb the psychic equilibrium through absorption of psychic energy, are subjectively tormenting and socially as well as biologically are unnecessary. (b) The minus functions or functional inhibitions which as symptoms of the neuroses are not compromise formations

but defects of normal functions and result from the using up of energy in the purposeless plus functions. The compulsive brooder complains at the same time of his inability to think. The energy consumed by an agoraphobe certainly fails at any important place in the social relationship and in love functions. Whoever feels himself inferior and as a matter of fact because of this feeling, accomplishes little, wastes his energy which might take from him this feeling, were it free, in reveries of ambition and sexual matters. The disturbances of the genital function jointly present inhibitions of function; they are not, with the exception of vaginismus, symptoms in the dynamic sense—that is, they do not correspond to the disguised gratification of a libidinous impulse stirring.

In this section the task is to point out what other path pent up libido can take if it does not appear as fear affect, and the subject is limited to a concise presentation of hysterical and compulsive neurotic impotence and to a more extended account of genital anesthesia in chronic neurasthenia.

(i) *Conversion Symptom and Hysterical Impotence*

Freud defines conversion as psychic affects diverted to abnormal innervation of organs. Psychic wish ideas also speak through the body organs. But we must not straightway assume the existence of the “leap from psychic to corporeal.” One should reflect that the somatic libido can be concentrated upon one or another erogenous zone for a longer or shorter time through psychic sex interest; also that hysteria disposes abundantly of pent up libido. One may assume in reference to conversion symptoms that the psychic interest is shifted from the genital to some other zone, and that, as has been assumed for hypochondria, somatic libido may accumulate at the site of conversion.

There is really no conversion hysteria without some admixture of fear hysteria. If the entire amount of genital libido cannot be discharged off the uncombined residue appears as fear in the sense of defense fear or stasis fear. In most conversion symptoms there is indeed only some substitute gratification. The latter word should not be understood as a sexual sensation. The genital energy which otherwise causes excitement of the genitals is applied to the pathological innervation of some other organ. The corresponding wish idea—wish does not become conscious any more than the genital sensation—determines the choice of organ.

The conversion process can take place in all of the organs but as a rule prefers those in which there is a special erogenicity or which

are adapted to symbolize the genitals—openings and prominences—and others which have an associative relationship with the genitals. The fewest conversion phenomena occur in the genitals themselves. Here belong the forms of hysterical impotence, the merely functional inhibitions, vaginismus, psychogenic dysmenorrhoea.

Psychogenic amenorrhoea and sterility are not conversion symptoms but mere functional inhibitions as far as they are the immediate expressions of castration fear or the wish for maleness. Sometimes amenorrhoea is part of a pregnancy phantasy. In analysis of many hysterical women the masturbation wish, strongly repressed, appears to consciousness as an itching eczema of the genitals. It is difficult to decide whether we have to do here with conversion or a mere masturbation during sleep, but the probabilities favor the first view.

Contrasted with the genital region are the oral and anal zones and certain cutaneous areas. To the oral belong also the buccal cavity, larynx, pharynx, stomach, bronchi, nose, face, skull and breasts. Corresponding conversion symptoms are hysterical vomiting, globus hystericus, functional pylorospasm, nervous bronchial asthma, mutism, hysterical aphonia, the blushing of erythrophobia and many forms of headache.

Belonging to the anal zone are hysterical obstipation and diarrhoea as expression of genital fear. Belonging to the cutaneous conversion symptoms are urticaria and morbid blushing, also sweating, pallor, etc. These are not necessarily conversion symptoms. Belonging to the muscular system are psychogenic tic as a masturbatory equivalent, astasia-abasia and arc de cercle, the latter symbolic of coitus. These conversions are not necessarily individual manifestations for we see admixtures of oral and anal, etc.

To take up hysterical impotence the special forms are as follows: (i) in both sexes neurotic abstinence due to conscious or readily recognizable unconscious sexual fear or timidity.

Neurasthenic abstinence is to be regarded as a special form of impotence because disturbance of genitality develops sooner or later when these subjects attempt coitus. The neurosis may not be manifest in fact until this impotence is discovered. In girls all attempts to approach the sexual object are bound down with cultural inhibitions which add themselves to older infantile inhibitions. In men impotence fear is often the motive for abstinence. Girls who originate in milieu which encourages sexual repression are seldom conscious of sexual timidity and of its connection with the neurosis. Impotence in the man is closely related to the sexual timidity of women.

It is not easy to recognize the neurotic nature of abstinence. The most credible as well as unreasonable reasons are given to explain the latter. A man will say that he has no chance to attempt coitus, no money to spend for that purpose. His reputation would suffer, he has moral or religious scruples, he fears venereal contagion (one of the commonest reasons) or he does not wish to beget children.

The persistent abstinence of young widows is mostly neurotic. They cannot find new sexual objects, are fixed on the dead partner, etc. Normally the grief over the loss sooner or later subsides.

Absolute abstinence from all sexual indulgence is rare as shown by the results of analysis. Masturbation and the so-called onanistic equivalents are very common.

The impotence in males takes the form of total or partial erectile insufficiency, precocious ejaculation and orgasmic impotence while in women we see vaginal anesthesia or hypoaesthesia and, in every case, orgasmic impotence.

While hysterical women are frigid as far as genital sensations are concerned all other localities which have become genitalized are hyperaesthetic, as the ovaries and breasts, and have no psychical meaning. Despite the vaginal anesthesia the clitoris is often readily excitable and the lightest touch may cause orgasm-like sensations—so that the condition may be confused with orgasmic impotence.

(ii) *Compulsive-Neurotic Impotence*

In the compulsive neurotic the genital conflict is avoided by regression to the anal-sadistic stage of libido development. Genital substitute gratification becomes anal (exaggerated orderliness and cleanliness, the anal ceremonial, etc.). Genitality enters into the service of the destructive impulses. Cohabitation signifies for the aggressive or male compulsive neurotic person a penetration or perforation of the woman. Of the special expressions there are

(a) Abstinence based on ascetic ideology. The sexual act is dirty and beastly (anal-sadistic) but the act is really refused on the sour grapes principle.

(b) Erectile impotence. This is not common among compulsive-neurotics but is more specific when present than in hysteria, where failure of erection is due to castration fear. In the former a taboo on erection exists, from an unconscious murder phantasy in which the phallus symbolizes a weapon. In the dreams of the compulsive the penis is symbolized by weapons—projectile or penetrating.

The stages of development of the two forms of impotence after regression to the anal-sadistic stage are aggression against the father

leading to castration; fear of punishment if this is done; transformation of this fear into sense of guilt. In compulsive neurosis one commonly arrives analytically at castration fear only after discovery of the anal and phallic sadism and after removal of the rationalization of the scorn for sexuality.

(c) This type which is common is characterized by extremely depressed orgasmic potency with good erectile potency. On account of the latter the condition is often overlooked, as shown by the criticism that some neuroses show no sexual anomalies. In many conscientious compulsive neurotics there is a sense of duty towards the wife. One man will have intercourse at regular intervals while one patient used the act frequently merely to keep in practice (but this was merely to make sure of his potency, for after a few frictions he desisted). These patients all have a psychic anesthesia or hypoesthesia and the condition has been termed "pseudopotence" while the patient is said to have only "cold erections." Ejaculation does not occur or at most only after great effort. There is also an anal tendency to hold back the semen (Ferenczi).

The orgasmic impotence of the erectively potent is easy to recognize. There is no concentration on the genitals and the neurotic with the brooding habit continues to brood during the act. He even may have a counting compulsion and count the number of frictions. If ejaculation occur there is no increase of pleasure. Afterward there are fatigue, headache and other manifestations of the neurasthenic syndrome.

While the hysterical character is feminine and the compulsive neurotic character masculine the sex may be reversed and female compulsive neurotics show masculine aggressive qualities.

Analysis reveals the existence of a frigidity in compulsive-neurotic women which is more marked the more compulsive the character. The unconscious wish for a penis of her own is expressed not only in sexual peculiarities but it also influences the masculinity of the ego. Not only would she become a man but without conscious effort she assumes male characteristics and ideals. The father identification does not stop at the ideal ego but goes over to the ego proper, while the mother identification in the same undergoes atrophy. There is a marked homosexual striving. The converse is seen in the hystericals who exaggerate their femininity and suffer merely from coitus (castration) fear. The compulsive neurotic denies her femaleness and compensates by exaggerating maleness. She does not refuse man as a sex object but strives constantly to uphold her masculine qualities. Her mostly unconscious wish is to rob the husband of

his penis, partly to own it herself, partly to get it out of the way so that it can no longer attract her suppressed feminine striving.

While the sadism of the male compulsive neurotic often retains its phallic character, in the majority of women it is of the anal type, as shown by crushing, treading on, bruising, striking the nates.

It is clear that this characterologic system of the compulsive-neurotic woman presents merely a reactive building over of her femininity, as shown by the alteration in character during the analysis; the feminine passive libido transference somewhat resembles that of hysteria. But the defense reaction is not one of fear but hatred until at some place the female demeanor comes unmistakably and undeniably to the fore.

Usually this new phase is ushered in with hysteriform fear, this indicating that the compulsive neurosis is beginning to change into hysteria; in other words the old regression process is made retrograde and thereby infantile fear hysteria is again activated. Dynamically expressed fear has set itself free from the symptoms with which it has been associated. Further characteristics of this transformation are spontaneously appearing genital sensations from which the patient shrinks; meaning that genital fear, of which previously very little had been felt, likewise appears on the scene. In place of the intent to annihilate now aroused against the genital instinct, therefore a danger-bringing object, the defense of the impulse itself replaces it and the object may remain, is accepted. With the analytic discharge of the genital fear as separated from the compulsive symptoms the therapeutic task is over.

(iii) *Genital Asthenia of Chronic Hypochondric Neurasthenia*

In a little work on chronic hypochondric neurasthenia recently published the author attempted to separate from compulsive neurosis a group of diseases which showed departures in the character, symptoms and form of disturbance of potency. These are summed up in the term "genital asthenia," a condition never seen in hysteria or compulsion neurosis but characteristic of chronic hypochondric neurasthenia.

A very long record of the analysis of a single case shows that this was very successful in laying bare even in the smallest details the sexual activities and phantasies of early childhood. The patient was a man of twenty-nine. For a long period there was nothing to show that phallus erotism had played any particular rôle or had served in any way in object besetment. Urinary erotism was inferior to anal erotism but was distinctly evident in precocious ejaculation

and hallucinations of urinous smells. It may be added that as a child the patient liked to be in the bathroom and play with water. This attachment to the genital position was however elaborated with anal and urethral tendencies.

It became evident that the patient phantasied himself as the object of urethral relationships. Among the recollections which popped out in the course of analysis the impression made on him by the milking of cows played a great rôle. The udder was made equivalent to the penis and this led to phantasies of sucking the breasts of women. His own penis was likened to the breast and semen and urine with milk. Mere contact with women caused an escape of semen although with flaccid penis. The patient gave a long history of masturbation, pollutions and genital weakness.

To reconstruct the history of the neurosis from the analysis and personal history he came from a family with familial obstipation, hence with anal anlage. The anality of the patient did not pass off and there was also a special anal fixation on the mother, which was repressed. To the anal erotism were later added oral and urethral erotism, which maintained the fixation on the maternal breast. There were many phantasies of eating feces, kissing the female genitals, etc. Urethral erotism persisted as precocious ejaculation and dribbling of urine and semen. These infantile impulses which were counter to the masculine-phallic direction led to infantilism and feminism. As a further inhibition of development, the genital erotism before it could fully evolve was suppressed through the reprimands of his brother and by certain pains in the testicles. Thus the way to an effective phallic identification with the father was cut off and fixation on and identification with the mother developed undisturbed.

To this mother identification in the ego there was, however, added a father identification which arose from two tendencies. On one hand the prohibitive demands of the strict father (also brother—prohibition of masturbation) were received into the ego and had done most of the work of repression. On the other hand the character of the patient had developed in contrast with that of the father, which has been designated elsewhere as a reactive formation of the super-ego. This came about as a favor to the mother who had always taken the patient's part. These tendencies can be readily realized for they conform to the patient's infantilism and feminism. It was different with the positive father identification. The patient respected his brother and his considerate friends and even wished to be like them. The wishes which his ideal ego fetched from this source

were destined to remain unrealized and gave origin to feelings of inferiority. For to realize his positively directed, masculine ego ideals required a strong genital libido which was undeveloped in him. The positive father identification followed therefore only in the super-ego.

It was not apparent in this patient why his curve of puberty ran so flat and whether the peculiar formation in inhibiting the libido had worked on the genital apparatus. The fact is that the phenomena of puberty which usually appear between the twelfth and fourteenth year did not set in until the twenty-second year. At this period he began to masturbate but with pregenital phantasies, strong feelings of guilt and apprehensions which led to restriction. Spermatorrhoea and dribbling of urine may be interpreted as the result of somatic irritation which remained undischarged; the expression of the fact that the phantasies of the patient led to discharge of the excitation without orgasm.

This patient as a result of somatic sexual excitement and the requirements of the masculine ego ideal requirements sought a woman but at once encountered the pregenital fixation. He was then twenty-five years old. He was impotent, pressed his flaccid penis against her and had an escape of semen. He had never had an erection and after his loss of semen turned his back completely on the woman. Under analysis he had lost his obstipation and headache, also an oppression in the chest. He also lost the dribbling of semen and urine and no longer had the pollutions on contact with women. In the fourteenth month of the analysis he succeeded twice in coitus after becoming conscious of the castration scene. He still suffered, however, from psychic genital weakness and had no real desire for coitus. Analysis could not create that which was never developed. The psychogenital asthenia was the cause of anesthesia of the genital apparatus, as expressed in his severe precocious ejaculation. The libido structure of this disturbance of potency is characteristic of the severe types of chronic neurasthenia.

b. *Genital Asthenia; Two Forms of Precocious Ejaculation*

It is the service of Abraham to have explained the nature of ejaculatio praecox. The name only signifies that in certain forms of impotence the semen escapes prematurely. Abraham showed that this condition is a micturition and patients are devoted to the pleasure of passive escape. Abraham also cites the following as characteristic:

- (i) the libido of these patients lacks energetic masculine activity;
- (ii) the genital zone has not become a conducting zone;

- (iii) the surface of the glans is defectively excitable;
- (iv) the genitals are often overexcitable, which is a sign of weakness; erection, immission, and friction are absent.
- (v) there is a special erogenicity of the perineum and back of the scrotum.
- (vi) The pleasurable sensations are localized in the posterior portion of the urethra. From the characterological angle such patients are either flabby, without energy, passive, unmanly, or erethetic, always in haste. Occasionally from resistance to specific male performances there is the wish to take over the feminine rôle. In many the desire for coitus and erective potency are present, but the erection subsides soon after or even before immission.

Abraham has shown that these patients have not reached the normal male attitude to women, but have rather remained fixed at the stage of narcissism. To this is added a constitutionally strong urethral erotism which overvalues the penis as a urinary passage.

Personal research appears to show that Abraham is correct in distinguishing between two forms of precocious ejaculation, which differ both in genesis and prognosis. They may be contrasted as follows:

1. The condition may have been present from the first or may not appear until after a period of relative potency.
2. The escape of semen may precede or follow immission.
3. The precocious ejaculation may be continuous or in jets.
4. The penis during ejaculation may be flaccid or rigid.
5. Penile anesthesia may be external, on the surface of the glans, or internal, in the urethra.
6. In the sexual phantasies, whether conscious or unconscious, there is the idea of penetration of the penis into the vagina with or without pleasure; while in the other form there are pregenital phantasies of cuddling women, kissing their breasts, etc. It is not to be understood that all cases are thus sharply differentiated throughout, but there is a marked tendency in this direction. Ejaculation outside the vagina is associated with continuous escape of semen, etc., etc.

Deviations from this order are also seen, especially ejaculation outside the vagina with penis erect. The differences are based on difference in the structure of the libido. One may term the two types the mild and severe, rather than speak of differences in kind. In the mild form the stage of development represented is the urethral-genital; in the severe form the anal-urethral. Common to both is urethral erotism.

The presence of pure genital libido is shown in the capacity for erection; the superior excitability of the glans; phantasies of coitus; the character—in the mild form the patient is active and aggressive as a male, sometimes actively homosexual, and the disorder appears after previous potency.

If the genital component is absent the patient has never been potent; heterosexual phantasies are either absent or inferior to pre-genital ones; the excitability of the glans is absent or weak; the seat of pleasure is in the urethra and perineum; erection is absent or at once followed by collapse; the character of the patient is passive-feminine.

The severe form is due to primary pregenital fixation; the milder to regression to the genital incest wish. In precocious ejaculation the genital stage is concerned with normal genital fixation to the mother from fear of castration. A strong phallic identification with the father prevents further regression. In many cases castration fear for the mother is present as fear of the dangerous object in the vagina (the penis of the father); or there is the inhibiting idea that the vagina is armed with teeth which can bite off the penis. The pleasure in urination serves genital and exhibitionistic tendencies. The dribbling of the semen or even the escape in jets may be the expression of this fear, expressed by one patient as "fear to trust oneself in the lion's den." Many have this fear consciously. Children react to fear and fright by diarrhea or involuntary loss of urine. Behind the father identification which stamps the character with masculine activity may sometimes be seen a mother identification at the genital stage.

At the anal stage the libido structure differs notably from the urethral. There is mostly an arrest of development and primary fixation at the anal-urethral stage with or without partial activation of the phallic phase. It is extremely rare to find total regression from the genital to the anal stage. With regression the genital father identification gives way to an anal mother identification. The genital wish usually gives way to a urethral relationship to the mother and a passive anal one in the father. The patient is usually unconscious of the urethral and anal gratification.

The urine is retained and urination with a filled bladder is said to be pleasurable. The urinary function is beset with anal qualities. Defecation is pleasurable and the patient spends a long time in the closet, voiding the feces slowly and piecemeal. Patients may go a week or more without stool and then extract the hard feces with the finger. Sometimes genital libido and the wish to copulate have been fully satisfied by defecation.

In the treatment of precocious ejaculation of the genital form it is necessary first to remove the incest wish and castration fear. In the anal form the patient must first give up the profits of anal and urethral pleasure. If a strong genitality can be freed from its repression the struggle between pregenital and genital libido may turn out fortunately.

It should be emphasized that the mother identification stands in the way of recovery. This is the strongest characterological obstacle because it stands in association with the punishment requirement toward the father. The formula is, "I am guilty toward my father and may not be like him or act like him but must expiate my guilt by devotion to him." The sense of guilt toward the father exists also in the genital form. Here vanishes the most important factor in the pregenital pleasure gain, which otherwise is frequently connected with masochistic phantasies and the feeling of guilt is beset with anal libido which from the therapeutic standpoint is especially disadvantageous.

Identification with the mother often contains a further determinant of precocious ejaculation. The penis in the phantasy becomes the breast, and the semen the milk. The penis is extended to the woman just as the breast is extended to the child. In phantasy and in forepleasure the wish typically appears of pressing oneself against the woman, of cuddling her, etc. In the worst cases the semen dribbles away at the time. The patient makes a double play; after he has given up his masculine rôle, or if he has never assumed it, he gives himself to the woman (mother) as a child and craves the breast; there is a phantasy of sucking the breast which is typical of such cases. In the second place he plays the mother who gives her breast to the child. Suction on the breast supplements the escape of semen. In one patient who sucked the breast of his woman friend the semen escaped at the same time. In dribbling of semen there is unconsciously associated the phantasy of milk flowing from the penis as a symbol of the breast.

To the urologist precocious ejaculation means an overexcitability of the genitals determined by persistent hyperemia of the genitals and prostatic hypertrophy. It is possible that this hyperemia is itself the result of the peculiar means of gratification. Under normal conditions the genitals during the act of forepleasure are hyperemic, this acute hyperemia subsiding after orgasm. Genital asthenics as a result of their mode of gratification have orgasmic impotence which determines a persistent urge to sexual irritation and continuous hyperemia. Thus originally psychogenic, this hyperemia become chronic can determine permanent somatic alterations.

In genital precocious ejaculation genital gratification remains the essential purpose. Those who suffer from the severe form renounce coitus, the forepleasure being the chief object. Since the penis has ceased to be the expression and apparatus of masculinity, it is represented ideally as the breast in the service of the unconsciously willed femininity.

Genital asthenia is the result of overflowing the genitals with pre-genital libido and should be separated from other forms of impotence in which genital impulses are centered on the genitals but are inhibited. The unconscious basic formula of impotence in genital asthenia is, "I will not have sexual intercourse but will utilize my genitals in some other manner"; but in simple impotence the formula is, "I will have sexual intercourse but do not because I fear some danger."

The result of pregenital activity of the genitals is that those amounts of excitement which can be led off only in the genital orgasm work themselves out elsewhere in the body and in this way we see develop persistent sexual irritation and hypochondric disorders. These are not imaginative conceits as is thought by physicians who are only oriented somatically, but, as has been shown by Freud and others, are well founded physical disturbances.

The fact that neurasthenics have developed a specifically formed character by reason of genital asthenia and orgasmic impotence shows the great importance which the study of the neuroses has for the lore of character. In analyzing such patients we perceive that there is no psychic excitement without somatic resonance, while no somatic process occurs without a psychic reaction. The actual neuroses seem to point out to us the way man must go if he would arrive at the common biological basis for somatic and psychic reactions.

VI

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC GENITAL THEORY

Psychology, before the time of psychoanalysis, could not formulate the problem of the development of the genital tendencies, because it was entangled in the prejudice that the sexual instinct was something that was first heard of in puberty, when it awakened in response to certain somatic developmental processes. Psychically, it then appeared all at once not only as an internal impulse but also as a will directed against an object of the opposite sex in the external world. Freud for the first time distinguished between the aim and the object of the impulse and showed that there were pregenital stages of sexual development. In the early years of life the libido runs through these

stages before it comes under the primacy of the genital stage. The question now arose as to whether the pregenital forms of sexual requirement are detached entirely from the genital or play a rôle in the formation of the latter. Incidentally this involves a study of the development of physiologic irritability of the genitally erogenous zones and the possible participation of psychic infantile attitudes and experiences, the motives behind the choice of a heterosexual object, etc. Of the several subordinate problems involved the first concerns the appearance of the impulse aim or the genital excitation, the second the development of psychogenital object love, and the third the genetic connection which subsists between the two (reciprocal relations between impulse and experience).

Freud at the outset believed that before puberty there was no genital primacy and that at that period pregenital partial impulses were comprehended under genital primacy. Later he corrected this view. Genital primacy is present even in childhood in the so-called phallic phase of libido development and in the same fashion. In man it forms penis pride as the most powerful principle of masculine self-consciousness. In woman we see penis envy and sense of inferiority with its compensations. The alternative is male genitals or castration. With the completion of the development at the time of puberty sexual polarity coincides with male and female. The boy retains the tendencies of this stage while the girl has the task, after the establishment of the relative inferiority of the clitoris, of mobilizing other erogenous qualities for the production of vaginal primacy and shifting clitoris erotism to the vagina; a process which is finally completed only under favorable conditions of development and not until after puberty. According to the unanimous views of a number of authors the vagina plays no part as erogenous zone in childhood. In analyses of women one finds no hint of vaginal masturbation in childhood save in cases where at an early period coitus-like manipulations are carried out and in this way the vagina is discovered to be an organ of pleasure.

Freud has recently published a paper on certain psychic consequences of the anatomical differences in the sexes in which he discusses the manner in which a girl who has been fixed on the mother in the genital phase can turn later to the father. When a boy has this union with the mother the status is simpler, for he does not have to change his original object. As causes of the change in the girl Freud adduces the following: (i) There is often jealousy over another child in the family; (ii) the mother is made responsible for lack of a penis; (iii) women bear masturbation poorly and we may

assume that this pleasurable activity is injured by the narcissistic insult of absence of penis, through the warning that she cannot try conclusions with the boy on this score and on that account gives up thoughts of rivalry. The girl gives up the wish for the penis for the wish for a child in its place, and with this intent takes the father as love object. The castration complex introduces to the girl the Oedipus complex, while in the case of the boy this perishes in castration fear. Freud does not decide as to whether this is a universal explanation or was merely present in the few cases analyzed by him. But although the experiences described are typical for the little girl and must be reckoned with the normal conditions of female sexual development, they apparently do not sufficiently account for the later attitude of the woman to the man.

Before certain analytical results are adduced the views of Rank may be discussed, as found in his recent work on the genesis of genitality. Both sexes are originally orally fixed on the mother (the breast). The normal end situation is that the girl vaginally craves the male penis and the boy phallically craves the vagina of the woman. The girl has the simpler status, as playing with the nipple in nursing masturbation extends to the clitoris, and through pleasure sucking of the thumb the breast is replaced by the penis. Oral libido is therefore transferred to the genitals, the penis takes over the rôle of the breast, the vagina that of the mouth, so that the end situation is quite analogous to the original one.

With the boy it is otherwise; the thumb which replaces the nipple is relieved by the hollow of the hand in playing with the penis; the hand replaces the mouth and at maturity the semen replaces the milk, so that masturbation becomes a full equivalent of nursing at the narcissistic stage of genitality.

It is not entirely clear what is meant by Rank in this last passage, for he is presumably speaking of normal development, yet the end result is met with in many neurotics and should be in contrast with a normal outcome. Analysis of libido displacement in chronic neurasthenia shows that the severest defects in male potency come about when the penis is a full substitute for the maternal breast and the semen the same for the milk. Further study of Rank's test shows an inaccuracy of terminology. The sexual development of many neuroses and perversions is distinguished from the normal in that too much oral, sadistic, and other libido is taken along to the genital stage. Otherwise stated, a fixation of the libido at the oral or sadistic stage respectively is present. For the normal sexual development the question must run, How much libidinous interest is withdrawn from pre-

genital zones and applied to the genital? And further, Under what conditions can the genital libido unfold itself relatively free from admixture of pregenital tendencies? We can see the difference in the problem situation itself, for Rank asks how genitality can originate in pregenital zones, and the opposed question is, How can genital libido evolve undisturbed by the influence of pregenital libido?

In the frame of psychologic analysis which dare transcend the individual only when driven by necessity, there is required a rigid distinction between the development of impulses and the development of relations to the external world. These indeed rest on impulsive attitudes but present also a higher stage of impulse development, and moreover, depend in the first rank from the experiences themselves. The genesis of genitality can mean the origin of the genital impulse, the origin of the genital object love and object choice.

Rank has the notion that phallic erotism is reducible and not a psychologic ultimatum. Erection, he states, is the visible sign of potency, and should be a transitory conversion symptom of sadistic-oral libido. It is not clearly perceptible how genital erotism requires a psychogenetic explanation any more than oral and anal erotism. Freud has said that phallic erotism comes about from the failure of anal gratifications which have to do with cleanliness procedures and the external and internal stimuli concerned in the same. To these speculative considerations may be added the numerous clinical experiences that the erection fails or the gratification is slight, as in compulsive neurosis, when the phallus steps into the service of oral or sadistic tendencies.

Quite the same objections apply to the efforts of many analysts to interpret the sexual act. Rank thinks that the normal sexual act should be not only a substitute but at the same time a sadistic revenge for the failure of oral gratification at the maternal breast. Should the normal sexual act really be only a substitute and an act of revenge? It is not pertinent to place the sexual enjoyment of the woman in the sexual act as a high point of masochistic experience. The claim has even been made that the high point of sexual enjoyment in woman is experienced in the act of labor, but there is no clinical justification for such conclusions, for the type of vaginal-masochistic patient is invariably sexually shy and anesthetic when it comes to coitus, and the more sane view is that the high point of gratification for woman in the sexual act lies in the vaginal orgasm.

Two kinds of error are involved in such interpretations of facts. First, associations are too readily found between conditions encountered in severe disease and in normal functions; no attention being

given to the amount, intensity and form of impulse life. Second, identity is often concluded from mere analogy. In analysis the words "is" and "signifies" are employed improperly. For example, normal intercourse "is" or "signifies" a regression into the maternal body. The word "is" in this connection is certainly employed wrongly. If "signifies" is used this could mean that the individual concerned consciously wishes for copulation but unconsciously seeks a return to the womb. In such an interpretation one may refer to the archaic unconscious and in such a case we imply a transference from the pathological to the normal. An impotent man may mean a return to the womb if he has a coitus dream, but if he dream of crawling into a hole he surely means coitus and also if he is fleeing from castration into the maternal body. But what is overlooked is the important fact that he is impotent because for him coitus is not merely or especially the gratification of autochthonous genitality in the forepleasure and the end-pleasure, but the gratification of the longing for the maternal body, the oral libido, the sadism, etc. It is now a safe assumption that the genital wish is regressively replaced through pregenital wishes and longing for the maternal body when as a result of castration fear genital gratification is refused.

Ferenczi, in his genital theory, places the bioanalytic interpretation of coitus in lieu of the individual-psychological. This in theory is without objection. A portion of speculatively obtained conceptions may be clinically confirmed—that ejaculation corresponds to the biologic autotomy of an organ which is the seat of pain or tension. For the healthy individual ejaculation is no castration, but for many neurotics the orgasm signifies a danger and they are disturbed by it. The normal feeling of "losing oneself" in orgasm can only come about when one is free from castration fear.

Another of Ferenczi's assumptions which concerns the composition of genitality requires more thorough discussion. This author seeks to visualize the process of friction and ejaculation as the result of an amphimixis of anal and urethral impulsive force. Ejaculation is a urethral process and prolongation of friction time through retention of the semen an anal process. In the struggle between the will to give and the will to retain urethral erotism normally wins. In precocious ejaculation the same factor prevails from the start, while in ejaculatory impotence anal endeavor wins. To secure normal ejaculatory potency a balance must be struck between the two factors. It can, of course, be objected that ejaculation can be explained completely as the result of a reflex process involving the spinal center which has been set in motion through friction as a sensory stimulus.

Friction, however, is no more amenable to a psychologic explanation than the scratching of an itching cutaneous area, unless one tries to interpret physiology in terms of psychology. In general, experience teaches that the genital function can only be deranged by nongenital factors. If Ferenczi is right, there must be some displacement of anal and urethral qualities upon the genital in order that normal genital function come about.

If one investigates analytically the normal genital functions of men who are orgasmically potent, one finds along with phallic object love, which is expressed unequivocally, numerous more or less intensive tendencies, which are known to us from the analyses of the impotent, together with pregenital and sadistic wishes and longing for the womb. Can one from these alone draw conclusions as to the genesis of a process or the sense of a function?

One certainly could not, for to the original tendencies many others could be added secondarily. When in analysis of the healthy, sadistic or oral tendencies strengthen themselves, the genital function suffers and undoubtedly from this cause. Normally the genital erotism admits of no limitation from the super-ego, from the standpoint of which the genitality may be tolerated or even approved but in no sense refused. It may readily be established by comparison that the fine distinction between mere toleration and approbation of genital gratification by the super-ego is expressed in the intensity of the terminal pleasure and in the total attitude to the sexual object as well as in questions of sexuality. Pregenital erotism participates in the gratification of forepleasure and end-pleasure in contradistinction to normal genitality. Should such pregenital claims be excluded by repression or mere defense from participation in genital gratification they suffer more or less according to the intensity of the incitation concerned and the defense experienced. What is the motive of this refusal?

It is improbable that the pregenital claims and others which do not belong to genitality should participate uninfluenced by the genital tendency in the general sexual gratification. This at once becomes clear if one thinks of the essential impulse aims which must be altered in the sexual act in order that they do not disturb the ego. The kiss which precedes the sexual act gratifies oral libido; its original aim was nursing and kissing raises it to the genital stage of gratification. The change from nursing to kissing may be ascribed without doubt to the influence of genital and oral erotism, shown best by the "tongue kiss." A contrary influence may be assumed if in the forepleasure acts the mouth comes in contact with the partner's genitals.

Between such casual acts and actual perverse practices there are all gradations. Anality may be elevated to the genital stage by normal coitus from behind and by olfactory erotism, and this is also the case with sadism in man and masochism in woman, illustrating respectively male aggressiveness and female passiveness. Urethral erotism, by reason of its genetic relationship to genitality in the ejaculation, seems able to take full part in the gratification. The pathologic extreme is the ejaculation outside the vagina with flaccid penis, and here urethral erotism exclusively besets the genitals.

Subordination of the pregenital claims to the genital primacy in the phallic phase of libido development determines also a qualitative alteration of the partial impulse which is to be ascribed to the phallic character of the libido and to the influences of the super-ego now in process of formation. It may be the case that one or another pregenital stirring remains excluded from genitalization by reason of partial fixation and isolated repression; either in the course of the development of sexual activities at the time of puberty or by a later regression, and is not admitted to genital gratification. Such isolation or partial repression respectively conceals within itself two sorts of danger. In the first place, a larger or smaller amount of libido is excluded from gratification and is pent up; and the necessary counter-besetment weakens the harmony of sexual existence. Second, the repressed impulse works constantly to attract other tendencies and becomes thereby a lurking place for tabooed wishes. From this germ, given appropriate causes, a neurosis may develop. Thus compulsive neurotics who are erectively potent may strongly taboo any other position than that of normal coitus.

The repressed impulse claim could probably not generate a neurosis alone, but only when the general weakening of genital gratification and the resulting libido stasis were added. In this respect that taboo is especially dangerous which involves manipulations which cohere with the masturbatory activity of the one concerned. Particularly typical is the taboo raised against the reciprocal contact of the genitals. In such cases an important fragment of genitality is itself excluded from gratification; this prejudices not alone the gratification but readily produces vaginal anesthesia in women and in men an extensive loss of pleasure in the act and sometimes weakening of erective potency.

In regard to the heterosexual object choice, that of boys stands in no kind of opposition to the impulse aims of the different stages of the libido. The aim of the oral as well as the sadistic, urethral and phallic stages is the object which from birth stands in closest prox-

imity—the mother, adapted in the sense of an individual and biological purposeful sexual attitude in later life. The change of erogenous relationships to this object is no longer a problem, as has been shown in earlier passages.

In regard to the heterosexual object of girls two partially opposed views are to be found in psychoanalytic literature. One is advocated by Freud and H. Deutsch and is to the effect that the womanliness of puberty and its preparatory stages is formed reactively from the love attitude of the little girl to the father; in other words, she first develops along the line of activity and maleness and only goes over to femaleness later. As a result of analytic experience Mrs. Horney represents the view that denial of the child wish in the genesis of the female castration complex, penis envy and wish for maleness plays a major rôle.

From last accounts Freud did not seem to hold his opinions with the same degree of certainty. Study of the writings of H. Deutsch gives one the impression that in her opinion, at least, penis envy is the original motive of all feminine attitudes—the child is the substitute for the penis and sexual pleasure of women in coitus is the result of identification with the man. It is not possible to come to a universally applicable decision to the question of priority between child wish and female passiveness and penis wish and male activity.

The views of Freud and Deutsch are sustained by the fact that a vaginal organization, which later becomes the foundation of affirmative femininity, does not exist in childhood. Clitoris masturbation in the Oedipus age and at puberty belongs to the typical finds and penis wish is always encountered, although it does not in all cases play a pathological rôle. Analysis has shown that penis wish is not identical with wish for maleness. The latter may occur without the former, but the converse is not true. The maleness complex of woman is the characterologic expression of the penis wish and can come about only if an identification with man (father) has taken place in the ego. This is mostly so in female compulsive neuroses, while in hysteria the penis wish is usually without essential influence on the female and maternal attitude and expresses itself in individual symptoms.

Analysis of the development of heterosexual object love in different types of frigid women shows that it depends less on clitoris erotism and penis wish than on external conditions to which the identifications are subject.

In many women who refuse men and heterosexuality and exhibit an emphatic masculine behavior, the conduct of the father had led

to a precocious and complete identification with him. They have experienced too little love and friendliness from the mostly strict, repellent, cold, or at times even brutal father. In their sadistic phantasies they themselves seem to have these qualities, which stand in unusual contrast with the contempt with which they regard brutal men. If in such cases the positive transference has become very strong in the analysis there pop up from the deeper strata of the unconscious, in correspondence with an earlier stage of libido development, child wishes and the tendency to feminine devotion to the physician as father. Such cases, the analysis of which was carried up to the limit of the age of recollection, had lived through the primitive scene in full mother identification and the age could be shown in which the father identification originated and overlay the mother identification, excluding it from the formation of the character. In the production of the father identification the primitive scene played an important rôle in so far as the brutal conduct of the father was fitted fully to the brawl scene which the girl overheard in the night; from which she obtained the idea that the mother was beaten, injured and castrated. When she turned from the father, which had as a result the giving up of the mother identification and the introjection of the renounced father, the Oedipus situation was closed. As she identified herself with the mother in the primitive scene, fear of castration can have been the sole motive in giving up the father. This showed itself also in the positive therapeutic reaction of such patients. When her mother identification caused by the positive transference began to stir, there popped up in night and day dreams masochistically colored coitus phantasies which were at first warded off with an acute strengthening of masculinity and hatred of man. The deepest motive of this defense is plainly genital fear. Hence such women, who have previously only tolerated coitus, no longer endure it, and fear, with or without fear affect, that in indulging something or other will happen to them. It is not difficult to understand the fear of the loss of the penis, for after the production of the father identification the wish to possess a penis is transformed to an unconscious phantasy that they really do possess one (case of a woman who urinated standing like a man). But what one has, that he will fear to lose. It is more difficult to understand castration fear before the production of father identification. At that time there is only the penis wish which excludes castration fear in the narrower sense but not the fear through which the already damaged genitals will be further injured. A residue remains—the clitoris, concerning which many girls believe that it will be the seat of an after growth

which will also procure pleasure. Despite this, the expression, genital fear, seems preferable in woman to castration fear, bearing in mind the psychological data.

The father identification in the ego which characterologically produces the maleness complex was the consequence of the renunciation of love experienced by the girl from her father, and not—or at least not directly—of the penis wish. The latter exists at first for itself alone and independently of mother identification and does not engage in conflict until it runs up against the barrier of external renunciation. Only through the father identification which was the consequence of purely externally determined experiences does it arrive at the power, which will be seen later to effect the character and symptoms.

That the penis wish does not always lead to maleness follows from a comparison of such patients with one another, who have never developed a masculine character and have always been feminine, showing maternal qualities at times despite hysteria which depends on a mother identification in the ego. The "push of activity" described by Deutsch as occurring in puberty was a transitory phenomenon and was unable to alter the feminine basis of personality in any notable fashion.

Analysis of the development of object relations shows also here the greatest significance which the real conduct and character of the father has for the development and maintenance of femininity. Without being feminine himself and not subject to the mother, the father brought toward the daughter much aim-inhibited love, so that to the internal renunciation none so grossly external was added as in the type formerly described; so that the occasion to a total father identification vanished. The mother identification could also remain, for the object love was satisfied, at least in a tender respect. That which failed for the complete confirmation was the vaginal erotic basis which could not come about because of neurotic conflicts. Among these, in contrast to the type first described, the heterosexual sensuality of which was wrecked in genital fear, the incest aversion and sense of guilt toward the mother played the most important rôle. In severe hysteria is indeed added a violent coitus fear (genital fear). Clitoris masturbation and penis wish belong, however, also in these cases to the typical finds. What makes the distinction between these two types? It may be established by comparison that in the compulsive-neurotic-masculine type clitoris masturbation begins with active homosexual phantasies; while the hysterical-feminine with heterosexual phantasies is very often ushered in with masochistic coitus ideas.

From these facts it is possible to compose the seeming differences in the views of Freud and Deutsch on one side and other writers including Mrs. Horney and the author. The first named hold that the phallic-masculine libido is first evolved, the others that that psychic attitude of the little girl to her father which is the preliminary stage of the later feminine attitude, is the first to develop. Female sexual development therefore becomes complicated by the fact that the little girl craves the father at first with a male organ (phantasies of coitus with clitoris orgasms). This visualization does not exclude the view that the organ libido of woman is at first masculine while the psychic attitude is nearly always and normally feminine or like that of later womanliness.

It may happen wholly by chance whether the girl first discovers the penis in her playfellows or brothers or on the occasion of the birth of a child first acquires the child wish. It is also very questionable whether the comparison of the genitals, before the genital phase, is active in the direction of a castration complex; to this undoubtedly pertains the possibility that the genitals are found to be the source of pleasure and are narcissistically beset. It is more important that the penis wish and the child wish—both as roots of extreme attitudes—agree so well for so long a time and exist side by side without exerting reciprocal influence until the individually very dissimilar destinies in the Oedipus period produce the equation of penis equals child in this or that direction, and the girl emerges from the Oedipus conflict with the masculinity complex or with mother identification. In this process the already activated clitoris eroticism plays no specific rôle.

If the Oedipus phase of the girl is concluded characterologically with a mother identification, this harmonizes with the clitoris erotism only to the time of puberty. After the old conflict has again become acute it finally succumbs in favor of the masculinity complex unless it is placed on the foundation of vaginal primacy.

The question of how the vaginal primacy comes about is an unsolved problem in important points. Freud in his original articles on the sexual theory held that clitoris erotism is normally displaced at puberty into the vagina without expressing himself as to the mechanisms of this transference. Comparative studies have since brought out that the most important factor in the displacement is the mother characterologic identification in the ego. Despite this psychic attitude we must ask how the phallic clitoris erotism can be changed into the receptive erotism of the vagina; for a mere shift without such transformation would be hard to visualize.

Jekel is probably the first to bring anality into causal relationship with vaginal erotism by reason of the receptive quality (cavity) which they have in common. The same view was later upheld by Ferenczi and Andreas-Salome. Deutsch adds that in addition to anal, the vagina can take over oral receptive qualities. It may be shown phenomenologically that the vagina has a suctional activity. In a study of the disturbances of the orgasm in woman there resulted not only corroboration of the views already cited but the conclusion was inevitable that only the displacement of anal and oral libido to the vagina made possible the indispensable shift of clitoris erotism as the keystone in the upbuilding of the vaginal primacy.

In these displacements it is probably not a matter of a physiological process but of transpositions of psychic-libidinous interests. The vagina has its own physiologic erogenicity, which cannot come into view as long as the clitoris with its strong psychic besetment and physiological erogenicity is first strongly entrenched. However, should oral receptive and anal passive libidinous interest beset the vaginal tract—which is possible through mother identification—the clitoris loses more or less in psychic interest. At the same time its physiological excitability does not disappear for it plays an important rôle in forepleasure actions and in coitus itself. The interest in the production of excitement in this organ is diminished as soon as the new source of pleasure is found in the vagina, one which can satisfy all claims of the libido which correspond to the biological sexual rôle, and, in contrast to clitoris erotism, causes no psychic conflict.

To sum up the concepts of genitality, three fundamental elements must be differentiated:

- i. The local erogenicity of the genital zone (genital excitability).
- ii. The somatic libido centered in the genitals (genital urge).
- iii. The psychogenital libido (genital yearning).

The above stand in a close reciprocal relationship although they have different foundations. Genital erogenicity depends on the specific irritability of the genital organs of pleasure. The psychogenital libido as a special instance of psychosexual energy depends on genital erogenicity and according to its nature is the expression of a devotion of general psychic sexual interest to the genital zone. Its seat is in the vegetative nervous system, its source in the processes of internal secretion. The orgasm is guaranteed only when a well built up psychogenital effort can concentrate the somatic sexual excitement undisturbed on the genital zone.

Every disturbance of any one of the three elements of genitality

is a factor in determining orgasmic impotence and somatic libido stasis; hence perhaps when the perception of the genital stimulus becomes repressed, or when the psychic genital libido is shifted to another erogenous zone, or when as a result of defectively developed psychogenitality, pregenital libido besets the genitals. In all of these cases the flow of somatic sexual excitement suffers.

Under the many possibilities which stand open to the pent up libido (formation of stasis fear, conversion symptoms, compulsive symptoms) strengthening of the destructive impulse has a significance previously little appreciated. This is taken up in the following section.

VII

THE DEPENDENCE OF THE DESTRUCTIVE IMPULSE ON THE LIBIDO STASIS

In the novel "*Le Disciple*" by Bourget a pair of lovers who for neurotic reasons declined to indulge in the sexual act resolved to commit suicide, after having first indulged. The man, who obtained gratification, wished to live, but the woman who remained cold, killed herself. This is something more than the phantasy of a poet, and the question suggests itself, "does the destructive impulse assert itself because of ungratified sexual impulse? Freud has recognized the existence of but two primary impulses—the sexual (love) and the destructive (hate)—which are polar to each other yet are also visible in the ambivalence of most psychic attitudes. What is the relation between the two and how may one influence the other? It is easy to show that the intensity of the destructive impulse (in its forms of manifestation—hate, aggressiveness, brutality, sadism) depends on the condition at the time of sexual gratification and the strength of the somatic libido stasis respectively.

This demonstration is supported by well known clinical phenomena, so that complete case histories may be dispensed with. The dependence shows itself to the observer not only in the somatic but the psychic province. In reality the two cannot be dissociated.

In acute neurasthenia which originates through inadequate gratification and reposes on somatic libido stasis, we see a rise in the phenomena of the destructive impulse—irritability, outbreaks of anger from trivial causes and a marked motor unrest. We know from numerous studies of the libido that the destructive impulse makes use of the muscular system, just as the sexual impulse makes use of the sexual organs and erogenous zones. The analysis of

suitable cases shows that motor restlessness in neuroses is due to the fact that ungratified sexual excitement seizes hold of the muscular apparatus. The assumption then is justified that suppressed sexual excitement communicates itself to the destructive impulse if not symptomatically bound or appearing as stasis fear.

In subjects with the sadistic-impulsive character it may be seen that motor unrest, the impulse to destroy or at least to occupy the muscles, and the general aggressiveness become the stronger the longer the period of abstinence, and become weaker again if the abstinence is temporarily given up.

Motor restlessness which expresses itself through the wandering impulse reposes, as shown by the analysis of pertinent cases, on sexual excitability transferred to the muscular system. There is here expressed the unconscious search for a sexual object and sexual gratification.

Further evidence is seen in the fact that the nursling begins to bite (oral sadism) when it is weaned and the same transference of excitement from erotic-sensory to motor-destructive may be seen in children who are on the point of repressing the Oedipus complex. It cannot be mere chance that motor agility, desire for movement and cruelty increase so much at the average of the fifth year of life.

At the onset of puberty, the somatic and psychical sexual evolution, the character is normally otherwise disposed than at the close of that period. At first there are reveries, sentimentality, a benevolent attitude to the entire world; but later with the new repression of the Oedipus complex and the struggle against masturbation, the period of churlishness develops—malice, spite, the tendency to snap the fingers at parents and teachers, pugnacity, muscular activity in sports, etc. In other provinces it may also be seen that ungratified sexual excitement is readily transformed into aggressiveness, even brutality, just as disillusioned love turns to hatred.

Neurotic women at the time of the menses and still more just before the onset are in a high degree irritable and aggressive or depressed. In certain women who are impulsive psychopaths but who are frigid, the rise in aggressiveness could be divined to be due to menstruation. Psychiatry perceives in the menstrual ill humor the direct consequence of the somatic menstrual process and seeks to influence the latter favorably by organotherapy, but analysis shows that the irritability and aggressiveness are psychic reactions to the loss of genital blood. The depression is due partly to narcissistic mortification (most women feel themselves damaged by menstruation as contrasted with men), and partly to the repressed destructive

tendencies (sense of guilt). The reaction, however, is not purely psychic as shown by the fact that in many cases aggressiveness and sadistic phantasies are reinforced before the woman knows that menstruation is upon her, which, considering the irregularity of the menses in neurotic women, is mostly apt to be the case. If as a result of analysis such women acquire genital sensibility and even orgasmic potency, the ill humors give place to local and general sexual excitement. Normally female libido is increased just before and during menstruation.

The woman who is free from frigidity does not suffer from libido stasis, which increases aggressiveness when it does not cause stasis fear. She has accepted the fact of penisless genitals and the anticipation of sexual gratification does not generate either love or hatred (as is the case with the neurotic woman, who suppresses the anticipation of pleasure) but it increases the preparedness for love.

Analysis of married couples who torment each other and treat each other roughly shows sexual nongratification to be the essential cause. This will be taken up separately later.

Castrated animals (capons, oxen, dogs, etc.) are never aggressive, while stallions and bulls are the more aggressive the more infrequently they have access to the females. After cohabitation both libido and aggressiveness flatten out. When one will keep a watch dog keen he chains him and thus keeps him away from wandering bitches. The phlegmatic nature of the eunuch castrated before puberty shows us not only that libido stasis is an important source of the energy of aggressiveness but also that the destructive impulse is powerless if the source of the libidinous excess is lacking.

An exception to the preceding is seen, however, in the climacteric and in old age. At the onset of climacteric involution the woman at first rebels and shows heightened sexual activity, while later she is dejected, argumentative and sometimes cruel—the more so the less gratification she had received during her life. Sadistic impulses are sometimes awakened. All this is a preliminary stage of senile involution, in which according to the belief of Freud, the death impulse or biologic destruction impulse unfolds itself from within. It may be no accident that with the exhaustion of the source of love, involution sets in which leads to death.

The dependence of the impulse of destruction on the state of the libido is shown further by the fact that tormenting and aggressive inclinations vanish spontaneously after a satisfactory sexual act. Through the orgasm energy is withdrawn from the muscular system. Athletes seeking to break records live in abstinence, a fact which rests upon the correct observation of this association.

What is the relation of sadism to libido statis and destructive impulse on the one hand and to fear on the other?

All impulses subjected to biological laws are present in the anlage and only the point of time, the kind, and the intensity of their appearance depend upon the experiences. We see erogenous partial impulses appear in definite series and in close dependence on the requirements of care and education. Permission and denial of libido gratification stand close to each other in every phase of libido development for a certain length of time until at last denial predominates. Two kinds of consequences result: first, another partial impulse which has not been included in the denial, comes strongly to the front (as anality after withdrawal from the mother's breast and genital masturbation after education in cleanliness has succeeded); second, every denial calls forth hatred and ambivalence toward the object which restricts gratification of the impulse. The stronger the denial falls out the greater the space occupied by the hate attitude. The more rapidly and brutally education in holding back impulses succeeds, the more intensive the hatred. A third consequence of renunciation and the resulting ambivalence is the more or less complete identification with the denying object. This paradoxical truth which cannot be altered is formulated as follows:

Man equals himself characterologically to that which he must hate because he may not love the same. The impulse force which serves the identification is love, the occasion for identification is hate because of the denial suffered. Hence the object which man cannot cease loving and must hate because it will not permit gratification is the prototype in the character formation of the ego and ego ideal.

In impulsive characters this association is most conspicuous. Those who in later life are aggressive without inhibition and in particular develop sadistic inclinations arrive typically and in very early childhood to an uninhibited gratification of the libido in contrast to characters with inhibited impulses. Aggressiveness awakens fully as the brutal suppression of sexual gratification sets in through the parents or their representatives. The abrupt denial of incestuous love should be felt the harder the more powerfully it has been increased through real sexual gratification. At the same time it appears that the regular succession in the development of the partial impulses is lacking and the infantile sexuality in the full sense of the word is "polymorphous perverse." The genitality becomes fully evolved and as far as physiological circumstances permit also gratified. The precocious introjection of the brutal object of love creates an ideal which within and without is sadistic. Such children are incapable of love, and notwithstanding this defect they crave love in the highest degree. But

hatred has overgrown every incitation to love. Later they hate most strongly where they most demand love—in the parental home. As they have moreover repressed the tendencies to love they understand excellently how to expose themselves to disillusionment; they crave only unattainable objects and so behave themselves that in every case they must experience a strict refusal. Both the sensual craving and the reaction to the inevitable disillusionment are uninhibited, impulsive. Moreover, the reactions are of the pronounced sadistic type, that is, aggressive-sadistic in the sexual sense, and analysis shows that in the kind of aggression and the object the renounced sexual incitation again comes to the fore. Renunciation of sexual gratification has driven forth aggressiveness, and through the mixture of revenge impulses with the renounced sexual impulse claim there arises the destructive sexual tendency, sadism.

For this comprehension of the individual origin of sadism there are abundant proofs in the realm of the inhibited compulsion neurosis and hysteria. In the case of a compulsive neurotic woman in which during the transference love tendencies broke through, she hated the analyst because she should know nothing of her love and feared him as any other love object. At the same time the sadistic phantasies, with unmistakable sexual character, luxuriated. That which went on here unconsciously often unrolls itself openly in impulsive people. They demand manifestations of love in inconsiderate fashion and perhaps threaten to poison the physician if he rejects them. As motive of the murderous intention this rejection is never given. Pride, so readily injured, and sense of guilt alike prohibit this; but a frivolous rationalization is found or the simple explanation that death, castration, or incendiarism would certainly cure him and only therein could he find complete gratification, he must just once stoutly rage himself out.

The relations of the destructive impulse to neurotic fear are not so simple as is the case with libido statis.

Adler has denied the libidinous origin of neurotic fear and takes the view that fear results as a reaction to aggressive impulse. At first sight this seems true enough. When impulsives put restraint on their sadistic impulses fear does appear. It does not, however, vanish when the impulse is carried out, as statis fear disappears after sexual gratification, but on the contrary appears reinforced. What now is the distinction between sexual fear and aggression fear?

Freud has taught that in the beginning of development of the ego the latter has only the tendency to obey the claims of the It but very soon afterwards must strike on the side of the moral super-ego which

is thrust upon him, unless he will risk perishing in the midst of the social community wherein he is forced to live. The ego reacts to the restrictions of the external world, failure to obey which brings fear of punishment, with fear of the object (for example, castration as punishment for masturbation) ; and as it cannot master the impulse claim, is forced to repress it. This fear of punishment, however, does not perish but persists as sense of guilt, as the feared object is introjected as super-ego, that is, as internal inhibition—an internal “you dare not” is received into the ego. Sense of guilt is, according to its nature, fear of conscience, a term which bears the account abundantly of the origin of sense of guilt in fear of punishment. The sense of guilt is only castration fear built over, the prototype of all fear of punishment. Man believes that he is moral but has at the foundation only fear; this is shown in the analysis of every compulsive neurotic.

If one investigates the nature of the sense of guilt,—more accurately, fear of conscience,—and compares it with infantile fear of punishment, an essential difference comes to light. Castration fear is the immediate reaction of the ego to the perception of a forbidden sexual impulse claim. Conscience fear, on the contrary, is first of all the reaction to the perception of a repressed destructive—sadistic—tendency, and must therefore be named descriptively aggression fear. Its sense is the apprehension of the individual of being himself destroyed should he behave in an egoistic, cruel, or antisocial manner. The sense of the castration fear is the neurotic fear of being harmed in the genitals when yielding to a libidinous impulse incitation.

Something then must be added to castration fear before it can be transformed to sense of guilt, and this is the aggressive-destructive reaction to the danger of castration, or, respectively, renunciation of a libidinous gratification. The process, which is best studied in compulsive neuroses, is this: The child suffers a refusal of a libidinous prompting and reacts to it partly by castration fear, and partly with aggressive impulses against those who have controlled the refusal. Hatred is the natural reaction to a denial or restriction of an effort for pleasure. With this hatred go death wishes, and in extreme cases an impulse to kill; but as the hated object is also loved, fear arises of carrying out the killing impulse on the loved object. This aggressive fear is coupled with the castration fear; one must fear to be castrated himself if one robs the father of his penis. So conscience fear (aggression fear) is indeed the immediate expression of an inhibited revenge impulse but could not arise from hatred and revenge alone.

Hatred leads to the deed without sense of guilt and only love can create conscience fear. Hate depends on the strength of the love denial and the destructive impulse on the intensity of the libido statis. The normal man has aggression fear as a moral inhibition without affect.

VIII

THE SOCIAL IMPORTANCE OF GENITAL ENDEAVORS

When the genital strivings come up against external or internal obstacles the inclination to an aggressive attitude toward the external world is increased. In compulsive neurosis the penis becomes in the phantasies an instrument of hatred and the genital erotism has placed itself in the service of the destructive impulse. If the repression of genitality augments the sadistic impulses, one is forced to assume that the general cultural renunciation of sexuality and the tendency to suppress it and split it plays a decisive rôle in the origin of human sadism.

(a) *The Cleavage of the Genital Tendency in Society.*

In the animal the destructive impulse comes into evidence only as an oral annihilation impulse in the service of self-preservation or a defense of its life. The carnivorous beasts of prey destroy suitable objects when hunger demands, and in menageries these animals are not dangerous when they have become satiated with food. Their aggressiveness toward strangers corresponds to an instinctively divined danger, as shown by the opposite bearing to the trainer. They show nothing comparable to the phallic and anal sadism of man (stabbing, shooting, beating, crushing, treading, etc.).

The destructive impulse of man is distinguished above all by the fact that its purpose is not a biologic necessity and in this respect is quite equal to the wildness of many animals who cannot attain sexual gratification. It is the counterpart of human civilization and culture in so far as this is built up by the suppression and sublimation of sexuality.

The fate of the destructive impulse is determined decisively by the social environment of the individual and by his adaptability. Two extremes are seen in the lust murderer and the hypermoral compulsive as illustrated by the churchmen responsible for the Spanish Inquisition. The demand for and carrying out of asceticism come from a deep sense of guilt. The sin of Adam and Eve was genital and forbidden by God the Father. External denial may become internal, as

seen in compulsion neurosis, and religious ceremonies follow the same laws as compulsion neurosis. But little attention has been given to the possibility that suppression of the genital powers forces brutality to the front. A sadism results which in religion may be inverted into masochism.

In passing to a consideration of the sexual morality of to-day, as represented by the traditional and capitalistic *bourgeoisie*, we find elements which are fully analogous to compulsive neurotic ideology:

(1) Extramarital coitus is generally ranked as beastly (sadistic) and dirty (anal), and (2) despite physiological and biological facts; even medical men lend themselves to a propaganda of asceticism. (3) Masturbation is regarded as the evil of evils despite the fact that it is normal at a certain stage of development, and medical men also lend their authority here as well. (4) Love strivings undergo cleavage—to the young and single man sexual intercourse is permitted, and in order to protect the girls of the same caste prostitution is tolerated and counts as a filthy although necessary evil. The conception of the sexual act as a beastly and filthy affair means that it cannot be a biological, physiological, psychically necessary process but a mere evacuation like defecation.

The sensual component of genitality is split off from the tender component and the young man gratifies his sensuality in an affair with a girl whom he would never marry simply because she has given herself to him without a marriage certificate and like a prostitute. He honors a girl of his own station and the greater the honor the more indignantly would he repudiate the thought of an intimate relationship with her; he would lose the tender aspiration should she yield to his sensual claims.

The division of the love aspiration and the splitting of sensuality prove their anal origin. Both are phylogenetically derived from the summation of individual repression performances. The august woman represents the mother who can impute no sexuality to the child and who forbids any autoerotic activities when they are present. Many neurotics have a deep contempt for women, one of the reasons being the bitter undeception of the child when it learns that parents practice what is forbidden to itself. The whole is repressed and there remains only doubt of the justice of God and of mankind in general; either over- or undervaluation of woman, compulsive neurotic religiosity or forced atheism and, last but not least, the inability to combine sensual with tender aspiration. Only half the personality can take part in sexual experiences and this always brings

a weakening of the psychogenital gratification with all of its consequences.

Aside from the irrational motives which establish the double sex morality, rational motives also play an important rôle in the varied conception of extramarital relations, including adultery. These are feelings which repose on the actual absence of culture and unnaturalness in the sexual relations of the sexes.

The dominant sexual morality first debases the life of sexual feelings and especially the sexual act, and then appeals to the baseness of the sexual feelings which it has degraded if its requirements are called unnatural and unhygienic.

Extraconjugal devotion of the woman, conformable to feeling, is valued otherwise than that of man even by those who are free from prejudice. In popular speech the woman "has thrown herself away," the man has "possessed" the woman but the man does not "throw himself away." This means that the man has conquered the woman and triumphed over her betrayed husband, so that it is not in reality regarded as a sexual experience at all.

It is clear that under these conditions the orgasmic life must recede behind the joy of conquest, betrayal, privacy, and let alone. To the orgasmically potent the sexual act is neither a proof of potency nor an act of conquest, nor an act of revenge against a third person, but a necessary pleasurable experience devoid of tendency. Here the woman takes as well as gives and in the same way as the man, and the not frigid woman has ceased to be solely a sexual apparatus. It is at once clear that an affirmation of genitality abolishes the degradation of the sexual act.

The consequences of the bourgeois sexual morality is that the man is concupiscent, and the woman, brought up dishonestly, is sexually inhibited. This concupiscence is due to the admixture of the normal sexual longings with the pernicious breath of baseness introduced by the declaration that the sexual act is something filthy and beastly.

The following biologic difference in the sexes complicates this subject: the woman is subject to the man who has caused an orgasm and be she never so mannish and emancipated, after such a sexual experience she wishes a strong and managing man; in women of less intelligence there springs up a peculiar will to dependence and subordination. It is otherwise with a healthy man. The phallic aggressive character of his sexuality preserves him from belonging to anyone, although the ungratified or feminine man can subordinate himself to a woman and be secretly despised by her.

It is unquestionable that the natural reaction of woman to the

absence of a penis is quite significantly reinforced through the contempt implied in the double sex morality. The little girl must constantly hear that she cannot and dare not do so much as the boy, and thus a circle develops: unsublimated penis pride of the bourgeois average man leads to contempt of the women, while this in turn makes the woman mannish, with sexual aversion and frigidity. Through frigidity she loses in value as a sex object, for the woman without sexual feeling arouses in man during the act the sensation that she is only a machine for his gratification. This in turn reinforces his masculine presumption and his contempt for woman.

The view that the woman tolerates the act, that it has for her something of degradation, cannot be explained altogether by a sadistic conception of coitus, for it is held by some in the absence of any sadistic component.

A question comes up in relation to the association of German students and the individual sexual life. Blüher has written extensively on the rôle of homosexuality in all unions of men and Boehm has associated intercourse with prostitutes with the gratification of repressed homosexuality. It is common among small groups of men for them to copulate one after another with the same woman. The close relationship between the "bursch" and his "fag" is a special example of this repressed homosexuality.

It may be seen over and over in the analysis of neurotics that through the cleavage of genital aspirations, and equally in men and women, homosexuality is reinforced and sadism driven into the open. In the student body both fencing and duelling gratify both. The joy in "rough house" and the oversharpest distinction between friend and foe are characteristic manifestations. In many patients who must battle ceaselessly against their homosexuality, as in the erythrophobes, this impulse urge appears in dreams under the form of combat with knives, swords and revolvers. This presentation takes account of both the defense and the gratification. Fencing among friends may be visualized as a sadistic equivalent of mutual masturbation which includes the punishment in the act. The aspiration to show many scars of fencing and the fact that superior swordsmen and young fags are ashamed because they have no scars admits of but one interpretation—it is a matter of self-punishment tendency which is gratified in the duel. A second motive is the compensation for inferiority, an evidence of bravery.

The brutality of the World War would have been impossible had not the need of power of a few leaders found the supplement in the latent cruelty of the individual. Freud summed up the war enthusi-

asm as a collective removal of repressions, especially the impulses of cruelty with the sanction of an ideal father imago, the Kaiser. During the war it could be noted that those with strong heterosexual tendencies or full value sublimations were opposed to war, while the most brutal were openly or latently homosexual, as shown incidentally by their attitude to women. Sadistic psychopaths and antisocial characters stood the test of war ideology. Whoever went through the war can bear witness that anal obscenity was heard everywhere, while in conversation the theme was always coitus and prostitutes. In other words, there was collective regression to the anal sadistic.

Where might and violence dominate, love can find no place, and if genital object love cannot come to action uniformly want of power and brutality develop beyond the requirements of biology and sociology. The influence of inhibited love on readiness to hate makes it possible to assert that even for the few leaders who had the decision over war and peace, need of power was not the principal requirement. Were sexual obligation and the restriction of object choice without influence on the mentality of the individual?

(b) *The Consequences of the Cleavage of Sexuality for Marriage.*

An important circumstance in the premarital life of the man plays a fateful rôle in wedlock. It is known that prostitutes are either quite frigid or are orgasmically potent only with their male consorts. The younger prostitutes usually simulate orgasm but to the experienced man this is repellent. He sinks into apathy toward them and the sexual act descends to the level of a mere autoerotic or masturbatory act. He is excited more by coitus phantasies than by the actual presence of woman. The attitude toward woman is reflected in popular idioms such as, "all cats are black in the dark." One woman is the same as any other.

Many men and women alike are ignorant of the fact that women can have orgasms and hence practice vagaries of all kinds which often lead up to nausea after orgasm—anal and masturbatory coitus. After marriage such experience is hard to live down. If there is a tender sentiment the husband feels that he degrades the wife by submitting her to intercourse. There is some danger that the attitude of the man to his new wife will lead to partial impotence, premature ejaculation, etc., while the wife who naturally suppresses her own sexuality must have her aversion to the act overcome by forbearance and tact. She will probably remain frigid even in the absence of a neurosis. She will at first have no orgasm and may never be able to have one especially by reason of precocious ejaculation of the husband which analysis finds to be an insuperable stumbling block. Even after

analysis has set free the genitality of the woman she cannot develop if the husband is defective in potency.

If the husband has practiced variations of the sexual act and extra-genital perversions before marriage, he cannot submit his wife to such practices although analysis of married women shows that something of the sort happens in preliminary activities, which go back to pre-genital impulses. If these have not become sublimated their repression may threaten a neurotic ailment. Phantasies which spring from undischarged impulses may force themselves on the man during copulation and derange the latter. The polygamous wish of the husband gives him the sense of guilt toward his wife and this in turn aggravates hatred of her. If suppression is impossible latent homosexuality may manifest itself by drinking or gambling.

The wife is more or less disillusioned by marriage, but this is not always conscious, and when it is repressed the husband seeks gratification in phantasies, with regression and libido stasis. There is often a marital strife founded on sexual disparity which may be only a disguised neurosis. To the frigid woman the act is burdensome and even brutal, and sublimation if possible is of no benefit.

In a life of marital strife sublimations are decomposed as soon as they have formed and ability to work is also injured. In such cases marital infidelity on the part of the husband may avert the threatened neurosis. There are marriages, however, in which the presence of numerous children with great material poverty absorb the psychic energies and the neurosis is averted. Love of children may compensate the wife for the absence of sexual gratification. But even under these circumstances neuroses develop.

Without underestimating the economic factor it should be emphasized that the internal conflict weakens the strength which is requisite to carry on in the face of rough reality. Although it has been pointed out that external problems may relieve internal strain, it is also true that either of these components may aggravate the other. It is possible to adjust oneself so that work becomes an outlet for domestic unhappiness, but experience in an analytic dispensary for the needy has shown that the disguised neurosis which results from marital infelicity may rank in importance from the medico-social standpoint with tuberculosis itself.

Marriage may be viewed as a purely economic unit or an institution for procreation, but few marriages are undertaken from either of these standpoints alone. The prime object is a sexual union, with genital object love. Marriage, however, means restrictions, and the danger of actual want but these are ignored in the presence of the

powerful sexual motive. Biologic propagation as a child wish, which is more pronounced in woman, is preceded in individual development by the sexual wish and the denial of sexual gratification inhibits the child wish save in certain women, shown in analysis to suffer from neurotic inhibition of the genital impulse.

This child wish may persist in women who fear coitus, consciously or not, and the wish for a child is by parthogenesis (H. Deutsch). When a frigid woman has a number of children and is a good mother it is not that she wanted children at first but realized later that they were a substitute for sexual gratification. And in relatively good marriages the wish for a child usually does not set in until a certain saturation of genital claims gives place to it.

It is generally held that marriage is secured by the arrival of a child, and this happens under certain conditions. When it does not occur the child becomes a new source of marital vexation, an oppressive bond, the solution of which is possible only for the well to do. With a number of children a further source of discord arises in that each parent has his or her favorites, in which favoritism sex plays a major rôle. This status is bad for the psychic development of the children and, according to Freud, multiple personality is apt to develop.

(c) *On Dulling of Genitality in Monogamous Wedlock.*

Fürbringer and others versed in sexological details mention the variations of coitus which originally came about through some disability of the wife for the normal position. The medical man is not to look on these aberrations with complete indifference, for they may mask or lead to perversities. Hence he should counsel only the normal posture. To study this problem anew and with the moral element omitted for the time, it is true that long years of monogamy blunt the genital attraction and this is not accepted passively but often leads to severe conflicts. Writers like Balzac and Strindberg find in this status a source of wit and obscenity, but scientific men have held aloof from its consideration.

As a result of blunting of genitality there is a mostly unconscious drifting apart in the shape of discovery of new and unwelcome defects, inability to get together and agree, etc. To trace a favorable case of marriage from the start, the act of defloration of the intact woman gives her a shock; it is for her a sort of castration. This may be followed by a period of frigidity, and should this persist hatred of the husband develops. Analysis has shown that the first cohabitation may determine the outcome of the marriage. The honeymoon represents a shortlived illusion which is followed by disillusion-

ment. Next comes the fear of pregnancy, and where there is fear there can be no pleasurable experience. The husband must separate his tender sentiments from the sensual cravings. The husband has for the first time the novel sensation of owning a woman of his own class after having consorted with his social inferiors. In the lower walks the husband may be devoid of feelings of tenderness.

The policy of enlightenment of those about to marry in regard to sexual hygiene should accomplish great good in the prevention of neuroses. The woman of the lower working class is often accused, as analysis shows, of coldness, and the men of the same class should be told that frigidity is common at the outset and that it will pass off under proper precaution. If it persists there is a prospect of curing it by analysis.

To continue the history of a favorable case of marriage, we may assume that the early disharmonies are adjusted, but it is still possible for others to develop. There is the likelihood of overindulgence and the libido finds an easy discharge with no possibility of stasis. Coitus becomes a sort of compulsion.

Ferenczi has considered *in extenso* this subject of "sexual habit" and introduces the element of sexual conquest by the man of the woman. The wife, having been conquered, is out of the question, as she cannot be conquered again. The mere fact with a certain type of man robs her of further attraction. Some men before marriage have the habit of conquest and always seek new victims. To understand the subject more fully it is necessary to go back to childhood, when sexuality was taboo. That which is prohibited is the more eagerly craved, and sexual prohibition may find an outlet in some other direction, as kleptomania. Conquest and possession of women go back to the narcissistic and sadistic stage of development, and in a monogamous marriage this fraction of genitality remains ungratified.

Whether monogamy or polygamy is the best for man in the long run has never been settled. In the psychoanalysis of infantile development the two appear to stand on the same footing. Monogamous tendencies originate in the singleness of the mother or father as the object of love. Incest taboo proves the polygamous tendency. The search of the man to find his mother again in his wife makes for monogamy, and the same holds good for the woman. In marital happiness there is no chance for polygamous wishes, provided there is complete adaptation to each other. But when libidinous claims remain ungratified polygamous tendencies are awakened. There is a difference here between the sexes as far as motives are concerned. Many women have polygamous wishes, for with the inferiority sense

comes admiration of many men, and with this in turn the wish to be conquered by each one. At the same time they know that this is out of the question and there is evidently a strong narcissistic background for these wishes.

Apparently women of this type outnumber the men because of the inferiority sense, due originally to absence of the penis. To this is added another component, desire for revenge.

In male polygamous desires there is no demand for more women of the monogamous type but the craving is for polygamous and even homosexual women.

Blunting of genitality is apt to occur rapidly when the normal coitus position is strictly adhered to and when there is no gratification from partial impulses in the preliminary actions. Neurotic inhibitions and repressions of the pregenital impulse and homosexual claims are always present. This status can be corrected by taking more liberties in copulation and many sources of blunting are cut off.

Analysis of frigid women may show an unconscious desire to lie on their husbands, in correspondence with the wish to be a man, and the converse is seen in those neurotic men who wish to assume the inferior position although they usually reject these desires and this may end in pathological results. The most masculine of men and most womanly women sometimes resort to these variations and the reversal of position may do good service in obtaining gratification of the libido. When a man prefers coitus from behind it is evidence of masked active homosexuality and if the woman prefers it, it serves to gratify ancient wishes based on the infantile notion of copulation or on observation of animals.

Many of both sexes look upon mutual handling of the genitals as a necessary preliminary to coitus and some women can obtain gratification only after previous manual irritation of the genitals. A strong pregenital organization as already stated may make it impossible to obtain gratification without oral practices.

The sexual act itself is adapted to satisfy the various psychosexual claims if the infantile sexuality is not much influenced by repressions. The conduct of the man and woman before and after the act is witness for the successful fulfilment of the summation of the wishes. The man before the act is at the same time tender and phallic-aggressive, the woman usually awaits his aggression. During the act she changes her conduct and becomes active until her orgasm coincides with that of the man. The latter does not attain full gratification if the woman is frigid or anesthetic. Undoubtedly this coincidence of orgasm means a co-experience, an identification of the two partners which satisfies all libido claims.

After a satisfactory act the conduct is usually reversed. The woman shows a tender motherliness and the man becomes a child. The consciousness of the possibility that a child may have been conceived brings it about that the woman anticipates the child in the man and thus meets his infantile attitude half way.

The said difficulties of and motives for the blunting of monogamous sex relations are not to be removed but can for the most part be avoided. One reason for blunting will not allow itself to be removed. The libido is labile as well as tenacious. Gratification itself causes blunting and variation of the mode of gratification can postpone it although not abolish it. This kind of deadening is, of course, physiological, differing from the type due to neurotic inhibitions in being less painful because not due to repression. The later its development the more it is coincident with the natural diminution of function in the somatic sexual apparatus. There is danger in over-indulgence which makes abstinence desirable some of the time although closeness of association makes this difficult to carry out.

Without due periods of continence the couple will some day find a recession of the libido. Both feel a sense of guilt and try to veil it or compensate by exaggerated tenderness. Later polygamous inclinations appear with phantasies of the same and resulting sense of guilt. The desires and phantasies are repressed. In the conscientious a neurosis may develop. Less scrupulous men break their vows and say nothing. Few dare to face the problem candidly. One act of unfaithfulness may in the long run prove of advantage to the marriage, and it is very doubtful whether an unwilling constancy has this result.

One is no longer astonished that these marriages end at times in uxoricide, embittered resignation or neurosis. Individual requirements can only be changed to a certain degree and cannot be remedied by divorce laws nor public opinion. Medical aid will be the least valuable if moral codes are mixed with practical valuations and the physician can be of service only when in the sense of Freud's therapy he remains absolutely tolerant and leaves the choice of conduct to the patient after having enlightened him.

(d) *The Erotic and Social Sense of Reality.*

The function of the orgasm influences decisively the differentiated functions of the social and cultural efforts of the individual. If the social and sexual performances of patients are compared with those of the healthy typical relations show themselves between the primitive and the highly developed functions which cannot be overlooked in connection with treatment.

The pregenital impulses are autoerotic and hence asocial; the destructive impulse and its erotic derivative, sadism, are both anti-social. In a social community the individual is compelled to sublimate his impulses.

One of the most important prerequisites for sublimation is that the impulses have not been repressed, which not only prevents the gratification but any other employment of the impulse. Repression may on occasion determine analogous performances but these are distinguished from genuine sublimations by their reactive exaggerated character and through the impression they make of spasmodic behavior. A further important distinction is that the genuine social reality sense gets along well with the erotic reality sense.

Among the summation of the impulses following the psychologic, physiologic, social and biologic conditions of life only genitality can fulfill the function of the erotic reality sense. Under psychologic, the impotent feels himself inferior and is more or less functionally insufficient in nonsexual provinces. Under physiologic, the genital gratification guarantees the orgasmic solution of the somatic libido tension and is thereby one of the conditions for the preservation of psychic equilibrium. Under social, genitality demands a genital partner and establishes at least a community of two. Under biologic, genitality alone serves to keep alive the species.

The healthy man, that is, the one capable alike of work and love, has applied his genitality chiefly to sexual ends, his destructive and pregenital claims to social and cultural ends. In the neurotic this arrangement is inverted; the sexual accomplishments are sexualized and the destructive impulse and pregenital impulse dominate his love life.

Analysis shows that disturbances of work occur under two conditions; in one the patient is unable to concentrate on his work because he is occupied by sexual or sadistic compulsive phantasies.

In another group of work disturbances such as writers' and violinists' cramp the activity cannot be carried out because it has assumed the value of prohibited sexual action. The libidinous excess to social performance is no longer freely controllable. If we compare this with the conduct of the sexually satisfied man it is seen that after a satisfactory sexual act there is a heightened social ability of performance and joy in work. After the acme of the orgasm the libido is distributed over the body, determining somatic freshness and exalted ego sense.

One may say, then, that the sublimations are newly kindled through the libidinous energy which becomes changed by the orgasm. Repres-

sion of the excess of libidinous energy has brought about both a renewed sexualization of the original libidinous tendencies and an application of aggressiveness to the original aims. In a schematic survey three elements may be distinguished in each sublimation:

- i. Destructive aggressiveness permanently deviated from destruction of the object (community sense, social conscience, etc.).
- ii. Permanent deviation from their autoerotic aims of pregenital impulses (social, cultural, artistic, scientific interests).
- iii. Unsublimated genital interest which maintains permanent tender object relations with periodical orgasmic discharge.

The significance of the libidinous excess for the maintenance of a sublimation one learns rightly to evaluate if one has observed serially that the social functional ability is the more restricted the longer and more absolute the abstinence. If there is failure of the libido excess sublimation is thereby weakened. Sublimation is not the opposite of sexual gratification but rather of non-gratification.

Can sublimation be endangered by the gratification of genitality? Is the satisfying sexual enjoyment able permanently to absorb all interest? These questions must be answered in the negative. The capacity of the genital libido for being gratified temporarily and for associating itself with the sublimations while in the condition of satiation excludes this possibility.

In people who determine sexual morality in the large cultural centers, the idea of antithesis between somatic sensuality and spiritual culture is intelligible and the scientific observer has only to examine into whether it is true or irrationally founded. It will be found that the antithesis succeeds only to a few and that the majority with this aspiration become metropolitan neurasthenics. Unsatisfied sensuality revenges itself and the intellectual and spiritual forces are not free for they are bound in defensive force, cramped, not solid, always on guard against impulsiveness, filled with sexual fear. In successful analyses in which sexual disorders become sublimated in a much higher degree than at first, this is due to the fact that no barrier is erected between sensuality and cultural aspiration. The very absence of sexual fear makes it possible after the momentary insensibility of orgasmic experience to swing back again to the activity of intellectual and spiritual effort. Those who preach asceticism out of religious or cultural ideology and do not get the desired results should associate with this the cultivation of the sensual and somatic, so that in place of the slogan "sensuality or culture" there would be "cultivated in sensuality."

The problem still remains of the possible fate of the libido in the abstinent, who from the psychic side seem sound. The somatic

sexual apparatus is intact else eunuchoidism would be in evidence. There must therefore be libidinous tension present. What other way can this organically fed libido find for an outlet if it is not orgasmically gratified and does not engender a neurosis? This could be learned only through analysis of healthy and abstinent men. It would not be false to maintain that whosoever lives abstinent and keeps sound does not follow his conscious will but is subject to inhibitions and fixations. Eunuchs castrated after puberty retain their psychic libido and after the climateric this also persists for a while. To admit that intensive labor and all true sublimation can remove stasis and that the effects shall be persistent is not to be accepted, from what we know of impulse energy, without reservations.

Since we have a physiology of the normal body although no two men are somatically alike, so also in the realm of the psychic there must be a purposeful fundamental structure in spite of individual variation. Pathology does not connote a difference in this structure but only a distortion.

Psychoanalysis aspires to a new arrangement of the instincts in the sense of this normal structure. We do not ask if the behaviors are good or bad but which of them correspond to the reality sense and which disturb this. Analysis, as Freud long ago taught, is therefore also a synthesis. Under this head come the various activities of analytic treatment as the educational, the restoration of the ability to work and also the capacity for love; in other words for sexual gratification. The patient cured by analysis has gained with the consciousness of his impulses also the ability to control them.

The question of intervention in personal self-determination which pertains to psychoanalysis in contrast with other psychotherapeutic methods is settled at the outset for the great majority of patients who seek the analyst either expressly by reason of the disturbed genital function or who soon gain insight into their impotence and themselves seek to be freed from it. In a minority are those who either compensate their impotence or as a result of deep characterologic singularity have sexual aversion. There are no exceptions to the rule that the latter patient sooner or later runs up against his sexual claims during the analysis. If the analysis is carried out regularly he professes his wishes and himself recognizes the importance which the inhibition of this function has for his neurosis.

It must be confessed that sublimation as an escape for the neurosis has been overemphasized. The abreaction is only temporary and ends no conflict. As a therapeutic factor it is seen only in certain cases of traumatic hysteria. Even becoming conscious of an unconscious conflict is but a prerequisite for the actual cure, and an intellectual

decision does not suffice to attain the rearrangement of the impulses, that is, to remove the characterologic reaction basis upon which the neurosis is erected.

Although the problem of the neurotic reaction basis is not yet solved it can be assumed with certainty that the libido stasis and the readiness for fear are the most important factors. To free the patient from fear of the impulse gratification is one of the indispensable means of arriving at the therapeutic goal. This fear is the cause of the libido stasis and this in turn of the stasis fear and the symptom and removal of this fear frees the impulse from its repression, when it is partly sublimated and partly urges to gratification.

Cumulative observation teaches that no analysis can be regarded as successful unless the fear bound with the symptoms is set free, as manifested by the appearance of transitory phobias. Further, the sense of guilt must again be changed back to fear. Only now can the sources of the fear be elaborated. In the first rank the narcissism of the ego which is the source of castration fear and the pent up libido which determines stasis fear come into consideration. As aggressiveness and longing for the uterus, or, respectively, birth fear, depend on the intensity of the libido stasis and castration fear, they play a secondary rôle as sources of fear.

In a successful analytical solution of the neurosis the uterine longing and the aggressiveness are given up, subordinated to other tendencies or sublimated while the genitality gives up its incestuous object while still retaining its sexual aim. Why should the liberation of fear cause in one case and automatically a fortified striving to the object of the aspiration, while in the other it causes aversion? The uterine longing and the aggressiveness are not given up if the castration fear is not analyzed (refractoriness) or the partly freed libido flows back to the earlier fixation after a weak forward push toward the genital position (relapse). There are cases which without full analysis remain free from symptoms, such as those in which analysis at first attacks the genital fixations and is able to detach them in full before deeper fixations can complicate the transference situation. The genital libido freed from castration fear can automatically abrogate other wishes because the orgasmic solution of the libido stasis disposes of the readiness to regress. If the genital primacy was imperfectly cultivated in childhood, the pull of the uterus, or respectively, the tendency to pregenital gratification, outweighs the combined sources of fear despite analysis.

Satisfied genital object love is the mightiest opponent of the destructive impulse, pregenital masochism, uterine longing and the punishing super-ego and the gratification disposes of the libido stasis and thereby

binds the destructive impulse. The object of analytical treatment is the superiority of the life conserving Eros over the destructive impulse. From this angle analytic treatment encounters many invincible external difficulties, which in favorable cases set real misfortune in the place of the neurosis and in unfavorable ones effect a relapse which defies all treatment. In the case of a woman patient the external stumbling block may be a husband of weak potency after the wife has been restored to normal genitality. In such cases the marriage could be terminated and in general the prognosis is better for the unmarried than the married. Aside from divorce the only avenues of escape are diversion in work and sexual resignation which make the prognosis very uncertain. Total abstinence is hardly practicable and the only other outlet short of infidelity would be masturbation which may temporarily prevent relapse but promotes phantasies which with the absence of any psychic gratification, even in the absence of fear and guilt sense, is apt to terminate finally in relapse. The sexual and social misery of the time must be taken into account in connection with prognosis. Sexual gratification and sublimation are the sole full value escapes from neurosis and its equivalents and these depend on the social-economic environment. This status restricts the field of therapeutic activity very notably. Mere solution of conflicts forms only the beginning of analytic treatment. Building up resistance and immunizing the patients are the real aims of analysis and can be effected in the majority of those treated.

A separate question to be asked is, if the nucleus of the neurosis is somatic and due to libido stasis and if the cure of the neurosis lies in altering or removing this somatic foundation, should we not resort to some organic method of treatment, such as organotherapy, in place of the circumstantial and tedious method of analysis? So long as libido stasis is due to the absence of sexual gratification the indication for treatment is to make this possible. There are physical means of stimulating the libido, just as there are of reducing it. Aphrodisiacs, however, in these cases would not only fail to remove the psychic inhibitions which are responsible for the genital disorders but would even aggravate the neurotic fear and perhaps bring out new symptoms. Anaphrodisiacs conversely reduce the fear and thereby diminish the extent of the neurotic reaction basis but could not remove it. If it could be possible by the most complete organotherapy to modify the disease, psychoanalysis would still be requisite for cure. It is not denied that organotherapy and sexual enlightenment might become powerful auxiliaries in the wholesale management of sexual disorders, but as a recourse for the individual patient psychoanalysis is a most powerful remedy.

PSYCHOANALYSIS IN CUSTODIAL EDUCATION

BY

AUGUST AICHHORN

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While the word psychoanalysis is no longer strange, the same cannot be said of the expression "custodial education," for it has not been long current in familiar speech. Custodial education is a branch of education; at the same time it is a part of the care of the young and must be studied in both these aspects although most of our time will be devoted to the first named subject. In a broad sense the care of youth comprises educational care, which in turn comprises custodial education but not every phase of care of the young is at the same time custodial care.

Care of youth begins when the need is first felt and also if it has already been present for some time; also when conditions are such that the parents, etc., are unable to care properly for their children. Certain individuals, organizations, or public factors—all of which represent society and its civic and autonomous corporate bodies—then interfere. Assistance through individuals as permitted by the community may be private or official; and while originally this was voluntary and proceeded from charitable sentiments, it has now become a duty through ever deepening social sensibility which in turn arises from a recognition of the rights of the individual in society as a whole.

Custodial education is requisite in actual and even in threatened need for all minors, although naturally this may mean an interference with the external factors of family life which is not always received without opposition. If the father does not offer resistance education can be supplied without much difficulty provided the necessary means are at hand. Abuse of power and neglect of duty on the part of the father may be met by compulsory measures if he offer resistance, and this is also true if he has made himself guilty of an infamous crime or an immoral mode of life. The rights of the father are withdrawn for the time and a curator is appointed in the interest of custodial education. If the lack of education is the result purely of economic distress, or if the mentality of the child is at fault, the state attorney cannot interfere through the guardianship court.

It is just here that there is a gap in legislation through which custodial care may be made impossible from the beginning. With restriction or withdrawal of paternal authority not much can be gained for custodial care if the child still remain a member of the family, for the environment is unchanged and development cannot be guaranteed unless he can be sheltered in some other way which is readily possible if the family have the means, but otherwise there can be no custodial education unless some outside person will volunteer his services or supply the necessary funds. According to the law of settlement the local community is liable for such assistance, financial or custodial, but under the circumstances no special provision is made for education.

The latter is also in abeyance in cases in which the legal determinations are insufficient. Only a few examples can be cited here for lack of space. In Austria the only legal provision for custodial education is that of the reform school.

Section 16 of the law against work dodgers and vagabonds determines that aside from cases covered by this law no one can be interned in the reformatory without going through certain technicalities which make it impossible to give advanced education to inmates even when needed. Again, children under ten cannot be interned without the consent of a legal representative, and youths between fourteen and eighteen only when convicted of vagabondage.

[Several pages of the author's text which presuppose a knowledge of Austrian law may be passed over.—L. P. C.]

What should be done and what can be done in custodial education are matters involving different conceptions. We shall find the extremes of the keenest pessimism and the most uninhibited optimism. For the pessimist education is useless, a concession made to the idealists, and is not to be taken seriously. It must be superfluous because of the unfavorable hereditary *anlage*. The optimist holds that the latter is negligible and that education is omnipotent in overcoming obstacles.

Before making a decision let us glance at the historical aspect and go back to the time when the individual ego and community feeling were in sharp antagonism, the former at the same time being in conflict with natural phenomena and natural forces. It is obvious that whoever made the earliest or best contacts with reality held his ground and that life was based on the requirements of reality which made possible adaptation to the environment.

Do these facts hold good psychically? Man learned to delay and even to renounce pleasure gain, to endure pain, and to divert his aims

from the impracticable to the practicable. In the course of a thousand years community culture developed with the formation of artistic, scientific, and social values.

The inhibition of the impulses of the individual was at first slight, but gradually, as capacity for reality increased, there also developed capacity for culture. The same situation is seen in the child, for the younger it is the less is its ability to renounce the fulfilment of the wishes of its impulse life and to conform to the necessities of communal existence. Only under the pressure of actual unpleasant experiences does it learn to impose restrictions on its impulses and to conform to the requirements of society. This road to culture in the child is longer or shorter, according to the stage of culture under which it lives, but it must be covered in the few years before maturity and may be shortened by direct intervention of the adult in the form of education. Culture then comes both from life and from education. The requirements of life enforce the primitive capacity for reality, while education amplifies it to capacity for culture. Life leads to self-maintenance, which is equivalent to capacity for reality, through such experiences as accidents from falls, etc., and the eating of dangerous foods as green fruit. Here the adult has not intervened and the pain of the experience supplies an inhibitory influence. Naturally no sharp line of demarcation exists between individual experience and the cultural effort of education.

If through hereditary *anlage* an individual is mentally deficient there is a defective capacity for reality and education is confronted by an insoluble problem. Education in fact does not actually add anything to the individual but only sets free certain promptings to the consummation of a task. It is even probable that a child of primitive mankind, with all the aid of education, would be unable to assimilate the capacity for culture of the child of to-day but could only receive a training. A child with normal hereditary *anlage* may reach maturity without education, but despite a certain capacity for reality he would not possess cultural capacity and would come into conflict with society. The peculiar behavior of the neglected child will be taken up in due course.

As stated, custodial education is required when there has been lack of education and the child has not the capacity for culture which corresponds to the norm of its age period. There is no real distinction between cultural and ordinary education for both have the same object: to render the child susceptible to culture. Custodial is distinguished from ordinary education by the motive, the educator, and the method. It is the latter which the author wishes especially to

take up in connection with psychoanalysis, which will be utilized for the purpose of referring phenomena to their causes and then to seek their removal. The causes, the forms of neglect, will not be taken up save in a casual manner, in connection with the management of custodial institutions and conferences on public education. The object of the effort of custodial education is to enable the dissocial to rehabilitate himself in society and to make it possible to encourage other educators to labor in this field.

Enough has been said formally on custodial education, and it is now time to look a little into the subject of psychoanalysis, the relations between which and custodial education will be taken up in due course. If nothing more could be said in its favor, it is at least a method of decomposing psychic manifestations and processes into their elements. But it is much more than this, and its content will become intelligible when we have discussed how it came into existence.

[The rather elementary account of the origin and first principles of psychoanalysis may be omitted.—L. P. C.]

Symptom Analysis. What we are accustomed to call the imitative instinct in childhood is a function of the unconscious. Without knowledge of the child tender relations to the parents arise within him, so that many of their individual traits and actions please him and some of them he makes his own or, as it is now termed, he identifies himself with them. Imitation, then, is to do, in identification, what others do. If we observe a child closely we shall see that identifications take place one after another. He identifies himself not only with people but with animals and inanimate objects. Identification comes about for reasons other than gain in pleasure, for in some cases there is an escape from painful afflictions. Naturally the child's amusements and diversions are made up largely of identifications, the girl imitating the domestic activities of the mother while the boy may mock some of the ordinary activities of the father, as when he puts on his hat and takes his cane, likewise mimicking his solemn look and dignified stride.

The custodial educator does not, of course, depend exclusively on psychoanalysis, for it is possible to learn the causes of neglect and the various factors which have brought about the dissociality. However, in this present work we have to study only the psychic reaction of neglected children, so that the objective data are much less significant than the subjective ones. This also means that we must take the part of the neglected one and assume that he is justified in his attitude and behavior. The factors that have damaged him also damage ourselves. We cannot take the part of the parents or of

society or pronounce judgment on social, moral, and ethical values. As matters stand society is determined against him as far as his nearest environment is concerned.

[The greater part of Aichhorn's monograph consists of individual analyses which cannot well be condensed for reproduction. We therefore pass to the last chapters of the work in which the views of the author are summarized.—L. P. C.]

Significance of the Ego Ideal for Social Dealing. There are two phases of neglect, the manifest and the latent. Nearly everyone who has had to do with neglected youth has observed that the moral norm of society does not have the restricting influence for the dissocial that it has for social mankind. However much you may differ in this respect in your opinions on neglect, in this respect your differences will be only quantitative, although some of you may go so far that a complete inefficiency of the recognized moral principles will result.

I myself could always make this observation not only in the institutions for custodial care but also in conferences on education. This has been a little evident to you on the occasion of the visit we paid to a modern institution of this sort. To-day we will resume our rounds and in this connection need regard only the new admissions, who at once impress us with quite distinct traits. These pupils are unmistakable. As for the old ones the duration of the sojourn is much less significant than the adaptability to the institution.

We note that the newly admitted children have face and hands unwashed, the hair is unkempt, clothing and shoes are soiled and torn. They stand apart, either depressed or with a superior smile, and even in the densest crowd we may sometimes single them out from the older admissions through their wild behavior. If we speak to them their eyes turn to the floor and they remain mute, sulky, and reluctant, or they may laugh in our faces or turn their backs to us.

The teaching staff will inform us that they do not keep the accustomed order and that when they believe themselves placed in the wrong they react by open opposition, although they may for a short time hold back their anger. If one is drawn into a game with his comrades another will refuse to play, while a third may assume the rôle of leader although this is not approved. They exhibit outbreaks of suppressed crying, spite, and quarreling up to active aggression. Those of the group who are liable to school attendance are insensible to the school requirements. Working tools are gotten rid of as a burdensome appendage so that often they cannot be found. At meal-times they note with suspicion whether others get larger portions

and become turbulent when they believe themselves discriminated against. Joy is expressed in primitive and crude pleasure. If they scuffle among themselves or merely watch the scuffling of others, they show joy. If some resolve to extemporize as dramatic players, real or simulated cuffs on the head are given and taken and the content of the plays comprises scenes of quarreling, theft, and at times suicide and murder. I could cite many more traits of this kind. This conduct in the old fashioned reformatories demands entire strictness of the personnel, but in modern custodial institutions it is met with mildness and kindness. We may ask ourselves whether any typical course is really requisite, and it may be that the problem may be solved along a certain line which will next be considered. At first we will not advance very far in this direction and will consider data which are merely fertile for later elaboration.

It must be admitted that we know all too little why the majority of mankind submit without more opposition to the moral norm of society and that it is the more difficult to understand why the neglected place themselves on the further side of the boundary. One thing only is certain, which is that social mankind follow an inner voice, a critical factor within them which makes unsocial actions impossible when obeyed; a so-called "categorical imperative" which prescribes both actions and omissions and suppresses both thoughts and impulses. We feel something within us which is sharply observant, which opposes the acting ego, inveighs against it, inhibits it, approves or disapproves of it, praises, blames, condemns. We may temporarily style this unknown the critical ego. To visualize it better we may borrow from the terminology of the radio: society sends constantly on wave "mn" its right lines through our territory and our critical ego is the receiver. The acting ego sits at the telephone to receive orders and notices and is the executive organ of the superior court. If the wave length is inaccurate or falsely set in the receiver it speaks incorrectly or not at all, and the one who receives the communication gets wrong messages or none, remains cut off, wavers, stumbles and falls, giving himself one bruise after another and engaging in blind rage.

To return to facts, the acting ego remains in society without a leader as long as the critical ego is not attuned to the requirements of society; and, speaking in general, to be social means to have such an ego component and to submit to it without a conflict. As soon as we have recognized this differentiation in the ego we must ask why we recognize the moral norm of the one and not the other, and why one is social and the other dissocial. We are interested in each ego for itself and for the reciprocal relations.

You doubtless would like to have a definition of the ego, for one does not like to speak of something concerning the nature of which one has no conception. Is it a structure or a function of the intellect, of the body or mind? Is it formed of two or of all three of these? I fear that I must owe you the answer to these questions although it would be fine if we could say that despite the millions of particles which make up our organism, despite the protean form and the most varied courses within us, we have a very definite consciousness that we are not only one individual but a particular individual, which feeling we owe to the ego. If this is inadmissible we must give up the idea of the ego as a consciousness of a unit organization of all the psychic processes, especially since Freud has shown that much of the latter is unknown to the ego.

To comprehend the ego there is requisite a deep psychoanalytic and theoretic preliminary education which must be left out of consideration here for want of space. Therefore we can only appeal to your healthy personal feeling which makes possible to you your own idea of the ego, even if the latter is not any too clear. But it will help if we discuss the way in which the ego originates.

We have already spoken of the critical and acting ego. These we abandon for the time. For the formation of the ego internal and external factors come into question, seated in the individual himself and the external world. A definite rôle must be assigned to the reaction of the individual to impressions which proceed from that world. We know from the investigations of Freud that the nursling before it comes into a personal world makes use of its own body as a source of pleasure and is thus independent for the time of pleasure derived from the outside world. In fact, the external world at first is part of the ego. Psychoanalysis makes this autoeroticism equivalent to infantile sexuality, but the word sexuality in this connection must not be confused with genitality, for it is employed in a much broader sense, and at the same time must not be confused with sexuality as used in the familiar sense.

After a preliminary period of infantile autoerotic gratification the child begins to note the people of its environment, applies its attention to them, and directs a portion of its self-love to one of these objects of the outer world or, in the language of psychoanalysis, invests this object with some of its libido or desire. During its growth the child has a series of such objects, exchanging one for another but never entirely renouncing them, for some trait of the person given up remains behind in the child's own nature, which process in psychoanalysis is termed an identification. But identification is not neces-

sarily tantamount to the surrender of any object, for in the case of the parents love persists.

Identification does not always follow love of an object. The two may coincide, but in any case identification may persist longer than object love. The libidinous strivings go out from the unconscious, invest an object of the external world, and are thereby gratified. With the progressive identification some of the object is incorporated into the child's ego, so that object love again becomes self-love, or, otherwise stated, object libido becomes changed to narcissistic libido.

Identification may also occur without previous object investment, and Freud describes what he terms a primary identification of the child with its father which is later reinforced in object investment. This fact explains the peculiar position of the father in the life of the individual and the community.

In the surrender of an object investment the once beloved object does not become an object of hatred. Each investment which is lost through identification is responsible for continuous change during the growth of the child, and Freud therefore states that the character of the individual is a precipitate of the renounced object investments illustrating the history of the choice of objects. However, these successively acquired traits are not superposed one upon another, as a mere summation for the reaction to the object choice must be considered.

The earlier the appearance of an identification, the greater the efficacy, so that the first must be the more significant. In investigating the ego of the child through identification we must, of course, take into account also the hereditary *anlage* and the environment. But under ordinary circumstances the first identifications are normally with the father and mother.

The Oedipus complex results from libidinous investment of the child to the parent of the opposite sex and the resulting rivalry with the parent of the same sex. Under normal conditions, or when the child develops without disturbance, this complex perishes. It occurs only in the first sexual period of the child, and upon this stage there follows a period of latency. The object investments involved in the Oedipus complex are given up and the child has formed identifications with both parents.

Freud shows that as a result of these precocious identifications the ego of the child undergoes a cleavage with the formation of a super-ego or ego ideal, which is the critical factor of the ego. In the external world the father and mother represent authority, for they force the child to restrict his impulse gratifications and the super-ego

replaces them in the psychic life. Thus the father restrains the libidinous endeavors of the child toward the mother, thereby forcing him to a new goal, and also is impressive through his various commands and prohibitions. A series of requirements is set up for the child to fulfil. The father says in substance, "You are to be thus and so (like me)," but also, "You are not to be like me (in certain respects)." In other words, "You must imitate me but at the same time it is reserved for me to do some things which you must not do."

There is therefore an impulse to be like the father, an aspiration to be big like the father, but in order to be like the father it is also necessary to place a curb on certain impulses by refusing to gratify them. These forbidden impulses are directed to other and higher goals which in time make for culture. After the period of identification with the father the requirements still remain and represent a peremptory command. In this way an ideal ego is built up in the child which is realizable jointly through love and fear.

This detached ego ideal has the ability to dominate the acting ego. At first the latter is weak and dependent but the mastery continues after the ego has matured. As the child is under compulsion to obey its parents, so it subjects itself later to the "categorical imperative" of the ego ideal. The more complete and rapid the repression of the Oedipus complex, the greater the renunciation, and the more dominant the ego ideal in later life.

We read in psychoanalytic literature that the development of the child so far as dynamic psychology is concerned is closed in the fifth or sixth year, but this applies only to the basic traits, for the child is still susceptible of education and the ego ideal can still acquire important traits from teachers, etc.

In a sense the ideal ego continues to receive additions and modifications from many other sources, such as the heroes of fiction and all uplifting influences. If we wish to translate the term into familiar speech we shall not have to go far, for it is practically the inner voice long known as conscience.

Therefore for psychoanalysis there exists a higher nature in mankind which originally proceeds from parental relations. As little children we have loved, admired, and feared this ideal ego and have finally adopted it within ourselves. It owes its special position to the fact that it goes back to the first of all the identifications, which resulted when the ego proper was still weak. Again, it is the heir of the Oedipus complex. The greatest of all object investments is thereby introduced into the ego. But it is not inalterable and rigid, for it is accessible to later influences and retains throughout its ability

to antagonize the acting ego, to master and direct it. The father, in other words, conveys to the child the requirements of society and enables it to gain social orientation and at the same time exclude dissocial actions.

It is important to note in this connection certain phenomena of community life. In large families, in school classes, retreats, day homes, etc., the children all tend to take over the same traits from father, educator, etc. They then tend to impart the same to one another until we see the result as mutual understanding, tolerance, compliance, orderliness, and inhibition of impulses. In other words, social sense is the result of wholesale identification based on a common ego ideal.

Having shown how social sense comes about, we are now in a position to discuss the phenomenon of the neglected, who are dissocial and badly adjusted to their environment. To improve this status we have to set up an ego ideal, for the problem presents no element which is not found in normal youth. However, in this respect we can only take time for a general orientation, a sort of introduction to a problem which must be approached from an unaccustomed viewpoint.

It is quite possible under certain circumstances to set up an ego ideal which is contrary to society's requirements. Suppose that a child grows up in a neighborhood distinguished for its dissocial actions, or that it has parents who themselves have been neglected or criminal. The relation of the ego ideal to the acting ego is quite normal and the real difference from the norm is found in the environment. Under such circumstances the youth may form a union for mutual advantage even to the extent of a criminal band.

Within certain limits these individuals are social and only become dissocial when their aims go beyond the immediate requirements. It is common to find a hereditary influence, a criminal *anlage*, in such bands, but while this is not impossible, the qualities of the band are much better explained by an antisocial ego formation. The child need not inherit directly from the parent, for he shapes his own ego ideal on that of the father and other seniors. Study of the lives of certain criminals appears to show that the hypothesis of hereditary criminality is often quite unnecessary. Nevertheless the two elements might conceivably be comprised under one head, for a hereditary *anlage* might partly explain the readiness to adopt the ideals of the antisocial community in question. If the youth which come under the care of the custodial educator is really tainted from birth, the prospect of adapting him to society is dubious.

Those unsusceptible to culture are inaccessible to custodial educa-

tion, but if the psychic apparatus of the child functions normally as to ability for investment or object relationship and identifications we may or may not be able to build up a normal and socially motivated ego ideal. A positive result is not invariably guaranteed. [The author here interposes a number of case histories or examples of immediate environment in which it would be very difficult to form proper identifications.—L. P. C.] The formation of a normal, socially directed ego ideal may miscarry if the nucleus of the ego ideal (based on the first major love object) is absent or only faintly present. Object investment and identification are functions of time, and require a definite interval before they can settle themselves. We may imagine the case of a foundling who drifts from one nursing home to another and who is thereby prevented from forming identifications. In the absence of any love relationships there is a very weak nucleus for the formation of an ego ideal. In all such cases there is need of ability to form an identification with someone who can represent the father.

The custodial educator must make a thorough investigation of the early life of the child with especial reference to the earliest libidinous relationships. He must find out all the particulars of the life at nursing stations, the duration of the sojourn, the character of the treatment, those to whom the child was attracted and by whom he was repelled. A problem of special interest is involved in cases in which object investments and identifications not only take place side by side but antagonize one another. These investments proceed originally from the unconscious and at first, at least, without participation of the conscious ego. Resistance may develop and lead to imperfect formation of the ego ideal. Thus in a case in which a brutal father provoked a reaction of hatred, identification with him was injured and the structure of the ego ideal no longer corresponded to the norm, so that the child may turn out to be dissocial. There are probably present in every case of neglect certain fractions, whether of external or internal origin, which may be split off and which serve to explain some of the finer individual variations in the typical forms of neglect: this subject is a promising field for future research by means of psychoanalysis.

We may now discuss those cases in which the acting ego seeks to withdraw itself from the demands of its ego ideal, for the latter demands too much; the acting ego is either too weak to measure up to the requirements or it offers active resistance. What under the circumstances does the ego ideal do? It does not remain silent and it warns and urges the acting ego to submit to it. Should the latter

still remain obstinate, the ego ideal is not vanquished but gives rise to the sense of guilt, which is the result of the conflict.

The ego ideal censures not only the impulses but the thoughts of which the acting ego is conscious. If there is harmony between the two egos, the perception of the thought or impulse could not precipitate a conflict; but if the ego ideal condemns the acting ego there is a reaction in the form of the feeling of guilt and the more intense the conflict the more keen the sense of guilt. If the acting ego submits the conflict at once ceases, and as a matter of fact this often occurs. Should the sense of guilt become intolerable the acting ego takes refuge in repression and the content becomes unconscious, including the sense of guilt.

The unconscious content flourishes and can give origin to psychic disorders, dissociation, etc., while an augmentation of the unconscious sense of guilt may lead to crime. The custodial educator is interested chiefly in knowing whether beneath this unconscious sense of guilt there is a dissociated expression or action. In general it may be said that dissociated actions are more frequently back of this feeling than is commonly assumed. The custodial educator who is schooled in psychoanalysis will not escape the conclusion that this goes hand in hand with a sharpening of the unconscious sense of guilt and of need of punishment.

Now we have added to the unconscious sense of guilt the unconscious demand for punishment, and this accumulation of new concepts may prove difficult to follow. Examples here may be better than discussion. In the case of the girl who stole linen from the chest of her dying mother and then squandered the money thereby obtained with a girl chum, she complained in the institution of fear dreams and also became refractory. Her dissociated expressions proceeded clearly from unconscious guilt and demand for punishment. The aggressives interned in one of the custodial institutions sought by all means in their power to get themselves cuffs on the head. Their unconscious sense of guilt would not permit of love toward the teacher and forced the chastisement, and behavior in these cases is such that punishment necessarily follows.

A boy stole money from his parents but out of the proceeds of the robbery bought a cap which fact he knew would lead to detection while another boy who also robbed his parents wrote down the fact with other bad behavior and left the confession where his father would be sure to find it when he came to sign the school report card, which by the way read "very good."

When as often happens children purloin money for the purpose

of making presents, unconscious guilt may have manifested itself in the dissocial action. Many criminals execute their deeds so clumsily that they seem to wish to be detected, while those who return to the scene of the crime are only victims of unconscious demand for punishment.

This conception may seem difficult but to those who have had much to do with the neglected the domination of the unconscious sense of guilt is irresistible in these dissocials. Freud has stated that in many criminals, especially the younger ones, a powerful sense of guilt is demonstrable which was present before the commission of the crime and hence not due to the latter. The motive seems to be to connect this unconscious sense of guilt with something real and actual. The neglected of the type just discussed are truly the sacrifices of their morals and would withdraw themselves from the strict demands of their ego ideal; and for this reason they are punished.

But we do not need to go so far in order to observe expressions of the unconscious sense of guilt, for the latter explains much of the refractoriness of the nursery and the schoolroom. When we resort to punishment we are merely meeting the children half way and for the moment the desire for punishment is gratified, but we do not in this way obtain any alteration in conduct. In fact the child is encouraged to persist in its refractoriness and resistance to discipline. Ordinary education does nothing here but the child improves when its unconscious sense of guilt is made conscious.

In this connection some very important data may be touched on although without any discussion. In expressions of neglect where unconscious guilt is involved, this must not at any time have become conscious. A fraction of this sense of guilt may go back to the Oedipus complex, which, of course, belongs to the unconscious. This, however, is a difficult subject for the custodial educator is not supposed to deal with cases in which actions are, so to speak, predetermined, but it is purely a matter for the psychoanalyst. In closing this problem we may sum up by the statement that many expressions of neglect come about because the individual will withdraw himself from the too strict demands of his ideal ego, as a result of which unconscious sense of guilt becomes a driving motive.

We may interpolate here that there may be alterations in the attitude of the acting ego to its ideal which are due to affects. Freud has shown that between ego ideal and acting ego the same relations and disturbances may come about which occur between the ego in general and the external world. However, we cannot here go into pathological conditions which belong under psychoanalysis.

We have discussed so many different matters that it is possible to forget the main motive which carried us along this direction of thought. Must we compromise on the problem of the relation of the neglected to the moral norms of society and can we from these deliberations obtain anything practicable for the radical cure of the results of neglect? Should the neglected be given the harsh discipline of the old reformatory or the mild form, as in the modern custodial institution? This last is unessential and in any case there is a third course to pursue which is merely educational.

These questions as to the best method to apply are beside the mark simply because all treatment of the neglected should be individualized or because the neglected may be subdivided into groups according as they are best adapted to one or the other method. Social fitness is guaranteed by an ego ideal which does not involve sense of guilt and which unsocial actions do elicit the latter, but in the neglected the sense of guilt is either repressed, is weakly present or absent outright. If the ego ideal is unusually strong, mildness and kindness on the part of the educator may have a good result through guaranteeing a diminution of its demands. If the neglected one is an uninhibited impulsive who has not found the world of reality, the educator must heighten these demands and thus it may be seen that every individual among the neglected may respond to a specialized treatment. How can custodial education best serve in the correction of individual character? This I have tried to answer in the present volume, but of course have only grazed the subject in its small compass.

I cannot close without calling attention to the importance of the personality of the educator in custodial education. A character correction in the neglected is equivalent to an alteration of the ego ideal and this must come from the traits of the educator himself. It is from him that the absent or defective identifications must proceed. Through him the custodial pupil gains the necessary emotional relations with his fellow pupils which make possible the conquest of dissociality. I often speak of the custodial educator as the "substitute father."

What now is the custodial educator's most important auxiliary in the permanent cure of the neglected? It is transference and that fraction of it which is known as the positive transference.

The pupil must form a tender relationship with the educator as the most important step for giving the pupil the impetus to do what ought to be done and to cut out what is forbidden. Moreover, the custodial educator supplies to the pupil object traits of identification as a libidinous investment and thereby effects a permanent alteration

in the structure of the ego ideal with at the same time a permanent alteration of conduct. As custodial educators we cannot imagine to ourselves unsocial individuals and the ego ideal of the pupil must therefore experience a correction in the sense of a recognition of the requirements of society. In living with the educator there will result eventually a habituation to the usages of society and the task of custodial education will be fulfilled.

We still have to discuss a possibility of the combination of custodial education with psychoanalytic treatment. In the former we mention the consequences of transference when the condition of the patient improves but this must not be overvalued, for with loosening of the transference the improvement may vanish. Must we then conclude that all the benefit comes from the transference? The status should not differ here from that which obtains in a psychoanalysis for there the patient permanently recovers so soon as he can transform unconscious to conscious material and a transitory improvement is not sought. In like manner we should not aim at partial results in custodial education such as may accrue from the transference but should make use of the latter to obtain end results in the shape of a permanent alteration of character and of susceptibility to culture.

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
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